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Abstract
This thesis attempts to develop a fresh perspective on the study of political 
development. By drawing on the experience of Taiwan’s postwar political trajectory 
while critically appropriating the existing concepts relevant in the field, I employ 
‘public culture’ as a new conceptual tool for understanding and explaining political 
change. Public culture is defined as the process o f public deliberation in which public 
intellectuals as well as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is 
formed and contested, and public consensus to various degrees is arrived at. Central 
to the concept of public culture is the role of political ideology and intellectual 
articulation and debates in social evolution and transformation.
Modernisation theories and ‘transitology’ remain dominant in the comparative study 
of political development. The public culture perspective developed in this thesis 
counters the economic determinism of modernisation theory and the elitism of 
transition theory while retaining the historical and structural approaches typical of the 
former and attention to the role of elite actors characteristic of the latter. Public 
culture is an attempt to provide an angle from which the context and text of 
ideological discourses and their sociopolitical implications can be analysed for a 
better explanation of Taiwan’s experience.
This thesis demonstrates that Taiwan’s postwar public culture is featured by a twin 
development of liberalism and nationalism against the backgrounds of the Second 
World War, Chinese Civil War and Cold War. In the same context welfarism as social 
justice emerged as another influential discourse. Postwar Taiwan’s institutional 
change from authoritarianism to liberal democracy reflects this feature.
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Note on Romanisation
The political division between Taiwan (or the Republic of China) and the Chinese 
mainland (or the People’s Republic of China) extends to the different systems of 
Romanisation used by each side. This presents problems for any work that deals with 
both Taiwan and China when it comes to presenting Chinese proper names and terms 
in English.
The principle that has been adopted in this thesis is to use the Wade-Giles system for the 
names of individuals, places and terms in Taiwan. In contrast, the (Hanyu) Pinyin 
system is used for the names of individuals, places and terms in the Chinese mainland. 
The Wade-Giles system has been used for all references of Chinese-language works.
With regard to the citation of Chinese names, the Chinese method of naming has been 
adopted in this thesis. That is, the surname or family name comes before the first 
name.
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Situating Postwar Taiwan 
~ A Historical Review
In this thesis, I attempt to develop a perspective of public culture to fill the gap created 
or left unbridged in existing theoretical approaches to the comparative studies of 
political development, primarily modernisation theories and transitology. While 
acknowledging the valuable contributions of these two theories- mainly the structural 
analysis of the former and the emphasis of historical contingency and the role of elite 
actors in regime change of the latter, the theory of public culture rejects their economic 
determinism and elitism respectively.
Public culture is defined as the process of deliberation in which public intellectuals as 
well as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is formed and contested, 
and public consensus to various degrees is derived. The focus of public cultural 
analysis is on the role of ideological discourses as well as intellectual articulation and 
debates in social evolution and transformation. Apart from examining the participants 
in public deliberation, this approach also examines the conditions, characteristics, 
process and consequences of the process.
This thesis demonstrates that liberalism, nationalism, and welfarism as social justice 
are the main public discourses in postwar Taiwan that feature Taiwan’s postwar public 
culture. It argues that, instead of prioritising liberal democratic political institutions in 
Taiwan centring on the idea of direct democracy, which is widely equated with 
referendum, a democratic public culture that emphasises the role of public deliberation 
in the formation of public consciousness or general will should be regarded more
crucial to the future of Taiwan’s democratic development. In the rest of this chapter, I 
will first provide a historical account of Taiwan’s postwar political development, 
followed by a discussion of theory and history and finally an explanation of this thesis’ 
organisation.
A Historical Account of Taiwan’s Postwar Political Development
‘With the stunning defeat of the KMT in the year 2000 presidential election, the 
resiliency of Taiwan’s new democracy has passed its last test. But the emerging 
consensus over national identity is by no means consolidated’.1 Here, two prominent 
political scientists in Taiwan sum up the island’s development since the end of the 
Second World War. While acknowledging democratic progress, they highlight a 
crucial element of Taiwan’s postwar political evolution: national identity. A distinctive 
feature of postwar Taiwanese public culture is the dual development of liberalism and 
nationalism in a setting of ‘growth with equity’.
In most literature on Taiwan’s democratic development, its relatively equitable society 
is rarely taken into account, let alone considered a significant socioeconomic 
precondition for its democratic transformation, widely praised as a ‘quiet revolution’. 
Oft-repeated accounts, such as those rooted in modernisation theories, focus on 
Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and concomitant sociocultural changes. As one expert 
on Taiwan’s equitable development has pointed out, the spectacular growth of per 
capita income and the distribution of that income, at least up to the late 1980s, are 
without parallel. While average real per capita GDP rates (percent per year) generally
1 Chu & Lin, 2001, ‘Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime 
Transformation and the Construction of National Identity’, China Quarterly, 2001, p. 129.
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rose, increasing from 5.9 in the 1960s through 8.1 in the 1970s and 5.6 in the 1980s to 
7.3 in the early 1990s, inequality of income (Gini coefficients) fell, from 0.56 in 1950 
through 0.44 in 1959, and 0.29 in 1970. It raised again from 0.29 in 1978 to 0.38 in 
1990. Taiwan also did well in improving basic living conditions. Though excluded 
from the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report for political reasons, estimates by economists show that Taiwan’s human 
development index (HDI) rating has improved steadily, from 0.618 in 1976 to 0.898 in 
1993.2 The Taiwan experience thus provides a persuasive counter-example to what was 
once viewed as Kuznets’ inverse-U-shaped iron law.3
The domestic socioeconomic factors that facilitated Taiwan’s political development 
must however be understood in the broader historical and political contexts of the end 
of the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War. Taiwan’s location 
in the ‘web of empires’, as Michael Mann described it, illustrates these contexts well.4 
These contexts have influenced the formation of Taiwan’s public culture, intellectually 
and politically. The attraction of liberal ideals of civil liberties and parliamentary 
democracy, the emergence of nationalist politics and its overtaking of liberalism within 
public debate, and the dearth of discussions of social welfare in studies of Taiwan’s
2 Gustav Ranis, 1999, ‘Reflections on the Economics and Political Economy of Development at the Turn 
of the Century’, in Gustav Ranis, Sheng-cheng Hu and Yung-peng Chu (eds.), The Political Economy o f 
Taiwan’s Development in the 21st Century, pp. 5-8. Howe’s article provides figures on Taiwan’s real 
GDP growth (percent per annum) from 1992 to 1998: 6.8 in 1992,6.3 in 1993,6.5 in 1995,5.7 in 1996, 
6.8 in 1997 and 4.8 in 1998. See Christopher Howe, 2001, ‘Taiwan in the 20th Century: Model or Victim? 
Development in a Small Asian Economy’, China Quarterly, p. 55.
3 Simon Kuznet’s ‘inverted U-curve hypothesis’ is the most influential idea ever put forward on 
inequality and development. It states that ‘inequalities first rise with the onset of economic growth, 
eventually level off over time, then begin to fall in advanced stages of development -  thus the 
growth-equality relationship is characterised by a trajectory in the shape of an inverted U’. See Timothy 
Patrick Moran, 2005, ‘Kuznet’s Inverted U-Curve Hypothesis: The Rise, Demise, and Continued 
Relevance of a Socioeconomic Law’, Sociological Forum, June 2005, p. 209.
4 Michael Mann has discussed Taiwan’s case from a specific perspective of the relationships between 
wars, capitalism and empires. Mann, 2004, ‘Taiwan in the Web of Empires’, paper presented to 
Conference ‘Taiwan at the Edge of Empires’, Taipei, December 18-19,2004, pp. 14-5.
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democratisation reflect the impact of these postwar factors.
National identity was long missing from the mainstream literature on Taiwan’s political 
development. This changed when acute ethnic conflicts in some third-wave 
democracies, specifically former communist states in Eastern Europe, prompted 
democracy scholars to scrutinise the relationship between democratic consolidation 
and nationalism. The Taiwan case was relevant because of the nation-building 
movement launched by the regime under Lee Teng-hui and the island’s transition to 
liberal democracy beginning in the early 1990s. Since then, argue liberal democrats, a 
divided national identity and nationalist politics have been the most crucial factors 
affecting Taiwan’s democratic consolidation, threatening the stability of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism on the island.
Yet evolving nationalism has always influenced the trajectory of Taiwan’s postwar 
political development. This includes the Kuomintang’s (hereafter the KMT) 
anti-communist struggles, which began in the Civil War on the mainland in the 1950s 
and ended in the early 1990s as a result of Taiwan’s new mainland policy. This entailed 
a shift away from viewing the People’s Republic of China (hereafter the PRC) under 
the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the CCP) as national enemy, to treating it as 
another political entity within the territory of China. Also significant was the left-wing 
campaign against American neo-colonialism launched by the Nativist Literary 
Movement in the 1970s.5 At the time, Taiwan was experiencing rapid capitalist
5 Neocolonialism is the term formulated to designate a specific form of imperial domination distinct from 
the ‘old’ form of imperialism, which is characteristic of emigration and colonialism, referring to the 
attempt to create colonies. As Johnson understands it, ‘The characteristic institution of so-called 
neocolonialism is the multinational corporation covertly supported by an imperialist power. This form of 
imperialism reduces the political costs and liabilities of colonialism by maintaining a facade of nominal 
political independence in the exploited country.’ He drew on the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara’s
economic development and a series of diplomatic setbacks in the wake of the 
normalisation of Sino-American relations. Finally, Taiwanese nationalism continued to 
mutate in the late 1990s as China emerged as an important regional and globed player, 
mainly because of its economic achievements.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed by China and Japan after China’s 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan, a peripheral island little valued by 
both the Qing government and the nearby Japanese Empire, was ceded to Japan as war 
booty. Taiwan then experienced half a century of colonial rule. The Japanese took over 
the project of modernisation begun by Liu Ming-chuan, the provincial governor of 
Taiwan appointed by the Qing regime, harnessing it to meet the needs of Japanese 
imperialism. Japan initially viewed Taiwan as a means of bolstering its capitalist 
development and later used it as a bridgehead into the Chinese mainland. Japan later 
moved into Fujien province. By the mid-193Os, when Japan was on the brink of total 
war with China, Taiwan had been transformed into a factory producing military 
supplies and a base for advancing southwards. Besides, the Japanese direct imperial 
rule was more benign than Japan’s imperial rule elsewhere, such as Korea. This might 
explain why anti-Japanese sentiments are far stronger among the Korean people than 
the Taiwanese. Taiwan in fact is probably the only place in Asia where anti-Japanese 
feelings are weak.
Throughout Japanese colonial rule, debates emerged on the best political order for the 
Japanese homeland. Should Taiwan be assimilated? Based on Law No. 63 (adopted by
observation, arguing that ‘neocolonialism “is the most redoubtable form of imperialism—most 
redoubtable because of the disguises and deceits that it involves, and the long experience that the 
imperialist power have in this type of confrontation.’” Chalmers Johnson, 2004, The Sorrows o f Empire, 
p. 30.
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the Imperial Diet in 1896), the Taiwan governor-general was able to issue law-like 
decrees, unchecked by other institutions. Public opinion on colonial policy in the 
Japanese homeland was divided, providing the politically active in Taiwan with a 
chance to seek support from sympathisers. They faced a dilemma. Should they play 
down their Taiwanese identity and emphasise their Japanese identity, reinforcing their 
claim to equal rights as citizens, or risk losing the support of Japanese assimilationists 
by stressing their distinctiveness?
(National) self-determination and equal citizenship were both desirable, yet could not 
be attained at the same time. Through the wartime ‘Japanisation’ movement 
(converting the colonials into imperial subjects), the colonial government not only 
intensified its penetration of local communities, but also aimed to eradicate Taiwanese 
people’s Chinese consciousness and identity (‘de-Sinicisation’) by making them adopt 
Japanese customs, religion, language and even names. This policy was later used by the 
defeated KMT to justify its ‘de-Japanisation’ policy, pursued by means of similar 
measures, after it took over the island in 1945. Most notorious of all was its language 
policy, embodied in the so-called ‘national language movement’. Mandarin was the 
minority language used primarily by KMT officials and those mainlanders who had 
fled to Taiwan with the regime following its defeat by the CCP. This movement aimed 
to make Mandarin Taiwan’s official language by suppressing the use of local dialects in 
public space.
In August 1945, with Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied forces, Taiwan was 
returned to China, specifically to the KMT government led by Chiang Kai-shek. The 
KMT took over the island without a carefully prepared plan; Taiwan was a sideshow 
within their effort to recover all of China after the war. Taiwan’s value thus resided in
its function as an outpost for the KMT’s anti-communist campaigns. The new 
government under administrator-general and garrison commander Chen Yi paid little 
attention to the local people. The KMT favoured mainlanders and ‘half-mountains* 
(ibanshan), the so-called ‘token Taiwanese’, that is, natives who had spent the war years 
in China and had been recruited by the KMT, to fill the huge number of government 
vacancies left following the departure of the Japanese.
The economy deteriorated rapidly; the transmission of hyperinflation from the 
mainland had a devastating impact on the war-torn island. At the same time, Taiwan’s 
resources were siphoned off to the mainland by the KMT government to fuel their 
military struggle with the Chinese Communists, and by corrupt carpetbaggers to enrich 
themselves. The tragic February 28 Incident, centred on disputes over the confiscation 
of assets formerly owned by the Japanese and thought by many to be a key experience 
in the formation of Taiwanese identity, erupted against this background.
The story goes that an old woman tobacco peddler, who had been selling black market 
cigarettes to make a living, got into an argument with officers of the Monopoly Bureau 
of Tobacco and Alcohol in Taipei. By the time a large number of frustrated and jobless 
Taiwanese conscripts from southern China and Southeast Asia returned in 1946 and 
1947, the island was already at boiling point. The ill feeling between the mainlanders 
and the Taiwanese/islanders, stemming primarily from the KMT government’s poor 
management of the economy, unfair allocation of government vacancies and corruption, 
came to head on February 28,1947, when the officers killed the female hawker. Angry 
bystanders attacked the officers, whereupon they fired into the crowd, killing people. 
Island-wide violence erupted.
The KMT government responded with a brutal military crackdown, though it had
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initially promised peaceful negotiations. Thousands of native Taiwanese were 
persecuted. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that only the native Taiwanese were 
the victims in these tragic conflicts. Native Taiwanese elites were either annihilated, 
co-opted as collaborators, or fled abroad (mainly to Japan). Over the following decades, 
these events, commonly known as the ‘2-28 Incident’, were the most severe hindrance 
to the formation of a Chinese national identity, and encouraged people to imagine a 
Taiwanese nation.
After the incident, Taiwan was upgraded from a special military zone to a province. 
Immediate local elections were called. Chen Yi was replaced with a civilian governor, 
Wei Tao-ming. More positively, the KMT government attempted to reconstruct the 
cultural and ethnic unity of the mainlanders and the native Taiwanese/islanders through 
programmes of ‘re-Sinicisation’. However, much damage had already been done to the 
KMT government’s credibility, and Taiwanese hatred of both the government and the 
mainland Chinese would not soon subside.6 The KMT regime faced an uphill struggle 
building legitimacy on the island after the incident. If the sense of political legitimacy is 
like the faith depositors place in a bank, by the time the Republic of China (hereafter the 
ROC, the official name of Taiwan) regime moved its capital to Taipei on December 7, 
1949, it had precious little credit left in the eyes of the native population.
For some of the natives, there was no difference between the Japanese and mainland 
Chinese rulers. Both were notoriously repressive emigre regimes. In the third 
presidential election campaign in 2004, the term ‘emigre regime’ was still used by the 
pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (the TSU) to discredit the ‘pro-unification
6 Copper, 1996, p. 36.
7 Christopher Hughes, 1997, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, p. 26.
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alliance’ made up of the KMT and the People First Party (the PFP). The latter was 
founded by the former KMT provincial governor of Taiwan, James Soong, who left the 
KMT after failing to be nominated as successor to Lee as leader of the KMT.
The only benefit of ‘February 28’ to the KMT regime was that it drove a generation of 
politically conscious social elites into self-imposed political passivity, creating the 
conditions for the establishment of a developmental state in Taiwan. Important policies 
carried out by the KMT developmental state include a sweeping three-phase land 
reform in the early 1950s and economic strategies of export-led capitalist development 
in the beginning of the 1960s. The KMT initiated land reform in 1949, having learnt the 
lessons of its defeat against the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. The reform was intended 
to pre-empt communist insurgency in the countryside; it inadvertently laid the 
foundation for Taiwan’s postwar economic reconstruction and relatively equitable 
economic growth.8
In late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were defeated by the CCP led by Mao Zedong 
on the mainland. When the KMT government fled to Taiwan, it brought with it some 
2.5 million people. The population of Taiwan at the time was about 6 million. In 
Taiwan, the KMT hoped to regroup and counter-attack, with ‘retaking the mainland 
and uniting the whole of China’ as its ultimate goal. Many, however, including the US 
Truman administration, believed Chiang’s regime to be on its last legs, as the Chinese 
Civil War was entering its final stages. In order to gain the support of the Taiwan 
people as well as its mainland followers and build political legitimacy and improve its 
international image to regain the support of the United States, the regime declared that
8 Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 113.
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liberalism and democracy, together with ‘retaking the mainland’, were its major 
political goals. To show its commitment to liberal democratic reforms, the authoritarian 
KMT regime allowed the general public a limited political space, primarily 
participation in local elections, which had been held since the period of Japanese 
colonial rule, and provided financial support to a bimonthly liberal magazine, Free 
China. This was founded in 1950 and run by liberal intellectuals who moved to the 
island with the KMT in 1949.
Free China has been influential in the liberal movement in postwar Taiwan, 
intellectually if not politically: a key figure in the magazine, Lei Chen, organised the 
abortive ‘new party’ movement in collaboration with the local Taiwanese politicians in 
1960. The liberal ideas promoted by the magazine were so influential that the political 
discourse constructed by the Dangwai (literally ‘outside the party’, referring to the 
non-KMT opposition forces) democratic opposition movement in the 1970s and 1980s 
still appealed to the same political values and ideals articulated within its pages. 
Nevertheless, liberalism initially served primarily as an ideological weapon of the 
KMT regime in its anti-communist propaganda. Not until one year after the foundation 
of Free China did liberalism articulated in the magazine begin to function as a 
dissenting ideology critical of KMT authoritarianism. This shift occurred after Free 
China liberals lost faith in the KMT, dissatisfied with its claim that liberal democratic 
reforms must be put on ice for national security reasons. The dramatic twist that not 
only suddenly extended the KMT’s lease on life for another half century, but which also 
explains why Chiang Kai-shek ‘felt free’ to ignore calls for change, was the outbreak of 
the Korean War on June 25,1950.
In order to contain the spread of communism, the United States, having ostensibly
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abandoned Chiang Kai-shek in January (when Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
described Taiwan, along with Korea, as beyond the US ‘defence perimeter’), sent the 
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to shield the island from attack. The KMT took 
advantage of the respite. Learning from his disastrous defeat on the mainland, and with 
the United States guaranteeing the island’s security, Chiang Kai-shek responded to the 
challenge of political reconstruction with an ambitious plan of party reorganisation, 
officially launched in August 1950 and centred on tightening party discipline. Steps 
were taken, for example, to rid the government of corrupt, lazy and incompetent 
officials. The end result was a better functioning, quasi-Leninist party-state.
The KMT’s party reorganisation was made easier by the proclamation of a general state 
of siege on May 19, 1949. The imposition of martial law greatly expanded the powers 
of the Taiwan Garrison Command and suspended the civil rights guaranteed in the 
ROC Constitution, formulated at the first meeting of the National Assembly in 1947 on 
the mainland. The Constitution was ‘frozen’ rather than ‘abolished’ because in the eyes 
of the pro-KMT mainland elites, the ROC was irreplaceable. It was the quintessential 
legal embodiment of the ‘one China’ principle.9 If the KMT offended the notion of ‘fa  
tong’ -  orthodox political succession -  it would be unable to root its political legitimacy 
in Taiwan in Chinese nationalism and its nationalist mission. Martial law either 
replaced or superseded many important provisions of the constitution with so-called 
‘Temporary Provisions’ and special legislation supposedly necessary ‘During the 
Period of Mobilisation and Combating (Communist) Rebellion’.
The United States institutionalised its security commitment to Taiwan by signing the
9 Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 114, note 31.
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US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty in 1954 in the wake of the Korean War and partition 
of Vietnam. The KMT’s one-party authoritarianism was consolidated in a new social 
setting, as the regime seized the historic chance created by the new Cold War security 
situation in East Asia. Meanwhile, the tension between liberal intellectuals involved in 
Free China and the KMT regime intensified, primarily because the magazine was 
increasingly critical of the government’s policies. As the KMT’s hopes of retaking the 
mainland dimmed, these liberal intellectuals rejected the regime’s claim that it had no 
choice but to put down people’s attempts to participate in political decision making 
because the country was still at war.
Free China ended up being banned by the authorities. Its leading members were 
arrested and imprisoned, including Lei Chen, punished for his active involvement in the 
abortive new party movement in I960,10 and his article claiming that there was little 
prospect of retaking the mainland. This was certainly a setback for Taiwan’s liberal 
movement, particularly the fight for freedom of speech and political association. After 
the suspension of Free China, Taiwan entered a decade of political silence, though the 
liberal tradition was inherited by a literary magazine, Literary Star, in which political 
critique took the form of cultural criticism of KMT authoritarianism, primarily 
Confucianism. The KMT’s views of ideal sociopolitical order and political authority 
have been influenced by the notions of paternalism and hierarchical social order, which 
are commonly set in opposition to the western modem values and thought to be the 
characteristics of Confucian doctrines. Western modernisation was therefore hailed by 
liberal intellectuals like those contributing to Literary Star as the model of
10 The movement was intended to found a new party, the ‘China Democratic Party’, which did not 
necessarily have to compete with the ruling KMT for political power but could function as a ‘loyal 
opposition party’ to scrutinise its performance.
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cultural-political transformation that Taiwan, indeed the future united China, should 
follow.
To furnish the authoritarian system with a democratic veneer, and incorporate local 
political elites into both party-building and state-building, the KMT held local elections 
in 1950 and popular elections to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly in 1954. Non-KMT 
parties existed under martial law, such as the China Youth Party and China Democratic 
Socialist Party, but these were by no means influential opposition parties. Many critical 
commentators saw them as a mere token designed to obscure the KMT’s one-party 
authoritarianism. Patron-client networks were constructed to control the limited 
popular electoral process by creating mutual dependence between the KMT and local 
factions, composed primarily of native Taiwanese politicians.11
While managing to rebut and contain the argument that there was little prospect of 
retaking the mainland, the KMT also realised that without American support it was 
unlikely to do so. The truth is that while the US Truman administration hardened its 
support for Taiwan at the time of the Korean War, in practice it had always kept Chiang 
Kai-shek ‘on a leash’.12 The US ‘hands-off policy towards Chiang’s KMT government 
during the later stages of the Chinese Civil War on the mainland merely demonstrated 
the Americans’ lack of confidence and trust in Chiang Kai-shek and his government.
During the 1958 Quemoy and Matsu crisis (islands just off the coast of Fujian province), 
Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in rejecting the American demand to give up the islands.
11 For a detailed account of how the KMT regime established and consolidated its authoritarian rule in 
Taiwan after 1949 by means of building ‘patron-client alliances’ with local factions, see Chen Ming-tong, 
1995, Factional Politics and Taiwan’s Political Change.
12 Hughes, 1997, p. 30.
20
The international turmoil caused by this crisis between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait pushed the Eisenhower administration closer to adopting a ‘two Chinas’ policy, 
that is, one intended to avoid conflicts between the two sides that might embroil the 
United States. Chiang, under intense pressure from the US Kennedy administration in 
1961-1962, was eventually persuaded to drop plans to invade the mainland. The KMT 
leadership was thus forced, if it wished to maintain its political legitimacy and indeed 
survive, to update its historical mission, shifting away from its anti-communist crusade 
towards ensuring the island’s security, international standing and economic 
prospects.13
The KMT’s political repression had badly damaged its relationship with native Taiwan 
society. It attempted to undo the damage by concentrating on economic reform and 
development. As one of its satellites in East Asia, the United States provided Taiwan 
with military protection and economic aid, which helped bring about the ‘Taiwan 
miracle* and enabled the emigrd regime to establish a relationship with the diverse 
social groupings on the island.14
The Taiwan economy in the 1950s was a transforming, semi-command economy 
supported by American guidance and resources. This was partly a reflection of the 
Japanese period and its aftermath, but was also congruent with the official philosophy 
of the KMT, that is, the Principle of the People’s Livelihood found in Sun Yat-sen’s 
‘Three Principles of the People’. Yet doubts remain among its critics about how 
seriously the KMT had ever thought of practising its proclaimed official ideologies, 
especially social equality and political democracy. In a nutshell, the Principle of the
13 Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 117.
14 Hughes, 1997, p. 26.
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People’s Livelihood evoked the idea of a society in which economic growth was not 
attained at the cost of social equality. While private capital and the market mechanism 
were considered conducive to economic development, the state enjoyed relative 
autonomy from private capital and the market, enabling it to undertake social 
redistribution by, for example, making the public sector the strategic economic actor. 
Under the guidance of the government, Taiwan experienced economic take-off, 
expansion and finally the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1970s, however, was also a period when Taiwan suffered a series of diplomatic 
setbacks, beginning with the Diaoyutai Incident in 1971, followed by the 
rapprochement between the PRC and the United States, the ROC’s withdrawal from the 
United Nations, recognition of the PRC by Japan in 1972, and culminating in the 
severance of Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with major nations, including the United 
States, in 1979. The Diaoyutai Incident involved the US hand-over to Japan in 1971 of 
the Diaoyutai islands, an archipelago to the north of Taiwan which the Americans has 
occupied in the Second World War. This provoked waves of patriotic demonstrations 
by students in North America, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
In 1969, relations between Washington and Beijing began to change as a result of the 
Nixon Doctrine, US efforts to disengage from Vietnam, and an escalation of 
Sino-Soviet border hostilities. A rapprochement between the PRC and the US was 
appropriate and to the advantage of both.15 The visit by the US table tennis team to the 
PRC and the visits of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Nixon 
to Beijing in 1971 not only damaged the ROC’s claim to be the sole lawful government
15 Copper, 1996, p. 40.
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of all China, but also raised questions over future US support.16 Meanwhile, largely as a 
result of the normalisation of Sino-American relations, the PRC was admitted to the 
United Nations and the ROC expelled.
The changed international situation in the PRC’s favour presented a formidable 
challenge to the KMT regime, stripped of its status as the lawful government of China 
and anticipating international isolation ahead. The change in Taiwan’s international 
status also caused a legitimacy crisis for the KMT regime in Taiwan. The official ‘one 
China’ principle, which assumed that the KMT was the sole lawful representative of all 
China, and based on which the KMT justified its authoritarianism in Taiwan, crumbled 
to dust. The PRC-US Joint Communique of 27 February 1972 was carefully worded to 
‘acknowledge’ and ‘not challenge’ the position that ‘all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China’, 
rather than to recognise Beijing’s claim to sovereignty. Neither reunification with the 
mainland nor independence occurred; the international status of Taiwan remained 
unresolved. The passage of the Taiwan Relations Act by the US Congress effectively 
froze its status in an intermediate state between the two possible types of statehood. 
This was done not by extending recognition to Taiwan, but by treating it as a legal
17personality in US law.
The diplomatic crisis provided the initial impetus for the demise of the KMT’s 
authoritarianism. The fulfilment of basic needs, enhancement of living standards, rise 
in the general level of knowledge and introduction of foreign (mainly American) values
16 Hughes, 1996, p. 30.
17 Hughes, 1996, p. 31.
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by students who had studied abroad contributed to the growth of political 
consciousness. By the beginning of the 1970s, another liberal magazine, The 
Intellectual, had begun to campaign openly for democratic participation in politics, 
basic human rights and funded social welfare. This new, vibrant wave of liberalism, 
commencing with the publication of The Intellectual after the politically quiet 1960s, 
has to be understood in the context of Taiwan’s international political crisis and 
incorporation into the global system of capitalism, and the KMT regime’s response. 
The party’s new leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, promised political liberalisation after the 
death of paramount political leader Chiang Kai-shek in 1975.
Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek, Vice President Yen Chia-kan automatically 
became president of the ROC according to the constitution. However, before Chiang 
died, his power had been gradually transferred to his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, 
who was appointed premier and head of the party. The succession was relatively 
smooth, though it entailed an internal power struggle. Nonetheless, lacking his father’s 
historical stature and foreseeing the legitimacy crisis of the regime, Chiang Ching-kuo 
tried to broaden his political support base by recruiting more native Taiwanese to the 
party and state leadership. This co-option of native Taiwanese is known as the 
indigenisation of the emigre regime.
In addition, to demonstrate the regime’s concern for the well-being of the people in 
Taiwan and ensure the island’s security by maintaining stable economic development, 
Chiang intensified industrialisation through large-scale infrastructure projects. Critical 
commentary on the government was encouraged, and Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated the 
discussions in The Intellectual magazine. This was welcomed as a sign of political 
liberalisation, but turned out to be an element in Chiang’s plan to generate public
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support for the regime’s authoritarian rule against the backdrop of Taiwan’s diplomatic 
crises in the 1970s. Chiang in fact continued to crack down on dissent and the 
organisation of new political parties until the late 1980s.
By the late 1970s, a loosely organised opposition campaign had been launched, known 
as the Dangwai movement. Whilst this has commonly been considered crucial to 
Taiwan’s liberal democratic movement, it included people on both the left and right. 
They had different views on capitalist industrialisation and parliamentary democracy 
and unification and independence but were united in fighting KMT authoritarianism. 
The Dangwai movement established its political identity and built electoral support by 
emphasising democratic reform and Taiwanese identity, though its members 
interpreted Taiwanese identity in various ways— unionists saw Taiwanese 
consciousness as a local consciousness while Taiwanese nationalists argued that it was 
a national consciousness.18
The Dangwai movement made considerable gains in local and Provincial Assembly 
elections in 1977. In the vigorously contested election for magistrate of Taoyuan 
County, a riot in Chungli stopped the local KMT officials from vote-rigging. In 
retrospect, the Chungli incident was the beginning of the end of the authoritarian 
regime.19 The fact that the KMT was prevented from using coercive measures during 
the incident helped the opposition overcome its psychological barriers and convinced it 
that the regime was vulnerable. Attempts were made to form an island-wide alliance.
18 For instance, Su Chin-li, a pro-unification leftist whose father was a devout communist who stayed on 
the mainland, participated actively in the Dangwai movement. The pro-independence Taiwanese identity 
was exhibited primarily by those Dangwai activists around the magazine Formosa ([meili dad). As well as 
advancing the cause of establishing a new party, the DPP, they explored the links between democracy 
and national identity.
19 Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 120.
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The movement was temporarily disrupted by the arrest and imprisonment of some of its 
leaders in the aftermath of the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, originally a rally organised 
to mark International Human Rights Day on December 10.20
Soon after the Kaohsiung Incident, the Dangwai movement regrouped and made 
significant gains in the 1980 supplementary elections, which had been postponed due to 
the international and domestic crises of December 1978. This time the Dangwai 
movement was bolstered by a mushrooming of social movements, representing all 
kinds of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups and environmentalist and consumer 
rights activists. The social movements of the 1980s, though they flourished partly 
because of political liberalisation, helped further loosen the authoritarian state’s firm 
grip on society and, in various social settings, provided soil in which the political 
opposition could take root. External pressure, primarily from the United States, also 
contributed to the advancement of Taiwan’s political liberalisation, although the US 
was clearly motivated by self-interest21
In competition with the overseas Taiwanese opposition (primarily in America and 
Japan), and encouraged by the successes of the ‘People’s Power’ movement in the 
Philippines and the popular opposition movement in South Korea, the Dangwai 
movement defied the law and finally announced the establishment of the first
20 A rally calling for the government to protect human rights was organised by the Formosa group within 
the Dangwai movement on International Human Rights Day, December 10 1979. This is why the 
incident was also called the Formosa Incident. An unexpected riot broke out, provoking a bloody 
government crackdown. Disagreement remained over whether the riot was the response of the masses to 
the alleged arrest of some rally organisers or a result of provocation of the security police by the masses.
21 As Potter pointed out, America’s support for limited democratisation along Japanese lines in the latter 
half of the 1980s, after decades of consistently backing the anti-communist authoritarian regime, may 
have been anchored in the pressure exerted by domestic economic interests. Simply put, some 
democratisation would mean a rise in wages, which had been kept down in Taiwan, an authoritarian 
developmental state, to maintain its competitive advantage in the global economy. See David Potter, 
1997, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, p. 235.
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influential opposition party on the island, the DPP, on September 28, 1986. About a 
year later, martial law was lifted. The government was acquiesced in the formation of 
the DPP largely because of pressure from the American House of Representatives 
Foreign Relations Committee, which passed a resolution urging the KMT to lift its ban 
on new political parties. Pressure from America also played a big role in Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s decision to end the world’s longest period of martial law in 1987. This, 
along with other political reforms carried out during the last few years of Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s tenure, formed a watershed in Taiwan’s political development.
To further secure the KMT’s political legitimacy by indigenising or Taiwanising the 
party-state, Chiang Ching-kuo decided to nominate Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese 
agronomic technocrat, as vice president in 1984. Lee grew up and was educated under 
Japanese rule and trained to be an expert in agronomics in the United States. This 
signalled the possibility of a native Taiwanese leader of Taiwan, which became a 
reality when Chiang died in January 1988.
By the time Lee had succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as Taiwan’s president, the 
‘Taiwanese consciousness vs. Chinese consciousness’ debate was already underway, 
triggered by a debate between two prominent Taiwan writers, pro-unification Chen 
Ying-chen and pro-independence Chen Fang-ming. In this debate, (greater) Chinese 
consciousness was seen by advocates of Taiwanese consciousness as the main obstacle 
to Taiwan’s democratic development because of its affinity to the notion of ‘fa  tong’ 
(legitimate succession), mentioned above, on which the KMT based its authoritarian 
rule on the island. According to this notion, the KMT regime was legal so long as 
representatives elected on the mainland before 1949 continued in office. Those 
representatives were not subject to re-election.
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Under Lee’s administration, the interleaved relationship between democratisation and 
national identity in Taiwan became more apparent than ever. Lee’s project of liberal 
democratic reform was set to challenge the ‘fa tong’ of the KMT, and therefore the ‘one 
China’ principle, which assumed that the KMT was the sole lawful representative of all 
China, in order to carry out constitutional reforms necessary to Taiwan’s 
democratisation. This included full re-election to the core representative bodies. 
Taiwan’s democratic reform, like its overall predicament since the KMT’s retreat to the 
island in 1949, was thus tied up with the adjustment of the ROC’s status and its 
relationship to the PRC. Given the different political system on the mainland, Taiwan’s 
moves towards liberal democracy and the growing common consciousness of Taiwan 
subjectivity, which had increased in parallel with the development of Taiwan’s 
capitalist democracy since the 1970s, made it inevitable that the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait would go their separate ways: peaceful unification seems possible only if 
the gap between the two systems can be narrowed. The evolution of Taiwanese 
nationalism away from the notion of China as the nation in question towards the 
establishment of Taiwanese nationhood occurred precisely in this context.
Another contextual factor affecting Taiwan’s dual development of democratisation and 
nationalist politics from the late 1970s on was the implementation of the PRC’s ‘reform 
and opening up’ policy. The PRC’s new approach had a considerable impact on 
Taiwan’s mainland and foreign policy and economic development. Low production 
costs in China and its huge domestic market, both attractive to Taiwanese businesses, 
rendered unsustainable the policy pursued by the Chiang Ching-kuo administration, 
based on the so-called ‘Three Nos’ principle -  no contact, no negotiation, no 
compromise. Long before the KMT made Taiwanese investment on the mainland legal,
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Taiwanese capital was flowing to China. The policy was therefore changed to permit 
contact between unofficial organisations or civil groups. The implications of 
developing links with the mainland for Taiwan’s international status were balanced by 
the ‘flexible diplomacy’ policy pursued by the Chiang administration and later the 
‘practical diplomacy’ policy under the Lee administration. Central to these policies 
were the acceptance of ‘dual recognition’ or ‘double recognition’ by those countries 
with formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, and efforts to establish informal 
relations with nations for which formal diplomatic relations were impossible.
The opening up of the Chinese economy has done much to end the highly successful 
phase of Taiwan’s economic development in the late 1980s. Taiwan has been forced to 
restructure its macroeconomy due to competition from the mainland. The outflow of 
Taiwanese capital, the transfer of local labour-intensive operations to China and 
Taiwan’s trade surplus with the mainland are frequently mentioned examples. As a 
consequence, Taiwan’s domestic savings began to exceed investment and 
unemployment increased. To ensure Taiwan’s economic security, that is, prevent 
excessive economic dependence on China, the Taiwan government examined proposals 
by Taiwanese businesses to invest huge amounts of capital on the mainland and was 
taking steps to diversify its export markets. A rather complicated situation emerged in 
which increased economic integration or interdependence and political antagonism 
co-existed. This is, more or less, still the case at present. It was against this backdrop 
that Lee Teng-hui launched the ‘new state movement’ in the early 1990s.
Along with his democratic reforms, Lee redefined the cultural orientation of the state, 
moving away from cultivating Chinese identity to endorsing the burgeoning Taiwanese 
consciousness. A cultural movement emerged, promoting Lee’s idea of a ‘community
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of common destiny’ and attempting to bolster the sense of Taiwaneseness. This 
included the revision of school text books to increase coverage of native history and 
Taiwanese literature, and the introduction of a mother languages/dialects curriculum 
(including Taiwanese, Hakka, and the languages of the aboriginal people) to primary 
school education. In the eyes of many Chinese nationalists, this is a cultural movement 
of ‘de-Sinicisation’ aiming to rid people of their Chinese consciousness and identity. 
Indeed, calls for ‘Taiwan subjectivity’ and the Taiwanese cultural nationalist 
movement, which involved native writers, poets, historians and linguists, have made 
primarily the first and second generations of mainlanders in Taiwan feel their Chinese 
cultural identity being threatened or undermined.
On March 23, 1996, the people of Taiwan had their first-ever popular presidential 
election. At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC gathered less than 
two hundred miles away across the Taiwan Strait for missile tests and military 
manoeuvres. These were intended to deter Taiwanese voters from going to the polling 
stations. For the election per se signified Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. Lee’s 
state-building movement promoted the so-called ‘ROC on Taiwan’ formula, anchored 
in a ‘two Chinas’ model. His efforts culminated in his announcement in 1999 that 
cross-Strait relations entailed a ‘special state-to-state’ relation. Towards the end of the 
1990s, a new consensus emerged that ROC sovereignty on Taiwan must be secured. 
This consensus also involves understanding ‘Taiwan’ as a political community which 
enjoys de facto national sovereignty, rather than a geographical unit. ‘Taiwanese’ no 
longer denotes an ethnic term for native Taiwanese (or islanders) but encompasses all
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the citizens of Taiwan.22 Yet it is still a much contested question, especially in the 
academia, as to whether Taiwanese nationalism as exemplified by Lee’s ‘new state 
movement’ and his discourse of ‘new Taiwanese’ is not an ethnic nationalism or 
ethno-nationalism.
The DPP’s unexpected victory in the year 2000 presidential election is significant for 
two reasons. Firstly, it was Taiwan’s first ever democratic and peaceful regime transfer; 
secondly, political support for Taiwan independence among the population had grown. 
The DPP benefited enormously from the internal divisions in the KMT as a result of the 
power struggle between Lien Chan and James Soong (Soong Chu-yu), the former KMT 
Provincial Governor of Taiwan who ran in the presidential election as an independent 
candidate, taking votes from the KMT.
The 2004 presidential election ended with the incumbent Chen Shui-bian, DPP leader 
and standard-bearer of the pro-independence ‘pan-Green camp’, winning his second 
term. Yet controversy raged over a dramatic incident the day before the election in 
which Chen was injured by a pistol shot while waving regally to his supporters aboard a 
jeep in his hometown of Tainan. Whether this ‘last-minute drama’, as Perry Anderson 
described it, was a near tragedy, as followers of the victor believe, or a comedy, as his 
opponents maintain, was not immediately clear. What is certain is that Chen’s victory 
was narrow, and widely thought to be a result of a sympathy vote, though estimates of
22 Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 123.
23 Taiwan is divided politically into two colour-coded blocs. On one side is the ‘pan-Green camp’, 
comprising two pro-independence forces: the DPP, in control of the executive since 2000, and its 
recently created ally, the TSU. On the other is the ‘pan-Blue camp’, composed of the KMT, which ruled 
the island for half a century after Chiang Kai-shek was driven from the mainland in 1949, and a 
breakaway faction of it, the PFP, both identified with a tradition, now attenuated, claiming Taiwan to be 
the seat of the legitimate government of the whole of China, and still opposed to the idea of Taiwanese 
independence. See Perry Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’, London Review o f Books.
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its scale differed.24
The pan-Blue camp refused to accept the outcome of the election in light of the 
shooting incident. Vast popular demonstrations were held during the following week, 
with student sit-downs in front of the presidential palace and indignant demands for a 
recount. Many commentators in Taiwan considered this a test of Taiwan’s democracy. 
At the same time, the vote for the pro-independence pan-Green camp reached 50 per 
cent, a record high. A distinct Taiwanese national identity is crystallising.25 While 
support for independence is plainly on the rise, the result of the 2004 election should 
not be interpreted as the final choice of the people of Taiwan on unification and 
independence, not least because Chen won by such a narrow margin. The picture 
becomes even more complicated when international political factors, in particular in 
East Asia, are taken into account.
A Brief Discussion of the Concept of Public Culture
In addition to examining Taiwan’s history, it is also illuminating to briefly discuss the 
concept of public culture, employed in this research to study Taiwan’s political 
development. I here provide a definition of public culture, discussing the concept in 
detail in Chapter Two. Public culture is the process o f public deliberation in which 
public intellectuals as well as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is
24 For an analysis of and commentary on the incident, see also Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’.
25 According to Anderson, the Green camp, committed to outright independence, started with 21 per cent 
of the vote in 1996. In 2000 it took 39 per cent. This year it reached 50 per cent. Even discounting the 
sympathy factor, and a variety of motives for not voting Blue, the trend of support is plain. A distinct 
Taiwanese national identity is in the process of crystallisation. The change has been relatively swift. As 
late as 1996, well over 50 per cent of the population, when asked, described themselves as ‘Chinese and 
Taiwanese’, over 20 per cent as ‘Taiwanese’ only, and under 20 per cent as ‘Chinese’. Today fewer than 
50 per cent define themselves as Chinese and Taiwanese, and not much more than 10 per cent as Chinese, 
while those who see themselves as simply Taiwanese number more than 40 per cent (ibid.).
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formed and contested, and public consensus in varying degrees is arrived at. To study 
Taiwan’s political development is to explore the conditions, processes, characteristics, 
consequences of and participants in public deliberation through a contextual analysis of 
the political discourses articulated in public debate.
History and Theory
This research provides a historical analysis and theoretical interpretation of the public 
discourses on Taiwan’s political development. It is essential that particular histories are 
investigated in comparative political studies as Tilly has emphasised in his critical 
examination of the dominant account of modernisation theories of political change. He 
argued that: ‘The analyses should be concrete in having real times, places, and people. 
They should be historical in limiting their scope to an era bounded by the playing out 
of certain well-defined process, and in recognizing from the outset that time matters.’26 
Here ‘history’ is related to but not the same as ‘culture’. Katznelson made a similar 
remark on what ‘the best historical social science’ should be like: ‘a work about a 
particular time, setting, and choice, a perceptible narrative constituted by a story of 
periodization and an account of preferences.’27
Drawing on Tilly and Katznelson, ‘history’ includes both political-sociological 
macroanalyses and theoretically informed case studies.28 ‘After all’, as Lin argued, 
‘any political science paradigm, with its assumptions and conceptions, must be 
validated, modified, or even rejected in light of historical discoveries and
26 Charles Tilly, 1984, Big Structures, Large Processes and Huge Comparisons, p. 14. (emphases 
original)
27 Ira Katznelson, 2003, ‘Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative 
Historical Social Science’, p. 270. See also his earlier article ‘Structure and Configuration in 
Comparative Politics’. (1997)
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interpretations, bearing in mind that the latter themselves depend on a certain 
theoretical framing’. 29 Therefore, ‘alternating between the empirical and the 
conceptual’, scholars need to ensure an ‘ “open-ended and ongoing interaction between 
evidence and concept” pertaining to particular histories’.30
‘Taiwanese modernity’ has been described as an ‘alternative modernity’31 from the 
perspective of neo-Confucianism, that is, a ‘non-individualistic version of capitalist 
modernity’.32 Yet Taiwan’s historical experience is in fact insufficiently distinct to 
justify such a claim. In this research, ‘alternative modernity’ means a developmental 
path different from capitalist modernisation. Taiwan is probably the best case for 
testing mainstream modernisation theory. Moreover, the west-east division into an 
individualistic versus collective ethos of culture is often overstated, as one 
commentator has pointed out. The supposedly ‘illiberal’ or anti-individualist idea of 
community, as implied in Taylor’s critical discussion of ‘negative liberty’, is just as 
important in the west in constituting self-understanding or self-identity.34
More relevant to our discussion here is that the state has played a significant role in 
creating conducive socioeconomic conditions for Taiwan’s democratic transformation, 
as demonstrated in the literature on the ‘East Asian model’ and related accounts based 
on theories developmental state. This point is not only important in any historical
28 See Charles Tilly, 1984; I. Katznelson, 1997; 2003.
29 Lin Chun, 2000, ‘Introduction: The Chinese Path and the Limits of Globalism', China Vol. Ill, p. xvii.
30 Lin Chun, 2000, ‘Introduction: The Chinese Path and the Limits of Globalism’, China Vol. Ill, p. xvii.
31 For a detailed discussion of ‘alternative modernity’, see Charles Taylor, 1999, ‘Two theories of 
modernity’, Public Culture, 27.
32 Peter Berger refers to the ‘East Asian development model’ as the ‘second case’ of capitalist modernity, 
distinct from the ‘first case’ of European capitalist modernity in its ‘non-individualistic cultural values’ 
(Berger, 1988). Ambrose Y. C. Kim thus argued that Taiwan’s political modernity is ‘democratically 
Confucian’, valuing the sociopolitical order and individual rights from a ‘(collective) relational 
perspective’ (King, 1998).
Lin Chun, 2001, ‘Defining and Defending the “Social”: A Chinese Tale’, p. 67.
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account of Taiwan’s postwar political development but also places a question mark 
over the core assumptions and concepts of the dominant neo-classical economics and 
modernisation theory. These feature ‘free market utopianism or fundamentalism’, 
‘state-market or state-soeiety antagonism’, and the associated classical liberal notion of 
civil society. In the light of this theoretical rethinking, any new concept or analytical 
framework intended to better capture Taiwan’s political development thus has to reject 
the assumed state-market or state-society antagonism in these theories, and take into 
account the active role of state.
The Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two elaborates the concept of public culture, 
developed in this research to study Taiwan’s political development, by critically 
examining the existing concepts and theories found in the field, primarily 
modernisation theory and transitology. A brief historical narrative on the evolution of 
Taiwan’s public culture since the end of the Second World War, which has featured 
liberalism, nationalism and welfarism, concludes the chapter. The subsequent chapters 
are devoted to historical analyses of the liberal, nationalist and welfare debates in turn 
and the evolution of these discourses in postwar Taiwan in chronological order. 
Chapter Three probes liberalism and Taiwan’s political imagination. Chapter Four 
looks at the nationalist debate, the growing Taiwanese consciousness, and Taiwan’s 
identity predicament. Chapter Five grapples with the issue of social welfare, much 
neglected in the existing literature on Taiwan’s political development. The conclusion, 
Chapter Six, summarises the research and focuses on the sociopolitical implications of
34 Cf. Charles Taylor, 1991, ‘What’s wrong with negative liberty?’, in David Miller (ed.) Liberty.
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liberalism, nationalism and welfarism, as perceived by the public in Taiwan, for the 
country’s future political development.
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Chapter Two 
Public Culture and Taiwan’s Modern Development
Modernisation Theory, Transitology and Taiwan’s Political Development
The ‘Taiwan Miracle’ -  Taiwan’s rapid and relatively equitable economic development 
and peaceful political transformation from authoritarianism to liberal democracy -  has 
attracted broad attention from scholars as well as policy makers in other developing 
countries. While we have seen an increasing number of critical studies of Taiwan’s 
political development,1 modernisation theory and ‘transitology’ remain the dominant 
approaches. The former emphasises the structural preconditions for political 
democratisation, such as a market economy, industrialisation, urbanisation, a high level 
of literacy and the emergence of a middle class as the main social force. The latter 
concentrates on the role of political elites in regime change and emphasises the pacts 
made between such elites in the power struggle that led to a negotiated transition to 
democracy.2
Research projects conducted within these theoretical frameworks have undoubtedly 
contributed to our understanding. It is however vital to scrutinise whether these 
mainstream approaches adequately capture the experience of Taiwan’s political 
development. Taiwan, as many commentators have pointed out, fits the tenets of 
modernisation theory far better than many other countries, such as China or India.3 The
1 See, for example, Lin Shu-fen’s critical analysis of the discourse of democratisation in Taiwan from the 
perspective of critical democracy, inspired by the Foucauldian conception of genealogy and Derridian 
deconstructive method (Lin, 2000).
2 See Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell et al, 1986; Di Palma, 1990; Przeworski, 1991.
3 This comment on the Taiwanese case was provided by Dr. Lin in feedback on the present author’s 
chapter. India is a counter-example to modernisation theory, as a democratic country with immense
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typical criticisms of classic modernisation theories, including the belief that there is a 
correlation between economic prosperity and the emergence of democracy and faith in 
the ‘automatic’ democratic orientation of the middle classes,4 thus seem less relevant to 
our critical literature review here. Nonetheless, the historical fact that socioeconomic 
indicators for Taiwan during authoritarian rule were much higher than for liberal 
democratic India in the same period poses a challenge to the hypotheses of 
modernisation theory and its account of Taiwan’s political development.
For some critics of modernisation theory, its greatest flaw is its presupposition of a 
steady progression towards liberal democracy. Modernisation theory struggles to 
explain countries’ transformation from authoritarianism to some form of democracy. 
Transition theory can be seen as a correction to modernisation theory in that it criticises 
structure-centred approaches for marginalising the importance of politics, the role of 
political agency and historical contingency. In the case of Taiwan, the transition 
approach provides a convincing explanation of Chiang Ching-kuo’s initial political 
liberalisation in the 1970s and Lee Teng-hui’s democratisation in the early 1990s. The 
two leaders’ key contributions to Taiwan’s democratic transition are generally 
considered to be the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the first popular presidential 
election in 1996 respectively.
Transition theory’s agency-centred approach has however been criticised for its elitism 
and neglect of structural factors. Some commentators, while acknowledging that 
charismatic individuals influence the course of historical events, argue that a ‘great
‘sophisticated’ versions of modernisation theory take into account a broader range of variables, 
such as political culture, colonial legacy and political parties.
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poverty 
4 More
man’ approach falls prey to voluntarism, assuming that particular politicians determine 
outcomes.5 As noted above, most explanations of Taiwan’s political development 
underline the roles of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui. Yet it is clear that changing 
structures of class, state and transnational power, driven by particular histories of 
capitalist development, profoundly shaped these short-term choices and actions.6
The role of Chiang Ching-kuo as party and state leader in setting Taiwan on the path to 
political liberalisation certainly deserves attention. It is however equally important to 
explain why, after several decades of authoritarian rule, ‘democratic reform’ made it 
onto the party’s agenda in the 1970s, rather than earlier or later. The ruling KMT faced 
increasing domestic and external pressure following the normalisation of 
Sino-American relations and the expulsion of the ROC on Taiwan from the United 
Nations in the 1970s, a massive diplomatic setback. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles o f 
the People, the KMT’s official ideology, meanwhile, postulated a democratic ideal, the 
‘Principle of Democracy’. Both factors illuminate the party’s shift towards democracy. 
Both are bound up with the KMT’s political legitimacy.
Similarly, it is crucial to investigate the context in which Lee Teng-hui initiated the 
project of political democratisation in the early 1990s. This includes: Lee’s urgent need, 
following Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, to consolidate his political authority as both party 
and national leader, achieved by means of a power struggle within the KMT in the 
name of democratisation;7 the initiation of cross-Strait dialogue for humanitarian
5 See Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt’s critical literature review on existing approaches to the 
study of democratisation with reference to the Indian case (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004).
6 David Potter, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, Democratization, p. 220.
7 Kuo Cheng-liang (1998, ‘Lee Teng-hui phenomenon: democratic transition and political leadership’) 
and Shaw Carl K. Y. (2002, ‘Modulations of nationalism across the Taiwan Strait’) provide very incisive 
analyses of this power struggle and its impact on Taiwan’s democratic transition.
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reasons (such as making it legal for veterans who retreated to the island with the KMT 
in 1949 to visit their families and relatives on the mainland); increasingly fierce 
competition from China in the economic and international political field since its 
economic reforms in the 1980s; and finally the pressure of electoral competition with 
the major opposition party, the DPP.
In light of the explanatory deficiencies of both approaches, some scholars have 
reflected critically on oversimplified versions of modernisation theory and the accounts 
of transition theory. Early efforts have been made to advance a broader framework that 
is intended to incorporate the factors of political agency and choice into the 
explanations of modernisation theory’s structural analysis of political change, as 
exemplified by Almond’s essay.8 In the studies of Taiwan’s political development, 
apart from drawing attention to the power of (democratic) ideas or the human spirit and 
the political opposition movement’s contribution to Taiwan’s democratisation, they 
have also called for a synthesis capable of accommodating the merits of 
modemisation/structure-centred and transition/agency-centred approaches.9
Rather than developing a synthesis that goes beyond the structure-agency dichotomy or 
which incorporates useful elements from existing explanations, the public culture 
approach developed in this thesis provides a different perspective. The public culture
8 G. A. Almond, 1973, ‘Approaches to Development Causation’, in G. A. Almond et al (eds.), Crisis, 
Choice, and Change: Historical Studies o f Political Development.
9 For example, Wu Nai-teh, 1989, ‘Searching for the Causes of Democratization: A Review Essay’, 
Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, vol. 2, no. 1,1989 Spring, pp. 145-61; Wu Nai-teh, 1999, 
‘The Role of Human Spirit in Historical Change: The Formosa Incident and Taiwan’s Democratisation’, 
paper presented at the ‘Towards the 21st century Taiwanese nation and state’ conference in Taipei; Wu 
Wen-cheng, 1995, ‘A theoretical discussion of the analytical frameworks for the studies of Taiwan’s 
political transformation’, The Soochow Journal o f Political Studies., vol. 4, 1995, pp. 135-84; David 
Potter, 1997, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, Democratization.
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approach rejects the economic determinism of modernisation theory and the elitism of 
transition theory, but retains the structural analysis typical of the former and attention to 
the role of elite actors in regime change and the historical contingency that characterise 
the latter. Central to this approach are publicly articulated ideological discourses and 
their sociopolitical implications for political development.
As mentioned in the Introduction, since the end of the Second World War, liberalism, 
nationalism and welfarism have been the key discourses imbuing the political identities 
and imagination of people in Taiwan and moulding the island’s political evolution. 
Viewed from the perspective of public culture, mainstream modernisation and 
transition theories have failed to explain Taiwan’s political development on three main 
fronts. Firstly, they fail to acknowledge the twin postwar development of liberalism and 
nationalism in Taiwan, primarily because modernisation theory sets itself up as 
‘universal’, preventing modernisation theorists from investigating the particular history 
of the society in question. Scholars thus failed to grasp the importance o f ‘nationalism’, 
both an obstacle to and the driving force of postwar Taiwan’s democratic 
transformation at different historical moments over the past five decades. This persisted 
until the early 1990s, when the subject of ‘consolidating the third wave democracies’ 
became one of the central concerns of comparative political scientists. Here, ‘ethnic 
cleavage’ or the ‘identity issue’ is widely considered to be the major challenge or 
obstacle to the consolidation of Taiwan’s liberal democracy.
Secondly and relatedly, scholars neglect the consistent concern for welfare in postwar 
Taiwan and its sociopolitical consequences. Critics who are suspicious of the KMT’s
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contribution to Taiwan’s welfare development might dispute the notion that welfare has 
ever been an ongoing priority, given that Taiwan has been falling behind northern and 
western European welfare capitalist states in terms of both the comprehensiveness of 
provision and universality of coverage of social welfare. ‘Economy first’ has remained 
the priority within Taiwan’s development programme as well as the dominant 
discourse in public debate. It is moreover argued that Taiwan’s welfare system tends to 
reflect the government’s desire to demonstrate its goodwill, rather than genuine 
concern for welfare rights.11 This interpretation of the government’s or politicians’ 
motivations, namely the desire to gain legitimacy, attract votes and consolidate power, 
does not however change the fact that the state has invested in public health, public 
education and social insurance. In short, public welfare as an idea or principle of social 
policy, and the ideology of welfarism, have been unduly neglected in most scholarship 
on Taiwan’s political development.
Finally, but importantly, scholars pay far too little attention to Taiwan’s state-led or 
state-guided development in relation to the ideology of the developmental state. 
Although the elitist approaches in the field of comparative politics do account for the 
role of state, in most existing literature on Taiwan’s development, the role of state, in 
terms of its contribution to the creation of socioeconomic conditions conducive to 
Taiwan’s democratic development, however has been relatively neglected. This can be 
explained by the wide reception and popularity of neoclassic economic theories and 
liberal theories of society and politics that treat both realms of human activities as 
market places. This academic phenomenon in turn has to be appreciated in the political
11 Ku Yeun-wen, 1997, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, p. 236.
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context of authoritarianism and the intellectual context of liberal capitalist democracy 
in Taiwan, as well as the broad historical context of the Chinese civil war and Cold 
War.
The accounts provided from these perspectives, which are greatly influenced by the 
classic liberal view of state-society antagonism, attribute Taiwan’s democratic 
transformation almost solely to the emergence of the middle-class as Taiwan’s 
economy has prospered, and the sociopolitical oppositional movements led by this 
class. The predominance of the discourse of civil society within the tradition of 
classical liberalism in Taiwan in the late 1980s reflects such accounts of Taiwan’s 
political transformation.12 Unsurprisingly, for liberal critics, the authoritarian KMT 
state is and indeed should be the prime target for transformation if Taiwan is to be 
democratised. Its role in creating socioeconomic conditions conducive to Taiwan’s 
democratisation, especially the development of human capital and the existence of a 
relatively equitable society, has however been inadequately covered in their accounts.
While taking into consideration the importance of human capital in material and human 
production and reproduction -  public education and medical care, relative equity and 
security13 -  and in laying a strong foundation for social capital,14 they nonetheless
12 Scholars and political commentators invoked the notion of civil society in public debates to explain 
and evaluate Taiwan’s political liberalisation and democratisation. Central to the concept, as commonly 
articulated in the Taiwanese context, is society-state antagonism. Accordingly, social movements are 
misleadingly conceived of as ‘ anti-state movements’. For not every demonstration or social movement is 
directed against the state apparatus; many protests focus on the injustice of specific public policies.
13 Lin Chun, 2001, ‘Defining and Defending the “Social”: a Chinese Tale’, Hitotsubashi Journal o f  
Social Studies 33,2001, p. 59.
14 Social capital refers to the vitality of civic and associational engagement, which is crucial to 
democratic politics. Amongst the earliest pioneers of the term were community reformers such as 
Hanifan, who wrote about the importance of social capital in explaining successful schools, the urbanist 
Jane Jacobs, the economist Glenn Loury and the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. M6re recently, the 
popularity of the concept can be accredited to three theorists, James Coleman, Robert Putnam and F. 
Fukuyama. See Blakeley, 2001, ‘Social Capital*, pp. 198-200. Putnam has advanced the idea of social
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misleadingly attribute Taiwan’s remarkable achievement to the efficiency of the free 
market and massive economic aid from the United States. This is not to say that these 
two factors are of no importance in explaining Taiwan’s political development, but 
rather to challenge the ‘free market fundamentalism’ of neo-classical theory and to 
suggest that the impact of American economic aid might have been exaggerated. The 
extraordinary economic and military aid from the United States in the 1950s, provided 
primarily as a result of the strategic relationship between Taiwan and the United States 
in an anti-communist context, was surely critical to initial capital formation in 
Taiwan.15 However, contrary to common belief, the cumulative contribution of foreign 
capital, including foreign aid, between 1952 and 1990, amounted to less than 10 percent 
of total investment.16 Aid and investment from overseas Chinese also helped, as well as 
the fact that the KMT had brought China’s gold reserves along in 1949.17
The notion of the ‘developmental state’18 and the related ‘East Asian Model’ of 
economic development19 directly challenge the market fundamentalism of neoclassical
capital in his famous book on democracy, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(1993). His later book Bowling Alone (2000) critically examines the declining social capital in America. 
Democracy in Flux (2002), a collection of essays edited by Putnam, provides accounts of the evolution of 
contemporary society from the perspective of social capital.
15 David Potter, 1997, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, Democratization; 
Gustav Ranis, 2002, ‘Lessons from Taiwan’s Performance: Neither Miracle nor Crisis’, Taiwan in the 
global economy: from an agrarian economy to an exporter o f high-tech products, p. 5.
Gustas Ranis, 1999, ‘Reflections on the Economics and the Political Economy of Development at the 
Turn of the Century’, in Gustav Ranis et al (eds.), The Political Economy o f  Taiwan’s Development into 
the 21st Century, p. 14.
17 David Potter, 1997, p. 225.
18 Leftwich defined a developmental state as possessing six main components: 1. A determined 
developmental elite; 2. A powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; 3. The effective 
management of non-state economic interests; 4. Relative autonomy; 5. A weak and subordinated civil 
society; 6. Repression, legitimacy and performance (Leftwich, 1995, ‘Bringing politics back in: towards 
a model of the developmental state’, Journal o f Development Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 400-27)
19 Both Alice Amsden (1985, ‘The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development’, in P. Evens et al (eds.) 
Bringing the State Back In) and Robert Wade (1990, Governing the Market) emphasise the role of state 
intervention and regulation in Taiwan’s remarkable economic development. Here, the explanation of the 
‘East Asian Model’ of development is characterised by its emphasis on state involvement, as opposed to 
the neo-liberal orthodoxy, which acclaims the East Asian miracle as vivid proof of the virtues of market
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economic theory, or in Johnson’s terms, the ‘market-rational economy’ of orthodox 
capitalist theory, as extolled by the United States and the United Kingdom.20 At the 
beginning of the 1960s, Taiwan was moving towards an economic strategy of 
export-oriented capitalist development under the direction of its developmental state. 
‘By using a battery of policy instruments covering conditionality ... screening and 
monitoring of foreign capital’, Taiwan has ‘given a virtuoso performance’21 in setting 
terms which have attracted foreign capital while making it serve the state’s domestic 
economic development priorities. As for private internal economic institutions, ‘the 
state has been active in promoting, pushing, persuading and manipulating these 
interests in directions which conform to its development strategy’.22
While criticisms of the ‘non-democratic’ nature and overwhelming power of the 
Taiwanese developmental state, primarily from the liberal democratic perspective, are 
legitimate, they pay insufficient attention to the role of this interventionist state in 
creating socioeconomic conditions, characterised by ‘growth with equity’, conducive 
to Taiwan’s political democratisation. They therefore present a partial if not biased 
account of Taiwan’s political development. To elucidate Taiwan’s rapid and equitable 
development, it is crucial to take into account the three-step land reform implemented
competition.
20 Chalmers Johnson expanded upon the dichotomy between so-called plan-rational and market-rational 
economies, which dominated Cold War ideological debate, to include another basic prototype: the 
plan-rational market economy, neither socialist nor Anglo-American capitalist in orientation or operation. 
The notion was first formulated by Johnson to describe Japan’s state-guided but privately owned 
economic system and to explain its post-World War Two advance to the rank of the world’s second most 
productive economy. The main principles and institutions of Japan’s economic achievement were 
duplicated in South Korea and Taiwan. See Johnson, 2001, ‘Japanese “Capitalism” Revisited’, Thesis 
Eleven, No. 66,2001.
21 Chalmers Johnson, 1987, ‘Political institutions and economic performance: the govemment-business 
relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’ in F. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy o f the New 
Asian Industrialism, p. 163.
22 Alice Amsden, 1989, cited in A. Leftwich, 1995, p. 417.
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between 1949 and 1953 and steady change in industrial policy from the 1950s onwards, 
from the import substitution phase in the 1950s and early 1960s, to an export 
orientation phase, and concluding with a science and technology-orientated phase 
beginning in the 1980s.23 Taiwan’s land reforms, moreover, followed Japanese colonial 
land reforms in 1905. ‘Together’, as Ranis pointed out, ‘they led to an unusually equal 
distribution of land and proved instrumentally helpful not only in terms of agricultural 
productivity increases, but also in terms of a redistribution in favor of the lower-income 
groups’.24
Taiwan’s experience demonstrates the importance of state capacity and its ‘relative 
autonomy’23 in achieving rapid and at the same time equitable development. The fact 
that, unlike most other developing countries in Latin American and Eastern Europe, 
Taiwan’s political opening was neither triggered by any major socioeconomic crisis nor 
accompanied by popular demands for major socioeconomic reforms,26 is not only proof 
of the success of its ‘growth with equality’, but also accounts for its steady and ‘less 
bloody’ democratic transformation.
What should be noted, however, is that drawing attention to the active role of state in 
Taiwan’s development is not intended to ‘romanticise’ state or make a case for any 
notion o f‘strong state, weak society’. Rather, the implication of Taiwan’s experience is
23 Gustav Ranis, 2002, p. 6.
24 ibid., p. 5.
25 The ‘relative autonomy’ of the developmental state is embodied in its independence of class and other 
interest groups. Some of these benefit more than others from state economic policies, but none controls 
the state (see, Potter, 1997, p. 226). The idea o f ‘state capacity’ is emphasised to demystify the so-called 
‘market mythology’.
26 This, along with four other aspects, is viewed by Chu Yun-han as distinguishing Taiwan’s democratic 
transition from the experiences of other countries facing crises of authoritarianism and concurrent 
movement towards democracy (see Chu, 1996, ‘Taiwan’s Unique Challenges’).
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merely, yet significantly, this: the realisation of political democracy and social justice, 
which have alternated as the dominant themes in political philosophy yet rarely been 
held in joint focus over the last fifty years or so, or the achievement of freedom and 
equality, the central values within contemporary political theory,27 are more likely in a 
context o f‘strong state and strong society’. In this scenario, the existence of strong state 
is justified not by the pursuit of state interests and power per se but the demand of the 
society for realising social goods. After all, the historical trajectory of Taiwan’s 
postwar political development is characteristic of public resistances against the 
repressive, authoritarian and unjust state. Indeed, as will be discussed shortly, at critical 
historical moments, public culture represents a resistance culture of the public that is 
aimed to challenge and eventually transform or conquer the state.
The Perspective of Public Culture
Taiwan teaches us that comparative studies on political development can advance 
theoretically if they avoid the demerits of existing theories and take particular histories 
very seriously. The conception of public culture, elaborated in detail below, thus allows 
space for an open-ended and ongoing interaction between evidence and concept 
pertaining to particular histories. It is believed in this thesis that by undertaking a 
research that pays due or sufficient attention to ‘the particular time, setting and choice’, 
as Katznelson has suggested, can provide us with a better understanding of Taiwan’s 
postwar political development.
27 See a collection of essays on the subject edited by Keith Dowding et al, Justice and Democracy (2004) 
for discussion of the conjunction, intersection and interaction of these two central values in 
contemporary political theory.
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Public culture is indispensable to the study of political development not because it is a 
synthesis accommodating all the merits of mainstream modernisation and transition 
approaches -  although it does retain the structural analysis of the former and focus on 
the role of elite actors in regime change as well as historical contingency of the latter. 
The public culture perspective draws attention to the importance of political ideology 
and its implications for political development and its study. Its core concerns are the 
conditions, characteristics, consequences of public deliberation and those who take 
part in it. Before discussing the concept, it is vital to underline that rather than aiming to 
replace all other existing approaches to explaining Taiwan’s political development, the 
public culture approach is meant to fill the gap they create or left unbridged in 
accounting for that development.
Defining Public Culture
Defining the conception of public culture necessarily entails a critical discussion of the 
existing concepts deployed to illuminate the cultural aspects of political development 
and social transformation, however ‘cultural’ may be understood within them. It is 
therefore essential to distinguish the concept of public culture, as defined and used in 
this research, from other types of culture, such as civic culture, common culture, 
political culture and ‘public culture’ used differently by other authors. Whilst civic 
culture and common culture are relatively easily distinguishable from public culture, 
political culture and public culture are different yet related concepts.
Public Culture and Civic Culture
Civic culture, as widely understood and used in mainstream comparative political 
studies, refers to the ‘political culture of a stable democracy’. The discourse of civic
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culture in this field has been greatly influenced by Almond and Verba’s empirical study 
on five nations in the aftermath of the Second World War, The Civic Culture.29 Their 
study was intended to explore the relationship between political culture and democratic 
stability. Political culture was measured by investigating the political knowledge and 
skills of citizens and their feelings and value orientations towards political objects and 
processes by means of survey techniques.
The result of the survey was said to be in line with the wisdom of the ancient political 
philosophers: a ‘mixed government/middle-class-predominant polity’ characterised by 
the ‘balanced disparities’ of civic culture was claimed to be most conducive to a stable 
democracy. The key to attaining democratic stability, according to this mixed 
government model, is a mixture or balance between participant and deferential or 
acquiescent attitudes; between a consensus on the rules of the game and disagreement 
on specific issues; between commitment and pragmatism.30 In short, the model is 
characterised by the coexistence of both active citizenship/political participation and 
passive citizenship/political apathy.31
The civic culture literature has been criticised from various perspectives. Some 
criticisms focus on the relationship between political culture and political structure 
presupposed in the study’s structure of inference. For instance, Lijphart has questioned
29 Almond and Verba investigated the cases of Britain, America, Germany, Italy and Mexico, presenting 
the first two nations as the models o f ‘Civic Culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963, The Civic Culture).
30 Dennis Kavanagh, 1989, ‘Political Culture in Great Britain: The Decline of the Civic Culture’, in G. A. 
Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 125.
31 As Almond has stated: ‘Indeed, by itself this participant-rationalist model of citizenship could not 
logically sustain a stable democratic government. Only when combined in some sense with its opposites 
of passivity, trust, and deference to authority and competence was a viable, stable democracy possible’ 
(Almond, 1989, ‘The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept’, The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 
16).
49
whether political culture can be treated as an independent variable. Some, for example 
Pateman, challenge the misleading identification of existing liberal democratic 
systems -  that is, liberal representative government plus universal suffrage -  with 
democracy. She made this criticism from the perspective of participatory democracy, 
arguing that, in contrast to the idea of ‘balanced disparities’ prescribed in the ‘mixed 
government model’ promoted by Almond and Verba, democracy requires active 
participation.32
Public culture is therefore a different concept to civic culture in that, in line with 
Pateman’s argument, it views active participation as essential to any conception of 
democracy. Yet public culture, understood as the process of public deliberation, does 
not have to be democratic in the sense that ‘democracy’ could be one of many other 
social goods, such as justice, decided collectively by the public in this process. 
Different preoccupations of the society in question at different times in history to a 
large extent determine the public decision on social goods and their priorities.
Public Culture and Common Culture
Common culture, as formulated by Raymond Williams, a prominent figure within the 
British New Left, refers to the culture of a community, the way of life or the tradition of 
a people. Central to his idea of common culture is the assertion that culture is ordinary, 
meaning that there is no special class, or group of people, who dominate the creation of 
meanings and values.33 Common culture is therefore considered to be a collective
32 For these methodological and philosophical critiques, see Lijphart’s ‘The Structure of Inference’ 
(1989) and Carole Pateman’s ‘The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique’ (1989). Both appear in The 
Civic Culture Revisited.
33 See Raymond Williams, 1989a, ‘Culture is Ordinary’, Resources o f Hope, pp. 3-17.
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achievement, the realisation of which would be impossible without a common 
historical inheritance (traditional culture). Crucial to this common culture of 
democratic nature is the interrelation between true communication and the community, 
which establish common ground for a way of life. Williams highlights common culture 
to problematise descriptions of ‘bourgeois culture’ and the manufacturing of an 
‘artificial working-class culture’ and to challenge the economic determinist’s 
reductionist interpretation of Marxism. In the Marxist view, culture is considered to 
belong to the ‘ideological superstructure’. This ‘superstructure’ is generally believed to 
be directly determined by the economic base.
Public culture thus differs from Williams’ idea of common culture in two ways: firstly
and straightforwardly, whilst common culture refers to collectively preserved or
created tradition of a community or people, central to the conception of public culture is
the process of public deliberation, in which political ideas are debated. Secondly, as an
analytical framework, public culture probes into both cultural and politico-economic
factors and analyses political discourses in context, tracing both historical and
intellectual threads. As a perspective of explaining political development, it emphasises
the role of political ideas, political education and socialisation, and political economy 
as well in explaining historical development and change.
Public Culture and Political Culture
Political culture, as noted above, is different from yet related to the concept of public
34 See Raymond Williams, 1989b, ‘Communications and Community’, Resources o f Hope, pp. 19-31. 
True communication, as Williams understands it, is similar to Habermas’ notion of the ‘ideal speech 
situation’, a process of public communication not distorted by economic and political power, in which 
equal and democratic participation is guaranteed.
35 See Lin Chun, 1993, The British New Left, p. 41.
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culture. The concept of political culture is claimed in the mainstream literature on 
political development to be intended to elucidate how democratic values and modem 
political institutions can be most readily transferred to new environments, such as the 
new sovereign states in the post-Second World War context.36 The understanding of 
political culture in most existing literature on political development derives from 
Almond’s observation that: ‘Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern 
of orientation to political actions’.37 That is, in any operative political system there is an 
ordered subjective realm of politics that gives meaning to the polity, discipline to 
institutions, and social relevance to individual acts. Almond referred to this particular 
pattern of orientation to political actions’ as the political culture.
Based on Almond’s definition, Pye and Verba developed an analytical framework of 
political culture to study political development. According to Pye, the concept of 
political culture suggests that:
[The] traditions o f a society, the spirit o f  its public institutions, the passions and the collective 
reasoning o f  its citizenry, and the style and operating codes o f its leaders are not just random 
products o f  historical experience but fit together as a part o f a meaningful whole and constitute 
an intelligible web o f relations.38
Political culture, in short, ‘consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place’.39 
Political beliefs constitute the core of a political culture. As indicated in Verba’s 
discussion of the homogeneity of culture, political culture is thus seen as the
36 Lucian Pye, 1966, ‘Introduction’, Political Culture and Political Development, p. 5.
37 G. A. Almond, 1956, ‘Comparative Political Systems’, Journal o f Politics, 18, p. 396.
38 Lucian Pye, ‘Introduction’, Political Culture and Political Development, p. 7.
39 Sidney Verba, 1966, ‘Comparative Political Culture’, Political Culture and Political Development, p.
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embodiment of the political beliefs shared by a people or all members of a political 
system.40 Power holders have one set of political beliefs and the masses another. 
Political culture is thus divided into ‘elite political culture’ and ‘mass political culture’.
Most relevant to our discussion is how ‘political ideology’ is perceived and treated in 
the political culture approach. The debate over the stability and changeability of 
political culture is central here. Almond, Pye and Verba all argue that political culture is 
stable and durable. Political culture, defined as a system of political beliefs, is 
accordingly thought to be a stabilising element of political systems. As Verba argues, 
‘they may motivate the actors in a political system to resist change in the name of 
traditional beliefs or they may lead to fundamental modification of innovative 
institutions so that they fit the traditional culture’.41
Verba argues that changeability is a critical question for the elites of developing nations 
facing the possibility of democratisation.42 Contrary to the stabilising function of 
political culture for the operation of a political system, political ideology is said to 
‘arise when one wants to create a political system that is not supported by the implicit 
primitive beliefs of the population’.43 Political culture here, implies Swidler, serves as 
an ‘ideology’ which guides the direction of change and ways of achieving it.44
513.
40 ‘The focus on political culture rather than political attitudes' Verba argues, ‘implies a concentration 
upon the attitudes held by all members of a political system rather than upon die attitudes held by 
individuals or particular categories of individuals’ (Verba, 1966, pp. 525-6, emphasis original).
41 Verba, 1960, p. 519. Verba however also points out the possibility of cultural change. For although 
fundamental political beliefs may be closely connected with the maintenance of existing patterns of 
politics, not all political cultures are well integrated and consistent, and may thus generate change (ibid., 
p.520).
42 See Verba, 1960, p. 520.
43 See Verba, ibid., p. 546.
44 Swidler identifies two senses o f ‘culture’: culture during periods o f ‘settled lives’ or ordinary periods 
and culture during periods of ‘unsettled lives’ or social transformation. The second sense of culture 
serves as political ideology, which guides the direction and types of change (Swidler, 1986, p. 282).
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In its analysis of political development, public culture, defined primarily as the process 
of public deliberation in which political ideologies are articulated and debated, is in a 
way designed to include both the idea of ‘political ideology* and the concept of 
‘political culture*. Political culture as understood in the perspective of public culture is 
similar to Taylor’s notion of ‘background or common understanding’ in his explanation 
of ‘modem social imaginaries’.45 It is thus crucial to our understanding of public culture. 
This involves ‘common understanding’, which not only makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy, but also influences if not determines 
how the public identify and perceive problems and the action they can and should take 
to deal with them. More importantly, what is emphasised in the perspective of public 
culture is that such common understanding can only be obtained through public 
deliberation or ‘true communication’ in Williams’ terms.
Public culture is therefore related to political culture because one of its conceptual 
elements is ‘background understanding’. Yet it is distinct from political culture. They 
are different in that whereas political culture suggests the ‘microanalysis’ of the 
aggregation of individual political cognitions, beliefs, preferences and evaluations, 
public culture implies the ‘macroanalysis’ of a process of public deliberation in which 
individual opinions and preferences are transformed and refined and public consensus 
is achieved. This is similar to John Rawls’ ‘public reason’ although he did not stress
49 Understanding social imaginaries requires grappling with how ordinary people imagine their social 
existence or surroundings, how they relate to others, how things proceed between people, the 
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images underlying these 
expectations. In his book Modem Social Imaginaries (2004), Taylor draws heavily on Benedict 
Anderson’s pioneering work Imagined Communities as well as the work of Jtlrgen Habermas, especially 
his idea of the public sphere, to develop his notion of social imaginaries, intended to explain the process 
of social change and its consequences. The aim of his book, however, is to sketch the forms of social 
imaginary that have underpinned the rise of Western modernity.
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deliberation when elaborating this concept.
Public reason, as Rawls defines it, refers to the most basic moral and political values 
that determine a constitutional, democratic government’s relationship with its citizens 
and the relations among these citizens. In short, it concerns how political relations are 
to be understood.46 Such reason is public in three ways: as the reason of free and equal 
citizens, it is the reason of the public. Its subject is the public good, concerning 
questions of fundamental political justice of two kinds: constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice. Finally, its nature and content are public, expressed in public 
reasoning by a family of reasonable conceptions of political justice reasonably thought 
to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.47
In brief, as a normative ideal, public reason is meant to apply to citizens when they 
engage in political advocacy in a public forum and vote on issues concerning 
‘constitutional essentials and matters of basic structure’.48 Public reason is a ‘political 
conception of justice’. Accordingly, it can be seen as the public norms developed or 
democratic consensus reached in public deliberation. It embodies the popular will. It is 
in this sense that public culture can be seen as a normative concept. For one essential 
element of public culture is public deliberation, similar to Rawls’ public reasoning, 
without which the formation of public opinion or general will, as argued above, is 
impossible. However, this understanding of public culture/public reason implies that its 
normativity is context-bound. This is not, however, to argue for a ‘provincialist’ or 
‘particularist’ as opposed to universalist conception of public culture. Rather, the
46 John Rawls, 1999, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, Law o f Peoples, p. 132.
47 John Rawls, 1999, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, Law o f Peoples, p. 133.
48 John Rawls, 1993, Political Liberalism, pp. 215-6.
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conception of public culture deployed in the present work points to a ‘universal theory’ 
of human development sensitive to particular histories, as in Amin’s advocacy of ‘a 
truly universal culture’.49
Different Conceptions of Public Culture
The conception of public culture has been formulated and applied in different 
disciplinary areas, including political theory, cultural studies and nationalism. Liberal 
political philosopher John Rawls sees ‘the fact of pluralism’, that is, the fact of ‘the 
diversity of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines found in 
modem democratic societies’, not as a mere historical condition that may soon pass 
away but ‘a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy’.50 Public culture as 
Rawls uses it thus refers to the specific political culture of (American) liberal 
democracy. For although Rawls abandons comprehensive liberalism as a worldview, 
that is, as the ideal life for individuals and communities, his theory of purely political 
liberalism still prescribes liberal principles of justice for the basic structure of society.51
In Public Culture, a journal devoted to ‘transnational cultural studies’, public culture is 
understood as ‘the cultural form of the public’. The term emerged not from the
49 Samir Amin, 1989, Eurocentrism, pp. 136-52. Amin argues that Eurocentrism is a specifically modem 
phenomenon, the roots of which go back only to the Renaissance and which flourished only in the 
nineteenth century. In this sense, he states, it constitutes one dimension of the culture and ideology of the 
modem capitalist world. Amin discusses a pluralist view of human development in a universal theory of 
culture. He claims that Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in that it assumes the existence of 
irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different people. Eurocentrism is 
therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. 
But it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is 
the only solution to the challenges of our time (Amin, 1989, p. vii). To develop a truly universal culture 
and a theory for understanding it, Amin suggests first challenging the culturalist philosophy of history 
that imbues Eurocentrism (ibid., p. 136).
50 John Rawls, 1989, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, New York University 
Law Review, 64, pp. 234-5. Cf. John Rawls, 1993, Political Liberalism, pp. 216-7.
51 See John Gray, 1997, ‘Rawls’ Anti-political Liberalism’, Endgames, pp. 51-4.
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‘contradictions of theory as did British Cultural Studies’ but grew out of ‘an impasse in 
area studies’ in American academia. Some scholars wished to generate a 
‘post-Orientalist area studies of the present that could think broadly global cultural 
forms and circuits’. This was also intended to ‘unsettle’ and interrogate four 
then-conventionalised sets of binaries: tradition and modernity; high and low culture; 
the humanities and the social sciences; and (less conventionalised) area and cultural 
studies.52 Clearly, ‘public reason’, arrived at through public discussion, is essential to 
the idea of public culture defined as the process of public deliberation in which ‘the 
public’ is a normative concept. In the journal Public Culture or the so-called 
‘area-studies-of-the-present’, ‘the public’ is equated with ‘the local’ as opposed to ‘the 
global’ without much emphasis on its normative connotations.
In contrast to the cases above, the literature on nationalism, specifically the writings of 
Anthony Smith, a leading figure in the school of ‘ethno-symbolism’ or ethno-cultural 
nationalism, defines ‘the nation’ and ‘nationalism’ as a form of public culture. Nation 
and nationalism are therefore based on (cultural) ‘authenticity’ and are ‘open in 
principle to all members of the community, or all the citizens of the “national state’” .53 
In short, public culture here refers to ‘collective cultural identities’ essential to national 
identity. As far as theorising nationalism is concerned, what should be noted, as Smith 
has clarified, is that the demand for public culture, understood as collective cultural 
identity and required for the formation of national identity, should not be mistaken for 
the pursuit o f ‘cultural homogeneity’.54
52 See Carol A. Breckenridge, 1999, ‘Editor’s comment on querying altemativity’, Public Culture, 1999, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. viii-ix.
53 Anthony D. Smith, 1998, Nationalism, p. 35.
54 Anthony D. Smith, 1995, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, p. 151.
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The conception of public culture in this research is centred on the process of public 
deliberation, its prerequisites, consequences, participants and consequences. It can be 
clearly distinguished from the conception of public culture in Rawls’ theory of political 
liberalism (the fact of pluralism as the public culture of democracies), in the journal of 
transnational cultural studies, Public Culture (public culture as the cultural forms of the 
public/local) and Smith’s ethno-symbolism/cultural nationalism (nationalism as a form 
of public culture). In short, the conception of public culture here differs from these 
others because it refers to a discursive and communication ‘process’ instead of a 
specific ‘cultural form’ or ‘form of culture’.
The Elements/Dimensions o f Public Culture
Public culture is the process of public deliberation in which public intellectuals as well 
as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is formed and contested, and 
public consensus is arrived at. Public intellectuals, public consciousness, public 
education and public deliberation are therefore the chief dimensions and fundamental 
elements of public culture. The term ‘public intellectuals’ means those 
scholars/intellectuals who are concerned with pressing public issues and speak beyond 
the academy to the general public by participating in public deliberation. The 
engagement of public intellectuals in public deliberation primarily involves the 
generation of new ideas, initiating public debate and arousing public consciousness or 
awareness.
It should be noted that ‘intellectuals’ can be seen as agents for change IF such changes 
do happen and can be attributed to their work, as the case of Taiwan’s political 
development demonstrates. For the term ‘historical agents’ makes sense only in a
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moving ‘history’ of significant events. Therefore not all the cultural giants can/should 
be seen as agents of history. Crucial to the role of public intellectuals as the agents of 
historical change is their concern to build and strengthen self-cultivating publics. As 
Mills has argued, the power elite may be persuaded, but only through the active 
deliberation of a critical public.55 Public consciousness-raising is thus a process of 
democratic education by means of public deliberation. The very process of public 
discussion encourages sensitivity to the public interest. For those anxious about the 
elitism involved in making public intellectuals the bearers of public culture, Mills’ idea 
of the democratic public shifts the intellectual away from a vanguard role.
Studies of Taiwan’s political development have tended to neglect the role of the public 
intellectual. Too much emphasis has been placed on the middle classes and political 
elites. Yet, as the discussion in the following chapters brings out, it was intellectuals’ 
public articulation, debating and promotion of the ideas central to liberalism, 
nationalism and welfarism -  freedom, democracy, constitutionalism, human rights and 
social justice -  that ultimately raised public consciousness, initiated ‘movement of 
ideas’ and forged the social forces that brought pressure to bear upon the government. 
In the history of the Taiwanese liberal movement for example, the Free China 
bimonthly in the 1950s, the Literature Star in the 1960s, The Intellectual in the 1970s 
and dissident political magazines published by the Dangwai group in the 1980s all 
contributed to political liberalisation and democratisation in Taiwan. In short, 
important and influential journals/debates did collectively make contribution to 
Taiwan’s political development.
55 See C. Wright Mills, 1959, The Sociological Imagination, pp. 180-1.
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Related to the aforementioned notion of the ‘democratic public’ is the idea of ‘public 
deliberation as public education’, referring to the potential of public debate to transform 
the preferences of individual participants. The potential of rational public deliberation 
to ‘transform preferences’ and the importance of this process to arriving at a 
meaningful democratic consensus have been the primary concerns of deliberative 
democrats. The practices of liberal democracies that focus on voting or electoral 
politics have been criticised for creating ‘civic privatism’, associated with widespread 
political apathy and political alienation. For Offe and Preuss, the worrying result of 
civic privatism in the American tradition is the emergence of a polity built around the 
ideal of the free pursuit of ‘individual happiness’.56 The term ‘civic privatism’ thus 
attempts to capture how escalating appeals to conflicting private interests in the voting 
ritual of the ‘secret ballot’ have slowly eroded the very idea that citizens should be 
trying to regulate fractional interests for the common good.57 Mills once said: ‘If we 
accept the Greek’s definition of the idiot as an altogether private man, then we must 
conclude that many citizens of many societies are indeed idiots’.58
In light of the negative sociopolitical consequences of ‘civic privatism’, public 
deliberation has been seen as significant in transforming the uninformed and 
self-interested into more active citizens with greater sensitivity to the collective
56 Claus Offe & Ulrich K. Preuss, 1991, ‘Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources’, in David Held
(ed.), Political Theory Today, p. 152. They argue that: ‘Whatever collective notions of happiness, 
salvation, or the realisation of any particular group’s destiny or potential may prevail, they are neither
defined nor implemented through the political process, but through the associative action within civil 
society. The public interest or collective good is thus no more than the secure enjoyment of individual 
good by each and every citizen’. ‘Political process’ means a public process in which individual interests 
and political preferences are negotiated and contested by citizens through discussion and debate. 
According to this understanding of political process, secret ballots per se, unless practised in a ‘social 
context’ that encourages public discussion on the part of every voter, cannot be considered a political 
process, 
ibid., p. 7.
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well-being. As Ackerman and Fishkin rightly point out, good government does not 
require a hyperactive citizenry, but neither can it thrive in a narrowly privatistic world.59 
The key to this transforming process, qua public deliberation, is that citizens adopt a 
multi-perspectival mode of forming, defending and thereby refining their preferences, 
which in the liberal democratic model are regarded as predetermined or fixed. In 
contrast to the notion of ‘fixed preferences’, deliberative democratic theories stress the 
formulation of carefully considered, consistent, socially validated and justifiable 
preferences. Preference here is characterised by its reflexivity.60 As far as the 
relationship between public deliberation and democracy is concerned, what is 
fundmental yet more important, according to Habermas, is that the formation of public 
opinion or general will is simply not possible without public deliberation.61
Having recognised the importance of public deliberation for a well-functioning 
democracy, empirical democratic theorists have undertaken extensive experimental 
studies which have established that public discussions do indeed influence the 
formation and transformation of individual preference.62 In Taiwan, experiments
58 C. Wright Mills, 1959, The Sociological Imagination, p. 41.
59 Ackerman and Fishkin, 2001, ‘Deliberation Day’, James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (eds.), Debating 
Deliberative Democracy, p. 8.
60 Seyla Benhabib, 1996, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, Democracy and 
Difference, Seyla Benhabib (ed.), pp. 71-2. In this article Benhabib describes what is involved in 
articulating a view in public: ‘The very procedure of articulating a view in public imposes a certain 
reflexivity on individual preferences and opinions. When presenting their point of view and position to 
others, individuals must support them by articulating good reasons in a public context to their 
co-deliberators. This process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individual to think of what 
would count as a good reason’ (Benhabib, 1996, pp. 71-2).
61 See Habermas’ works on public sphere and its implications for the theory of democracy, primarily The 
Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere (1989), Legitimation Crisis (1975), Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) and ‘Towards a Communication Concept of Rational 
Collective Will-Formation’ (1989).
62 For example, Sheri Frost and Denis Makarov present the result of their experiment on public 
deliberation in the article ‘Changing Post-Totalitarian Values in Russia through Public Deliberation 
Methodology’ (1998, PSOline: December 1998, www.apsanet.org), making several important points.
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inspired by the idea of deliberative democracy have been carried out in recent years 
with a view both to encouraging mutual understanding through dialogue among people 
with clashing views on the issue of national identity, that is, reunification versus 
independence, and to engaging the general public in debates on policy.63 Public 
deliberation thus implies ‘a learning process that aims not at some preconceived 
standard of rationality, but at an open-ended and continuous learning process in which 
the roles of both “teacher” and “curriculum” are missing’. That is, ‘what is to be learned 
is a matter that we must settle in the process of learning itself.64 Public deliberation is 
in this sense a process of public education.
From a normative perspective, public deliberation, as many deliberative democratic
First, typically participants had not contemplated the issue of public participation prior to attending the 
forum; once they were asked to consider it, their awareness of many political issues developed rapidly. 
Secondly, generally participants expressed their political views, sympathies, and preferences with more 
clarity and sophistication as the forum proceeded. Finally, participants' discussions ranged far beyond 
the general categories of totalitarian, transitional, and democratic provided as examples of political 
cultural orientations. Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin proposed a research project on ‘Deliberative 
Polling’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2001, ‘Deliberation Day’, Debating Deliberative Democracy). This 
project imagined a new national holiday -  Deliberation Day, held one week before major national 
elections. Registered voters would be called together in neighbourhood meeting places, in small groups 
of IS, and larger groups of 500, to discuss the central issues raised by the campaign. Each deliberator 
would be paid $150 for the day’s work of citizenship, on condition that he or she shows up at the polls the 
next week. All other work, except the most essential, would be prohibited by law (Ackerman and Fishkin, 
2001, p. 7). John Dryzek, in his article ‘Pluralism and consensus in political deliberation’ (presented to 
the Political Theory Workshop at LSE, October 2004), explores the issue of political legitimacy by 
investigating the relationship between pluralism and consensus in political deliberation. He conducted an 
experiment on public deliberation relating to the Bloomfield Track project in the World Heritage 
Rainforest in northern Australia. The results show that although no causal relationships can be 
established between consensus and political deliberation, deliberation does transform individual 
opinions and preferences. See also the newly published work by Fishkin et al, Deliberation Day (2004).
Group discussions have been organised by a Taiwanese NGO, the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan, 
primarily to advance ‘ethnic reconciliation’ and a peaceful solution to cross-Strait problems. Inspired by 
the institutionalised ‘Consensus Conference’ first established in Denmark, a conference of the same kind 
was organised in 2005. The ‘lay public’ was invited to debate a controversial tax policy. A report was 
written and published on behalf of all participants.
64 Offe & Pruess, 1991, ‘Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources’, David Held (ed.), Political 
Theory Today, p. 168.
65 For example, Hannah Arendt used the terms ‘public space’ or ‘public realm’, referring both to the 
space o f appearance and to the world we hold in common (or 'the common world*). See Maurizio 
Passerin d’Entrdves, 2000, ‘Public and private in Hannah Arendt’s conception of citizenship’, Maurizio 
Passerin d’Entrdves and Ursula Vogel (eds.), Public and Private: legal, political and philosophical
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theorists have stated, provides the moral resources of democratic institutions. The 
notion of ‘discourse ethics’, a term used by Habermas to summarise his arguments in 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1992) and Justification and 
Application (1993), implies that: ‘publicly binding norms can only make a legitimate 
claim to rationality, and thus a claim to rational legitimacy, insofar as they emerge out 
of open discourse and free argument between all parties affected by them; that is, 
insofar as they emerge out of contexts corresponding in all crucial respects to a public 
sphere’.69 Discourse ethics emphasises ‘communicative reason’ in the process of 
‘general will’ formation, that is, public deliberation. Communicative reason, as 
opposed to the subject-centred conception of reason, is therefore characterised by its 
‘intersubjectiveness’ .70
perspectives.
66 Jtlrgen Habermas, 1997, ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’, Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas 
and the Public Sphere.
67 JUrgen Habermas, 1989, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, p. 27.
68 The private sphere here simply means the familiar liberal concept of a realm of thought and action 
protected from the coercive power of the state. It entails the concepts of limited government, liberty of 
conscience and the separation of church and state (Evens Chamey, 1998, ‘Political Liberalism, 
Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere’, American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 1, 
March 1998, pp. 97-110).
69 Roberts & Crossley, 2004, After Habermas, p. 6.
70 JUrgen Habermas developed the concept of ‘communicative reason’ in his critical discussion of 
subject-centred paradigms in the essay ‘An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject: 
communicative versus subject-centred reason’ (1990), which appears in The Philosophical Discourse o f 
Modernity, pp. 295-326.
71 John Rawls, 1999, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, Law o f Peoples, p. 132.
72 John Rawls, 1999, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, Law o f Peoples, p. 133.
73 John Rawls, 1993, Political Liberalism, pp. 215-6.
74 Samir Amin, 1989, Eurocentrism, pp. 136-52. Amin argues that Eurocentrism is a specifically modem 
phenomenon, the roots of which go back only to the Renaissance and which flourished only in the 
nineteenth century. In this sense, he states, it constitutes one dimension of the culture and ideology of the 
modem capitalist world. Amin discusses a pluralist view of human development in a universal theory of 
culture. He claims that Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in that it assumes the existence of 
irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different people. Eurocentrism is 
therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. 
But it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is 
the only solution to the challenges of our time (Amin, 1989, p. vii). To develop a truly universal culture
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Political Development: the Evolution o f Public Culture
Understanding political development as the evolution of public culture suggests a view 
of human development different from the ‘progressive view’ of the Enlightenment 
tradition. Historical contingency rather than historical teleology is inherent in the 
conception of public culture. Political development is therefore a historical process that 
can move forwards and backwards. Also relevant and indeed more important to our 
discussion of political development and public culture is the issue of state and public 
culture. Public culture is a resistance culture that is intended to transform and 
eventually conquer state in the sense that public culture changes the cultural aspect of 
state. The cultural aspect of state refers to the ideology of state or ‘official ideology’.
Never the less, public culture should not be accordingly seen as or equated with 
‘ideological struggle’. For whilst public culture is a continuous process of public 
deliberation, any particular ideological struggle in the sense of battling for ideas comes 
and goes. In other words, public culture is a broader conception than ideological 
struggle in that at certain or critical historical moments public culture can function as a 
particular ideological struggle, representing a resistance culture. But at the time when 
public culture has transformed or conquered state, that is, when we witness the 
occurrence of political change, public culture has advanced and institutionalised, and 
become the dominant culture instead of resistance culture. The relationship between 
political development and public culture— political development is the process in 
which public culture evolves— in this research is therefore established through 
aforementioned understanding of the relationship between state and public culture.
and a theory for understanding it, Amin suggests first challenging the culturalist philosophy of history 
that imbues Eurocentrism (ibid., p. 136).
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To explain and understand political development thus requires us to investigate the 
evolution of public culture, that is, the process of public deliberation in which public 
intellectuals as well as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is formed 
and contested, and public consensus to venous degrees is arrived at. Analysis of public 
culture, hence political development, entails contextual analysis of political discourses 
and assessment of their sociopolitical consequences.
The content of a particular political discourse, which emerges in a society at a particular 
stage of development, reflects both domestic and external contexts. By analysing 
political discourses articulated in public deliberation, we can identify and clarify the 
specific problems confronting that society and which issues its members are most 
concerned about. The articulation of political discourses in a public forum not only 
helps the members of the society to comprehend and debate them and the political 
values upon which they are based, but also forges public consciousness and helps 
people reach a consensus on public norms. The origins, evolution, and accumulation of 
these public political discourses thus constitute the history of the collective political 
consciousness of the society in question. Public culture can be understood as collective 
historical-political consciousness, a ‘repertoire’ revealing the possible paths of political 
development.
Public Culture and Taiwan’s Political Development -  Liberalism, Nationalism 
and Welfarism as Social Justice
Liberalism in Taiwan: the Negative Sense o f Freedom
Liberalism and nationalism, two chronically consequential and intellectually related
yet non-overlapping, even competing movements, have dominated public political
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discourse in Taiwan since the end of the Second World War. The discourse of 
liberalism emerged in a historical context marked by two key aspects. The first was the 
Chinese civil war on the mainland, featuring the Nationalist Party or the KMT and the 
CCP as the main protagonists. The second was the Cold War, the power struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the ideological struggle between 
the liberalism and communism that the two societies represented.
The KMT’s long-term reliance on the United States in its struggle against the Chinese 
communists on the mainland during the civil war and on subsequent military and 
economic aid from the United States throughout the Cold War period accounts for the 
incorporation of Taiwan into the US-led liberal camp. Ironically, however, while 
Taiwan was considered to belong to the liberal camp, the KMT claimed that its 
‘historical mission’ to fight for liberal democracy justified its authoritarianism. Civil 
liberties were curbed until the removal of martial law in 1987. Until then, the official 
ideology of liberalism was nothing more than political rhetoric or ‘tokenism’, invoked 
to gain support from other ‘liberal’ countries and bolster the party’s power.
Within this context of political authoritarianism, liberalism in fact functioned as the 
major ‘dissenting ideology’ in Taiwan following the KMT’s retreat to the island in 
1949, following its defeat by the CCP on the mainland. The most influential intellectual 
grouping within the liberal movement was made up of those liberals involved in the 
magazine Free China bimonthly. This was first published in Taiwan in 1949 under the 
‘spiritual leadership’ of Hu Shih, a leading figure of the New Cultural Movement on the 
mainland in the early twentieth century. Lei Chen was in charge of publishing and 
editing the magazine. Lei later became one of the leading lights of a failed attempt to 
form an opposition party in 1960. The magazine was banned in the end as a result of
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this failed movement and criticising the policy and leader of the KMT. The magazine, 
whilst having friendly relationship with the regime initially, fought against the 
communist forces as well as propelling party reform inside the KMT and political 
change within society as a whole.
The KMT asserted that making Taiwan a liberal democratic society and thus a ‘model 
province’, to be emulated on the mainland in future, was a national goal. This makes it 
less surprising that the magazine was furnished with a limited degree of official 
financial support and that its dissenting voices were tolerated to a limited degree. Many 
critics of the KMT saw this as social control however. Liberal intellectuals writing for 
Free China supported the KMT regime for its proclaimed commitment to liberal 
democracy and taking back the mainland. Tensions began to emerge within this 
originally cooperative or friendly relationship when the KMT tightened its control over 
Taiwanese society for reasons of national security, against the background of the 
outbreak of the Korean War. The magazine was ultimately banned in 1960.
As a dissenting ideological discourse, Taiwanese liberalism was characterised by its 
prominent ‘political character’: liberal discourse publicly criticised the totalitarian 
KMT state.75 The theoretical coherence or depth of the discourse was not therefore the 
chief concern of these liberal intellectuals. In the face of authoritarian state control, 
liberalism, unsurprisingly, was commonly considered to be all about ‘individual 
freedom’ in the negative sense, as defined by Berlin.76 Because individual freedom is of
75 Chien Sechin Y. S., 1988, ‘Liberalism and Political Order -  Reflections on the Experience of Free 
China’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly o f Social Studies, vol. 1, no. 4,1988.
76 Isaiah Berlin distinguishes two senses of freedom: negative and positive. Negative freedom is said to 
consist in the absence of obstruction of or interference in one’s activity by others. Political liberty in this 
sense is simply the area within which a person can act unobstructed by others. The wider the area of 
non-interference, the greater the freedom. See Isaiah Berlin, 1958, Two Concepts o f Liberty, pp. 7-8. For
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such great value, liberals argued, governments must be prohibited from interfering with 
it, no matter how worthy their intentions.77 Limited government is thus the ideal form of 
government. The ideas of negative freedom and limited government have been the core 
feature of the public understanding of liberalism in Taiwan from the Free China 
movement to the present.
In an effort to clarify the idea of ‘freedom’, Chang Fo-chuan published a book entitled 
Freedom and Human Rights in 1954. This provided a useful intellectual resource for 
liberals, probing the question ‘what is the essence of freedom?’ and guiding the 
emergent democratic movement. Individual freedom is defined by Chang as basic 
human rights, the preservation of which depends on realising democratic 
constitutionalism. Understanding individual freedom as human rights thus establishes a 
link between the ideals of liberalism and the democratic demand to preserve the 
constitution, theoretically as well as strategically.78
The liberal ideas of individual freedom, human rights, democracy and 
constitutionalism advocated by the Free China group have deeply influenced the 
political imagination of generations of liberal intellectuals and opposition activists 
since the 1960s. ‘Human rights’ is a good example to hand. This concept is so 
influential that all opposition campaigns used to be launched in its name. Moreover, in
a detailed discussion of Berlin’s ‘positive liberty’, see David Miller, 1991, Liberty, p. 10. Miller points 
out that three different doctrines of freedom may usefully be isolated: 1. Freedom as the power or 
capacity to act in certain ways as contrasted with the mere absence of interference; 2. Freedom as rational 
self-direction, the condition in which a person’s life is governed by rational desires as opposed to random, 
non-rational ones; 3. Freedom as collective self-determination, the condition in which each person plays 
his or her part in controlling the social environment through democratic institutions.
77 David Miller, 2003, Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, p. 56.
78 Chien Sechin Y. S., 1988, ‘Liberalism and Political Order -  Reflections on the Experience of Free 
China’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly o f Social Studies, vol. 1, no. 4,1988.
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March 2000, about five decades after the publication of Chang’s book, when the then 
major opposition party, the DPP, won the presidential election for the first time, the 
protection of human rights was proclaimed to be the paramount principle of all state 
policies, though it is quite another issue whether this was merely political rhetoric. 
More importantly, however, the ascendance of negative liberty in Taiwan and the 
state’s retreat from its role in economic re/production and social redistribution has 
increased relative socioeconomic inequality, which had underpinned the country’s 
social capital formation and democratic development.
Crafting a Civic Nation in Taiwan
Nationalism is another influential political discourse that emerged in public debate in 
the early 1970s, though historical events long before had sown the seeds of the 
nationalist debate. The two major nationalist discourses are pro-unification Chinese 
nationalism and pro-independence Taiwanese nationalism. Pre-1949 historical events, 
specifically the 1947 ‘February 28th’ incident, explain the ‘ethnic element’ of these two 
nationalisms: the (ethnic) distinction between mainlanders and Taiwanese (or 
islanders). ‘Mainlanders’ refers to those people who came to the island after 1945 from 
all over China, especially the group that retreated along with the KMT in 1949, and 
their offspring. ‘Taiwanese’ refers mainly to those who came to the island, for the most 
part from the southern part of Fujian province, prior to or during the 1895-1945 
Japanese occupation and who speak the Hokkien dialect.
The tensions between mainlander officials and Taiwanese before the ‘February 28th
incident were rooted in the fact that the war-weary mainlanders came to Taiwan as an
occupying army, with greedy officials and merchants treating the local Taiwanese as
second-class citizens. The incident turned Taiwanese frustration and hostility towards
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mainlanders into violence in the cities. The uprising was brutally suppressed by the 
KMT regime and followed by several months of state-imposed terror, which cowed 
prominent Taiwanese into submission. Memories of this incident provided a rallying 
point for subsequent Taiwanese nationalism.79
The KMT’s Official Nationalism versus Taiwanese Nationalism
After its retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT made ‘retaking the mainland’ from the 
Chinese communists or ‘national unity’ its ultimate goal. The island was regarded as 
nothing more than a ‘base for regeneration’, from which the grand historical mission of 
recovering the mainland and repelling the communists would be carried out. Appealing 
to the Chinese idea of ‘(dynastic) orthodoxy’ (lEfUt, cheng tong), the KMT attempted to 
relegitimise its defeat by the communists. Its official nationalism, consequently, was a 
metamorphosis of this idea of ‘orthodoxy’, which consisted of three elements: ‘dao 
tong’ (3I®C, cultural orthodoxy), ‘fa tong’ legitimate succession) and the
ideology of liberalism. Liberalism, as noted above, was utilised by the KMT in the Cold 
War context as an ideological weapon to contrast itself with communist rule on the 
mainland. These three elements not only relegitimised the defeated KMT but also laid 
the ground for its policy of ‘unification’, which resonated with the Chinese value of 
unity tong).*0
The cultural hegemony and political authoritarianism resulting from the KMT’s 
Chinese nationalist policies not only alienated the native Taiwanese but also aroused
79 David Potter, 1997, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, David Potter et al 
(eds.), Democratization, p. 219.
80 ‘Orthodoxy’ {cheng tong) perse  in the dynastic tradition consisted o f ‘daotong’ and ‘fatong’. For a 
detailed discussion of this point, see Shaw Carl K. Y., 2002, ‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the
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Taiwanese nationalist sentiment. This was so strong that some scholars eagerly sought 
anthropological ‘proof that the native Taiwanese were not Han Chinese, while others 
constructed historical genealogies subverting the ‘China-oriented’ historiography. 
Ming Shih, a left-wing historian who is commonly regarded as ‘the father of Taiwan 
independence’, for instance, is best known for his narrative of Taiwan’s 
‘four-hundred-year’ history, commencing during the Min dynasty, instead of the 
standard history textbook narrative that traces the island’s history back to the common 
genesis of the Chinese nation five thousand years ago.
The KMT’s official nationalist discourse was clearly constructed on the basis of both 
political and cultural nationalism.*1 While it primarily appealed to national unity, 
viewing the Chinese communists as national enemies and the Soviet Union as an 
imperialist country, the common historical link and traditional culture shared by the 
island and mainland were also emphasised. Moreover, as noted above, vigorous 
attempts were made to generate a Chinese/China-centred cultural and historical identity 
among the native Taiwanese, through comprehensive and indeed discriminative 
cultural and language policies. From this perspective, the KMT’s official Chinese 
nationalism was arguably a cultural nationalism in pursuit of cultural homogeneity,
Taiwan Strait’, Issues and Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 125-6.
81Hans Kohn’s classification of nationalism was popularised by Plamenatz. Nationalism was classified 
into two types: Westem/liberal/civic nationalism and Eastern/cultural nationalism. The former was 
thought to be more desirable and acceptable primarily on the basis of a political belief in individualist 
liberal democracy. For these scholars, liberal nationalism is more acceptable because it is premised on 
the Enlightenment values of reason and universalist humanism, linked to democracy, liberalism and 
constitutional rule and aiming to liberate the individual and create a more open, plural, outward-looking 
society. Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, is thought to be more overtly authoritarian, closed, 
inward-looking, particularist, pathological, bellicose and xenophobic. See Andrew Vincent’s critical 
article on liberal nationalism ‘Liberal Nationalism: an Irresponsible Compound?’ For a detailed 
discussion of Hans Kohn’s work, see ‘Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background’ and 
John Plamenatz’s ‘Two Types of Nationalism’ (Andrew Vincent, 1997, ‘Liberal Nationalism: an 
Irresponsible Compound?’, Political Studies, vol. 45, pp. 275-95).
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rather than merely demanding a single public culture as Smith stated in his defence of 
nationalism.82
Efforts were made to construct an ethnic Taiwanese nationalism in response to the 
KMT’s official Chinese nationalism. The most influential discourse of Taiwanese 
nationalism, however, was anchored in the ‘Declaration of Taiwanese Self-Salvation’ 
drafted by Peng Ming-min in 1964. Given that the KMT was regarded as an ‘emigre 
regime’, which gained jurisdiction over the island only in 1945 and paid lip service to 
its proclaimed goal of building a liberal democracy, this Taiwanese nationalism 
naturally combined national and democratic discourses. It is thus no surprise that 
‘democratisation’ and ‘localisation’ or ‘Taiwanisation’ became the central components 
of the discourse generated by the political opposition movement. This subtle discursive 
convergence elucidates the immense emotive power and mass mobilisation of 
Taiwanese nationalism under KMT authoritarian rule.83
It was only in the early 1980s that humanist intellectuals, primarily writers and 
historians, made major, systematic efforts to construct a Taiwanese cultural 
nationalism, which focused on the uniqueness of native Taiwanese culture as opposed 
to the Han Chinese (high) culture promoted by the KMT regime.84 Crafting a 
Taiwanese national literature, national language and national history thus became the 
core features of the discourse and practice of this cultural nationalist movement. The 
invention of the Hoklo writing system is an illuminating example. What should be 
noted here, as discussed in detail in Chapter Four on nationalism, is that some leading
82 See Smith, 1995, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, p. 151.
83 Shaw Carl K. Y., 2002, ‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’, p. 127.
84 See Hsiau A-chin’s book Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, which is perhaps the first
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figures involved in this Taiwanese cultural nationalist movement were participants in 
the Nativist Literary debate in the early 1970s, part of a literary movement of 
anti-western modernism and anti-American imperialism led primarily by pro-China 
left-wing writers.
The Nativist Literary Debate in the Wake of the Diaovutai Incident
The ‘February 28th’ incident in 1947 had a deep impact upon the nationalist public 
debate in Taiwan. The historical events of most direct relevance to the emergence of the 
‘Chinese nationalism versus Taiwanese nationalism’ debate are however the 
‘Diaoyutai Incident’, the controversial return of the Diaoyutai Islands to Japan by the 
United States, and the subsequent severance of diplomatic relations between Taiwan 
and the United States as a result of the normalisation of Sino- American relations.
Central to the Diaoyutai Incident were several waves of student demonstrations against 
the secret deal between America and Japan (the so-called ‘Baodiao’ movement, 
literally, ‘preserve the Diaoyutai Islands’). These began in North America then spread 
to Taiwan through contact primarily between overseas Chinese students from Hong 
Kong in Taiwan and Taiwanese students at American universities. In Taiwan at the 
time, information was tightly controlled and censored and free travel was banned. A 
message like this was likely to arouse anti-American nationalist sentiment and 
therefore to cause tension between the KMT government and the US, the regime’s 
long-term supporter and ally. It could only be transmitted to students in Taiwan by 
these overseas Chinese students, who were able to receive information freely while
comprehensive study on the subject.
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outside of the island.
Within this movement, left-leaning students, moved and mobilised by the American 
student movement specifically, and influenced by the 1968 intellectual and political 
ferment generally, gradually tended to identify themselves with communist China. 
Ideologically, this was rooted in attraction to socialism. Politically, the driving force 
was the CCP’s strong and critical response to the Diaoyutai Incident, its determination 
to ‘preserve the national territory’ and its condemnation of American and Japanese 
imperialism. The right-wing KMT thus lost the confidence of this section of the 
population. Yet the KMT continued to enjoy a certain amount of support from other 
Taiwanese students in North America. These defended the government’s position, 
accusing left-leaning students of being ‘travellers with the Chinese communists’. At a 
time when the latter were viewed as the national enemy, these students were in real 
danger of being charged with treason and imprisonment.
In the Nativist Literary debate, (Chinese) national and socialist discourses appeared to 
converge. Socialist humanism was expressed in the tendency towards social realism 
typical of the leading figures of the nativist literary movement. The ‘Others’ perceived 
by these nationalist/nativist writers and alluded to in their works were America and 
Japan. The nationalist debate in the aftermath of the Diaoyutai Incident in the early 
1970s, unlike that which emerged in the early 1980s, was thus not centred on the 
division between Chinese and Taiwanese national identities. It was primarily a debate 
between Chinese nationalists and pro-West modernists.
The US Nixon administration’s decision to normalise Sino-American relations and the
ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations as a result of the American government’s
policy change plunged the KMT into a crisis of legitimacy. In the context of Taiwan’s
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diplomatic setback, ‘Taiwan independence’ was perceived, primarily by those political 
activists blacklisted by the KMT regime, as a sensible response to Taiwan’s ‘crisis of 
survival’, that is, the risk that communist China might take over the island. It was also 
viewed as a viable alternative to the notion of Taiwan as ‘representative of all China’.
For this group, only by relinquishing this claim within the international community and 
asserting that Taiwan was a political entity separate and independent from the mainland 
could it survive this crisis of international status. The unification-independence issue 
thus entered and subsequently became the core of the public debate between Chinese 
nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism, despite the fact that the term ‘Taiwanese 
nationalism’ was first widely used in the early 1990s.
Taiwanese Consciousness and the Taiwanese Nationalist Movement
The ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate published in various 
Dangwai political magazines in the early 1980s, and the ‘Chinese complex vs. 
Taiwanese complex’ debate, carried out by the pro-China liberal magazine China 
Tribune about a decade later, marked the commencement of an all-out public debate 
between Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists in Taiwan. The changed 
political situation, domestic and international, laid the ground for this debate in general 
and public talk about Taiwanese nationalism in particular. Very briefly, the KMT came 
under immense pressure to embark on political reforms, to liberalise and democratise in 
order to maintain its political legitimacy.
‘Taiwanese consciousness’ was aroused not only in the aforementioned debates but 
also within the political movement campaigning against KMT authoritarianism. The 
evolution of this consciousness reached its climax when Lee Teng-hui, a native
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Taiwanese educated under Japanese rule and trained in the United States, was anointed 
by Chiang Ching-kuo as successor, becoming the (first Taiwanese) president of the 
ROC (Taiwan) in the late 1980s.
Under the Lee government, a series of cultural and educational policies were carried 
out under the banner of ‘localisation’ or ‘Taiwanisation’. The aim here was to cultivate 
and strengthen Taiwanese consciousness, emphasising the ‘subjectivity of Taiwan’, 
primarily in opposition to China. The notion of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ is best 
exemplified in the ‘Taiwan-centred’ principle of official historical education: ‘gaining 
a foothold in Taiwan, having the whole mainland in mind, and bringing the whole 
world into view’ (li-tsu t ’ai-wan, hsiung-huai ta-lu, fang-yen Vien-hsia).85 The election 
in 2000 of the pro-independence Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, the major opposition party, 
further consolidated the island’s turn towards independence despite the lack of 
international support. Since the late 1970s, the elusive ideal of ‘self-determination for 
the residents of Taiwan’, rather than a more direct appeal for ‘national 
self-determination’, had been central to the nationalist-democratic discourse generated 
by the opposition party, legalised only in 1986.
The emergence of Taiwanese civic nationalism has to be understood in the context of 
the island’s political democratisation, which aimed to establish a liberal/ representative 
democracy. For civic nationalists, the process of democratisation itself is that of nation 
formation.86 The civic republican tradition understood Taiwanese autonomy as
85 See Ministry of Education, 1994, p. 829, quoted in Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural 
Nationalism, 2000, p. 155.
86 See Lin Chia-lung, 2002, ‘The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism’, Memories o f the 
Future, pp. 219-41; and Wu Rwei-ren, 2002, ‘Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism: Democratization and 
Taiwan’s Passive Revolution’, Memories o f  the Future, pp. 197-218.
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collective autonomy and citizens’ self-government, aimed at realising the common 
good of the political community.87 The very fact that Taiwan has enjoyed such 
autonomy as a de facto independent political entity hwever renders inadequate the 
nationalist appeal to the principle of national self-determination as the ‘condition’ for 
collective self-government.
Taiwanese nationalism has transformed itself, initially viewing ‘China’ as the nation in 
question, then shifting focus to Taiwanese nation building. Taiwanese national identity 
is in the process of crystallisation. As late as 1996, well over 50 per cent of the 
population, when asked, described themselves as ‘Chinese and Taiwanese’, and just 
over 20 per cent as ‘Chinese’. Today fewer than 50 per cent define themselves as 
Chinese and Taiwanese, and not much more than 10 per cent as Chinese, while those 
who see themselves as simply Taiwanese number more than 40 per cent.88 A more 
recent figure published by a Taiwanese national newspaper in February 2005 showed 
the number of those describing themselves as Taiwanese peaking at 63 per cent.89 
Crafting a civic nation in Taiwan has become an important part of Taiwan’s public 
culture, despite the fact that reunification with the mainland remains the other major, 
though less popular, construct within the public political imagination. Some 
commentators even argued that unification is in actuality ‘out of the map’.90
87 See Iseult Honohan, 2002, Civic Republicanism, pp. 88-9.
88 Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’, London Review o f Books, 2004, Vol. 26, No. 11, p.4. 
(http://www.lrb.co.Uk/v26/n 11/andeO l_.html.)
89 ITie survey was carried out and published by the United Daily Newspaper, on February 26th, 2005. 
(http://www.udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS2/2531807.shtml).
90 This remark was made by Christopher Hughes, an International Relations and China scholar, in his 
public talk on Taiwan and Chinese nationalism on 11 November, 2005, at School of African and Oriental 
Studies, London.
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The Development o f Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan
Compared to the debate over liberalism and nationalism, public welfare has attracted 
relatively less public discussion. Taiwan, however, is widely considered to have been 
tremendously successful at improving basic living conditions over the past four 
decades. This remarkable human development, notably the public provision of 
education and basic health care, reflects the government’s consistent concern for 
welfare. The active role of the state is as central to grasping the history of welfare in 
Taiwan as it is to understanding Taiwan’s rapid and equitable economic development. 
It is sufficient here to note that until the late 1980s, unlike most European welfare states, 
its role was that of ‘regulator’ and ‘coordinator’ rather than ‘provider’. State 
intervention thus tends to mean imposing rules and coordinating available resources 
provided by local as well as international communities.
The Japanese legacy undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of welfare 
capitalism in Taiwan. Apart from this factor, if we wish to understand historically why 
the state focused on welfare and how it evolved, we must take into account the Chinese 
civil war on the mainland, with the capitalist KMT and the socialist CCP the main 
protagonists, including the period following the KMT’s flight to Taiwan. Crucial too is 
the party competition between the KMT and the DPP during political democratisation 
in Taiwan. The KMT’s defeat by the CCP on the mainland was attributed primarily to 
corruption within the party and the appeal of social equality to ordinary Chinese, who 
had suffered during the war and were unhappy with their lot under KMT rule. Learning 
from its defeat on the mainland, the KMT government prioritised socioeconomic 
equality after it fled to Taiwan.
The ‘freedom vs. equality’ issue was also hotly debated among Free China intellectuals
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until Hayek’s free market theory took on such force that freedom in the negative sense, 
including the idea of limited government, was widely considered most crucial to the 
pursuit of liberal democracy. Accordingly, state intervention came to be seen as an 
obstacle, even if it might be necessary for social justice. The KMT, however, was faced 
with the pressing need to gain the political support of the farmers and workers. It thus 
hoped to prevent challenges to its rule, like those which had caused its defeat on the 
mainland, through a ‘pre-emptive strike against the left-wing movement’.91
The Labour Insurance programme, already part of the social policy manifesto of a 
KMT government keen to outmanoeuvre the Communists in 1945 and the first social 
insurance scheme in Taiwan, was therefore introduced in 1950, shortly after the KMT 
was forced to cross the Taiwan Straits. This scheme included the outlines of a national 
nursery policy, labour policy, farming policy and postwar primary social security 
policy.92 This plan was claimed to reflect the philosophy of Sun Yat-sen, the founding 
father of the Republic of China, and his ‘Principle of the People’s Livelihood’. After 
the introduction of the Labour Insurance Programme, the Government Employees’ 
Insurance and Retired Government Employees’ Insurance Programmes were 
introduced in 1958 and 1965 respectively.
Social welfare emerged at the centre of public debate in the 1970s, in the wake of a 
whole range of socioeconomic changes brought about by two decades of capitalist
91 This is often used to describe cases in which social policy is used by politicians to gain power or stay in 
power. The oft-cited example is Bismarck’s social policy in Germany, which was not only a pre-emptive 
strike against left-wing movements but also a nation building effort to assert the authority of central 
government over local governments. See Huck-ju Kwon, 1998, ‘A comparison of East Asian welfare 
systems’, in Roger Goodman et al (eds.), The East Asian Welfare Model -  Welfare Orientalism and the 
State, p. 30.
92 Ku Yeun-wen, 1997, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, p. 32.
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industrialisation. Rising quality of life expectations among the new middle classes and 
increasing discontent among labours and farmers, who lost out in this process, account 
for the emergence of public welfare consciousness. Social class was the major concern 
of the left-wing intellectuals initiating and participating in the Nativist Literary debate. 
The articles and stories published in the representative magazine of the Nativist 
Literary movement, China Tide, were concerned with social issues. Liberals, greatly 
influenced by the ideals of Free China, who saw liberal democracy as the core of their 
intellectual and political movement, also drew public attention to the issue of social 
justice. Liberal-oriented magazines, such as The Intellectual and Taiwan Political 
Review, and the centre-left magazine Movement published during the period of 
Dangwai movement, did collectively help raise the consciousness of public welfare. 
Nonetheless, the government failed to come up with a specific welfare programme 
despite increasing public pressure.
The general public viewed existing public education, basic health care and very limited 
social insurance programmes as inadequate. Demand for better provision was 
incorporated into the opposition’s calls for political reform in the 1980s, forcing the 
government to respond. It launched a pilot Farmer’s Health Insurance scheme in 1985 
and in 1995, five years aheand of the schedule, implemented a National Health 
Insurance programme. Political democratisation and party competition thus largely 
drove new social policy initiatives in Taiwan, for better or worse. On the positive side 
of the balance sheet, the government has had to respond to public demands for social 
protection. Less pleasing is the fact that to attract votes parties tend to ignore the crucial 
matter of fiscal discipline, irresponsibly overselling a vision of social welfare in which 
the state is the main if not only financial provider.
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The public welfare debate in Taiwan has for long centred on the thorny question of 
whether public expenditure on social welfare is necessarily detrimental to economic 
growth. A related yet no less important debate revolves around the state’s role. Should 
it primarily provide or regulate? For libertarians, the state should be barred from 
interfering in economic activities, as this only disturbs the operation of the free market 
and the ‘spontaneous [Hayekian] order’ of society. For economic technocrats, 
economic growth is the priority. Too much public expenditure on social welfare results 
in economic slowdown. Welfare scholars and advocates argue that continuous 
economic growth relies on public investment in social welfare. Moreover, taking the 
Nordic welfare states, in which public welfare is financed by the state, as exemplary, 
welfare scholars have endeavoured to clarify the distinction between social welfare and 
social insurance, urging governments to take more financial responsibility for social 
welfare.
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Chapter Three 
Liberalism and Taiwan’s Political Development
The Chinese Civil War, Cold War and the Liberal Movement in Postwar Taiwan
Defeated by the Chinese Communists in the Civil War on the mainland, the Nationalist 
forces, mainly in the shape of the KMT, were forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. The 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 not only marked the beginning of the four-decade 
long Cold War, but also consolidated the antagonism between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. The Cold War pitched the United States, leader of the ‘Free World’, 
against the Soviet Union, lynchpin of the ‘Communist Bloc’. KMT-ruled Taiwan, 
unsurprisingly, was incorporated into the former camp. The island became an important 
ally of the United States in the region, primarily due to its strategic geopolitical value, 
while Mainland China was under the control of the CCP. Taiwan’s strategic value 
explains why America abandoned its ‘hands-off* or disengagement policy in the 
Chinese Civil War prior to the Korean War.1 The Korean War and subsequent Cold War 
are crucial to understanding the emergence of the Taiwanese authoritarian 
developmental state, and the evolution of the liberal movement, led by intellectuals, 
revolving around the Free China bimonthly.
America’s decision to resume formal relations with the PRC in the early 1970s, in the 
wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, ushered in a series of diplomatic 
setbacks for Taiwan and contributed to a KMT legitimacy crisis on the island. In 1971, 
Nixon’s historic visit to China was announced. In the same year, the ROC’s place at the 
United Nations, including its permanent membership of the Security Council, was
1 For an excellent, detailed historical analysis of American foreign policy in the Far East between 1941 
and 1950, see Tsou Tang, 1963, America’s Failure in China: 1941-50.
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taken over by the PRC, which was accordingly recognised by the international 
community as the sole representative government of all China. America’s new China 
policy culminated in January 1979 with the severance of formal relations with Taiwan.
The Korean War, the Cold War and the United States’ newly minted ‘China policy’ help 
elucidate why liberalism has become an important element of Taiwan’s public culture. 
All imbued the liberal movement in Taiwan in different ways and with different 
consequences. Very briefly, whilst the first two ‘justified’ the KMT’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule as vital to national security, the latter generated an acute legitimacy 
crisis, heaping pressure upon the regime to initiate political liberalisation. Also 
liberalism is in line with anti-communism. It was not until 1987, when martial law was 
revoked after four decades, that Taiwan began to democratise. The opening move was 
the legalisation of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party. After the 
first popular presidential election in March 1996, Taiwan was said, along with other 
‘Third Wave Democracies’, to have completed the democratic transition stage and 
entered that of democratic consolidation.
The aforementioned historical events also informed the context in which liberalism and 
nationalism developed alongside one another. To a great extent, liberal discourses have 
been bound up with the pursuit of different and indeed, since the late 1970s, competing 
nationalist discourses: Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism. Most scholars 
working on Taiwan’s political development tend to treat the concern with national 
identity as the inevitable result of Taiwan’s democratisation, given the tragic ‘February 
28th’ incident in 1947 and native Taiwanese’ perception of the KMT as a foreign regime. 
This research, however, brings out nationalism’s close relation not only with the 
intellectual construction of liberal discourse, but also the liberal democratic movement 
in Taiwan. Nationalism, as this chapter lays bare, thus constitutes another important
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element of Taiwan’s public culture. We shall scrutinise the origin, evolution, 
consequences and prospects of liberalism, as both an intellectual and political 
movement, since the end of the Second World War in Taiwan.
A Liberal Seed in Illiberal Soil: The Aftermath of the KMT’s Defeat and the ‘Free 
China Movement’ from 1949 to 1960
Seeking to grasp why it was defeated by the CCP in the civil war and how the CCP was 
able to gain control of the mainland, the KMT focused on corruption within the party 
and its failure to resolve economic problems, notoriously inflation. People suffered 
enormously from economic chaos and bureaucratic corruption, which eventually 
resulted in almost universal dissatisfaction with the KMT’s rule on the mainland.2 This 
to a large extent explains why the CCP managed to defeat the KMT, which enjoyed 
military and economic support from the United States, despite having far less military 
equipment and logistical wherewithal. The key factor was popular support for the 
CCP’s social programmes and the general public’s loss of confidence in the KMT, apart 
from landlords and capitalists who had been benefiting from the regime’s corrupt rule. 
Having established the causes of its humiliating defeat on the mainland, the party 
carried out internal reforms, focusing on tightening party discipline, to stamp out 
political corruption. At the same time, the regime implemented land reforms restricting 
individual land holdings, abolishing absentee ownership of land and reducing land rent. 
These reforms, as noted above, have had far-reaching economic and sociopolitical 
implications for Taiwan’s development.
2 Maurice Meisner, 1999, Mao’s China and After, p.38
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In Pursuit o f Liberal Democracy: the Foundation o f the Free China Bimonthly
Among the social groups that fled with the KMT to the island in 1949 were the liberal 
intellectuals who founded the Free China bimonthly. The intellectual and political 
movement spearheaded by the leading lights of the magazine from 1949 to 1960 is 
commonly dubbed the ‘Free China movement’, ‘Free China’ referring to ‘the ROC on 
Taiwan’. Initially, the Free China group had a rather friendly relationship with the 
KMT. It was critical of the regime’s authoritarianism while at the same time expressing 
understanding for its difficulty in striking a balance between ensuring national security 
and protecting civil liberties. Indeed, the magazine received financial support from the 
Ministry of Education. The acknowledged common goals of anti-communism and 
liberal democracy3 also drew the two parties together although clearly the KMT never 
wholeheartedly pursued the latter goal.
It is fair to say that the KMT supported the magazine and tolerated its critical opinions 
mainly because it needed the liberal-leaning magazine to ‘window dress’ its de facto 
authoritarian rule. After all, the regime relied on the ideology of liberal democracy to 
establish its political legitimacy on the island and gain the support of the ‘Free World’. 
It also lent on this ideology to reinforce its vision of national unity, quite different from 
that of the Chinese communists. As one leading opposition activist, Fu Cheng, has 
pointed out:
3 The aim of the magazine was outlined in its opening statement: ‘Free China bimonthly aims to 
elucidate the disaster the Soviet Union has caused to the world, especially to China, and the evil the 
Chinese Communist Party has brought to the Chinese people and their country. We discuss this issue and 
contemplate how to end the disaster and the evil. The arguments in this magazine are based on the 
principle of freedom of thought... We denounce totalitarianism and believe in democracy; we pursue the 
freedom of our country and our nation and the peace of the world...’ (FC, Vol. 1, No. 1). In short, the 
magazine intended to promote the values of liberty and democracy, and keep an eye on the government’s 
progress with political and economic reforms and its endeavours to build a free and democratic society; 
to support and prompt the government in the fight against communist totalitarianism and prevent its 
influence spreading; to help fellow Chinese trapped on the communist mainland regain their freedoms; 
and achieve freedom for all of China (ibid.).
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'A  different ideology was needed to deal with both the domestic and international situations and 
that was liberalism. The KMT regime also realised that the names o f the KMT and the People’s 
Three Principles therefore were not appealing and could not change the situation, so the Free 
China movement emerged... In other words, from the very beginning, the Free China 
movement was launched to meet the political needs o f the KMT regime.4 At a time when 
freedom of speech was curbed, the KM T’s tolerant attitude towards the magazine was also 
regarded as one o f several ways o f carrying out social and political control’.
Hu Shih, as noted above, was the spiritual leader of the Free China group. It was Lei 
Chen who actually took charge of the magazine. Other regular contributors included 
Yin Hai-guang, Hsia Dao-ping, Dai Du-heng, Fu Cheng, and Hsu Dao-lin. Of these, 
Yin probably did most to systematically introduce and elaborate western liberalism. He 
is commonly regarded as an important representative of the Free China generation 
influential in the construction of liberal discourse in Taiwan. A memorial foundation 
was set up to commemorate his contribution.
The Legacies of Liberalism in Taiwan and Free China's Conception of Liberalism
Liberal intellectuals around the Free China magazine lent support to the KMT not only 
because of their liberal convictions but also because they, unlike the members of the 
so-called ‘Third Forces’ (officially named the ‘Democratic Alliance of China’), who 
fled to Hong Kong instead of Taiwan with the KMT,5 believed the party was the only
4 Lei Chen, 1989, in Fu Cheng (ed.), Lei Chen Collection Vol. II, p.340. The original plan was to publish 
Free China in Shanghai. The change of political situation on the mainland, i.e. the defeat of the KMT in 
1949, caused the liberal intellectuals involved to change their plan and publish the magazine shortly after 
their arrival on the island.
5 The ‘Third Force’ was a political group set up in 1941 by Chang Chiun-mai and others, originally 
aiming to arbitrate between the CCP and the KMT and avoid causing divisions in the resistance war 
against Japan. The group was later renamed the ‘Democratic Alliance of China’ in 1944 and took part in 
the postwar Political Consultative Conference. In 1947, the Democratic Alliance was outlawed and 
dismissed by the KMT government and fled to Hong Kong the following year, announcing its decision to 
side with the CCP. The intellectual orientation of the Democratic Alliance is close to democratic
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alternative to the CCP. They felt it represented the best hope of liberal democracy being 
established throughout China at some point in the future. As its spiritual leader Hu Shih 
was a leading figure in the 1919 May Fourth movement on the mainland, the liberal 
thought of the Free China group was, unsurprisingly, deeply influenced by this 
intellectual tradition.
It would be misleading, nonetheless, to think of the democratic legacy of the May 
Fourth movement as ‘monolithic’, for there were heated debates about the idea of 
‘democracy’, an essentially contested concept.6 What has been missing in most studies 
in Taiwan on the liberal tradition of May Fourth is the idea of economic democracy, 
which was debated in the early issues of Free China but dropped later after Hayekian 
economic theory prevailed. Taiwan’s liberal legacy was also moulded by the liberal 
democratic movement in Japan, which influenced the Taiwanese intellectual and 
political scene before 1945 through Taiwanese students in Japan.7 Taiwanese elites’ 
periodic petitions for a meaningful role in their own governance were for example 
inspired and encouraged by the Japanese liberal democratic movement.
This liberal tradition in Taiwan, however, came to an abrupt halt due to the Japanese 
government’s brutal repression of liberal democratic thought as Japanese militarism 
surged and preparations were made for war; later, the Taiwanese liberal and leftist elites
socialism. Its leading figures felt that the western idea of liberal democracy was more capable of 
establishing political institutions, whilst the Soviet Union’s socialism was better able to build economic 
institutions. See Yi-chen Chen, 1997, Modern Chinese Political Thought -  from the Opium War to the 
Foundation o f the People’s Republic, pp. 135-7.
6 Although the idea of democracy promoted by May Fourth intellectuals is generally interpreted from the 
liberal perspective, some commentators have contended that it was more complicated than this. For 
instance, Gu claims that socialism and ‘popularistic democracy’ are ‘major theme(s) in modem Chinese 
ideologies since 1910 and by 1919 they had obtained cultural hegemony in Chinese intellectual life’. Gu,
2001, p. 620.
7 As Winckler has pointed out, ‘Taiwanese students in Japan witnessed the flourishing of political parties 
and the expansion of the electorate there. With some encouragement from progressive Japanese in Japan, 
elite Taiwanese demanded the extension of participation to Taiwan, either through the Japanese 
parliament or through home rule’. Edwin A. Winckler, 1988, ‘Mass Political Incorporation, 1500-2000’, 
in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy o f Taiwan, p. 57.
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were eliminated when the KMT cracked down on the February 28th uprising in 1947 
and subsequently enforced the ‘White Terror’ policies of ‘Cleansing the Countryside’ 
and ‘Wiping out the Red’.8 This explains why liberalism in Taiwan was almost 
exclusively moulded by the liberal tradition within May Fourth and why Chinese 
intellectuals involved with or sympathetic to the Free China bimonthly played a 
significant part in Taiwan’s liberal movement.
The Taiwanese political context was dominated by the enmity between the KMT 
regime and the CCP, while the KMT and Free China shared an anti-communist stance. 
The public culture of 1950s Taiwan was thus characterised by the prevalence of 
political discourses repudiating communism, promoting liberal democracy, the rule of 
law and patriotism, and pursuing national unity.9 Given the complete lack of ‘ideal 
speech situations’, public deliberation was confined to internal debate among liberals 
and critiques of communism, rather than debates between different ideologies. A 
left-wing movement had however been active in Taiwan during Japanese rule.10
The liberal Free China intellectuals focussed on the negative sense of liberty. Hayek’s 
The Road to Serfdom and The Constitution o f Liberty were the main intellectual sources 
of Free China's liberal discourse. Chinese political philosopher Fo-chuan Chang’s 
Freedom and Human Rights, discussed later, was seen as a further attempt to convert a
8 See Hsiue Hua-yuan, 1998, Free China' and Democratic Constitutionalism -A n  Investigation Into the 
History o f 1950s Taiwanese Political Thought, pp. 2-3; 51-2; also Wu Nai-teh, 2000, ‘Reactionary 
Discourse and Social Science: the reactionary discourse in Taiwan during the period of authoritarian 
rule’, unpublished conference paper, p. 16
9 Chen Ruei-chung, 1996, ‘ Discourse as a Way of Viewing: a Re-construction of the Field of Political 
Discourse of Free China Bimonthly’. Soochow Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 5, p. 163.
10 Prior to 1925, Taiwanese students in Mainland China and Japan introduced anarchism, socialism and 
Marxism-Leninism to Taiwan. Anti-Japanese imperialism, Taiwan independence and proletarian class 
revolution were advocated. Many Taiwanese intellectuals were engrossed in the success of the 
Bolsheviks in Russia and hence keen to stage a socialist revolution in Taiwan. The farmers’ and workers’ 
movements had flourished since 1924 and the Taiwanese Communist Party was established in 1928 as 
part of the programme of the Third International to reorganise communist movements in Asia. The first 
historical discontinuity of the leftwing movement in Taiwan emerged when the Japanese government 
began to purge Taiwanese communists through military action. See Hua-yuan Hsiue, 1996, p. 52; Chien
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liberal intellectual discourse into a political strategy for democratic constitutional 
reform, by defining the realisation of individual freedom as the protection of human 
rights. Yin, as noted above, played a crucial part in the Free China movement and the 
construction of liberal discourse in Taiwan. Any discussion of Free China liberalism 
thus demands investigation of his ideas, along with those of other important figures.
Hu Shih, in his article ‘What is liberalism?’, defined freedom as acting ‘out of one’s 
own will’ as opposed to ‘out of external force’. This implied freedom from external 
constraints. Hu saw liberal movements in human history as a series of efforts to liberate 
human beings from all sorts of constraints: freedom of religion aimed to liberate people 
from a particular religious authority; freedom of thought meant liberation from control 
by orthodox opinion.11 He attributed the liberal movement’s failure to evolve into a 
democratic movement in East Asian societies, as it had in their Western counterparts, to 
a failure to grasp the central importance of political freedom to the protection of 
fundamental human liberties. Hu thus concluded that the political meaning of
1 "Jliberalism is the establishment of representative democracy. Hu’s argument is within 
the tradition of classical liberal democracy, which emphasised the liberal value of 
toleration and the democratic institutions of majority rule and opposition parties. Hu’s 
emphasis on these values has to be understood in the context of KMT authoritarianism 
during the Cold War.
Hu Shih’s short article on liberalism laid the ground, in a sense, for Free China's liberal 
discourse. It was however the philosophically trained Yin Hai-guang who realised the 
urgent need to produce a consistent and solid argument for liberalism. His article ‘The 
meanings of liberalism’ was written in 1950. It was an attempt to inform people about
Chiung-ren, 1996,142; Kuo Chi-chou, 1999, p. 3.
11 Hu Shih, 1999, ‘What is liberalism?’, in Chang Chung-dong et al (eds.), What is Liberalism?, p. 215.
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liberalism; he felt that most were far better acquainted with and attracted to the ideals of 
socialism, communism, Marxism and Leninism, particularly the value of equality, 
given the acute social problems on the mainland caused by the KMT’s misrule.
People had doubts about and indeed distrusted ‘liberalism’, according to Yin, mainly 
because they mistook it for libertarianism or laissez faire, which ignored 
socioeconomic equality. He claimed, ‘whenever liberalism is mentioned, it seems that 
many people immediately associate it with laissez faire and tend to think that liberalism 
is synonymous with laissez faire’. This was, in his view, the ‘economic interpretation of 
liberalism’.13 He repudiated this comprehensive ‘economic causation’ perspective, 
which was deeply influenced by historical materialism.14
It was not Yin’s intention to deny the contribution of political economy to human 
development or to reject socialism altogether. Yin and Lei Chen had in fact been 
influenced by the Fabian Society’s idea of democratic socialism. Yin’s concern about 
social (inequality is apparent in his view of the nature of the Chinese Civil War, which 
he considered at once a ‘national war (aiming to preserve the nation)’ and a ‘social war 
(aiming to build an equal and progressive society)’.15 Democratic socialism thus held 
an appeal for Free China intellectuals, although they labelled themselves liberals and 
understood liberalism in its classic sense. Social equality and economic democracy 
were the subject of early debates in Free China before Yin introduced Hayek’s theory, 
specifically The Road to Serfdom, which settled the debate and laid down the 
parameters of Free China's liberal discourse.
1 2 pp. 216-7
13 Yin, 1950, ‘The content of liberalism’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 3, No. 3 & No. 4.
14 Yin said that he understood that anyone who had been trained as a communist, directly or indirectly, 
would interpret the history of human society and the development and essence of any thought or theory, 
including liberalism, from the perspective o f ‘economic causation’, (ibid.)
15 Yin, ‘National war or social war?’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 1.
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The Debate over Individual Freedom. Political Liberalism and Social Equality
In his article ‘The content of liberalism’, Yin stated that liberalism fundamentally 
opposed ‘any form of unreasonable constraints on human nature, all shackles on human 
intelligence and any unreasonable regulations on human action’.16 The conception 
implied here is negative freedom, understood as freedom from external interference. 
Hence liberalism signified a ‘resistant attitude towards authority’. In line with the 
negative sense of freedom and interpreting liberalism as an ‘actively resistant spirit’, 
Yin equated political liberalism, or the ‘political dimension of liberalism’ as he termed 
it, with (liberal) democratic politics. This, he thought, was the only political institution 
that could prevent the exercise of unjust power and ensure that human beings were 
treated with dignity.17
In another related article, ‘Individual freedom and political organisation’, Yin 
responded to anxieties about the possible or intrinsic contradiction in the relationship 
between the individual and the collective, arguing that the type of political organisation, 
democratic or non-democratic, was the crucial factor here.18 The classical liberal ideas 
of limited government and the distinction between public and private spheres were 
clearly implied in Yin’s discussion of democratic political organisation. Later, inspired 
by Chang Fo-chuan’s argument on ‘freedom as human rights’, Yin replaced individual 
freedom with human rights and claimed that ‘true democracies’ were those political 
systems that existed to protect fundamental human rights. This is a negative view of 
democracy: it is needed in order to resist state intervention, rather than encourage
16 Yin, 1950, ‘The content of liberalism’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 3, No. 3.
17 ibid.
18 Consistent with his early argument about individual freedom, political liberalism and democracy, Yin 
took Locke’s idea of ‘political organisation’ as representative of democratic political organisation 
because it was designed to fulfil individual political will and guarantee that all individuals were equal 
before the law. Those political organisations set up according to Lenin’s theory were non-democratic 
mainly because they were intended to serve the collective will at the cost of individual freedom. See Yin,
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public participation by citizens.
The initial debate over individual freedom and social equality among Free China 
intellectuals, as noted above, is best understood in the global context of the ideological 
antagonism between communism and liberalism and the local context of the aftermath 
of Chinese civil war. Having recognised that the defeat of the KMT by the CCP on the 
mainland was due to socioeconomic polarisation and political corruption, it was widely 
agreed among the Free China intellectuals that the core value of socialism, i.e. equality, 
must be taken into account. This inspired a debate on whether freedom and equality, or 
in present terms, democracy and justice, were difficult if not impossible to obtain at the 
same time.
Tseng Hsu-bai, a much-respected postwar Taiwanese journalist, argued that democracy 
and socialism, which respectively meet the political and material needs of individuals, 
were indispensable to achieving a truly liberal society. His argument rooted in 
democratic socialism, he criticised the inhuman treatment suffered by the working 
people in a capitalist society which saw them merely as the machinery of production. 
He cast doubt on communism’s capacity to deliver an equal and at the same time 
democratic society.
He assailed the notion of individual freedom in a capitalist class society, arguing that: 
‘It seems that everyone enjoys political freedom, economic freedom, freedom of 
education, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and 
freedom of speech, et cetera, in a capitalist society. However, the fact is that the rich 
enjoy far more freedom than the poor... as poor people have to work most of their time 
to earn a living... Under the capitalist system, wages for labour are actually regarded as
1950, ‘Political organisation and individual freedom’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 10, No. 2.
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the benevolence of employers rather than human rights to which the labourers are 
entitled... In such a class society, in which most people are working slaves and few are 
masters... freedom, equality, and fraternity are only meaningful for the bourgeoisie, and 
the principle that democracy is of the people, by the people and for the people is only 
applied to the bourgeoisie’.19
The repressive, bureaucratic regimes exercising tutelage over the proletariat in the
onSoviet Union and Eastern Europe caused Tseng to doubt whether socialism could do a 
better job than capitalism of establishing social welfare and political democracy. Indeed, 
from a global perspective, Stalinism had done permanent damage to the world 
communist movement by the mid-twentieth century.21 In the context of demoralised 
world communism, tainted by Stalinism, Tseng critically examined the sociopolitical 
situation on the mainland a year or so after the CCP’s take-over. He concluded that: 
‘[T]he labourers and peasants are still suffering... Although communism has triumphed 
over capitalism and the capitalist regime has been replaced by the proletarian regime, 
yet human rights are not being protected and the achievement of social revolution is 
still out of sight’.22
In an article entitled ‘On planning and freedom’, Hsi-he Wang expressed a similar but 
more radical view of the importance of economic equality to realising individual 
freedom and political democracy. It was an attempt to make a case for a planned 
economy, at a time when most intellectuals, especially liberals, tended to associate this 
with totalitarianism. Wang’s argument, simply put, was that no truly ‘free economy’ 
had ever existed. He asserted that since the end of the Second World War, all economies
19 Tseng Hsu-bai, 1950, ‘On liberalism, democracy, and socialism’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 6.
20 See Perry Anderson, 1976, Considerations on Western Marxism, p. 25.
21 See Chun Lin, 1993, The British New Left, pp. 2-3.
22 Tseng Hsu-bai, 1950, ‘On liberalism, democracy and socialism’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 6.
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had been planned in one way or another. While planning was the order of the day in 
socialist countries, even the most capitalist societies planned their economies to a 
certain degree. At the same time, Wang was not unaware of the problem of low 
productivity that blighted most socialist societies. He argued that the idea of equality 
would be meaningless if the end result of the socialist experiment was that everyone 
was equally poor. In making a case for a meaningful conception of freedom very much 
in the Marxian fashion, Wang urged people to reconsider and even relinquish the ideas 
of individualistic economic freedom and the free market altogether.23
Around the same time that the ‘freedom vs. equality’ debate was exercising the minds 
of Free China intellectuals, a comprehensive land reform programme was launched by 
the KMT. This was in part a pre-emptive strike intended to prevent the emergence of a 
labour movement which might one day topple the regime, inspired by the bitter 
experience of defeat by the communists not long ago. It was also a response, however 
reluctant, to pressure from the United States, whose primary aim was to incorporate 
Taiwan into the postwar global political economy of capitalism.24 The debate seems not
23 Wang identified two main goals of socialism: ending exploitation and achieving fair distribution of 
social wealth, and the effective and reasonable utilisation of national resources to prevent economic 
panic. He saw common ownership of the means of production as the only way to achieve these social 
goals. Yet he argued that enhancement of productivity to raise people’s living standards was 
indispensable for building an ideal socialist society. Wang argued that as long as social justice and 
economic equality were considered social goods to be pursued with vigour, the ideas of individualistic 
economic freedom and the free market should be reconsidered and even relinquished. He argued that the 
idea of individualistic economic freedom, which consisted of individual freedom of consumption, of 
investment, and free choice of occupation, et cetera, had lost its meaning in contemporary capitalism due 
to the increasing monopoly of private enterprises in the market, the increasingly imperfect competition in 
production, and the malfunctioning of trade unions, which were more and more concerned about their 
own interests rather than the welfare of workers. See Wang Hsi-he, ‘On planning and freedom’, Free 
China, 1950, Vol. 3, No. 1.
24 It may appear contrary to common belief to argue that the KMT responded reluctantly to American 
pressure in embarking on land reforms. However, ‘nationalist sensitivities about American interference 
applied particularly to land reform’ and ‘became particularly acute with regard to the critical third phase 
of land reform’. Very briefly, the dispute over the last phase of land reform between the United States and 
Taiwan involved problems related particularly to the transfer of Government enterprises. America’s 
primary concern was to secure a private sector and to guarantee Taiwanese participation in it. See Denis 
Fred Simon, 1988, ‘External Incorporation and Internal Reform’, in Winckler and Greenhalgh (eds.), 
Contending Approaches to the Political Economy o f Taiwan, pp. 149-48.
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have affected the strategies pursued by the authoritarian KMT developmental state. 
Although some liberal intellectuals vehemently advocated the value of economic 
freedom at home and the United States intervened to install economically liberal 
institutions, public sector economic activity still made up a large chunk of Taiwan’s 
industrial economy at the time. It remained central to the island’s economy until the 
idea of privatisation, with its appeals to efficiency and competitiveness, came to 
dominate the public imagination regarding economic institutional design in the 1980s. 
Calls for privatisation of state-own-enterprises were incorporated into the opposition 
movement’s political discourse, thus ‘moralising’ privatisation in Taiwan’s political 
context.
Setting the Tone of Liberal Discourse: Freedom over Equality
Wang’s article questioned the individualistic conception of economic freedom in 
contemporary capitalist societies, arguing that a planned economy could help bring 
about a more meaningful freedom that could be enjoyed by all members of society, rich 
and poor. After its publication, Yin defended liberalism in general and his notion of 
‘economic freedom’, which constituted one aspect of individual freedom, in particular, 
by pointing out the major failure of planned economies: low productivity. Having 
recognised that no existing economy was truly free and that capitalism did cause acute 
sociopolitical and international-political problems,25 Yin suggested that it was 
important to figure out whether the problems of existing societies since the Second 
World War were theoretical or practical in nature. Their deep belief in the negative
25 Yin mentioned that both economic inequality and social polarisation had occurred as a result of the 
capitalist industrialisation. He also alluded to Lenin’s theory that ‘imperialism is the highest stage of 
capitalist development’ and the related issue of anti-colonial nationalism. See Yin, 1950, ‘The content of 
liberalism’, Free China, 1950, Vol. 3, No. 3
26 Although Ym did not answer his question concerning the ‘theory and practice’ problem, throughout his 
discussion, the Soviet model of socialist industrialisation was equated with ‘state capitalism’ and 
‘economic paternalism’, about which he commented critically (ibid.).
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sense of liberty convinced Yin and his fellow liberals that it would be very difficult if 
not impossible for people to obtain political freedom if their ‘stomachs’ were controlled 
by the state.27
In a political context in which most people in China longed for freedom and equality, or 
democracy and justice, and given the different conceptions of freedom, socialism and 
liberalism, Yin eschewed glib answers. It was not until he was led to read Hayek’s 
works, particularly The Road to Serfdom, by renowned postwar liberal economist Hsia 
Dao-pin, that Yin finally overcame his confusion about the complex relationship 
between political freedom and economic freedom. From this point forward he stood 
firm in his defence of a free economy, which, he was convinced, was indispensable for 
individual freedom.28
Unlike Yin and other liberal intellectuals involved in Free China, convinced by the 
socialist theory of economy, Hsia Dao-ping was a died-in-the-wool economic liberal. 
Hsia was a trained economist who actively engaged in the ‘freedom vs. equality’ debate 
during the latter days of Free China. Unsurprisingly, he argued strongly against 
economic regulation. He wrote an editorial for the magazine entitled ‘The government
27 Yin took the situation of tigers in a zoo to illustrate this point: ‘the reason why ferocious tigers in the 
zoo have to listen to the animal tamer’s orders is because they cannot search for food freely in the woods’, 
(ibid.)
28 In Ihe foreword to the Chinese version of The Road to Serfdom translated by himself, Yin said: ‘I am a 
liberal. Like most liberal-leaning young men influenced by the May Fourth movement, I am not 
self-conscious of my exclusive attention [confusing/meaningless] to the political dimension of liberalism. 
There is also an economic dimension of liberalism, which has been the target of the socialist critics. 
Liberals, including Jeremy Bentham, amended the classical idea of the free economy in response to 
criticisms made from the socialist perspective.... Faced with the serious challenge from the communists 
and propelled by the motive of alleviating the urgent situation, many Chinese liberal intellectuals are 
arguing for “political democracy and economic equality”. Such arguments actually ask people to be 
“masters in the political domain and slaves in the economic domain”. I personally feel this argument is 
problematic. However, I am neither a political scientist nor an economist. All I can express, therefore, is 
my feeling that there is something wrong with the argument. My thoughts have been trapped for a long 
time due to my confusion. Suddenly my confusion was overcome when I read Professor Hayek’s The 
Road to Serfdom. Hayek drew liberalism back on the right track, away from the attraction of the 
economic theory of socialism.... If a person’s rice bowl is controlled by a strong person, how can he or 
she obtain any freedom?’. Yin, 1990, ‘Foreword’, pp. 1-2.
96
should not induce people to commit crimes’29 and another unpublished editorial, ‘A 
few questions related to the death of Sun Yuan-chin’, often cited to illustrate the 
magazine’s free economy stance, which was coloured by an emphasis on ‘freedom over 
equality’. Here, Hsia fiercely criticised the government’s policy of financial regulation, 
commenting on two incidents involving the corruption of financial inspectors and 
police officers. Later, Hsia shifted the focus of his criticisms to state-owned enterprises 
and the broader issue of the party-state capitalist regime in postwar Taiwan.31
From the mid-1950s onwards, against the background of the authoritarian rule of the 
KMT developmental state and the broader historical context of the Cold War, Hayek’s 
work exercised a pervasive influence on public discourse in Taiwan, especially his 
distinction between ‘spontaneous order’ and ‘designed order’, anchored in classic 
liberal rationalism. Liberalism of the kind propagated by the New Right in the 1970s 
and 1980s seems to have dominated Taiwanese public culture at the time. Indeed, 
despite challenges, intellectual as well as political, from various perspectives, 
adherence to an abstract and rationalistic conception of homo economicus, the pursuit 
of a general theory of minimal government, an individualist and legalist conception of 
contractual relationships as the basis of economic and social order and the utopian
29 Hsia, 1951, ‘The government should not induce people to commit crimes’, Free China, 1951, Editorial 
II, Vol. 4, No. 11. In this incident, police officers, attracted to the money reward offered by the authorities 
for fighting economic crimes, induced a man to break the related financial regulations.
30 This article was written in 1955 but not published because the magazine’s editor was afraid that it 
might get the publication into trouble. The case involved the death of a businessman who committed 
suicide due to die unbearable pressure from corrupt officials who falsely accused him of receiving money 
from the mainland (all forms of interaction were prohibited at that time) and threatened to report him if 
he failed to give them money. See Hsia, 1989, ‘A few questions related to the death of Sun Yuan-chin’, A 
Collection o f Hsia’s Works (Volume I: My Time in Free China).
31 See Hsia, 1955, ‘The mission of private enterprises’ (Free China, 1955, Vol. N o.) and 1958, ‘On the 
drawbacks of foreign exchange controls’ ( Free China, 1958, Vol. 18, No. 5). In the former, Hsia bluntly 
opposed the monopoly of state-owned enterprises, arguing that these should be confined to those 
industries involving scarce natural resources with a view to preventing private monopoly, which would 
result in market failure. Moreover, Hsia made a simple association between the scale of state-owned 
enterprises and regime type -  the larger the scale, the less democratic. In the latter article, Hsia pointed 
out that the KMT party benefited from the state’s policy of regulating foreign exchange.
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preoccupation with constitutional devices32 remain key features of liberal discourse in 
present-day Taiwanese society.
The Abortive New Party Movement and the End of the Free China Era
The Free China era ended after the publication of a special issue in 1956 to celebrate 
Chiang Kai-shek’s seventieth birthday,33 a series of articles in 1957 criticising the 
KMT’s state corporatist policies34 and numerous contributions between 1959 and 1960 
arguing for the legalisation of opposition parties. Prior to the publication of these 
critical articles, tension between the magazine and the authorities had already 
intensified because of the call by Free China liberals for freedom of speech. In the 
anti-communist context, any criticisms of the KMT’s authoritarian rule were almost 
always distorted and claimed to be communist propaganda.
For instance, following publication of the aforementioned editorial, ‘The government 
should not induce people to commit crimes’, The Public Security Police Headquarters 
involved in the incident issued a warning to editor-in-chief Lei Chen, accusing him of 
discrediting them. They kept the Lei residence under surveillance. An official report 
was authored to make a case of arresting other editors. This was not however carried
32 These are the distinctive features of the British New Right, as John Gray pointed out in his polemic 
article ‘The Strange Death of Tory England’ (collected in Gray, 1997, Endgames). Yet, Taiwanese liberal 
discourse since the mid-1950s has also featured these elements, apart from the emergence of egalitarian 
liberal discourse, which has challenged but is nowhere near replacing classic liberal discourse in public 
fora.
33 The advice given by the contributors to this ‘Special Anniversary Issue’ on, for example, the 
parliamentary system, the professionalisation of the army, etc., was considered by the authorities to ‘pave 
the way for communist propaganda’ and was attacked by all official propaganda organs. A pamphlet 
titled Comprehensive Attack on Poisonous Thoughts was later handed out to soldiers and officers in the 
army. These ‘poisonous thoughts’ include: freedom of speech, the professionalisation of the army, free 
education and personal criticism of the President. See Lee Hsiau-feng, 1987, Forty-year Democratic 
Movement in Taiwan, p. 61.
34 This series of articles was published under the title ‘Today’s Problems’ and was published in the 
magazine over seven months from August 1957. It began with the issue of ‘Retaking the mainland’ and 
ended with that of ‘opposition party’, raising fifteen problems in total.
35 Apart from the issue of an opposition party, Free China also urged Chiang Kai-shek not to run for a 
third term as ROC president as it would be unconstitutional.
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out. The government issued a statement emphasising the need for financial regulations 
and calling upon the press to support it.36 The seemingly positive response to this 
statement, the editorial ‘On economic regulations (II)’ in the following issue, inspired 
Hu Shih to protest against both the magazine’s caving in and the government’s 
interference, triggering a heated debate.
The campaign for the legalisation of opposition parties in the 1960s, commonly dubbed 
the ‘New Party Movement’, marked the most radical phase of the whole Free China
<5Q
era. This campaign tested the limits of KMT tolerance of the dissenting voices of Free 
China intellectuals, ultimately causing the publication’s demise. Based on the argument 
of ‘freedom as human rights’ developed by Chang Fo-chuan, Free China, in 
collaboration with local Taiwanese elites, attempted to found an opposition party that 
fused movements pursuing both civil rights and political rights.40 A non-adversarial
36 In its defence, the government emphasised the necessity for financial regulations to prevent illegal 
financial activities, possibly organised and manipulated by Chinese Communist agents. The press was 
called upon to support the policy. In response, die editors held a board meeting and decided to write 
another editorial ‘On economic regulations (II)’. Pressurised to respond to the government’s statement 
positively, the article recognised that financial controls were vital to maintaining a stable economy. It 
also expressed appreciation for the labour, integrity, and achievement of the officials responsible for such 
tasks.
37 The editorial, Free China, 1951, Vol. 5, No.4.
38 Hu Shih however considered this response a retreat from the magazine’s fight for freedom of speech. 
He then threatened to resign as its publisher. In the following issue {Free China, 1951, Vol. 5, No. 6), the 
response by the then Premier Chen Cheng was published, stating that the government was determined to 
protect freedom of speech and the publication of Hu’s letter proved that the government did not interfere. 
From that point on, numerous articles contributed to the debate on freedom of speech, including, for 
instance, Yin’s editorial ‘Knowledge and the basic conditions for freedom of speech’ {Free China, Vol. 5, 
No. 7), Lei’s ‘Democratic politics and public opinion (I), (II), (III), (IV)’, a lengthy text published 
successively in several issues as serial articles {Free China, 1951, Vol. 5, No. 9; Vol. 5, No. 10; Vol. 6, No. 
1; Vol. 6, No. 2) and ‘On the nature of public opinion (I) and (I)’ {Free China, 1954, Vol. 12, No. 10; Vol. 
12, No. 11).
39 The magazine, however, featured advocacy of new parties as early as 1950, when a draft outline of the 
organisation of a new party, the China Liberal Party, was published {Free China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 1 & 
Vol. 2, No. 2). Nonetheless, the new party was expected to be supportive of the KMT rather than an 
opposition party. This explains the emergence of the ‘Free China Alliance', aiming to recover the 
mainland. Hu Shih was considered its leader. Lei Chen’s article ‘How to protect the freedom of the 
opposition party’, published the same year, was the first to discuss the issue (Lei, 1950, Free China, Vol. 
2, No. 7).
40 Local elections in Taiwan were already held under Japanese rule in 1935 as the result of the ‘home rule’ 
movement led by the liberal Taiwanese elites. During its later years, some members of Free China began 
to express concern about local elections and wrote reports and commentaries on the campaigns and the 
results of the elections. Chen Lei was invited to a review meeting after the Taiwan Provincial Assembly,
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multi-party system existed in Taiwan at the time, including the KMT, the China 
Democratic Socialist Party (the CDSP) and the Young China Party (the YCP), but 
competitive party politics was entirely absent since only the KMT wielded power. 
Because of the dominance of the issue within public debate, Free China had published 
a considerable number of articles on the idea of an opposition party, most notably those 
by Chu Ban-yun, published between 1955 and 1958.41
The Free China era ended with the imprisonment of Lei Chen and Fu Cheng, two key 
Free China figures involved in the abortive New Party movement, and the banning of 
the magazine. A decade of political silence followed before the liberal democratic 
movement was rejuvenated in the 1970s.
The Silenced Liberal Voice and Its Re-emergence, 1961-1975
Politics stagnated for a decade or so after the banning of Free China and the arrest of 
Lei Chen and other Free China figures involved in the New Party movement in 
September 1960. The already limited space for public political critique was further 
reduced. The prospects for liberalism in Taiwan looked bleak in light of the continued 
political repression. Yet the political silence of the general public in 1960s Taiwan was 
partly a result of unprecedented economic expansion, which provided the KMT with 
legitimacy.
The 1970s witnessed remarkably rapid and at the same time equitable economic 
development, a key component of the ‘Taiwan miracle*. As Taiwan was incorporated 
into the global capitalist system as a result of internal and external initiatives, primarily
mayoral and county leader elections in 1957. The idea of founding an opposition party emerged from the 
subsequent meetings.
41 See Chu, from 1957 to 1958, Free China, Vol. 16, No. 7; Vol. 17, No. 6; Vol. 18, No. 4; Vol. 18, No. 9; 
Vol. 19, No. 5; Vol. 20, No. 10; Vol. 23, No. 5. Mo Li-fei’s ‘On the difficult aspect of the opposition party 
problem’ (1957, Free China, Vol. 16, No. 3) appeared earlier.
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by America and Japan, it confronted a series of diplomatic setbacks, beginning with the 
Diaoyutai Incident in the early 1970s and ending with the normalisation of Sino-US 
relations in 1979. Nationalist discourse of an anti-imperialist tenor began to compete 
with liberal discourse for attention within public debate, as represented by the Nativist 
literary debate; it came to constitute part of Taiwanese public culture.
Literature Star (1957-1965): from cultural critique to political criticism
After Free China was banned, Literature Star emerged as the main conduit of liberal 
thought in the 1960s. Originally, Literature Star was not a political but a literary 
magazine, publishing articles on art, literature and lifestyle. Later on, articles including 
more social and political commentary began to occupy a considerable proportion of the 
magazine. It then took a ‘political turn* in 1961 after Lee Ao,42 an iconoclastic liberal 
modernist, and other like-minded young men joined the magazine. Based on a firm 
belief in modernisation and western values such as democracy and science, the main 
elements of the so-called ‘May Fourth spirit* as understood by liberal intellectuals in 
Taiwan, Literature Star confronted Chinese traditionalists in the ‘Chinese Culture vs. 
Western Culture’ debate. At the heart of this debate were arguments over the 
compatibility of western values and Chinese culture and the need for another ‘new 
culture movement’, i.e. a comprehensive cultural transformation, to modernise the 
country.
A liberal cultural discourse like this was especially radical and politically sensitive in 
light of the ‘Chinese cultural renaissance movement’, a cultural campaign launched by 
the authorities to spread political propaganda. It was intended to show the Chinese
42 Lee is a well-known historian, writer and political critic of liberal orientation. He was a ‘cultural hero’ 
in the eyes of many university students who were deeply influenced by Lee’s cultural critiques on 
traditional Chinese culture and his argument for modernisation in the western style. Lee’s iconoclastic
101
people, on the mainland and on the island, that the KMT represented the cultural 
orthodoxy of China in the wake of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. From 1962 
onwards, political criticisms began to appear in the magazine in addition to cultural 
critiques. Unsolved political issues close to the hearts of Free China liberal intellectuals 
were addressed. In 1965, at a time when no sign of political liberalisation was to be seen, 
Literature Star suffered the same fate for criticising the KMT’s political repression as 
had Free China -  it was banned.
The Intellectual Magazine (1968- 1973): electoral politics and social welfare
Changed domestic and external situations in the 1970s consolidated the political trend 
towards liberalisation and democratisation. At the same time, the discourse of liberal 
capitalist modernisation was being challenged in the early 1970s as leftists incorporated 
social welfare into public debate. Internally, apart from concern about political reform, 
public attention shifted from Taiwan’s economic success, primarily the improvement of 
its human capital, to the lives of those who had benefited less if not totally lost out in the 
process of Taiwan’s incorporation into the global capitalist system. The leftwing ideas 
‘smuggled’ into Taiwan by overseas Chinese students, the student demonstrations in the 
wake of the Diaoyutai Incident and the Nativist Literary movement that followed all 
played an important part in raising public awareness of the issue.
Externally, as American relations with the PRC improved, the United States began a 
protracted process of diplomatic and military disengagement from Taiwan. Meanwhile, 
Taiwan became more deeply enmeshed in both the American and Japanese economies 
as they used Taiwan’s cheap and skilled labour to compete with each other. Politically 
and economically, Taiwan, like its regional neighbour South Korea, moved from the
book Monologue Under the Tradition was enormously popular among students at the time.
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periphery to the semiperiphery within the world system.
The Intellectual, originally a literary magazine founded in 1968, turned into a political 
magazine in the mid-1970s, when Taiwan faced an uncertain future. Its international 
status changed dramatically as a result of America’s new China policy and the ensuing 
domestic political situation, as Chiang Ching-kuo was groomed to succeed his father 
Chiang Kai-shek as the president of Taiwan. Inheriting the liberal tradition of Free 
China, modernisation, human rights and democratic constitutionalism continued to be 
central to the concerns of the liberals involved in The Intellectual. Social welfare and 
farmers’ welfare/agriculture policy, however, emerged as two of nine issues addressed 
in a co-authored article on national affairs published in 1972 after Taiwan (ROC) was 
expelled from the United Nations.43
From the beginning, the KMT’s agricultural reform policy had two faces. On the one 
hand, state action was the key to increasing agricultural growth; on the other, 
agriculture was consistently squeezed to provide the surplus necessary to finance the 
growth of other sectors. This included a labour surplus drawn from the rural areas. The 
cornerstone of both sides of state policy was the three-stage land reform initiated in 
1949 and completed in 1953. Land previously owned by landlords under Japanese rule 
was distributed to a peasant majority that had not struggled to attain it. Landlords were 
given land bonds in kind and stocks in the four main state-owned enterprises in 
exchange for the compulsory divestiture of their holdings.44 The land reform ended 
landlordism in Taiwan and, together with the Green Revolution, contributed to the high 
growth of Taiwan’s agricultural production. It transformed the life of almost every 
peasant, narrowing the gap between industrial income and agricultural income and 
preventing extremes of inequality. Agricultural decline and outflow of population from
43 See The Intellectual, ‘Nine issues of national affairs’, 1972, Vol. 49.
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the countryside nonetheless remained serious problems.
Crucially, while The Intellectual was commonly regarded as a liberal magazine which 
aimed to disseminate liberal democracy, it attracted some intellectuals more 
preoccupied with social justice than political liberalism. Wang Hsin-ching (otherwise 
known as Nanfanshou), for example, was one of those who actively participated in the 
Baodiao movement. He was also deeply involved in mobilising the students’ 
movement. When Wang dubbed The Intellectual the ‘last fortress of Chinese 
liberalism’, he meant Sim Yat-sen’s ‘Three Principles of the People’ (nationalism, 
democracy and the livelihood of the people),45 though this was certainly not how the 
doctrine was commonly interpreted.46 The later rupture in The Intellectual group can be 
attributed to the differing priorities of its participants; it emerged as the result of an
A m
internal ‘left-right’ debate.
The liberal democratic movement took advantage of successive external political and 
economic shocks48 to challenge the Establishment, while generational and leadership 
transitions primed the ruling elite for change. International recognition of Beijing rather 
than Taipei as the lawful representative of all China sparked off a serious crisis for the 
KMT regime, whose legitimacy had been built primarily on two related bases: the
44 See Alice Amsden, 1985, pp.84-5.
45 Wang, 1978, The Last Fortress o f Chinese Liberalism, pp. 189-90. He fiercely criticised the dominant 
liberal idea of the group for being influenced by western liberalism in the utilitarian tradition. He then 
claimed that: ‘Liberalism cannot indicate the proper direction of China’s development because of its 
hypocrisy and powerlessness, and its highly compromising attitude towards international affairs.... On 
the contrary, Sun Yat-sen bequeathed to us sufficient wisdom on the issue.... However, most of the group 
has ignored the instructions of the Three Principles of the People. Some ignore the importance of 
nationalism in the current stage; some are poisoned by (western) liberalism and thus oppose the Principle 
of the People’s Livelihood. In fact, without the Principle of the People’s Livelihood as its prop, we cannot 
realise the Principle of Democracy. The only way out for China’s development is to unite with all nations 
who treat us as equal to fight against all forms of imperialism’.
46 The Three Principles of the People are commonly regarded, as Bergdre commented, as ‘a work of 
propaganda, a long political tract designed to win followers rather than to instil conviction, an appeal to 
action rather than to thought’. See Bergfcre, 1994, Sun Yat-sen, p. 353.
47 It was a ‘right-left’ conflict in that whilst most involved were liberal democrats, some who were deeply 
influenced by the ‘radical liberalism’ of the 1970s and involved in the student Baodiao movement tended 
to incorporate nationalism and socialism into their ‘liberal discourse’.
48 The economic shock here referred primarily to the oil crisis in 1974.
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ideology of retaking the mainland and internationally recognised status. To maintain its 
legitimacy, stable economic development and political liberalisation became the two 
main tasks of Taiwan’s new leader, Chiang Ching-kuo. The so-called ‘nativisation’ or 
‘Taiwanisation’ policy was initiated to bring more local Taiwanese into the political 
elite and establish a popular base among the Taiwanese masses. Supplementary 
elections were held to this end and in response to The Intellectual's call for 
comprehensive re-election of representatives at central government level.49 This 
remained the main theme of the liberal democratic movement in Taiwan until it was 
realised in the early 1990s.
In 1973, The Intellectual disintegrated into four groupings, represented respectively by 
four magazines with different orientations and preoccupations: Man and Society and 
China Forum, led by American-trained liberal Yang Kuo-shu, who had studied 
psychology; The Intellectual led by Chen Shao-ting; Taiwan Political Review and This 
Generation led by Huang Hsin-chieh and Chang Chun-hung; and the leftwing China 
Tide led by Chen Yin-chen, a realist novelist and leading figure in the Nativist literary 
debate. The politically quiet period from the 1960s to mid-1975 was followed by the 
vibrant Dangwai era, culminating in the end of KMT authoritarianism.
The Dangwai Era: the Turn towards Democratisation, 1975-1987
The Dangwai era witnessed waves of political opposition and the mushrooming of 
dissenting political magazines. Yet this was by no means a united movement, its 
participants differing particularly on the unification-independence issue. They were
49 Chen Shao-ting was the first person to question the ‘representativeness’ of the central representatives. 
He pointed out that ‘only 27 out of a total o f2000 central representatives were elected from the region of 
Taiwan in the supplementary election of December 1969; the others were either elected in 1947 and 1948 
or took over the seats of those who for various reasons were no longer able to do their jobs’. See Chen, 
1971, ‘The question of the re-election of central representatives’, The Intellectual, No. 46.
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united primarily under the banner of the ‘democratic movement’, joining forces in the 
manner of a ‘democratic alliance’ to fight the KMT’s authoritarianism. Intellectually, 
the Dangwai movement’s liberal-democratic discourse remained much the same as 
Free China's in the 1950s, though the feminist intervention in the liberal debate in the 
later stages of the Dangwai era broadened the parameters of liberal discourse. 
Politically, however, Taiwan’s liberal-democratic movement gained momentum during 
this period, its most notable achievement being the removal of martial law in 1987 after 
four decades.
Taiwan Political Review and the 1977 Chungli Incident
Taiwan Political Review, published in 1975, was a key component of the movement in 
its early stages. Most of its contributors later became leading figures in the foundation 
of the first opposition party, the DPP, in the late 1980s. Their liberal discourse was 
deeply influenced by that of Free China, with democratic constitutionalism and human 
rights as its core ideals. Taiwan Political Review was the first publication to shed 
substantial light on the unbalanced distribution of sociopolitical resources or 
sociopolitical capital between the local Taiwanese and the mainlanders as the result of 
KMT policies, the ‘quota regime’ which skewed national examinations for would-be 
civil servants in favour of the mainlanders and discriminatory cultural and language 
policies. The so-called ‘provincial-origins issue’ began to emerge as a subject of public 
debate. People’s awareness of this issue was, unsurprisingly, closely related to their 
Taiwanese background.
Taiwan Political Review was short-lived, publishing only five issues. It was soon 
banned because of an article by Chiou Chui-liang touching upon the sensitive issues of 
the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the future of Taiwan,
specifically the implications of Taiwanese independence. Shortly after the magazine 
was banned, occurred the Chungli Incident, the first large-scale mass protest against the 
authorities in postwar Taiwan during the martial order period, triggered by the rigged 
election for the Chief of Taoyuan County in northern Taiwan in 1977.50 The KMT’s 
dirty tricks in the election and subsequent crackdown on the protest proved 
counterproductive. Dangwai candidates later gained considerable seats from the KMT 
in various local elections at county chief, mayoral and Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
level. A quasi-opposition party was taking shape and the political landscape in Taiwan 
was changing.
Formosa Magazine and the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident
The 1978 supplementary election for legislators was called off in December of that year 
when the Carter administration announced that the United States intended to sever 
formal relations with Taiwan and abolish the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty on 
January 1st, 1979. The Dangwai movement, however, went on, primarily in the form of 
mass rallies. Formosa was founded two months after the publication of a relatively 
moderate political magazine, The Eighties, in August 1979.51 The magazine served as a 
base for Dangwai political dissidents and as its propaganda organ. Local branches were 
set up around the island and a series of rallies were organised, partly in preparation for 
future election campaigns.
The Dangwai movement put ‘human rights’ at the heart of its political discourse, which
50 It was widely believed that the KMT decided to cheat because it was aware that the Dangwai 
movement might mount a successful challenge to KMT candidates in light of its active participation in 
five local elections, including the election in Chungli.
51 Two magazines represented two different strands of the Dangwai movement. The Eighties led by Kang 
Ning-hsian adopted a more moderate form of political participation in the opposition movement by 
writing articles and initiating public debate. A more radical line, privileging mass mobilisation, was 
adopted by the Formosa group. Its activities centred on public speeches.
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embraced political, economic and social rights. On December 10th, 1979, an illegal 
mass rally was organised in Kaohsiung to mark ‘International Human Rights Day’. The 
rally turned into a violent confrontation between the participants and the riot police and 
was crushed with considerable force. The leaders of the rally were jailed and local 
expressions of dissent by Dangwai leaders were suppressed throughout Taiwan. The 
Kaohsiung Incident effectively and abruptly halted the intellectual and political 
movement led by Formosa, but it certainly did not end the demand for reform. The 
elections originally scheduled for December 1979, but called off due to the severance of 
Taiwan-US relations, were eventually held one year later, in December 1980.
Perhaps to the surprise of the KMT, the arrest and imprisonment of the most prominent 
figures involved in the Kaohsiung incident and their military trial attracted so much 
sympathy and support for their attorneys and relatives that they were elected to office. 
This made a deep impression on Chiang Ching-kuo, causing him to review the party’s 
repressive policies and practices. Overall, while the incident muted the expression of 
dissident views and indeed mere public discussion of politics, it ultimately 
strengthened rather than weakened the opposition movement, as the second generation 
of leaders emerged to fill the roles of the senior figures now behind bars.52
Chiang Ching-kuo then became receptive to political liberalisation. In September 1986, 
the Dangwai movement declared the establishment of the DPP on the eve of the 
parliamentary elections in 1986. The government not only allowed it but also began 
formal negotiations with its leaders. Martial law was lifted and democratisation, aimed 
at establishing representative political institutions, commenced. Pressure from the 
United States also figured in the KMT’s decision to embark on political reform. Yet
52 Alan A Wachman, 1994, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization, pp. 140-1.
53 David Potter, 1997, ‘Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan’, p. 233.
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America’s support for limited democratisation along Japanese lines in the latter half of 
the 1980s, after decades of consistently backing the anti-communist authoritarian 
regime, may have been anchored in the pressure exerted by domestic economic 
interests. Simply put, some democratisation would mean a rise in wages, which had 
been kept down in Taiwan, an authoritarian developmental state, to maintain its 
competitive advantage in the global economy.54
Liberalism Challenged: Confronting Egalitarianism, 55 Nationalism and 
Postmodernism,561987 to the present
The Dangwai movement, which united social activists with different priorities, thus 
successfully challenged KMT authoritarianism, leading both commentators and 
scholars to produce a society-centred account of Taiwan’s political development. 
According to this, social power, as demonstrated in the general public’s active 
participation in mass rallies and public meetings during the Dangwai period, was the 
main and indeed indispensable driving force behind Taiwan’s democratisation.
‘Civil society’ was at the core of this society-centred explanation and came to dominate 
public debate shortly after the end of martial law in 1987. Indeed, it is even more 
popular now with the public and academics in Taiwan, following the introduction to the 
island of cosmopolitanism and a plethora of discourses revolving around the idea of 
‘globalisation’. The emergence of civil society discourse in post-1987 Taiwan was 
certainly related to the remarkable, broad-based revival of civil society from the late
54 ibid., p. 235.
55 Egalitarianism refers to the discourse of the liberal left that emphasised social justice in addition to the 
classic liberal concern with individual freedom.
56 Postmodernism is undoubtedly a heavily loaded notion and far from easy to define. As Peny Anderson 
described it, the history of ideas of die postmodern was a ‘complicated story of anticipations, 
displacements and inversions, that can at times look arbitrary or enigmatic, yet possesses its own 
underlying logic’. Anderson, ‘Foreword’, in Fredric Jameson, 1998, The Cultural Turn. In the Taiwanese 
context, it refers primarily to those discourses that overwhelmingly value individuality and oppose the
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1970s onwards, which took place against the backdrop of totalitarianism in Europe, 
dictatorship in Latin America and communism in Asia.57 Post-1987 liberal discourse is 
dominated by the concept and theory of civil society.
China Tribune and the ‘Civil Society’ Debate
Two years after martial law was revoked, a liberal organisation, Chengshe, was set up 
by intellectuals involved with the liberal magazine China Tribune. The leading figures 
were scholars, mainly from the most prestigious university in Taiwan, the National 
Taiwan University, including the psychologist Yang Kuo-shu, the political scientist Hu 
Fu, and the legal scholar Lee Hung-hsee. A debate on civil society was organised by 
China Tribune in 1989, with the title ‘How to locate civil society’.58
Nanfanshou (real name: Wang Hsing-ching) saw civil society as under constant threat 
from all manner of state intervention. For him, the KMT’s bureaucratic managerialism 
had made its power so pervasive that the contemporary Taiwanese state exhibited a 
species of ‘traditional despotism’. He drew upon the theory of liberal economy, 
specifically the idea of the ‘free market’, to present a solution to this problem based on 
weakening state power. This argument had negative implications for social equality, 
which began to emerge as an issue after Taiwan’s economy entered a science and 
technology-oriented phase in the 1980s.
The neo-liberal or laissez-faire approach proposed by Nanfanshou to counter the state, 
which he viewed as the only menace to democracy, certainly surprised those aware of 
his persuasive argument, made in the 1970s, stressing the urgent importance of Sun
idea of ‘authority’, most notably, the nation state.
57 John A Hall and Frank Trentmann, 2005, Civil Society: A Reader in History, Theory and Global 
Politics, p. 3.
58 The debate was published in the magazine afterwards. See ‘How to Locate Civil Society’, 1989, China 
Tribune, Vol. 28, No. 12.
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Yat-sen’s Principles of Nationalism and the People’s Livelihood.59 This neo-liberal 
discourse sat very uneasily with the domestic and external contexts in which the ‘civil 
society vs. the state’ debate took place in the late 1980s. The growing concern about 
social inequality at home and the dominance of ‘American economic-cultural 
imperialism’ globally, the prime target of Nanfanshou’s Chinese nationalism in the 
1970s, made his new position unpalatable.
Nanfanshou’s argument was criticised by Karweipo (Ning Ying-bin) from a radical 
pluralist perspective.60 He assailed the idea that the state is the sole source of 
domination and coercion and the notion of a ‘civil society’ without internal inequality 
or hierarchy. In short, Karweipo criticised the perception of civil society as a social 
entity featuring ‘normative consensus about or hegemony of fundamental ideas among 
social forces, even among contending groups’.61 As far as the internal contradiction 
within civil society is concerned, much empirical research on Taiwan’s social 
movements, which got off the ground on a large scale in the late 1980s, has indicated 
that not all demonstrations or protests were directed against state intervention.62 On the 
contrary, many demanded that the state take a more active role in social redistribution, 
particularly those calling for more comprehensive provision of public welfare.
Related to the ‘civil society vs. the state’ debate was the introduction by Hun-tzu (Chen 
Chung-hsin) to public debate of Habermas’ idea of a public sphere.63 Rather than
59 See Note 45 in this chapter.
60 Simply put, radical pluralists argue that antagonism not only marks the relationship between state and 
society but also characterises society itself. They also claim that it is not only crucial to tolerate 
adversaries, but that the multiplication of antagonisms is fundamental for democracy to retain its vitality. 
See for example, Chantal Mouffe, 1999, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy’, in 
Chantal Mouffe (ed.), The Challenge o f Carl Schmitt", 2000, The Democratic Paradox.
61 Joel S. Migdal, 1994, ‘The State in Society: an Approach to Struggles for Domination’, in Joel S. 
Migdal et al (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World.
62 For a detailed account of the development of social movements in Taiwan and its relationship to 
Taiwan’s political transformation, see Chang Mau-kuei, 1989, Social Movements and Political 
Transformation.
63 See Hun-tzu, 1990, Towards a Post-Formosa Civil Society, Vol. 2.
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assuming an antagonism between civil society and the state, he stressed the role of the 
public sphere as an intermediate space in which democratic citizens participate in 
public affairs through deliberation. For Hun-tzu, a well-functioning public sphere 
capable of maintaining a critical balance between civil society and the state, or between 
life world and system, was vital to democracy.
Classical Liberalism vs. Egalitarian Liberalism: Individual Freedom vs. Social Justice
The mission statement of the liberal organisation Chengshe, written by its leader Yang 
to clarify its intellectual stance, confused some of its readers, such as liberal political 
philosopher Chiang Yi-hua.65 On the one hand, Yang claimed that Chengshe would not 
adhere to Fabian reformist socialism, though it was set up to perform the same function 
as the Fabian Society. On the other hand, he argued that some moderate and effective 
socialist measures should be taken seriously and implemented to achieve social justice. 
Whether there is an insoluble contradiction, theoretically as well as practically, 
between freedom and justice, depends on which liberalism is under discussion: 
libertarianism (in the tradition of Friedrich A. Hayek and Robert Nozik or in American 
sense) or the so-called ‘new liberalism’ or egalitarian liberalism (referring to liberal 
theories of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin).
These two liberalisms are distinguished primarily by the differing degree of emphasis 
they place on equality. Both talk about equality, and how it is perceived. Related to this 
distinction are the different senses of liberty postulated by Berlin. Whilst individualism, 
spontaneous social order, rule of law, limited government and the free market constitute
64 See Perry Anderson’s critical discussion of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere in his A Zone o f 
Engagement.
65 Chiang pointed out that, at least in theory, there might exist potential conflict between the ideals of 
individual freedom and social justice in that the realisation of social justice, involving social
redistribution through taxation, inevitably impinges upon individual economic freedom. Chiang, 2001, p. 
302.
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the core of libertarianism, egalitarian liberalism is mainly concerned with how best to 
strike a balance between freedom and equality, and to examine which basic principles 
might underlie a just society, in order to make individual rights more meaningful in the 
contemporary context. What is at issue here is thus the question: ‘equality of what?’ 
From this perspective, what distinguishes libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism is 
the difference between ‘(formal) equality of opportunity’ and ‘fair equality of 
opportunity’.
In Taiwan generally, and among liberal intellectuals involved in Chengshe specifically, 
public policy disagreements, primarily in relation to the role of government, stem from 
contrasting liberal stances. Views on social welfare and media policy67 are good 
examples. Libertarians in Taiwan, most of whom are economists, regard the ‘free 
market’ as the basic principle of all policy. Accordingly, ‘social welfare’ should be 
provided by the private sector in the form of individual insurance, and the less 
government regulates the mass media the better. Their liberal left counterparts, leaving 
aside the question as to whether the state should be the only or main provider of social 
welfare, reject the notion that the market should be the key mechanism of welfare 
provision. Privatisation of welfare is thus undesirable. In light of the scarcity of 
airwaves and radio frequencies, they stress the public role and social responsibility of 
the mass media. The mass media is thus not merely a ‘free market of opinions’. It is a
67 The KMT had monopolised and controlled the mass media for more than fifty years. Until the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the mass media performed the role o f ‘ideological state apparatus’ in Gramsci’s 
terms. Criticisms of the authoritarian media policy focused on the role of three terrestrial television 
companies, including Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), China Television Company (CTV) and 
Chinese Television System (CTV), which were accused of acting as the party’s mouthpiece and attacked 
for being state-owned. TTV was owned by the Taiwan Provincial Government, CTS by the Ministry of 
Defence and CTV by the KMT. Given the dominance of free market discourse, privatisation has been the 
most popular suggestion for media reform. However, a number of organisations have been set up, 
primarily by media scholars, most notably the Union for the Democratic Reform of Terrestrial Television 
and the Students’ Struggle for Communication, to promote the idea of ‘public media’. The Public 
Broadcasting Group, similar to the BBC in the UK and the NHK in Japan, has been at the heart of their 
campaign.
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public sphere and important to the practice of deliberative democracy.
Libertarianism, unfortunately, is still a distinctive feature of Taiwanese public culture. 
The first of Chengshe’s reports on various issues invoked neo-liberal doctrine, viewing 
de-regulation as the solution to almost every problem: Disintegrating KMT-State 
Capitalism -  A Closer Look at Privatising Taiwan’s State- and Party-Owned 
Enterprises.68 This libertarian view has been criticised from two perspectives. Firstly, 
as noted in the discussion of the ‘East Asian model* in Chapter Two, government 
intervention in ‘governing the market’ should be given the credit for Taiwan’s rapid 
economic growth. It is therefore misleading to argue that economic efficiency can only 
be achieved through the invisible hand of the free market. Secondly, the contribution of 
state-owned enterprises or the public sector to Taiwan’s ‘growth with equality’ is 
ignored in the libertarian view.69 In short, these critiques are imbued by the market 
myth and neglect the social responsibility of the public sector.
The prevailing libertarian ideology, and the idea of negative liberty so central to 
Taiwanese public culture, are best understood in the context of Taiwan’s long history of 
political authoritarianism. Wu Chuan-yuan analyses the historical-political context of 
liberal development in Taiwan from a social democratic perspective and with a specific 
concern for the autonomous development of local social movements in post-1987 
Taiwan. Wu finds that anti-communism and rejection of KMT authoritarianism explain
68 ‘Efficiency’ underpinned these economists’ attraction to a policy of privatisation. It was stated in the 
conclusion: ‘Generally speaking, the purpose of privatisation is to decrease the range of government 
intervention in pursuit of the full functioning of the price mechanism. Hence private economic activities 
are instructed and regulated by an invisible hand by means of which.... the highest level of efficiency can 
be achieved .... Government intervention must only be allowed when the market fails to prevent the 
natural monopoly of resources, economic externalities such as industrial pollution and income inequality 
with a view to maintaining a stable economy’. See Chen et al, 1991, Disintegrating the Party-State 
Capitalist Regime, p.267.
69 See Chu Wan-wen, 1995, ‘The Role of the State in the Development of Capitalism in Taiwan -  A 
Review of Party-State Capitalism’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sciences, August 1995, No. 20; 
Chin-fen Chang, 2001, The Privatization o f State-Owned Enterprises in Taiwan: A Critique o f the 
Economic Myth.
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the appeal of Hayek’s capitalist democracy anchored in libertarianism to the Taiwanese 
public and intellectuals. Hayek’s theory could namely be deployed to counter the 
communist ideal of ‘economic equality’ and demand liberal democracy from the 
KMT.70
In a setting dominated by libertarian discourse, a group of egalitarian liberals deeply 
influenced by Rawls’ theory of justice and originally members of Chengshe, notably 
Chien Sechin Y. S. and Chang Shih-hsiung, advocated the idea of social justice within 
public deliberation in the late 1990s. In his articles ‘The Political Character of 
Liberalism -  the Contrast between Ym Hai-guang and John Rawls’71 and ‘Why 
Liberalism is Concerned with Equality -  a Contemporary View’,72 Chien, whilst 
viewing the focus on negative freedom within the liberal discourse of Free China in the 
1950s as understandable, stressed the importance of making individual freedom 
meaningful in the contemporary context of capitalist modernity by taking social justice 
seriously. Chang Shih-hsiung’s ‘The Evolution of Taiwanese Liberalism and the 
Challenge of the New Century’ expressed concerns similar to those of Wu Chuan-yuan 
and Chien Sechin Y. S. and claimed that a critical rethinking of Taiwan’s predominant 
libertarianism is crucial, especially in the context of globalisation, to ensure social 
justice.73
70 Wu Chuan-yuan, 1997, ‘Oppositional Movements and the Formation of A New Political Culture: A 
Social Democratic Perspective’, in You Ying-long (ed.), Democratic Consolidation or Consolidation: 
the Challenges to Taiwan in the 21st Century.
71 It was originally presented as a paper to a cross-Strait academic conference on Yin Hai-kuang’s 
thought in Hubei, China in 1998, with the title ‘The Character of Yin Hai-kuang’s Thoughts and 
Reflections on the Political Character of Liberalism’. It was later collected in Beyond Absolutism and 
Nihilism: Political Ethics in the Modern Context (2001).
72 It was originally presented to several conferences in 1999 and later collected in Beyond Absolutism and 
Nihilism (2001)
73 Chang Shih-hsiung, 2004, ‘The Evolution of Taiwanese Liberalism and the Challenge of the New 
Century’, in Social Justice and Globalisation -  Welfare and Reflections on Liberalism.
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The *Liberal Democracy vs. Radical Democracy’ Debate
Related to, yet intellectually distinct from, the debate between classic liberalism and 
egalitarian liberalism are the critiques on the practice of liberal democracy in post-1987 
Taiwan from the perspective of radical democracy. Due to their different 
understandings of democracy, liberal democrats celebrated the entry of Taiwan into the 
phase of ‘democratic consolidation’ after the first popular presidential election in 
March 1996 and the historic power transfer from the KMT to the DPP in the 2000 
presidential election, while radical democrats argued that Taiwan had merely entered a 
‘post-authoritarian’ era and was far from being a (genuine) democracy.
Sub-groupings within the camp of radical democracy can be differentiated by the 
different intellectual sources and orientations of their democratic discourses. To 
simplify somewhat, they include those who advocate the idea of people’s democracy as 
understood in Dewey’s pragmatism and those deeply influenced by the theory of 
radical pluralism found in postmodernism.74 These two groupings revolve around a 
radical journal, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, and claim to represent a 
common political stance, that of the ‘democratic left’, which also includes some 
egalitarian liberals like Chien Sechin Y. S.
Chao Kang’s essay on Dewey’s critiques and reconstruction of liberalism can be seen as 
representative of the first grouping. Against the backdrop of the dominance of 
libertarianism in Taiwanese culture and the emergence of nationalist discourses at the 
centre of public debate, Chao questions whether the libertarian concept of 
individualism was a helpful and desirable theory to counter the arguably increasingly
74 Again, it is hard to define a heavily loaded concept like ‘postmodernism’.
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influential reactionary collectivism, such as ethnic nationalism. The aim of the essay 
was to formulate a non-statist theory of public/private spheres as the foundation of the 
project of radical democracy. Based on Dewey’s concept of ‘the public’76 and critiques 
of Richard Rorty’s ‘postmodern bourgeois liberalism’ 77 and Jtirgen Habermas’s 
quasi-transcendentalism’, Chao criticised the liberal discourse in Taiwan for its 
inability to perform any ‘mediating function’ because an active public was impossible 
in an intellectual context dominated by the concept of negative liberty. Later Chao 
incorporated the idea of ‘the social’ into his project of radical participatory democracy,
TObut without differentiating it from ‘the public’.
The other radical democratic discourse is represented by the Con-temporary magazine 
and other magazines associated with it, for example, Off The Island. Theories of 
postmodernism have been introduced systematically by the magazine. The English title 
suggests its postmodern orientation, mainly characterised by anti-foundationalism.80 
The thoughts and theories of leading figures in the tradition of postmodernism have
75 Chao’s concern about this issue has to be understood in the context of early 1990s Taiwan, when a 
‘state/nation-building movement’ was underway. His criticism was directed against Taiwanese 
nationalism. Four essays out of eight in the same volume were devoted to critical discussions of 
Taiwanese nationalism, the origin of which, according to Chao, was ‘resentment’, a term he borrowed 
from Nietzsche. See Chao, 1998, ‘Power, Resentment, Vanguard: an Examination of the Identity Politics 
of Ethnic Nationalism’, p. 98.
76 In contrast to the isolated individuals in a liberal democratic society who are powerless and easily 
‘guided’, the public, in the view of Dewey, refers to those people who can grasp and utilise their ‘freed 
intelligence’ and actively engage in public affairs. Chao Kang, 1998, ‘What is “Democracy”? What is 
“the Public”?: Dewey’s Criticisms and Reconstruction of Liberalism’, p. 233.
77 It is argued in such criticism that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism, inspired by 
Dewey, are used to endorse the ideas of classic liberalism: a strictly defmed distinction between public 
and private spheres and the negative sense of individual liberty. Chao, 1998, ‘What is “Democracy”? 
What is “the Public”?: Dewey’s Criticisms and Reconstruction of Liberalism’, note. 2, p. 194.
78 Habermas was criticised for misplacing the radical historicism of Dewey’s pragmatism within his 
framework of ethical universalism.
79 See Chao Kang, 2001, ‘Against Neoliberal Globalization, Why and How’, Taiwan: A Radical 
Quarterly in Social Studies, December 2001, No. 44. See Lin Chun, 2001, for a definition o f ‘the social’.
It was stated: ‘The English title of this magazine, “Con-temporary”, fully expresses our purpose in 
founding it. “Con” as opposed to “pro” signifies the meaning of “against”, thus stressing that 
“contemporary” does not equate with a “sole temporal unit”. It is full of tensions and complexity. 
“Temporary” signifies the meaning of “time”. The term “con-temporary” thus signifies both the notions 
of “contemporary” and “temporary” and indicates Con-temporary'^, rejection of any transcendental truth 
and its emphasis on temporality’. Con-temporary, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1989.
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appeared in its articles, including, Heidegger, Jameson, Benjamin, Bourdieu, Lyotard, 
Barthes, Rorty, and Foucault. Off The Island was published two years later.81
Postmodern ideas, still largely confined to university students, have impacted upon 
the public discussion of political democracy in Taiwan by ‘radicalising’ the idea of 
democracy, criticising and indeed rubbishing the mainstream discourse of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism and its practice in post-1987 Taiwan. Instead, radical 
democracy, a concept interchangeable with ‘popular democracy’ or ‘people’s 
democracy’ in this radical discourse, was claimed to be a more effective strategy than 
the competitive elections of representative democracy in the political struggle against 
all forms of domination.83
The two main sub-groupings of radical democrats discussed above share the same 
strategy of political struggle, inspired by the idea of new social movements, a legacy of 
the New Left.84 They differ, however, in their views of the role of the state and the 
concept of individual freedom. Very briefly put, the discourse of the second group, 
deeply influenced by the theory of postmodernism, was criticised by the first group,
81 The idea of a ‘non-mainstream’, ‘marginal’ or ‘de-centring’ position is signified in the title Off The 
Island. ‘Island’ refers to Taiwan.
82 It was not until the campaign calling on Taiwanese voters to spoil their ballot papers in the presidential 
election, together with the first referendum in Taiwan in 2004, that the impact of this radical view of 
democracy on Taiwanese politics was seen by the general public.
83 ‘Many people have argued that there is a causal relationship between the establishment of 
parliamentary democracy and the ability of the people to throw off domination. Here, empowerment is 
attributed to the institutions of parliamentary democracy. However, we wish to point out that the reason 
why people have such tremendous capacity to reject domination in the western countries is not because 
they have parliamentary democracy but because of the legacy of the labour movements since the 19th 
century and various new social movements in the 1960s. It has nothing to do with parliamentary 
democracy. There has in point of fact been naked, cruel, and bloody oppression of labour movements and 
other anti-domination movements in these parliamentary democratic countries... Parliamentary 
democracy therefore does not necessarily bring about more space for popular democratic participation 
unless the dominated continuously struggle’ (Shen, 1993, pp. 367-8).
84 For a detailed discussion of developments from the New Left to the New Social Movements, see Lin 
Chun, 1993, The British New Left, pp. 190-5. In the Taiwanese context, ‘new social movements’ have 
been invoked to criticise the ‘CENI (competitive-elitist neo-institutional) model’ of democracy and 
democratisation. See Lin Shu-fen, 2000, Democratization in Taiwan Revisited: In a Pursuit o f Radical 
Democracy, pp. 8-14.
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inspired by Dewey’s ‘radical liberalism’, for neglecting the importance of political 
economy in their analysis of and strategy for sociopolitical emancipation. This is bound 
up with their outright hostility to the state and the libertarian view of individual 
freedom which it underpins.
Liberalism’s Encounter with Nationalism: Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics
The emergence of radical democratic discourse in Taiwan was linked with discontent 
with the practice of liberal democracy, but also with the emergent nationalist politics of 
the early 1990s. While public debates related to the issue of national identity appeared 
much earlier, for instance, the ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ 
debate in the early 1980s, over-arching nationalist politics first became central to 
Taiwanese politics following the programme of ‘Taiwanising’ or ‘localising’ the KMT 
carried out under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, successor of Chiang Ching-kuo as 
Taiwan’s president until 2000. Lee’s main concern was to consolidate his own power 
and maintain his party’s ruling status in the face of the challenge represented by the 
opposition party’s convergent discourse of democratisation and Taiwanese nationalism.
Yet Taiwan’s public culture began to shift away from liberalism towards nationalism as 
early as the late 1970s. Since then, local Taiwanese politicians had gradually replaced 
Chinese liberal intellectuals of the Free China generation as the main participants in 
public fora. The politics of the Dangwai era, discussed earlier, presented an opportunity 
structure for these local Taiwanese politicians, who had been deeply involved in the 
opposition movements. As noted above, one of the distinctive features of opposition 
discourse was the convergence of democratisation and Taiwanese nationalism. Liberal 
discourse was thus connected to the issue of national identity in an attempt to construct 
a discourse of liberal nationalism. Central to this liberal nationalist discourse was the
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view that Taiwan’s democratisation was at the same time ‘(Taiwan) nation-building’ by 
means of periodic elections.85 Ethnic Relations and National Identity,86 a widely cited 
book on the issue, has been commonly considered the first attempt by scholars to 
examine the relationship between nationalism and Taiwan’s democratisation from 
various perspectives.
The critics of liberal nationalism include liberals, radical democrats and Chinese 
nationalists. The debate between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism is 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. The discussion here therefore focuses on 
the critiques by liberals and radical democrats. Drawing on the theories of S. Mill, H. 
Beran, Y Tamir and H. Kohn, which argued that liberalism and nationalism are 
compatible, Wu Nai-teh conducted an empirical survey to explore the political value(s) 
or ideology underpinning Taiwanese national identity. Attitudes towards ‘cession’, 
which was taken to embody the liberal value of ‘self-determination’ or ‘autonomy’, 
were at the heart of this research. The conclusion lent support to the aforementioned 
liberal nationalist theories, which claimed that Taiwanese national identity and liberal 
belief were interconnected.87
Wu’s research has been discussed thoroughly and critically by Chiang Yi-hua from a 
liberal perspective. Chiang argued that it was misleading to see ‘political cession or 
independence’ as the key strategy extolled by western theorists of liberal nationalism. 
He pointed out that what Taiwanese demanded was space to pursue ‘cultural autonomy’ 
within the same liberal state. Chiang also reminds us of the core of classical liberal
85 See Lin Chia-lung, 2001, ‘Taiwan’s democratisation and nation formation’, in Nationalism and 
Cross-Strait Relationship, pp. 217-66 and 2002, ‘The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism’, in 
Memories o f the Future, 219-41; Wu Rwei-ren, 2002, ‘Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism’, in Memories o f 
the Future, pp. 197-217.
86 Ethnic Relations and National Identity, 1993, Mau-kuei Chang (ed.). Taipei: National Policy Centre.
87 Wu Nai-teh, 1996, ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Identity: the search for the ideological base of Taiwanese 
nationalism', Taiwanese Political Science Review, Opening Issue.
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values -  individual rights, limited government, checks and balances, division of power,
A O
etc. A standard liberal critique has also been provided by Chien Sechin Y. S., focusing 
on the particularism of nationalism from the perspective of liberal ‘universalism’. He 
criticises the concept o f ‘national’ as opposed to ‘citizen’.89
The critiques produced by radical democrats, which were as diverse as the different 
strands of liberalism and nationalism, were directed against nationalism in general, 
primarily from the perspective of ‘radical pluralism’ and ‘internationalism’. The 
influences of various ‘post-isms’ can be discerned in these discourses, including 
postmodernism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism. A discussion of these intricate 
theories and their histories is beyond the scope of this research. I thus limit myself to 
highlighting a few salient points. Based on their anti-essentialism, postmodern and 
post-structural discourses in Taiwan question any attempt to establish a link between 
individual subjectivity and national identity. They underline the multiplication and 
complexity of identity.90 The pre-eminent figure producing post-colonial critiques on 
nationalism is cultural studies scholar Chen Kuan-hsiung, whose ‘international 
localism’ is representative of post-colonial discourse. Central to this discourse are the 
ideologies of anti-imperialism, anti-hegemony and anti-capitalism. The practice of 
bourgeois democracy is called into question while the political imagination of a 
‘post-national’ world takes centre stage 91
88 Chiang Yi-hua, 1998, ‘The theoretical types of national identity discourses in contemporary Taiwan’, 
in Liberalism, Nationalism and National Identity, pp. 170-76.
89 Chien, 2001, ‘Liberalism and Nationalism: a Reflection on Two Political Values’, in Chien, Beyond 
Absolutism and Nihilism, pp. 371-80. Originally collected in the proceedings of the ‘Towards a fair and 
just society: arguments for the regenerative development o f 21st century Taiwan’ conference in 2000, 
with the title ‘The debate between mainstream political values: liberalism vs. nationalism’. See Huang 
Rong-tsun (ed.), Towards a fair and just society: arguments for the regenerative development o f 21st 
century Taiwan.
90 See for instance, Lin Shu-fen (2000).
91 The representative article is Chen’s ‘The Imperialist Eye’ published first in Chinese in Taiwan: A 
Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, in 1994, and later translated into English and published in a cultural 
studies journal, positions, in 2000.
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Feminist Interventions: The Debate Between Liberal and Lesbian Feminists
Most existing literature on Taiwan’s political development has, unfortunately, failed to 
investigate the liberation and empowerment of women. Yet feminist critiques have not 
only enriched Taiwanese liberal discourse but, more importantly, have raised the 
general public’s consciousness of the importance of feminist contribution. Difficult 
though this awareness-raising is, it is indispensable to the liberation of women in a 
society deeply influenced by the traditional culture and norms of Confucianism.
Compared to other East Asian capitalist industrial societies greatly influenced by 
Confucian values, such as Japan and South Korea, Taiwanese women have in fact 
enjoyed relatively equal and autonomous status in society, politics and economy.92 
However, as Farris notes, in Taiwan, ‘rapid industrialisation significantly altered 
women’s roles without necessarily “liberating” them from the Confucian patriarchal 
family; and the terms of Taiwan’s incorporation into the world capitalist system 
unevenly exploited women, depending on their economic and social positions’.93 
Farris’ comparison of capitalist Taiwan with socialist China is particularly stimulating. 
Taiwan scores lower in terms of gender equality in almost every aspect except 
individual freedom and privacy, the latter failings of China’s ‘state feminism’ a product
92 Christensen noted at the beginning of his article on the impact of electoral rules in Japan that: ‘Among 
the advanced industrial democracies, Japan is widely seen as a hostile environment for women in politics. 
Its business and bureaucratic elites are extremely male dominated. This characterization carried over into 
the electoral realm, where Japan is notorious for the low representation of women in the Diet (Japan’s 
national legislature)’ (Christensen, 2000, p. 25). Comparing electoral reform and the empowerment of 
women in Taiwan and South Korea, focusing on women in the national legislative bodies, Lee pointed 
out that ‘the situation concerning women’s representation in Taiwan is quite different from that in South 
Korea, and much more positive’ (Lee, 2000, p. 52).
93 Of the articles collected in the same book, all of which compare women’s status in capitalist 
democracies in the region, Farris’ comparative analysis of the impacts of socialism and capitalism on 
women’s social existence and political participation in China and Taiwan is particularly stimulating. 
Farris also draws attention to the importance of class analysis in women’s studies, which is central to the 
debate between socialist feminism and liberal feminism, and which has been and remains a neglected 
perspective in Taiwan’s public debate.
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of its ‘equality through sameness’ doctrine.94
In the 1970s, the newly bourgeois culture of urban Taiwan witnessed the beginning of a 
women’s movement, commonly regarded as the first wave of the Taiwanese feminist 
movement (1972-1982),95 led by Lu Annette Hsiu-lien among others. Lu is a 
Harvard-trained scholar and an active participant in the democratic movement. She 
currently serves as the vice-president of Taiwan. Lu wrote the feminist book New 
Feminism which criticised gender inequalities in educational level, the feminisation of 
low-status, low-paying jobs, a sexual double standard, and the continued denigration of 
women within a Confucian value system.96
The intellectual influence of the second wave of western feminism on Taiwanese 
feminists, specifically that of the United States, was obvious. Many of them studied in 
America and read Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex (1961) and Betty Friedan’s 
Feminine Mystique (1963), both of which had been translated into Chinese and 
published in a Taiwanese national newspaper, the China Times, by overseas Taiwanese 
feminist Yang Mei-hui.97 Whilst recognising the influence of western feminism, Lu 
also drew on Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People to argue that a movement for 
women’s liberation was essential. She applied its popular formula to define feminism 
as:
‘a thought that emerged from the demands of the society along with the tide of history; a belief
94 See Lin, 2001, p. 63. Lin, however, rightly emphasises that China’s state feminism ‘was liberating and 
empowering, especially initially, as a task of transforming a deeply patriarchal and repressive traditional 
society’ (ibid.).
95 The history of the feminist movement in Taiwan is roughly divided into three periods: the first wave, 
from 1972-1982; the second wave, from 1982-1993; and the third wave, from 1993 to date. See Ku, 1998. 
Ku’s historical periodisation was based mainly on the transformation of the nature of Taiwanese 
‘women’s studies’ from a value-free or value-neutral discipline to one inspired and guided by 
female/gender consciousness, i.e. feminist studies. Corresponding to the evolution of feminist-oriented 
women’s studies in academia, all kinds of female consciousness-raising institutions and movements 
emerged in society.
96 See Lu, New Feminism, 1986.
97 See, Lu, 1994, p. 298; Farris, 2000, p. 150.
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that the prosperity and harmony of androgynous society shall be founded on the basis of 
substantial equality between men and women; and a power that will abolish the traditional 
prejudice against women, reconstruct a new and sensible value system, create independence 
and dignity for women, and foster the realisation of the true equality of sexes*.98 
The lengthy quotation of Lu’s definition of feminism is vital to understanding the core 
ideas of Taiwanese liberal and state feminists and to grasping what is at issue in their 
debate with lesbian feminists two decades later in the 1990s, the third wave movement 
according to Ku’s periodisation.
Lu asserted that she was ‘critical yet compromising’ when promoting gender 
consciousness in 1970s Taiwan. She emphasised the need to take into account 
commonly accepted social ethics. Accordingly, she intentionally set aside some gender 
issues that she reckoned were less urgent for Taiwanese women’s liberation and 
empowerment and those too sensitive to be advocated openly in a still conservative 
society like Taiwan, such as sexual freedom and homosexuality. She also expressed 
moderate views on the validity or value of marriage and the feminine nature of 
women." All these issues were at the heart of feminist debate in 1990s Taiwan. Lesbian 
feminists considered them crucial to women’s liberation.
Lu’s book New Feminism was an effort to combine liberal feminism and traditional 
femininity.100 Central to the liberal feminist discourse was its concern with equal rights 
for women in education, in every kind of occupation, in key positions in society. 
George and Wilding note:
‘ Liberal feminists see the welfare state as an approach to organising economic and social 
relations which can be, and has been, used by women to reduce inequalities and contribute to
98 Lu, 1994, p. 297; emphasis added.
"ibid., p. 298.
the development of a more sympathetic public opinion. They see the development of equal pay 
and sex discrimination legislation and of a social security system marginally more sensitive to 
women’s needs as a sign that the political system can respond to women’s needs. The welfare 
state offers both a possibility and place for the extension of women’s social and political 
rights'.™
The emphasis on the state as the major institution responsible for the improvement of 
women’s socioeconomic existence and extension of social and political rights explains 
why liberal feminists in Taiwan were called ‘state feminists’ by their lesbian
i mcounterparts. Lesbian feminism in the Taiwanese context refers primarily to the 
discourse of ‘sex rights feminism’, discussed later in detail in the section on the liberal 
movement in post-authoritarian Taiwan.
In the 1980s, a plurality of public discourses began to flourish. Women’s groups, 
religious groups, environmental groups and others began to agitate for reform. A slow 
political transformation from one-party authoritarianism to more democratic rule began. 
Martial law was lifted in 1987, opposition parties were legalised and the autonomy of 
society vis-^-vis the state increased. The role and status of women in Taiwan have 
clearly been transformed in the modernisation process although certain patriarchal 
values and practices remain. Throughout the 1980s, Taiwanese liberal feminists 
continued their consciousness raising campaign and advocated various 
‘women-friendly’ policies. For example, a segment of the women’s movement led by 
the only openly ‘feminist’ organisation, the Awakening Group (Fu-nu hsin-chih,
100 Ku, 1998, p. 116.
101 George and Wilding, 1994, p. 136; emphasis added.
102 What should be noted is that state feminism can refer to both the liberal feminism’ of the Nordic 
welfare states as well as ‘state feminism’ in socialist societies, as implied in Lin Chun’s discussion of 
welfare capitalism and state socialism. She argues that although they are very different systems and also 
differ in their respective sub-systems, they nevertheless resemble each other in their state welfarism (Lin, 
2001, p. 58).
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literally ‘the awakening of women’) has been active in promoting changes in public 
policy and legislation to give women equal rights under the law. Ku has analysed the 
processes by which the feminist movement effected changes in two areas: the 
legislation of abortion and equal employment opportunities.104 Taiwan’s feminists also 
urge legal change to tackle sexual harassment at work and domestic violence or spousal 
abuse.
A substantial intellectual debate among Taiwanese feminists first emerged in the 1990s 
when Taiwan entered the third wave of the women’s movement (from 1993 onwards). 
Taiwan’s women’s movement has been a multifaceted phenomenon. In the early years 
of the movement, not all women’s leaders appreciated and supported the values of 
gender equality espoused by Western-educated liberal feminists, anchored in the 
arguments of mainstream white feminists in the United States. Some women’s studies 
scholars were keen to identify indigenous sources o f‘women’s consciousness’, such as 
nineteenth-century anti-foot-binding societies, or the May Fourth movement.105
Yet the leaders of the movement tended to agree on the importance of gender equality 
and women’s liberation and empowerment and regard these as common goals for 
women’s movement although they hold different perceptions of these values and 
suggest different approaches to realising them. Liberal feminism has been influential in 
Taiwan’s public culture, unsurprisingly, because it has formed part of the human rights 
discourse of the democratic movement. The 1990s feminist debate is thus more 
substantial intellectually in that lesbian feminism, greatly influenced by postmodernism
103 See Farris, 2000 and 2004 for detailed discussions.
104 See Ku, 1995 and 1996. In both articles, Ku argued that although abortion is now legal, patriarchal 
constraints remain, as a woman must obtain the consent of her husband or legal guardian to have an 
abortion. In contrast, the fight for equal employment opportunities, especially the outlawing of the de 
facto rule that women must quit after marriage or the birth of their first child, was more successful in 
advancing the feminist agenda and in rallying women to the cause.
105 Farris, 2004, p. 364.
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and poststructuralism, has posed a strong challenge to the dominant liberal feminist 
discourse. Politically, in contrast to the ‘reformism within Establishment politics’ 
pursued by liberal feminists, lesbian feminists suggest a more radical strategy. This 
revolves around ‘popular vandalism’, which is also central to the Taiwanese ‘new 
opposition movement’ emerging in the early 1990s.106
The Taiwanese feminist movement split into two groups in the 1990s: liberal feminists 
of the Awakening group and lesbian feminists dedicated to the sex liberation movement. 
Lesbian feminism is thus commonly known as sex rights feminism in Taiwan. Two 
incidents triggered this split: the publication of a controversial book The Gallant 
Women: Feminism and Sexual Emancipation in 1994 by an outspoken feminist sex 
radical, Josephine Ho; and the dismissal of gay and lesbian activist Wang Ping and 
others from the Awakening Foundation in 1997.107 In the book, Ho advocated the 
sexual liberation of Taiwanese women, an end to the cult of virginity for unmarried 
women and to a lifetime of frigid love to one, probably unfaithful man followed by 
enforced celibacy in widowhood or divorce for married women.108 Ho created a 
rhyming slogan to promote her radical idea of sexual emancipation in a public 
demonstration against sexual harassment and abuse in 1994: ‘I don’t want sexual 
harassment; I want sexual climax!’109 which afterwards became a trademark of sex
106 The ‘old’ and ‘new’ Taiwanese oppositions differ mainly in their view of the role of the state, the 
relation between social movements and the opposition party and the source of power domination. The 
new opposition’s imaginary of ideal democracy revolves around the notion of a very ‘strong society’, 
whilst traditional liberals still hold that the ‘state is a necessary evil’.
107 For discussions of the development of Taiwanese lesbian feminism/activism and the split in the 
feminist movement in Taiwan in the 1990s, see Sang, 1999, Farris, 2000, Ning, 2001, Chang and Chang, 
2003, and Farris, 2004. Lesbian feminism has played an important part in the development of identity 
politics in Taiwan. For example, the so-called tongchih movement initially emerged in large part from 
Taiwan’s nascent feminist movement and was spearheaded in the first instance by lesbians. The term 
tongchih, literally meaning ‘comrade’ but appropriated as a politicised marker of sexual identity, arrived 
in Taiwan from Hong Kong in 1992.
108 Farris, 2004, p. 365.
109 They are rhyming couplets as ‘sexual harassment’ is pronounced ‘hsing sao-rao’ in Mandarin, while 
‘sexual climax’ is lhsing kao-chao\
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rights feminism in Taiwan.
The most thorough debate between women’s rights and sex rights feminists is perhaps 
that published in the journal of the Awakening Foundation under the title ‘Exploding 
Feminism’ in 1995. The debate was ostensibly ignited by the editor of the lesbian 
magazine Girlfriend who, in an article simultaneously published in Girlfriend and 
Women’s Awakening Journal, attacked the Awakening Foundation for reinforcing 
compulsory heterosexuality and neglecting lesbian and gay human rights. In response, 
Women’s Awakening put out a special issue on the relationship between feminism and 
lesbian activism titled ‘Heterosexuality/Homosexuality: Both/Neither’, defending 
itself by claiming that it was just as dedicated to challenging conventional family values 
as lesbian and gay activists were. A consensus was reached in a later roundtable 
discussion that the women’s movement needs lesbian feminists and that it should do 
more for lesbians and promote more lesbian perspectives.110 In spite of the consensus, 
the tension between the two sides remained. The Centre for the Study of Sexuality was 
founded at a national university in 1995 as a response to ‘a growing woman’s 
movement that was beginning to ostracise elements standing in the way of its upward 
mobility’.111
The sex rights/liberation discourse of Ho and her colleagues is primarily based on 
Freud’s theory. Ho and her husband Kaweipo co-authored a book entitled Why Don't 
They Tell You? -A n  Introduction to Sexual Politics, published in 1990. It begins with 
Freud’s hypothesis that the progression of civilisation is accompanied by sexual 
oppression. They then explore various forms and myths of sexual oppression and how 
they function as a means of social control in Taiwan. They also critique the view of
110 For a detailed and obviously sympathetic analysis of the debate, see Sang, 1998, pp. 143-9.
111 See Ning, 2001, or the English version of the purpose for setting up The Sex Centre at National
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sexual activities within the heterosexual marriage that restricts their meaning to 
reproduction and wealth inheritance, suggesting that it is responsible for the creation of 
a cult of virginity and the myth of fidelity. Heterosexual marriage is thus seen as an 
institution based on an oppressive ideology of gender and the source of oppression of 
‘sexual minorities’, meaning anyone whose sexual practices do not conform to the 
married, heterosexual ideal. Sex emancipation is in this sense essential for women’s 
liberation and for making civilisation a process of ‘non-oppressive distillation’.112
In contrast to the ‘politics of sexuality’ promoted by the lesbian/sex rights feminists, 
liberal/women’s rights feminists believe that the ‘politics of gender’ should be at the 
centre of the women’s movement. Ku, a leading liberal feminist in Taiwan, states that 
‘the subjective perception of sexual subjects cannot substitute for the real social 
condition of women as victims of sexual objectification. Only the success of a politics 
of gender can bring us a safe and equal environment for multiple erotic choices’.113 For 
liberal feminists, like Ku, ‘our [women’s] sexualities may be many, but our gender is 
only one’.
The different ideological and political orientations of the two Taiwanese women’s 
movements is manifest in another heated debate on prostitution in the wake of the 
Taipei City Government’s decision to abolish legal prostitution in 1997. The idea of 
‘prostitutes’ rights’ was introduced into Taiwan for the first time. The debate is typified 
by the discourses of ‘banning prostitution vs. prostitutes’ rights’ and ‘anti-pornography 
vs. anti-anti-pomography’, and generally named the ‘sex critique vs. sex liberation’ 
debate. While liberal feminists, drawing on studies of Taiwan’s adult films, criticised 
the reproduction of patriarchal logic in pornography, primarily the objectification of
Central University at http://sex.ncu.edu.tw.
112 See Ho and Kaweipo, 1990. Kaweipo is the pseudonym of Ho’s husband Ning Ying-bin.
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women’s bodies, lesbian feminists advocated the idea of ‘lewd woman’ and argued that 
only through ‘actively engaging, appropriating, enjoying and moreover creating 
pornography’ could women realise their ‘subjectivities’.114 Taiwanese feminists were 
divided on whether prostitution was inherently oppressive to women or merely a 
legitimate and sometimes lucrative form of labour in which they may voluntarily 
choose to engage. In the discourse of ‘prostitutes’ rights’, prostitutes or ‘sex workers’ 
were perceived as occupying ‘subject positions’ as both women and labourers.
Given lesbian feminists’ inherent hostility towards the state (seen as a ‘legal yet violent 
apparatus’), mainstream ideology and culture, and Establishment politics, it is no 
surprise that they have assailed the state feminism espoused by liberal/women rights 
feminists. Undoubtedly, the lesbian feminist movement as a form of identity politics or 
cultural politics has contributed enormously to broadening the scope of feminist debate 
in Taiwan through the introduction of such concepts as lesbianism, body politics, and 
Third World feminism. It has also challenged the technology of gender at a deeper level, 
highlighting the structuring of gender norms through sexuality at a time when the 
traditional agenda of the women’s movement in Taiwan -  equal rights between men and 
women in the public realm -  had already entered the mainstream.
Yet the state feminist movement as a form of social politics seems to have made a more 
substantial contribution to improving women’s socioeconomic condition on the whole. 
This it has done by engaging in the formation of public policies which, for example, 
make women’s reproduction a public rather than private concern (maternity leave and 
day care) and helping formulate progressive status laws that guarantee women’s 
equality with men. It is important to acknowledge the achievement of state feminists in
1,3 Ning, 2001.
114 See Ho, 1998, The Lewd Woman.
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advancing the civil law movement, which has helped amend legal codes on family and 
marriage of a patriarchal nature. They have in addition tackled the ‘feminisation of 
poverty’, a result of the social security system’s failure to take into account women’s 
special needs in balancing home and work, and promoted community development and 
the public health care system.
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Chapter Four 
Nationalism, Taiwanese Consciousness and Taiwan’s 
Identity Predicament
The ‘Nationalistic Turn’ in Taiwan’s Public Culture
Around the time when the Lee Teng-hui administration adopted ‘nation 
state-building’ or the creation of a ‘new state’ as its core task in the early 1990s, 
nationalism appeared to take the place of liberalism in public fora, becoming perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of Taiwanese public culture. The launch of the nationalist 
movement has to be understood in light of the trajectory of Taiwan’s democratisation, 
local party competition, the power struggle within the ruling KMT and the Chinese 
developmental state’s emergence on the world stage as a regional power, primarily as 
the result of its astonishing economic performance.
While the origin of Taiwanese identity can be traced back to the period of Japanese 
occupation, embodied in the Taiwan independence movement, led by leftwing 
Taiwanese nationalists fighting against Japanese imperialism, geographical 
separation and the different historical experiences of the island and mainland account 
for the formation of the Taiwanese nationalism that evolved after retrocession in 1945. 
The half-century of Japanese colonial rule was deeply formative, ensuring that the 
island’s fate would differ from that of the mainland, as expressed in the film The 
Puppet-Master by distinguished Taiwanese director Hou Hsiao-hsien. 1 The
1 As Anderson interpreted the film, ‘[F]ew viewers of Hou Hsiao-hsien’s film The Puppet-Master, a 
landmark of world cinema, are likely to forget the beauty and dignity of one of its greatest scenes, the 
funerary theatre of a Taiwanese soldier killed in Guadalcanal, with Japanese officers at attention. The
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separation was reinforced by the Chinese Civil War and further consolidated by the 
Cold War.
Nationalist debate can however be said to have emerged in Taiwan as early as the 
1950s in the ‘Free China movement’, if the debate between national security and 
individual freedom may be counted, though this debate was settled rather swiftly after 
liberal democracy rose to pre-eminence.2 The Soviet Union and the Chinese 
communists were constructed as the national enemy of free China. In the early 1970s, 
when Taiwan suffered a series of diplomatic setbacks as a result of the normalisation 
of Sino-American relations, another nationalist debate emerged, commonly known as 
the Nativist Literary debate. With the Vietnam War and the 1968 revolt making up the 
broader historical context, anti-imperialism, primarily focused on America and Japan, 
played a central role in nationalist rhetoric. Elements typical of Third World literature 
appeared in the nationalist discourse put forward by the Nativist Literary movement, 
which originated in the early student demonstrations in the wake of the Diaoyutai 
Incident. The radical dependency theory of development, which gained wide 
popularity in the 1970s, was later introduced into the debate. The Nativist literary 
debate can be analysed from various related perspectives, including literary 
‘modernism vs. realism’, and ‘capitalism vs. socialism’ from the perspective of local
ambiguity of this experience, utterly unlike that of the mainland at the hands of Japan, remains a basic 
element in island life to this day’. Anderson explains: ‘[F]or whereas Japanese imperialism was a 
ruthlessly destructive force once launched against China itself, responsible for millions of deaths and 
massive devastation, in Taiwan, it established a relatively orderly, peaceful and productive system of rule: 
authoritarian as all European colonial regimes were, but in a more “backward” rural society with, 
eventually, less repression than in Korea or Manchuria, and a record of economic and educational 
development superior to any area of Republican China’. Perry Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’, 
London Book Review, Vol. 26, No. 11, June 2004.
2 ‘National struggle’, however, still constituted an important framework of liberal debate as the Chinese 
Civil War was thought to be a ‘social war’ as well as ‘national war’. The nationalist debate was settled in 
the sense that liberal democracy was considered crucial to winning this national war and founding a free
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as well as global political economy. As far as the nationalist debate is concerned, 
while the Soviet Union and the CCP were still regarded as the prime national enemy 
within the KMT’s rightwing official nationalism, the United States became the target 
of the campaign launched by the leftwing Nativist literary movement. Yet these 
discourses called for Chinese nationalism.
The debate between Taiwanese nationalists and Chinese nationalists emerged only in 
the 1980s, but Taiwanese nationalism was still in the process of formation. Instead of 
‘nationalism’ or ‘national identity’, the term ‘consciousness’ or ‘complex’ was used. 
We can thus talk of the ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate 
and the ‘Chinese complex vs. Taiwanese complex’ debate. Nevertheless, the idea of 
‘Taiwan independence’ had been entertained before: first during the radical leftwing 
movement active when the island was still under Japanese colonial rule, and then in 
the early 1970s when Taiwan (or the ROC) was no longer recognised as the sole 
lawful representative of all China by the international community. The story of the 
nationalist movement clearly imbued by (sub)ethnic politics began with the tragic 
‘February 28th Incident’ in 1947.
The Beginning of the Tragedy -  The ‘February 28th Incident’ in 1947
The history of Taiwan from the 1600s onwards has been dubbed ‘a history of 
ambiguity’ by one historian:
‘Since the 1600s, Taiwan has been defined as a small part of something else. The island was
China in the future.
3 While in the former case anti-imperialism underlay the Taiwan independence movement during 
Japanese colonisation, in the latter the primary concern was to secure the international status of Taiwan 
as a political entity independent from the mainland.
134
home to non-Han Chinese peoples for millennia, then became a prefecture of China’s Fujian 
Province in 1684, a full-fledged province in 1885, a Japanese colony in 1895, a province of 
the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945, the only province of the ROC in 1949, and eventually a 
virtually independent nation, which it remains today. With the exception of the last transition, 
central governments located far from the island initiated these changes.’4 
This ambiguous history later became the focal point of contentions between 
China-centred and Taiwan-centred historians. Indeed, pro-independence historians 
have drawn on this history to create accounts claiming that Taiwan’s contemporary 
history commenced four hundred years ago, as opposed to the KMT and Chinese 
nationalist notion that the island’s history goes back to the Huang Ti period on the 
mainland, five thousand years ago.
Taiwan was returned to China after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War in 1945. 
Between late 1945 and early 1947, the legacy of Japanese domination and the 
immediate difficulties caused by the KMT’s misrule spurred a lively debate over 
Taiwan’s relationship with the nation of China and the ROC state. With reasoned 
argument, rhetorical sleights of hand, and unconsciously selected images, the 
Taiwanese constructed a political discourse that recalled positive aspects of the 
colonial experience (stability and economic growth for example) while 
simultaneously downplaying the ‘problem’ of collaboration with the Japanese.5 The 
efficient and rigorous colonial government experienced by the Taiwanese was 
deployed to assail the Nationalists (the KMT), corrupt and inept as they often were. 
The retrocession was thus a bitter disappointment to many Taiwanese, especially if
4 Steven E. Phillips, 2003, Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter 
Nationalist China, 1945-1950, pp. 3. Emphasis original.
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one takes into account those of the KMT’s goals that involved both the state (ROC) 
and the nation (the Chinese) -  seeking to de-colonise and reintegrate Taiwan by 
erasing the Japanese influence and bringing the island under the economic, cultural 
and political sway of the central government.
Economically, the KMT hoped to exploit the island’s wealth and industrial base for 
postwar reconstruction and the struggle against the Communists. The 
Nationalists/KMT inherited an industrial infrastructure worn down by the demands of 
Japan’s war efforts and American bombing. Repair work ceased upon surrender as 
Japanese technical experts and managers began to return home, and spare parts for 
equipment became difficult to obtain. Agricultural production, insufficient in late 
1945, remained inadequate because of the lack of fertilisers. Food shortages and 
unemployment worsened as hundreds of Taiwanese who had been soldiers, labourers, 
students, merchants and low-level bureaucrats in China, Japan and Southeast Asia 
were repatriated. The Nationalists/KMT magnified problems that had already been 
severe by connecting Taiwan to the mainland’s economy even as the latter struggled, 
then failed, to recover from the war.6
The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, an administrative system 
unlike that of any another province in China but similar to that in existence during the 
Japanese colonial era, was established to attain this economic goal. Chen Yi became 
the administrator and commander of the Taiwan Garrison. Taiwan’s special status 
included restrictions on freedom of speech, understandably creating the feeling
5 Phillips, 2003, p. 40.
6 Phillips, 2003, pp. 64-5.
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among Taiwanese that they were again to be treated as second-class citizens. Indeed, 
the general style of Chen’s administration was that of the victor over the vanquished, 
rather than that of the liberator.7 The widely shared feeling of being denied 
recognition as full citizens, or even being seen as foreigners, quelled any initial 
patriotism felt towards the new regime.
The similarities between the KMT’s administrative system and Japanese colonial rule 
sparked resentment among the Taiwanese. This, together with the policies of cultural 
assimilation and political authoritarianism, explains why the KMT was considered a 
‘foreign or external regime’ and its rule ‘internal colonisation’. Culture and language 
constituted another problematic aspect of the KMT’s policies of de-colonisation and 
reintegration. The government sought to eradicate Japanese influence and Sinicise the 
Taiwanese through a process of cultural reconstruction based on cultural assimilation. 
To this end, Chen Yi used organisations like the Three Principles of the People Youth 
Corps, the Taiwan Office of Translation and Compilation, and the Association For 
Improving Taiwan Culture. The main goal was to reform Taiwan’s ‘enslaved’ culture 
through spreading the doctrine of the Three Principles of the People and promoting 
the study of Kuoyu, which mainly refers to classical Chinese literature and ‘standard 
Mandarin’.
Language became a point of conflict between the Taiwanese and the new Chinese 
administration. 8 Although most Taiwanese enthusiastically studied the new 
language -  whether out of patriotism, a drive to profit in the Chinese market, a
7 Christopher Hughes, 1997, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National identity and status in 
international society, pp. 24-5.
8 For a detailed discussion of the postwar linguistic problems resulting from early mainlander-Taiwanese
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curiosity stifled by the Japanese, or simply self-interest, is difficult to say -  the 
government’s approach encountered obstacles. Language competence became a 
symbol of one’s ‘Chinese-ness’ and national loyalty, turning the use of Japanese into 
a political problem. To mainlanders, the inability to speak, read and write the official 
language suggested backwardness and a lack of patriotism.9 This explains why the 
‘mother languages movement’ became an essential part of the nation-state building 
movement in the early 1990s.10 The lack of a good command of the new official 
language, i.e. standard mandarin, among the local elites largely accounts for their 
absence from public debate in the 1950s.
By early 1947, the problems of reintegration and postwar dislocation led to 
simmering discontent in the cities, towns and villages of Taiwan. People in the central 
part of the island talked about ‘three hopes’ (san hsi-wang). First came the hope 
(hsi-wang) that existed when Japan surrendered until the arrival of the Nationalist 
administration two months later. Next was lost hope (shih-wang), stemming from the 
dismal performance of the new government. Finally came hopelessness (chieh-wang), 
which set in once people came to feel that the future was bleak. A short poem 
published in New Taiwan summed up how many Taiwanese felt about the events of 
1945 and 1946:
contact, see Hsiau, 2000, Chap. 2, pp. 50-75.
9 Phillips, 2003, p. 69.
10 The linguistic issue was first addressed within the Dangwai opposition movement when Taiwanese 
consciousness was at the heart of public debate. The decree stipulating that elementary and high school 
students who spoke local languages in school must be punished was abolished as a result of an incident in 
the Legislative Yuan (parliament). A defiant legislator, Kao-cheng Chu, deliberately used Hoklo 
(commonly known as ‘Taiwanese’) instead of Mandarin to address a session in with a view to exposing 
the nature of the KMT’s cultural and linguistic policies, that is, assimilation. He wished to highlight the 
fact that the mainlander political elites could not understand and were unwilling to learn the major local 
language, though they had lived in Taiwan for over forty years. It should be noted that Hoklo is just one 
of many local languages, which also include Hakka and the languages of the aborigines. See A-chin
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‘American bombing startled Heaven and moved the Earth,
the news of retrocession led to debauchery,
the government was sinister and dark,
and the people appealed to Heaven and Earth.'11
Simmering tensions exploded in an incident on the evening of February 27. Six police 
officers attempted to arrest a woman selling cigarettes illegally in Taipei. One 
policeman struck the woman, an angry crowd gathered and violence broke out after an 
officer fired his weapon, killing a bystander. The next day 2,000 to 3,000 Taiwanese 
marched to the Monopoly Bureau Headquarters and hundreds gathered outside Chen 
Yi’s office. Besides protesting against the beating and shooting, islanders complained 
about unemployment, food shortages, inflation, political repression and corruption. 
That afternoon, a soldier or police officer guarding Chen’s office fired into the crowd, 
sparking an island-wide uprising. Vandalism and violence against police, soldiers, 
bureaucrats and any mainlander unfortunate enough to be on the streets spread 
beyond Taipei.12 The other masterpiece by Hou Hsiao-hsien, The City o f Sadness, was 
the first attempt to provide a historical narrative of the incident in the form of film and 
to initiate public debate on the event.
Official Chinese Nationalism vs. Taiwanese Consciousness, 1947-1970
The overwhelming power of the ROC military reinforcements from the mainland
Haisu, 2000, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, pp. 128-35.
11 This poem can be found in many publications. It was sometimes called ‘Five Heavens and Five Earths’. 
Quoted in Phillips, 2003, p. 74.
12 For brief historical accounts of the incident, see Wachman, 1994, Taiwan: National Identity and 
Democratization, pp. 98-9; Hsiau, 2000, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, pp. 55-8; and 
Phillips, 2003, Between Assimilation and Independence, pp. 75-6.
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ensured consolidation of the new state. In the purges that followed, commonly known 
as the White Terror,13 potential leaders among the residents of Taiwan were either 
killed, co-opted into collaboration, or fled overseas. The events related to the 
February 28th Incident were perhaps the most significant formative experiences 
preventing the consolidation of a Chinese national identity on the island over the 
following decades. Indeed, the whole episode impeded subsequent efforts at 
integration because of residual hostility and mistrust. This made it all the more 
difficult and vital for the KMT regime in Taiwan to establish legitimacy after it was 
forced to flee across the Strait in 1949 following its defeat by the Chinese communists 
on the mainland.
Chinese nationalism was the officially sanctioned nationalism and laid the foundation 
for the KMT’s authoritarian rule in Taiwan, although liberal democracy was claimed 
to be its ultimate goal and also constituted one element of its legitimacy. As briefly 
discussed in Chapter Two, the KMT’s official nationalism was a reinvention of the 
idea of ‘orthodoxy’ in the Chinese dynastic tradition. It consisted of three elements: 
cultural orthodoxy (dao tong), legitimate succession {fa tong) and orthodoxy per se in 
the dynastic tradition (cheng tong). Culturally, the KMT was the defender of orthodox 
Confucian values in contrast to the communist destruction of these values. Inheriting 
the iconoclasm of the May Fourth movement, Confucian culture and norms were 
viewed as the residue of feudalism, from which people should be liberated. Hence, 
part of the KMT’s historical mission was to revive and preserve Chinese culture.
13 The leaders of the KMT apparently suspected that the Taiwanese had collaborated with Japan while 
the KMT had been battling Japanese savagery on the mainland. The KMT also feared that Taiwan had 
been infiltrated by Communist provocateurs. The February 28th uprising was thus linked by the regime to 
Chinese communist penetration of Taiwan; its leaders were perceived as dangerous dissent intelligentsia.
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Some well-respected intellectuals, deeply alienated by the CCP’s radical cultural 
movement, which targeted Chinese culture in the 1950s, thus endorsed the KMT’s 
cultural orientation.14
The idea of ‘fa  tong', legitimate political succession, was signified in the KMT’s 
self-proclaimed status as representative of all China, grounded in the fact that it had 
held the last nation-wide elections to the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan in 
1947. In short, essential to the KMT’s official nationalism and the legality of its rule 
in Taiwan was the constitutional claim to legitimacy. The constitution formulated in 
1947 before the communist take-over (the ROC constitution as opposed to the PRC 
constitution in 1949) which was devised for the whole of China, together with the 
addition of a number of emergency measures justified as necessary to the Chinese 
nationalist revolution,15 became the foundation of the KMT’s claim to fa  tong'.
Based on the claim to 'dao tong’ and 'fa tong', the KMT asserted its orthodox status 
and claimed to be representative of all China, that is, ‘cheng tong'. In the Cold War 
context, with the support of the United States and liberal ideology, supposedly shared 
by all countries of the ‘free world’, the KMT relegitimised its authoritarian rule 
primarily through the ideology of Chinese nationalism, which aimed to reunify 
Taiwan with the mainland. The implementation of the KMT’s official nationalism,
Wachman, 1994, p. 97.
14 Shaw, 2002, ‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’, Issues & Studies, p. 126.
15 These were the legal devices for maintaining the party dictatorship put in place on the mainland in 
April 1948 by the first meeting of the ROC National Assembly. Entitled the Temporary Provisions 
Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, they suspended most of the constitutional 
constraints on the president. The president’s powers were further enhanced by the Legislative Yuan in 
December 1949, when it issued an administrative order declaring Taiwan a combat zone. This allowed 
Chiang Kai-shek to activate martial law on the island by emergency decree. See Tien, 1989, The Great 
Transition, p. 110; Hughes, 1997, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, p. 26.
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however, resulted in cultural hegemony, which not only impeded reintegration but 
also helped stir a Taiwanese consciousness among the majority of the population.
Underlying the voices of protest and dissent emerging from Taiwan’s creeping 
democratisation and growing sense of its own identity was the refutation of the 
principles and imperatives of Chinese nationalism. The discourse of Taiwanese 
nationalism entered its formative phase. The earliest comprehensive critique of the 
KMT’s official nationalism was probably the 1964 Declaration o f Taiwanese 
Self-Salvation, drawn up by a professor of international law at National Taiwan 
University, Peng Ming-min, and two of his students. All three were promptly arrested 
and imprisoned, and their publication destroyed. Peng later fled to the United States, 
where he propagated his views amongst Taiwanese students studying overseas. It was 
also there that he developed his argument in the 1972 autobiographical work, A Taste 
o f Freedom}6
Peng’s argument laid the ground for the discourse of Taiwanese consciousness 
articulated in the early 1980s, which took the Chinese consciousness of the KMT’s 
official nationalism and pro-China intellectuals to be the main obstacle to Taiwan’s 
political democratisation. It also had a deep intellectual impact on the construction of 
the discourse of liberal nationalism in Taiwan, especially the conception of political 
community developed in his A Taste o f Freedom, influenced by the work of Ernest 
Renan, in particular What Is A Nation? .17 Peng’s work also elucidates the
16 Hughes, 1997, pp. 35-38.
17 What strikes Peng is that Renan put forward the idea that, contrary to Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of 
Nationalism, neither race nor language nor culture makes a nation, but rather a deeply felt sense of 
community and shared destiny (Peng, 1972, p. 26; see Hughes, 1997, p. 37), a conception that was 
clearly attractive to Peng in ethnically-divided Taiwan.
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convergence of democratisation and Taiwan nationalism, first in the oppositional 
discourse of the Dangwai movement and, later, Lee Teng-hui’s ‘new-state 
movement’.
Neocolonialism, Anti-imperialism, Chinese Nationalism and the Nativist 
Literary Debate, 1971-1979
The observation that nation-building by means of the direct manipulation of culture, 
as practised by the KMT, tends to evoke alienation rather than identification, is bome 
out by the dissatisfaction felt with the straitjacket imposed under Chiang Kai-shek. 
Until the mid-1970s, the main alternative to the state-imposed version of Chinese 
tradition appears to have been literary theories from abroad, the so-called ‘modernist 
school of literature’, which, according to critics, was imported wholesale by the 
cultural ‘compradores’ of the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature at 
National Taiwan University. The Nativist Literary debate began with the ‘modem 
poetry debate’, or the attacks by leftwing literary critics on modem poetry, in the 
context of postwar modernisation and neocolonialism.
The Nativist Literary Debate and the Call for (Chinese) Nationalism
The Diaovutai Incident and the Baodiao Movement
The Nativist Literary movement emerged in the wake of Taiwan’s political crises of 
the early 1970s, beginning with the Diaoyutai Islands Incident in 1971, which 
involved the US hand-over to Japan of the Diaoyutai Islands (the ‘Senkaku Islands’ as 
they are known in Japan), an archipelago to the north of Taiwan which the Americans
143
1 fthad occupied in the Second World War. Left-leaning university students radicalised 
in the political and intellectual context of 1968 viewed this as a ‘secret deal’ between 
two major ‘empires’. The KMT response not only angered and disappointed these 
students, but also led to their feeling confused about their national identity, inducing 
many to turn away from ‘Free China’ and identify with Socialist China. Fearful that 
the US might cease supporting it, and that it might thus lose the main external 
foundation of its legitimacy, after initially making no comment, the KMT government 
merely issued a verbal protest asserting its determination to protect the national 
interest in the Islands.19
In January 1971, before the formal Japan-US agreement was signed, Taiwanese 
students studying in the United States organised a wave of protests, commonly known 
as the Baodiao movement, literally ‘preserving the Diaoyutai Islands movement’. The 
radicalisation of Taiwanese students was anchored in the events of 1968 in the United 
States. ‘The storm of 1968’, as Lin pointed out, ‘was an unusual historical conjuncture, 
more profound than it may seem, in the sense that it entailed the rebirth and 
stimulation of an expansive mood of radical resistance within capitalist societies,
18 The US-Japan agreement was related to Japan’s need to secure its oil sources and was part of 
America’s plan to develop a new strategic structure of cooperation in the region. In 1969, the UN’s 
ECAFE (the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Far East, which became the Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in 1977) published a report in Bangkok, 
suggesting that there were petroleum deposits under the East China Sea. The region includes the 
Diaoyutai Islands, which lie about 170 km northeast of the island of Taiwan. The Islands had been 
occupied by the United States in the Second World War. In 1971, Japan and the United States signed an 
agreement (the 1971 Japan-US Ryukyu Islands Reversion Agreement) returning the Ryukyu (Okinawa) 
and Daito Islands to Japanese administration. The Diaoyutai Islands were included in the returned islands. 
Before the reversion agreement was signed on June 17 1971, the Japanese government had already 
publicly claimed territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands in September 1970, a claim 
recognised by the United States.
19 In defence of the government, Chue argued that the then-premier Yen Chia-kan had publicly expressed 
the ROC government’s determination to protect the national interest in the islands as early as September 
1971. The Taiwan Provincial Assembly also passed a motion urging the government to stand firm in 
claiming sovereignty over the islands. Chue, 2001a.
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under conditions of peace, prosperity and political stability based on bourgeois 
democracy’.20 The access to radical political thoughts, specifically the new leftism or 
radical liberalism, enjoyed by Taiwanese students in North America, is particularly 
important to understanding the emergence of the Baodiao movement. For in Taiwan’s 
anti-communist context, radical or leftwing intellectual stimulation was non-existent 
and access to it was denied, indeed banned. The revolutionary spirit of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution (1977-1976) had an enormous influence on the student 
movements in the heartlands of the capitalist world, such as the United States, Japan, 
France and West Germany, and special meaning for the patriotic Taiwanese students 
taking part in the demonstrations in North America.
Nation-wide protests were launched by Taiwanese students on 29 January 1971. 
Initially, the students agreed to leave aside the internal ideological differences 
between liberal capitalism and democratic socialism and unite under the banner of 
patriotism. Right-wing supporters of the KMT, radical sympathisers with the CCP 
and a relatively small number of pro-independence Taiwanese students reached a 
compromise in order to put the protest against America and Japan first21 Eventually, 
though, disputes erupted between left and right. Important here was the fact that 
autonomous activities centred on Chinese patriotism were viewed with suspicion by 
the state. The government condemned the patriotic demonstrations staged by students 
across the Chinese-reading world following the Diaoyutai Incident as part of a
CCP-inspired united front. As a result, the KMT’s supporters, in defence of the
»
government’s foreign policy, attacked their left-leaning co-participants in the
20 Lin, 1993, The British New Left, p. 108.
21 Kuo, 1999, The Leftwing Movement in 1970s Taiwan, p. 19.
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demonstrations, branding their criticisms of the government and sympathy with 
Socialist China ‘unpatriotic’. At the same time, the leftwing Baodiao movement 
gradually evolved into a ‘unification movement’, aiming to found a democratic 
socialist China.
The Baodiao movement in Taiwan emerged slightly later than its counterpart in North 
America, primarily due to the lack of information. Under martial law, information 
was strictly controlled. Personal correspondence between students in Taiwan and 
North America therefore became the only channel for exchanging messages, making 
the Baodiao movement possible on the island. After the Baodiao movement was 
dominated by left-leaning students, the nationalist movement critical of American 
imperialism and frustrated by the KMT’s muted response to the Diaoyutai Incident 
was transformed into a national opposition movement fighting against both capitalism 
and authoritarianism. Inspired by the leftist idea of ‘labouring’ in general and the 
populist movement on the mainland in particular, student demonstrations were 
transformed into a kind of social service movement, dubbed ‘Young Men Going to 
the Countryside Movement’. ‘Back to the earth’ and ‘people’, concepts related to 
‘nation’ and ‘society’ and essential to the Nativist literary movement, were key 
components of this social service movement.
The Nativist Literary Movement -  Back to the Earth
While the Baodiao movement was underway, the United States signalled an
22 This campaign was known as ‘One person, one book; one person, one letter’ and involved sending 
letters containing messages of protest from North America to Taiwan. Related information on the 
transformation of the Baodiao movement from a purely nationalist/patriotic movement into a leftwing 
political campaign was also passed to students on the island in the same way. Kuo, 1999, p.35.
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impending change in its relations with Taiwan in a statement on April 28, 1971, 
declaring that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined.23 The same idea was 
expressed again later in the PRC-US Joint Communique of February 27, 1972, 
carefully worded to ‘acknowledge’ and ‘not challenge’ the position that ‘all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is part of China’, rather than to recognise Beijing’s claim to sovereignty 24 
The 1971 visit of the US table tennis team to the PRC and the Kissinger visit to 
Beijing were not only evidence of the improved relations between Beijing and 
Washington, but also contributed to the forced withdrawal of the ROC from the 
United Nations in October 1971 25 Following Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing, Japan 
recognised the PRC in September 1972 as did many other major states before long. 
Taiwan thus found itself isolated in the international community as an ‘intermediate 
state’.26
The 1970s, as noted above, was also the period when Taiwan experienced rapid and 
persistent economic growth with an average growth rate of 10 percent, except in 1974,
23 The statement made two main points: the legal status of Taiwan is an unresolved issue between the 
antagonistic governments of the KMT in Taiwan and the CCP on the mainland; any disputes between the 
ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland should be dealt with directly by the two regimes.
24 Hughes, 1997, pp. 30-1.
25 One important question that had to be resolved, stemming from the normalisation of Sino-US relations, 
was the representative status of ROC in the international community. In the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC’s 
legitimate representative status was secured with the help of the US, which delayed discussion of the 
‘Chinese representative’ issue at the General Assembly, and insisted that a two-thirds majority was 
needed to approve PRC membership of the UN. After Nixon’s decision to visit Beijing in 1971, the UN 
General Assembly endowed the PRC with full rights and recognised its representatives as the only 
legitimate representatives of China to the UN, expelling forthwith those of Chiang Kai-shek, now 
considered to be unlawfully occupying China’s seat at the UN and all organisations related to it 
(Resolution 2758, the UN General Assembly). Before the Resolution was passed, Chiang Kai-shek had 
already announced the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN, and rejected a proposal by the US to share a seat 
with the Chinese communists.
26 The term ‘intermediate state’ was borrowed by Christopher Hughes from Hedley Bull to describe 
Taiwan’s status. He applied it to Taiwan to draw attention to the difficulty posed to the foreign policy of 
such an entity, which remains transfixed between statehoods, when it has to deal with international 
society, whose institutions are designed to deal with states alone. Hughes, 1997, pp. 129-30.
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when the rate was zero as a consequence of the global oil crisis. Yet at the same time 
Taiwan began to encounter social problems resulting from its capitalist 
industrialisation and urbanisation. For example, the strategy of ‘using agriculture to 
nurture industry and using industry to develop agriculture’ did not work out entirely 
as expected: agriculture declined. The proportion of rural household income earned 
outside of agriculture rose from 25 percent in 1962 to 43 percent in 1975.27 Industrial 
policy included a system of multiple rates, overvaluation of domestic currency, trade 
controls, and the biasing of domestic trade against agriculture by means of land taxes. 
Both compulsory procurement of rice at below-market prices and the rice-fertiliser 
barter scheme tended to lower agriculturalists’ real income.28 For many critics, this 
developmentalist policy was overly exploitative of the agricultural surplus, inevitably 
creating an unequal power relationship between industries in urban areas and 
agriculture in rural areas.29
Having suffered political humiliations and frustrations externally and social problems
27 Ranis, 2002, p. 8, emphasis added. However, while Ranis saw this as a success of Taiwan’s industrial 
restructuring, characterised by the increase in non-agricultural output and the consistent agricultural to 
non-agricultural labour reallocation, many critics were concerned about the exploitation of farmers in the 
process.
Overvaluation of domestic currency compared to the US dollar provided a mechanism for extracting 
resources from the agricultural sector and transferring them to manufacturing. Exports, which were 
mostly agricultural, received less in domestic currency than they would have at an equilibrium exchange 
rate, so the overvalued rate acted as a kind of export tax. Indeed, rice and sugar exports faced an even 
more unfavourable rate than other exports under the system of multiple rates. At the same time, trade 
controls which accompanied the overvalued exchange rate increased the price of everyday consumer 
goods, tending to lower the farmers’ real income. On the other hand, industrialists benefited from the 
overvalued exchange rate because of lower costs for imported inputs, and from the trade controls as a 
result of the higher prices of products sold on the domestic market. The domestic terms of trade were also 
biased against agriculture by means of land taxes and, more importantly, through both compulsory 
procurement of rice at below-market prices and the rice-fertiliser barter scheme. The total tax burden on 
agriculture was significantly higher than for the non-agricultural sectors. See Wade, 1990, Governing the 
Market, pp. 76-77.
29 Chen Yu-hsi, 1992, Taiwan’s Dependent Development, pp. 129-41. At a seminar addressing the 
problems of Taiwan’s farming villages in the 1970s, Chen quoted the speech by Lee Teng-hui, former 
president of Taiwan, who was then in charge of the policy: ‘[T]he government purposely suppressed 
farmers’ income with a view to transferring population from agriculture to manufacturing’, (ibid., p. 132)
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resulting from capitalist industrialisation in the early 1970s, the subsequent sense of 
cultural crisis that gripped the island underscored more than ever the need to tackle 
social issues and critically examine the state of the nation. The surge of 
anti-imperialism that followed these political setbacks was manifested in part in the 
emergence of a ‘back to the earth* movement, which began to question the values and 
ideas of the West and advocated a return to the island’s Chinese cultural roots. Among 
writers and other intellectuals, the mood shifted from disengagement to engagement 
with immediate sociopolitical issues. The modernist principle of ‘art for art’s sake’ 
was attacked and replaced by the realist idea of ‘art for life’s sake’. Modernist poets 
and fiction writers, with their western themes and borrowed techniques, held less and 
less appeal to a public thirsty for nationalism.
The Intellectual attracted some leading students of the Baodiao Movement after it 
published a statement protesting against the US-Japan Agreement on the Diaoyutai 
Islands. The magazine was used by radical left-leaning students to promote their 
socialist ideas, which they believed should guide Taiwan’s political reform, while 
others wrote articles in favour of capitalist development.31 A strong social and nativist 
consciousness was expressed in a co-authored article, ‘This is the time to wake up!’. 
The disintegration of The Intellectual group and the government’s banning of a public 
seminar intended to initiate debate on nationalism in the wake of the Diaoyutai
30 Hsiau, 2000, p. 69; Yip, 2004, p. 27.
31 Chang Chun-hung, one of the founding fathers of the DPP, among others, was criticised for his 
pro-capitalism opinions and for using the magazine as a tool to pursue a career in politics. Kuo, 1999, 
p.38.
The article argued that: ‘Taiwanese capitalists are groomed at the cost of declining farming villages, 
low labour wages, and the hard lives of the civil servants and service men and women. All Taiwan people 
were forced to bear the cost.... They therefore have the right to stop the capitalists taking away the capital 
accumulated by the people as a whole with their sweat and blood’, (ibid., p. 40)
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Incident, which involved students from the Philosophy Department of National 
Taiwan University, forced these left-leaning students to shift their ‘field of practice’ 
from political campaigns to literary criticism. There then emerged the most radical 
cultural movement in postwar Taiwan before 1987- the Nativist Literary movement.
Although the controversy over the relationship between modernisation and 
westernisation can be traced back to the early decades of the twentieth century, the 
May Fourth era (1917-1921) and the so-called New Culture Movement, which has 
been described as the ‘beginning of Chinese nationalism’,33 a more immediate but 
equally significant precursor to the Nativist movement in the 1970s can be found in 
the modem poetry debates of 1972.
Socioeconomic Transformation and the Modem Poetry Debate34
Having enjoyed two decades of political stability and economic prosperity, Taiwan 
encountered serious challenges domestically and externally in the 1970s. Taiwan’s 
spectacular ‘economic miracle’ was not without its costs. As Taiwan evolved from a 
primarily rural, agricultural society into a predominantly urban, industrial one, it 
underwent dramatic and indeed traumatic changes, which shook its traditional orders 
to the core. The economic boom and industrialisation were accompanied by a host of 
new problems: social inequalities, conflicts between capitalists and labourers, 
conspicuous consumption and cultural alienation. As foreign investment grew and the 
Japanese and American consumer cultures penetrated further into Taiwanese society,
33 See Yip, 2004, Envisioning Taiwan: Fiction, Cinema, and the Nation in the Cultural Imaginary, pp. 
30-2.
34 The discussion in this section relies primarily on Kuo Chi-chou’s work The Leftwing Movement in 
1970s Taiwan (1999) and June Yip’s Envisioning Taiwan (2004).
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many began to question the social and cultural costs of the island’s continued military 
dependence and its increasingly complex economic ties with the global capitalist 
system. Radical intellectuals wondered whether Taiwan was once again being 
enslaved and exploited by foreign powers -  becoming an economic and cultural 
colony of Japan and America. Against this backdrop, the modem poetry debate was 
initiated.
Western modernism has had a huge impact on Taiwanese literature. From a literary 
point of view, Taiwanese society was perceived as a ‘cultural desert’ by many during 
the first decade of the KMT’s rule.35 The literature taught in Taiwan’s schools was 
limited primarily to Confucian classics and traditional Chinese poetry from the 
dynastic era. Popular literature consisted largely of escapist entertainment -  historical 
romances and swordsmen epics -  far removed from the quotidian realities of Taiwan. 
The literature of this early period also tended to be monopolised by refugee writers 
from the mainland. Against this background, post-1949 Taiwan’s Modernist literary 
movement emerged. It in fact carried on many of the traditions established in China 
during the Republican era, 1911-1949, characterised by emulation of western high 
culture. Postwar Taiwan’s Modernist literary movement, one of the latest in a series 
of such efforts, naturally displayed some of its essential characteristics. The 
Modernist literary Movement was arguably linked with liberal thought prior to the
35 The native tradition of resistance literature under the Japanese was stifled after the KMT take-over of 
the island, since, as noted above, many Taiwanese authors were either executed or imprisoned by the 
government or fled abroad. Besides, writers in Taiwan were largely cut off from the humanistic tradition 
of modem Chinese literature, as the richly varied and socially conscious literature of the May Fourth 
period was banned by the government because most of its major authors, such as Lu Hsun, Lao She and 
Pa Chin were affiliated with the Chinese communists. Yip, 2004, p. 23.
36 Their work was dominated by the nostalgic literature of exile, love stories and spy novels set in 
Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing and other cities in China, which were unfamiliar to the majority of Taiwanese 
readers, (ibid., p.23)
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(communist) Revolution, especially that of Anglo-American intellectuals.37
The new generation of young writers taking part in this literary movement, many of 
them university students, began to publish critical and creative works in newly 
established literary journals, some of which were devoted to promoting ‘new poetry’, 
such as Blue Star (1957-1965) and Contemporary Poetry (1953-1963), while some 
focused exclusively on fiction, for example Epoch (1954-1970), Literary Review 
(1956-1960) and Modern Literature (1960-1973). The major characteristic of these 
literary journals was an intense interest in European and American modernist 
literature, which for many young intellectuals had begun to fill the void left by 
Taiwan’s alienation from modem Chinese literary traditions.38 The principle of 
artistic autonomy was promoted and defended.
The attacks on modernism by Nativist writers in 1972, predominantly from an 
anti-imperialist and realist perspective, were commonly known as the modem poetry 
debate, a precursor of the Nativist Literary debate later that year. This debate began 
with Kuan Chieh-ming’s article promoting the ‘re-Sinicisation’ of modem Chinese 
poetry and calling for poets to forget their borrowed western ideas and techniques and 
turn their attention to the Taiwanese reality around them, to the daily struggles of the 
ordinary people. His was one of the earliest appeals for a ‘national style’ in Taiwanese
37 The ideas of key literary figures in post-1949 Taiwan such as Liang Shih-chiu, former member of the 
Crescent Moon Society, Hsia Chi-an, the chief editor of Literary Magazine and mentor of a group of 
modernists, and Yen Yuan-shu, a leading critic of the 1960s who introduced New Criticism into Taiwan, 
are all fundamentally rooted in the western liberal-humanist tradition (the R.O.C. Yearbook 1999, pp. 
431-2).
38 For a detailed discussion of the works of these modernist writers and the intellectual influence of 
western writers on them, see Yip, 2004, pp. 24-5. For a discussion of contemporary poetry, see Kuo, 
1999, p. 43.
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literature.39
The modernists were criticised for their overeager experimentation with techniques 
and ideas borrowed from western literary theories; they were considered the victims 
of cultural and intellectual colonisation. Moreover, their use of obscure, 
unconventional language and their obsession with formal stylisation elicited charges 
of hollow aestheticism, elitist decadence and abdication of social responsibility.40 The 
attack on western modernism initiated by the modem poetry debate eventually 
evolved into a broader and more constructive discussion of the function of literature 
and the arts. As the aestheticism of literary modernism fell increasingly out of favour, 
the historical and social role of literature was re-emphasised. It was during this period 
of introspective enquiry and cultural renaissance that writers and scholars 
re-discovered the native Taiwanese literature of the Japanese occupation period 41
Like modernist writers, Nativist writers were loosely affiliated with particular 
newspapers and literary journals, most notably the United Daily News (specifically, 
its literary supplement), one of the island’s leading newspapers, Writer's Forum, 
Youth Monthly and Literary Quarterly. The most important theoreticians of the 
Nativist Literary movement include Yu Tien-tsung, Wang To and Chen Ying-chen. 
Their fictional works and the critical discourse they inspired were structured on 
numerous and sometimes overlapping pairs of binary oppositions, most notably: 
native vs. foreign cultures, Taiwanese dialect vs. Chinese language, experimental vs. 
cognitive knowledge, tradition vs. modernity, village vs. city, and rural agrarianism
39 Kuo, 1999, p. 43; Yip, 2004, p. 33.
40 Kuo, 1999, pp. 44-6; Yip, 2004, p. 32.
41 Yip, 2004, p. 33.
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vs. industrial capitalism. Such ‘dogmatic’ reduction of the complicated changes in 
Taiwanese society to a binary struggle between the negative values of an industrial 
capitalism imposed by foreigners and the positive values of indigenous agrarian 
society certainly bolstered the ideological struggle against the modernists. Yet at the 
same time it oversimplified the sociohistorical problems facing Taiwanese society.
Literary Critiques as Social Interventions -  Nativist Literature
Unlike most of the Modern Literature writers, Wang To, Yang Ching-chu, Chen 
Ying-chen, Wang Chen-ho and Huang Chun-ming were native islanders writing 
about the contemporary Taiwanese people and concrete social problems that many 
felt had been ignored by modem literature. Kuo and Yip have produced excellent, 
comprehensive analyses of the work of these Nativist writers, highlighting their 
depictions of the plight of those people exploited and marginalised during capitalist 
industrialisation, which entailed critical views of the KMT’s development strategy.42
Yang is best known for his examination of daily life in the new industrial 
manufacturing plants that dotted the island’s landscape. In his most famous fiction, 
‘The Factory Workers’, which drew on his own experiences and observations as a 
refinery factory worker in Kaohsiung, the base of Taiwan’s heavy industries, he 
depicted the abuse suffered by factory workers and examined its bitter consequences. 
Wang To, known for his fictions such as ‘Auntie Chin-shui’ and ‘Bombing’, was 
concerned with economic exploitation, not only in the new manufacturing industries
42 See Kuo, 1999; Yip, 2004. Whilst Kuo analysed the Nativist literary debate from the perspective of the 
short-lived re-emergence of the leftwing/socialist movement (dubbed ‘the third wave’ of Taiwan’s 
leftwing movement since the Japanese rule) in Taiwan society, Yip centred her discussion on the cultural 
imaginary of ‘the (Taiwanese) nation’ projected by the Nativist writers.
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but also in more traditional modes of production such as farming and fishing, which 
he perceived to have been permanently altered by the introduction of the capitalist 
systems of wholesale marketing, organised distribution, and retailing. Chen 
Ying-chen, probably the most active of the Nativist group, wrote stories addressing 
the problems created by multinational companies, especially American corporations, 
that had set up branches in Taipei and which in his view were exploiting and 
enslaving armies of Taiwanese white-collar workers.
Wang Chen-ho is famous for his Rose, Rose, I  Love You and ‘Oxcart for a Dowry’. 
The former is a pointed critique of Taiwan’s flourishing sex trade, providing 
Taiwanese women to satisfy the appetites of American soldiers on leave from their 
tour of duty in Vietnam. The central metaphor of roses in a garden refers at once to 
sexual love and to the nickname for a type of venereal disease rampant among 
American soldiers in Vietnam at the time, ‘Saigon Rose’.43 The latter is a dark, 
sardonic comedy about a destitute couple distinguished only by their ludicrous flaws 
and a story asking some poignant, fundamental questions: what happens when people 
struggling for mere subsistence are thrown together in a godforsaken land? When 
survival is at stake, what happens to venerated cultural notions such as pride, dignity, 
love and honour? The story, as one literary critic commented, is a complex parable of 
survival and the human condition 44
Huang Chun-ming’s works such as ‘The Taste of Apples’, ‘The Sandwich Man’ 
‘Sayonara Good-bye’ and ‘Days of Gazing at the Sea’ all examined the traumatic
43 See Yee, 2001, p. 95; Yip, 2004, p. 34.
44 For detailed analysis of the story, see Yee, 2001, p. 95.
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changes that modernisation and urbanisation brought to traditional Taiwanese 
villages by depicting the poverty-stricken lives of Taiwan’s lower classes, the ‘little 
people’, such as peasants, street peddlers and prostitutes. ‘The Taste of Apples’ used 
the comic and fantastical story of a Taiwanese worker, whose rickety bicycle was run 
over by an American general’s shiny Mercedes limousine, not only to raise questions 
about the American military presence in Taiwan and the degree to which the 
penetration of American culture had led to blind admiration of all things Western,45 
but also to demonstrate how harsh the worker’s family life was. Instead of grief and 
complaints, the family felt that the father’s injury was good luck -  the compensation 
money from the American general, medical treatment in a well-equipped modem 
hospital, and a chance to enjoy the taste of apples, luxury fruit for most Taiwanese 
people at the time.
These Nativist fictional works were later the raw materials of the first New Wave 
Cinema or New Cinema in 1980s Taiwan, which was inspired by the idea and theory 
of Third Cinema.46 Inspired by the Nativist literature of the 1970s, New Wave 
directors such as Hou Hsiao-hsien, Edward Yang (Yang Teh-chang), and Wang Tong 
created a new style of cinema with a unique Taiwanese flavour by focusing on 
realistic and sympathetic portrayals of rural and urban life. Among them, Hou’s later 
films, such as The City o f Sadness and The Puppet Master, are recognised as major
45 See Yip, 2004, p. 35.
46 Third Cinema was characterised by its ‘oppositional’ filmmaking, influenced by revolutionary 
cinematic currents in Europe that were, in part, precipitated by anxieties over encroachment by foreign, 
notably American, culture: movements such as Italian neorealism and British notions of die social 
documentary. The parallels that Italian neorealism offers to Third Cinema in general and Taiwanese New 
Cinema in particular are striking, both in terms of its historical significance as a cinematic movement and 
its stylistic characteristics. For a more detailed discussion of Italian neorealism, Third Cinema and 
Taiwanese New Cinema, see Yip, 2004, pp. 60-8; 173-80.
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contributions to world cinema. The New Wave Cinema was original in its 
replacement of melodrama and escapism -  the previous mode of cinema -  with a 
realistic examination of life in Taiwan society following the tremendous social, 
political, and economic changes that had taken place over the previous fifty or so
47years.
Nativist writers also relied on frequent public lectures and literary forums -  carefully 
publicised on college campuses and generously covered by the major newspapers -  to 
build an audience and broaden their appeal. By the mid-1970s, the Nativist writers 
had succeeded in winning considerable popular and critical support. The new foci of 
anti-imperialism, localism and realism were championed not only as a break from the 
tired nostalgic fiction of the refugee writers, who had dominated Taiwanese fiction 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but also as a more serious-minded and socially 
relevant alternative to the escapist literature -  teen love stories, historical romances 
and swordplay sagas -  popular at the time.48
In line with calls for Chinese nationalism, the Nativists constructed a national 
consciousness by focusing on specifically Taiwanese sociohistorical problems and 
shifting away from the western-orientated modernist experimentation and
47 The second New Wave Cinema emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the initial enthusiasm 
of local audiences for the first New Wave began to wear off. The second New Wave offered greater 
variety in content and style. However, it still exhibited a strong commitment to portraying a uniquely 
Taiwanese perspective and exploring the reality of life in contemporary Taiwan, especially its pain and 
absurdities. See the R.O.C. Yearbook 1999, pp. 372-4.
48 See Hsiau, 2000, p. 67; Yip, 2004, p. 29. Central to the critical discourse of anti-modernism was the 
idea that the modernism introduced and promoted by many western-trained liberal scholars, considered 
to be ‘superior’ and ‘progressive’ as a body of thought as well as literary genre, was in fact merely a 
fashionable trend, hard for ordinary people to understand and appreciate. Moreover, ordinaiy people 
were seen by the modernists as overly conservative, possessing outdated aesthetic views and insensitive 
to modem ideas. Modernists were therefore criticised for alienating themselves from the public because 
they had lost their sociohistorical awareness.
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individualistic tendencies of writers associated with the literary magazines of the 
early 1960s towards more traditionally realist narratives. Although the Nativist 
cultural form is generally associated with works by Nativist writers in the 1970s, it in 
fact originated during the period of Japanese occupation and the Sino-Japanese War, 
when Taiwan was absorbed economically and culturally by the Japanese regime. 
Conceived by patriotic Taiwanese intellectuals as a nationalistic effort to resist forced 
assimilation into Japanese culture and preserve local traditions, the Nativist literature 
of this period sought to realistically depict the social and economic conflicts 
precipitated by the clash of traditional Chinese feudalism with the capitalist 
modernisation introduced by the Japanese colonisers. Important Nativist writers of 
the occupation period include Yang Kuei, Wu Chou-liu, Chung Chao-cheng and 
Chung Li-ho. Perceiving the historical context of 1970s Taiwan as a type of 
neocolonialism, the Nativist writers of the 1970s deliberately introduced the works of 
the prewar generation of Nativist writers.
The Nativist Literary Debate and the Foundation of the China Tide Group
This debate was triggered by Wang To’s article ‘Bells toll in the graveyard’ in Cactus 
Magazine in 1977. The article was critical of the escapist orientation or 
‘sociohistorical disengagement’ of 1960s literary modernism and called for works 
tackling local subjects to be published. It was followed by two critical responses: Yin 
Cheng-hsiung’s ‘Where are the bells tolling in the graveyard?’ and Chu Hsi-nin’s 
‘Where to return? How to return?’,49 accusing Wang of inciting social hatred by
49 Chu expressed anxiety that the Nativist movement would eventually develop into a kind of 
‘regionalism’ as the ‘localness’ of literary creation was overemphasised. He argued that Nativist works 
could thus hardly be expected to create a new paradigm for literature.
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exaggerating social inequalities and promoting localism and xenophobia.
The official response to the rise of Nativist fiction was a retrenchment in which the 
binary structures of classical nationalistic thinking were manipulated to reaffirm the 
KMT’s vision of China. In August 1977, the government organised a three-day 
conference called the Symposium of Literary Workers. The ostensible purpose of the 
conference was to celebrate the creative freedom enjoyed by writers in Taiwan and to 
condemn the censorship and persecution suffered by writers and artists on the 
mainland. However, as many have pointed out, it soon became obvious that the true 
objective of the meeting was to criticise, censure and ultimately suppress the Nativist 
literary movement.50
The KMT strategy was to paint the Nativist camp as traitors, insinuating that its 
particular brand of sociopolitical consciousness in literature and art was an invitation 
to subversion and a threat to the national security and unity of the ROC. The most 
famous supporters of this move were Peng Ke, a critic closely associated with the 
KMT, and Yu Kuang-chung, a famous modem poet. Yu’s sarcastic, critical and 
oft-cited article ‘Wolves are coming!’,51 is an example of how the opponents of 
Nativist literature sought to link it to the Chinese communists, the national enemy, by 
mobilising the politically loaded terms ‘proletarian literature’, ‘literature of the 
workers, peasants and soldiers’ and ‘class struggle’. 52 The debate on Nativist
50 Kuo, 1999, p. 244; Yip, 2004, p. 40.
51 Yu made a sarcastic remark on Nativist literature: ‘We have not heard of “Literature of 
San-Min-Chu-Yi” in Beijing. Yet “proletarian literature” is already everywhere in Taipei. The 
“proletarian literature” might win awards someday in Taipei. When our country is suffering from 
diplomatic setbacks, some people are promoting “proletarian literature”. What a coincidence’. Yu (1977), 
quoted in Wei, 1980, p.266.
This involved specifically the rigidly defined talks on literature and the arts in Yenan. Yip, 2004, p. 40.
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literature and its role in the emergence of a ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ was further 
polarised by attempts by the government and its cultural apologists to accuse the 
Nativist writers of promoting separatism.
In response, Wang To wrote the article ‘“Realism” not “Ruralism”’ to clarify that he 
was a literary realist rather than political separatist.54 Chen Ying-chen, in his article 
‘The blind spot of Nativist literature’, insisted on the continuity between the 
anti-imperialist spirit of Nativist literature and earlier resistance movements in China. 
He performed an exercise of self-criticism, outlining the position of those who call for 
Taiwanese cultural nationalism and then dismissing it as the rhetoric of separatism. 
Instead, Chen emphasised that the Taiwanese consciousness of which the Nativists 
spoke was an inseparable part of a broader Chinese consciousness, an inherited 
struggle in pursuit of Chinese self-determination. Besides, Sun Yat-sen’s Three 
Principles of the People -  the guiding tenets of the ROC under the KMT, were evoked 
by Nativists not only to affirm their allegiance to the official vision of Chinese 
nationalism, insisting that Nativist literature was necessarily opposed to separatist 
localisms, Yu Tien-tsung’s ‘Nativist literature and nationalist spirit’ being an example, 
but also to construct a new discourse for the Nativist movement by relinquishing the 
term ‘Nativist literature’ altogether, as Wang Hsing-ching’s article ‘Bells tolling
53 ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ refers to a local consciousness irrelevant to any idea of Taiwanese 
nationalism as perceived later in the 1980s debate between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese 
consciousness.
54 Wang To argued that the cultural and political movements of the 1970s signalled Taiwan’s sudden 
waking to ‘the true face of imperialist aggression’ and ‘served an important educational and provocative 
function vis-&-vis our long-time existence under American and Japanese economic incursions 
masquerading under the guise of “economic cooperation’” . Wang went on to cite numerous examples of 
tragedies suffered by Taiwanese labourers in American- and Japanese-owned factories. Yip, 2004, p. 34, 
p. 261 (note 82).
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everywhere’ set out to achieve.55
Faced with all-out attacks from the government and its apologists, Nativist writers 
understandably sought sympathetic allies and any protection that might be available 
to them. The China Tide group was organised by the leading members of the Nativist 
movement in part for this reason, with the assistance of the nationalist China 
Magazine. The magazine’s Chinese nationalism, anti-westernisation and 
anti-modernisation made it keen to help the Nativists, many of whom shared these 
concerns. Hu Chiou-yuan, a legislator and member of the KMT, enjoyed personal 
connections with the regime due to their shared conservative Chinese nationalism, 
allowing him to negotiate with the government for the China Tide group. Ho defended 
the group by obscuring or ‘whitewashing’ the socialist orientation of the Nativist 
writers, emphasising their Chinese nationalism. The cooperation or union of China 
Tide and Chinese Magazine was called the ‘China Alliance’. Yet the sociopolitical 
conservatism and radicalism of the respective groupings laid the foundation for 
internal conflicts over the issue of ‘nationalism vs. internationalism’ and eventually 
caused the Alliance to split in 1979.
The ‘Chinese Consciousness vs. Taiwanese Consciousness’ Debate and the 
Emergent Taiwanese Nationalism, 1980-1990
Encouraged by public support for the Dangwai movement in the pre-election
55 Wang felt that interpretations of the term ‘Nativist literature’ were so extreme that the people who used 
it were ‘enslaved’ by it rather than using it to express their ideas properly. He then announced the death 
of the term, hoping however that this would give the literature a whole new lease of life. For Wang, this 
new-born literature, with the same spirit, emphasised ‘resistance against imperialism by exalting national 
dignity, resistance against capitalism by practising the Principle of Livelihood, and resistance against 
bourgeois democracy by employing the democratic principle of the People’s Three Principles’. Wang 
( 1977), quoted in Wei, 1980, p.306.
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campaigns and their surprising victories over the KMT’s candidates in 1977, the 
China Tide group began to get involved in oppositional activities against the KMT. 
Initially, they lent the Dangwai opposition verbal support. Later, after a heated 
internal debate which failed to produce consensus,56 some members of the group were 
convinced that the Dangwai movement’s ‘mass approach’, which focused on 
elections, was more effective and direct than cultural critiques, and joined forces with 
the political opposition, led predominantly by native Taiwanese politicians.57
Another key change in the magazine was the reduced attention paid to the Three 
Principles of the People and the thoughts of Sun Yat-sen. The focus shifted to the 
legitimacy of Taiwanese historical consciousness, which contributed to the 
transformation of Taiwanese consciousness from a local consciousness that was an 
inseparable part of Chinese consciousness to a Taiwan-centred consciousness. This 
was embodied by one of Wang Hsing-ching’s comments, made in response to the 
KMT’s criticism of violent ‘mobs’ in the Chungli Incident, which implicitly 
challenged the China-centred view of history by emphasising the equal importance of 
the histories of Taiwan and China.58
Indeed, his remark also implied that people on the island and mainland had different
56 Different views were held by its members. For example, fanatic nationalists like Wang Hsiao-po and 
Chen Ying-chen insisted that unification was the most important goal, which should never be 
compromised. Some, like Wang Hsing-ching, rejected the proposal to join the Dangwai movement as 
they were sceptical about ‘bourgeois democracy’. For those who later joined the Dangwai movement, 
direct contact with the masses in political rallies was the most effective form of political practice.
57 The editorial entitled ‘Our aims and arguments’, published on the occasion of China Tide's second 
anniversary, stated: ‘We seldom talk about politics in the magazine. However, this does not mean that we 
have no political arguments. Our political arguments are very simple: corruption must be eliminated and 
elections fair... Prior to the election, we published two interviews on the election; after the election, we 
published our comments and reflections on the Chungli Incident. We are also concerned with the 
orientation of young people demonstrated in the election’. Editorial, China Tide, 1977.
58 Wang, 1977, p.15.
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historical experiences: while the island was a colony of Japan, the mainland was a 
semi-colony of western powers; whereas Japanese imperialism was a ruthlessly 
destructive force once launched against China itself, responsible for millions of 
deaths and massive devastation, in Taiwan it established a relatively orderly, peaceful 
and productive system of rule. Yet China Tide's call for due attention to Taiwan’s 
history was by no means made to support Taiwan independence.59 It was not until the 
new Taiwanese literary movement in the 1980s, a component of Taiwanese cultural 
nationalism, that Taiwanese consciousness was aroused and the project of crafting a 
national literature of Taiwan got underway.60
The 1979 Kaohsiung Incident, originally a mass rally organised by the Dangwai 
movement to mark International Human Rights Day, which sadly ended in a ruthless 
government crackdown, was undoubtedly a severe setback for the opposition. Yet the 
imprisonment of the rally leaders set the scene for the rise of militants within the 
group, radicalised their strategy and strengthened their determination to fight against 
the KMT’s authoritarianism. Gradually, Taiwanese consciousness as opposed to 
Chinese consciousness was promoted by addressing the taboo issue of the “February 
28th Incident”, depicting resistance heroes fighting against different regimes that had 
ruled Taiwan, and eulogising ‘Taiwanese glories’. The radicalisation of the 
opposition’s political discourse was apparent in the common manifesto published in 
the election campaign in 1983 that defiantly claimed the right of Taiwan people to 
self-determination: ‘Taiwan’s future must be decided by all citizens of Taiwan’.
59 Its anti-separatist stance has remained unshaken. This was shown in its overall ‘cautious cooperation’ 
with the Dangwai movement in general and open criticism of the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 in 
particular.
See Hsiau, 2000, p. 90-102.
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The Characteristics and Evolution o f Taiwanese Consciousness
In the context of the KMT’s authoritarianism and official Chinese nationalism, as 
noted in Chapter Two, the convergence of Taiwanese nationalism and 
democratisation naturally became central to oppositional discourse. Taiwanese 
consciousness was thus construed as both a democratic consciousness and a national 
consciousness. In his article ‘Taiwanese consciousness -  the cornerstone of the 
Dangwai democratic movement’, Chen Shu-hung listed reasons why the recognition 
of Taiwanese consciousness, which was independent from Chinese consciousness, 
must be the pre-condition for Taiwan’s democratic development. In contrast, Chinese 
consciousness, on which the official Chinese nationalism and the political legitimacy 
of the KMT’s authoritarianism (the frozen democratic constitution, suspension of 
re-election of representatives to the three central legislative bodies, and the repression 
of civil liberties) were based, was seen as the major obstacle to Taiwan’s liberal 
democratisation.61
In defining ‘Taiwanese consciousness’, Chen provided a rather materialist account: 
‘Taiwanese consciousness is neither bom naturally nor is it merely a geographic term. 
It is the product of a distinctive social and economic development’. This view is 
reminiscent of the accounts of Benedict Anderson and Perry Anderson, among 
others, who attribute the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism to its unique historical 
experiences and geographical separation, and is closely related to the theoretical
61 Chen Shu-hung, 1983, ‘Taiwanese consciousness -  the cornerstone of the Dangwai democratic 
movement’, in Shih Min-hui (ed.), A Selection o f Articles on the Debate Over Taiwanese 
Consciousness -  A Conclusion to the ‘Taiwan Complex versus China Complex’ Debate, pp. 191-205.
62 Benedict Anderson, 2001, ‘Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism -  Is there a difference that 
matters?’, New Left Review, 2001, May-June; Perry Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off In Taiwan’, London 
Review o f Books, June 2004, Vol. 26, No. 11.
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perspective on identity change in Taiwan which emphasises the role of social 
experiences. He rejected the primordial view of national identity which argued that 
a ‘common consciousness’ would necessarily develop within a group of people who 
were bom and grew up in the same place, that is, a natural community. Instead, he put 
forward a modernist-functionalist account of the formation of Chinese national 
consciousness that stressed the role of capitalist development commencing in the late 
Ming dynasty (1600s). This common consciousness was later consolidated further by 
the common experience of resisting foreign aggression on the mainland.64
Chen argued that before the mid-nineteenth century, no common Taiwanese 
consciousness existed on the island. Local consciousnesses prevailed as the result of 
migration from the mainland, primarily Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Most 
notable were the ‘Chuan-chou consciousness’, the ‘Chang-chou consciousness’ and 
the ‘Hakka consciousness’.65 The feudal economy and small-scale agriculture at the 
time were taken to explain why diverse local consciousnesses overrode the very weak 
‘common Taiwanese consciousness’, if it existed at all. Frequent ethnic conflicts, 
according to Chen, proved the absence of a common Taiwanese consciousness.
The capitalist industrialisation launched under colonial rule to meet the needs of
63 Melissa J. Brown, 2004, ‘Preface’, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact o f Culture, Power, and Migration 
on Changing Identities.
64 For comprehensive discussions of theories of nationalism see Anthony D. Smith, 1998, Nationalism 
and Modernism’, 2001, Nationalism -  Theory, Ideology, History.
63 People of Chang-chou and Chuan-chou origin are commonly termed and viewed as sub-groups of the 
‘Min-nan’ people in the popular categorisation of ethnic groups in Taiwan. According to this 
categorisation, there are four main ethnic groups in Taiwan: the aborigines (normally contrasted with the 
Han Chinese, which includes the following three ethnic groups), the Min-nan, the Hakka and the 
mainlanders (those people who came to the island with the KMT in the postwar era and their offspring). 
See Wang Fu-chang, 2003, Ethnic Imagination in contemporary Taiwan (especially Chapter Three); 
Melissa J. Brown, 2004, Is Taiwan Chinese? (especially ‘Figure 4’ which illustrates the relations 
between the ethnic terms used in Taiwan, p. 10).
165
Japan's imperialist expansion was, according to Chen, a significant stage in the 
development of Taiwanese consciousness. The establishment of unified measuring 
and monetary systems and the construction of the North-South highway boosted the 
growth of island-wide business. It also reflected the growing level of unity in 
Taiwan’s social and economic affairs. It was as a result of this stage that a Taiwanese 
consciousness shared by different ethnic groups gradually grew.66 In addition, the 
new educational system, which encouraged children to go to school and increased 
enrolment rates, the national language policy, which promoted Japanese, and the 
broad social and collective mobilisation during the Second World War in the service 
of Japan’s military expansionism, all contributed to the formation of a ‘sense of unity’ 
under specific temporal and spatial conditions.67 Taiwanese consciousness was also 
strengthened by the common experience of resisting Japanese colonialism.68
This common Taiwanese consciousness continued to develop in postwar Taiwan. The 
integration of social and economic activities island-wide continued, despite the 
demographic change resulting from the retreat of the KMT and its followers to the 
island, that is, an increase of population on the island. In theory, mainlanders who 
moved to the island with the KMT in 1949 might be made felt need to decide whether 
or not to join the existing socioeconomic entity of the island. In practice, however,
66 Chen, unlike some historians, contended that the disappearance of ethnic conflicts after the Japanese 
took control of the island was not because of the brutal yet effective suppression by the Japanese police. 
Instead, it was because of the formation of a common consciousness -  Taiwanese consciousness, hence a 
new collective Taiwanese identity. However, it is hard to believe that these two factors—the brutal 
suppression by the Japanese police and the formation of common consciousness of the Taiwanese people 
were irrelevant, as the following accounts demonstrate.
67 Chiang Cheng-kuan, 1999, ‘The Spirit of Resistance in Taiwan’s History’, in China Tide Foundation 
(ed.), Proceedings o f the Conference on Chinese Consciousness and Taiwanese Consciousness, pp. 
298-9.
68 The spirit of resistance was demonstrated in the nationalist movements led by such radical leftist 
political groups as the ‘Cultural Association’, ‘Taiwan People’s Party’, ‘Farmers Corporation’ and the
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mainlanders and islanders came to form a community with a common fate, on the 
basis of shared experiences of rapid and equitable capitalist industrialisation, the 
KMT’s right-wing authoritarian rule, and the severe diplomatic setbacks that 
challenged the status of the ROC on Taiwan as the sole representative of all China. 
However, as the Nativist literary movement’s call for nationalism demonstrated, this 
common Taiwanese consciousness should not be equated with ‘Taiwan independence 
consciousness’.
The historian Huang Chun-chieh has studied the intellectual history and evolution of 
Taiwanese consciousness. Taiwanese consciousness encountered various ‘Others* at 
different historical stages.69 Similar to Chen Shu-hung’s historical periodisation, 
Huang divided the development of Taiwanese consciousness into four stages. Firstly, 
during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1661-1895), ‘consciousness’ was localised, as 
represented by the Chuan-chou, Chang-chou and Hakka consciousnesses. Secondly, 
during the period of Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), a collective Taiwanese 
consciousness as the ruled class or ‘secondary citizens’ emerged. The distinctive 
feature of this Taiwanese consciousness was that it embodied both class and 
nationalist consciousness. Huang however emphasises that during this period, 
although Taiwanese consciousness was not an alternative to but rather part of a 
broader Chinese consciousness, it was a cultural rather than political identity.70
‘Taiwanese Communist Party’. Chen, 1983, p. 193.
69 Huang Chun-chieh, 1999, ‘On the development and characteristics of “Taiwanese consciousness” -  
historical review and prospects’, pp. 3-8.
70 In short, what the Taiwanese people identified with was Han culture rather than the Chinese regime on 
the mainland. Another dimension of Taiwanese consciousness during Japanese rule was a consciousness 
as the ruled or dominated class both politically and economically. In short, the national contradiction in 
the domain of culture, and the class contradiction in the fields of politics and economy, overlapped at that 
time. See Chiang Cheng-kuan, 1999, ‘The spirits of resistance in Taiwan’s history -  a preliminary review 
from the perspective of consciousness’, pp.8-16.
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The third stage began with the end of Japanese colonial rule and the KMT take-over 
of Taiwan in 1945. From then until 1987, when martial law was lifted, Taiwanese 
consciousness developed in a context where the ‘Other’ it encountered was the 
Chinese consciousness embedded in the political identity of the mainlanders. The 
February 28th Incident in 1947 was undoubtedly significant to the formation of this 
Taiwanese consciousness. From the late 1980s, the beginning of the last stage of the 
evolution of Taiwanese consciousness in Huang’s account, Taiwan gradually 
developed into a liberal democracy. The intensifying political enmity between China 
and Taiwan from the-mid 1990s, most notably the ‘Crisis of the Taiwan Strait’ of 
1995-1996, which occurred in the context of Lee Teng-hui’s speech at his alma mater, 
Cornell University, and Taiwan’s first popular presidential election in 1996, 
contributed to making Taiwanese consciousness a political consciousness centred on 
resistance to the PRC.
The ‘Chinese Consciousness vs. Taiwanese Consciousness' Debate
This debate began with Chen Ying-chen’s article titled ‘Towards a broader historical 
vision’ in the Advance Weekly, commenting on a folk singer’s ‘illegal’ emigration to
m «
mainland China in 1983, through a sentimental and sympathetic interpretation of the 
singer’s famous song The Dragon’s Descendants and a critique of what he called
71 At the centre of the event was Hou Teh-chien, a household name in Taiwan, particularly in the 1980s 
when the ‘folk song movement’, part of the Nativist movement, was a key element of popular culture. 
His action was illegal since no contact in any form was allowed between the two sides of the Strait under 
martial law. As a result, his most famous song, ‘The Dragon’s Descendants’, was banned by the 
government.
Chen expressed the affection that Ho’s song had aroused in him: ‘The Yangtze River, the Yellow River; 
the water of the Yangtze River, a surge of the Yellow River; China; dragon; the “black eyes, black hair, 
and yellow skin” of the Chinese people; the rumbling of the great powers’ guns in China one hundred 
years ago... These expressions and images deeply arouse our national affection, concealed at the very 
bottom of our hearts... Perhaps the propagators on the other side of the Strait would say this expresses the
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the ‘Taiwanese-ism imaginary’. The debate involved and indeed provoked a 
controversy over the guiding principle of Taiwan’s sociopolitical reform -  should it 
be China-centred or Taiwan-centred?
As the chief spokesman of the ‘Chinese consciousness camp’, that is, the China Tide 
group, Chen interpreted Hou’s action as motivated by a ‘natural nationalist sentiment’ 
on the basis of a commitment to a ‘cultural and historical China’ rather than loyalty to 
the KMT or the CCP. Such ‘affection for China’s history, culture and geography’, 
according to Chen, went beyond an identification with any ‘secular, transient regime’. 
Moreover, it was shared by all Chinese, be they Taiwanese or mainlanders. By 
appealing to common ancestry, history and culture, Chen also repudiated the 
argument made by the ‘Taiwanese consciousness camp’, revolving around the
desire of people in Taiwan to return to the motherland. Surely, this is untrue. Today, does any Chinese 
want to live under an undemocratic and illiberal regime characterised by bureaucratism and political 
privileges? This song nonetheless really and deeply touches our soul. The Yellow River and the Yangtze 
River contain more than geographical meanings; “The Dragon’s descendants” with “black eyes, black 
hair, and yellow skin” have more than just anthropological meaning; the “rumbling of the guns one 
hundred years ago” is more than a historical chronicle. The song expresses a deep and complicated 
culture and all the concepts about and affection for China throughout history, which eventually form a 
collective memory and national complex after five thousand years....’ Chen, 1984a, pp. 32-3.
73 Chen’s criticism of the ‘Taiwanese-ism imaginary’ was made in response to the arguments of Shih 
Ming, commonly known as the ‘father of Taiwan independence’, who criticised the ‘Han-ism imaginary’. 
At the heart of Shih’s argument was the fact that the geographical separation, different social 
environments and different experiences of modernisation resulting from Taiwan’s four-hundred-year 
historical development made 'Taiwanese people’ socially and psychologically different from ‘Chinese 
people’ on the mainland. The term ‘imaginary Han-ism’ referred to any idea constructed without a 
‘material basis’ in the sense that it was produced beyond the space and time of contemporary Taiwan, 
such as ‘China, the motherland’ and ‘Taiwan, part of China’. Without directly challenging Shih’s 
methodology of historical materialism -  both, after all, claimed to be leftists -  Chen asked why, under the 
same historical conditions, Han Chinese people migrated to and settled in other parts of the world yet did 
not develop a distinctive identity or consciousness like the ‘Taiwanese’. Chen then criticised Shih for 
misusing ‘historical materialism’ to serve a ‘subjective political bias’. With regard to the ‘social 
contradiction’ in Taiwan’s capitalist society, without addressing the fact that the KMT was a ‘foreign 
regime’ for the local Taiwanese or differentiating 'the mainlanders’ on the island from Chinese people in 
general, Chen rejected the view that equated the relationship between the Chinese and Taiwanese with 
that between the Japanese and the Taiwanese or the Koreans, or that between the British and the Indians. 
In conclusion, Chen associated this anti-Chinese Taiwanese-ism with a group of ‘very frivolous petits 
bourgeois’, who were impolite, provoked and were hostile to the mainlanders. Chen, 1984a, pp. 34-6.
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magazine Cultivate, that the mainlanders were the ruling group/oppressors and the 
islanders were the ruled/the oppressed. In line with accounts anchored in dependency 
theory, Chen instead attributed the ‘class problem’, which involved the ‘real’ 
relationship between the ruling and the ruled, to the invasion of American capitalism 
through its foreign investment in Taiwan. Chen further argued that both the KMT and 
the CCP had to be held responsible for the emergence of the ‘Taiwan/ Taiwanese’ 
consciousness on the island.74
By adopting ‘a broader historical vision’, Chen thus perceived ‘Chinese 
consciousness’ as consciousness o f ‘a cultural, historical China’, which ‘evolved over 
thousands of years and was built with the contribution of Chinese people’. 
‘Nationalism’, according to him, is a kind of ‘self-awareness of the Chinese people in 
the struggle for China’s as well as other nations’ advancement, progress, development, 
solidarity and peace’. In light of bitter experiences, ‘more and more Chinese on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait realise the urgent need to create a free, democratic and 
united nation and are willing to fight for it’.75
A number of critical commentaries followed the publication of Chen’s controversial 
article in the Advance Weekly. For example, Tsai Yi-min wrote ‘On Chen 
Ying-chen’s “Chinese complex’” , ‘scrutinising’ Chen’s argument, such as his 
conception of ‘natural nationalism’, his interpretation of ‘historical view’ and his
74 He criticised the KMT for the February 28* Incident in 1947 and the CCP for categorising a leftwing 
Taiwanese musician, Chiang Wen-yeh, as a rightist because of his Taiwanese origin. Chiang decided to 
stay on the mainland after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949. He was criticised as a 
Rightist in the 1957 Anti-Rightists Campaign and later sent to a labour camp in Hubei Province during 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Here ‘Taiwan’ refers to the geographic concept of the island whilst 
‘Taiwanese consciousness’ designates the consciousness of being Taiwanese.
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criticism of the ‘Taiwan/ Taiwanese consciousness’. Rejecting, for instance, Chen’s 
interpretation of Hou’s migration to the mainland as motivated by a ‘natural (Chinese) 
nationalism’, Tsai stated:
‘I believe very few people who grow up under the nationalistic education of the ROC on 
Taiwan would wish or expect to visit the motherland one day. The KMT’s educational system 
can of course be criticised in many ways. However, the deep affection towards mainland 
China felt by people growing up under the KMT’s educational system should not be criticised 
in any way. It is therefore not difficult to understand why Teh-chien Ho, who has grown up 
under this educational system, wrote a song such as “The Dragon’s Descendants” and why he 
wanted to see mainland China, “the Dragon’s homeland”. It is nonetheless questionable to 
interpret his ideas and behaviour as the expression of a “natural nationalism” in this specific 
historical-political context of ideological inculcation’.76
Without addressing Chen’s association of ‘Taiwanese-ism’ with ‘the ideology of the 
Taiwanese petit bourgeoisie’, Tsai questioned his ‘double standard’ in evaluating 
Chinese consciousness as natural nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness as a 
distorted consciousness. In addition, Tsai challenged the opposition between the two 
consciousnesses in Chen’s argument. In short, Tsai emphasised that Taiwanese 
consciousness and Chinese consciousness were likely to coexist. Tsai implied that 
Taiwanese national identity was ‘compatible’ with consciousness of a ‘cultural and 
historical China’ and ‘Han-ist’ ethnic nationalism. This discourse of ‘Taiwanese 
nationalism’ appeared for perhaps the first time in Chen’s public response to Tsai’s 
article, and has become the most widely accepted discourse for those who support the
75 Chen, 1984a, p. 37.
76 Tsai Yi-min, 1984, ‘On Chen Ying-chen’s “China Complex’” , p. 40.
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subjectivity or autonomy of Taiwan.77
Chen Ying-chen and famous left-wing historian Tai Kuo-hui engaged in a dialogue in 
an attempt to provide a more systematic and scholarly criticism of the development 
and theory of Taiwanese nationalism, albeit in the language of Taiwanese 
consciousness. It was published with the title ‘“Taiwanese consciousness” and the 
falsity and truth of the “Taiwan nation”’ in China Tide Tribune, whose original title 
was China Tide. In the wake of the disastrous Chinese Cultural Revolution, Tai 
discussed the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness in the early 1980s. Taking the 
Dangwai movement, which he viewed as a bourgeois democratic movement, as an 
example, Tai argued that the ‘Taiwanese complex’ originated in the fear of 
communism and Chinese communists out of ‘personal interest’, which led some, 
especially middle-class islanders, to advocate the maintenance of the status quo and 
the right to self-determination in Taiwan. ‘Personal interest’ referred to the possible 
loss of their properties, which relied on the institutions of capitalist democracy.78
77 The term ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ appeared perhaps for the first time in public debate in Chen 
Ying-chen’s response to Tsai’s article. Chen doubted the existence of a Taiwanese nation and Taiwanese 
nationalism, albeit he only touched on the issue in passing, arguing that: ‘Discussions of “Taiwanese 
nationalism” involve analyses and judgements from various perspectives of philosophy of history and 
Taiwan’s history in general, social history and political economy. The best way to deal with the so-called 
“problem of provincial origins” is to initiate an intellectual debate among ideologues of left-wing 
Taiwanese separatism, non-KMT nationalism and official nationalism’ (Chen, 1984b, p. 62). Chen 
clearly shifted the focus of his discussion from a left-wing critique of Taiwanese consciousness to calling 
for open and thorough deliberation on Taiwanese nationalism. This is partly because Taiwanese 
consciousness or nationalism cannot be explained only from the perspective of historical materialism but 
must also be defended from a left-wing ideological stance. Chen however still firmly rejected any 
movements promoting Taiwanese nationalism as separatist movements that would harm the solidarity of 
the whole (Chinese) nation. For Chen, so-called ‘Taiwanese separatism is a temporary historical 
phenomenon and indeed a freak bom in the dark politics and international imperialism of China’s 
contemporary history’ (Chen, 1984b, p. 66).
78 Tai argued that the failure of the Chinese Cultural Revolution explained much of the disillusion felt 
especially by left-leaning pro-unification intellectuals and the general public in Taiwan, where the 
official Chinese nationalism of the KMT had held sway for over three decades. This disillusion in turn 
accounted for the emergence of the ‘maintaining the status quo’ discourse. After emphasising the 
significance of the Cultural Revolution for world history and expressing high expectations of it 
regardless of its unclear content, Tai pointed out with disappointment and a sense of powerlessness that
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A significant international factor, which affected the views of these bourgeois 
Taiwanese, according to Tai, was the normalisation of Sino-US relations. By 
advocating the maintenance of the status quo, they wished on the one hand to prevent 
any possibility of secret deals between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, 
and on the other to resist the influence of mainland China on Taiwan, especially its 
socialist ideology. Chen Ying-chen and most left-wing pro-unification intellectuals 
and activists held the same view on this issue, criticising the Taiwan independence 
movement for being a political movement o f  and for the Taiwanese bourgeoisie.79
Constructing An Idea o f ‘Taiwanese Nation *
The focus of the ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate then 
shifted to the nature of the Taiwan independence movement and the construction of 
theories of the Taiwanese nation from various perspectives. In his dialogue, Chen-Tai 
discussed Liao Wen-yi’s lineage theory of the ‘Taiwanese nation’, which emphasised 
the hybrid ethnic origins of the Taiwanese people80 and was claimed to by Liao and
‘the only choice left now was the argument for the maintenance of the status quo’. ‘Maintaining the 
status quo’ was seen by Tai as the ‘common interest’ of die KMT and the bourgeois democratic 
movement, led primarily by middle-class Taiwanese. ‘Reformation for the preservation of Taiwan’ was 
their common goal, against the background of Taiwan’s rapid economic growth. The right to 
self-determination of the 18 million people in Taiwan was therefore put forward against the Chinese 
Communists’ call for unification. Tai, 1984, pp. 80-1.
79 See Tai, 1984, pp. 79-80; Chen, 1984, p.83. In his discussion, Chen presented an interesting theory of 
what might have been, imagining a divided China with the CCP ruling the territories north of the Yangtze 
River and a right-wing liberal-democratic regime founded by the bourgeoisie to the south and on the 
island. Because the bourgeoisie was almost entirely destroyed in the Chinese revolution, the Taiwanese 
bourgeoisie, which emerged during the period of rapid economic development in the 1960s, lacked the 
confidence to transform the whole of China into a liberal democracy. Their efforts were thus confined to 
the island, which was the second-best scenario. This is why they promoted Taiwan independence. Chen, 
1984, p. 81.
80 According to this hybridist account, the Taiwanese nation was distinct from the Han-Chinese nation in 
that the Han ethnie was one of many, such as the aborigines, Japanese, Latin, and Teutonic, that shaped 
the ethnic configuration of the Taiwanese nation. Lee, 2001, p.l 11.
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his colleagues lay the theoretical foundation for the discourse of Taiwan 
independence. Liao was a radical advocate of Taiwan independence. In 1948 in Japan, 
Liao founded the ‘Alliance for Taiwan’s Re-Liberation’ with Sheue-hong Hsieh, an 
important figure in the history of Taiwan’s communist movement.81
US President Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 1972, in Tai’s view, was an important 
factor in the transformation of the discourse of Taiwan independence. The prime 
mover here was the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), a group of 
Taiwanese intellectuals who studied primarily in the United States and Japan, later 
blacklisted by the KMT for promoting Taiwan independence abroad.82 A new 
discourse of the Taiwanese nation based on the model of civic nationalism was 
suggested by scholars who are sympathetic to Taiwan independence to replace the 
previous lineage theory. Most notable was Peng Ming-min’s idea of ‘community’, 
influenced by Renan’s theory of liberal nationalism.
Two points were at the heart of this new discourse: first, membership of the 
Taiwanese nation should be based on Taiwanese citizenship; second, Taiwanese 
nationalist morality was rooted in the political principle of liberal democracy (or 
liberal patriotism as some theorists like to call it). This was also an attempt to resolve 
the intensifying ethnic conflict at the time by rejecting the opposition between the
81 In Japan, Liao founded the ‘Taiwan Independence/Democratic Party’ in 1950 and the Interim 
Government of the Republic of Taiwan in 1956.
82 The new idea of the Taiwanese nation was expressed in a secret WUFI document written by the then 
chairman Tsann-hong Chang in 1976. Like Tai, Lee saw the diplomatic crises of the 1970s as a 
significant factor in the transformation of the discourse of the Taiwanese nation. Unlike Tai, who 
emphasised that the reason for the change in the WUFI’s discourse was anxiety about the suspension of 
America’s support due to the normalisation of Sino-US relations, however, Lee argued that die change 
was essentially strategic, necessary to advance political reform inside Taiwan. The central idea was to 
differentiate between the KMT/Chiang regime and ordinary mainlanders in order to broaden the social 
base of support for Taiwan’s democratic reform. Lee, 2001, pp. 134-5.
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mainlanders, the ‘late-comers’, and the islanders, the earlier Chinese immigrants. The
O '*
minority aborigines were missing entirely from this discourse.
In contrast to the earlier argument that associated all Taiwan independence apologists 
with the petit bourgeoisie, Chen Ying-chen and Tai Kuo-hui now differentiated 
sub-groupings within the Taiwan independence movement, which included 
‘pro-Taiwan independence conservatives’ and ‘pro-independence leftists’. The core 
members of the former grouping were middle-class Taiwanese in North America 
preoccupied with capitalist interests in Taiwan and piecemeal political reform rather 
than radical change. The latter group consisted mainly of radical intellectuals 
influenced by the uprisings led by Taiwanese national heroes, such as Liao Wen-yi 
and Hsieh Sheue-hung. Compared to the right-wing conservatives, these were far less 
powerful within Taiwanese society. Although leftwing radical discourse has played a 
part in shaping the Taiwanese public culture of today, it still appears relatively 
powerless in the face of the ethos of capitalist democracy. Besides, as discussed in 
greater detail below, in the intellectual and cultural scene on Taiwan, the new leftism, 
deeply influenced by the legacy of 1968, has been the dominant leftwing voice.
In response to Tai and Chen’s critical analysis of Taiwanese independence theory and 
the independence movement, Cheng Ming-cheh wrote the article ‘Is the Taiwan 
independence movement really a bourgeois movement?’, criticising their class-based 
analysis for oversimplifying the whole issue. Cheng questioned Chen and Tai’s 
criticism of the Dangwai movement as a bourgeois democratic movement from two
83 The ethnic imagination of the aborigines in Taiwan emerged only in the late 1980s in the context of 
Taiwan’s flourishing social movements. This was the first time their voices were heard in public fora and 
their needs taken seriously by the public. This imagination was constructed against the category of the 
dominant Han Chinese, which included the mainlanders and the Taiwanese (islanders). See Wang, 2003,
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perspectives: firstly, it was unreasonable to categorise a movement as ‘bourgeois’ 
because its leaders or most members were from a bourgeois background, given that 
the leaderships of most socialist movements in history were of the petty bourgeoisie; 
secondly and relatedly, a more reasonable way to decide whether a movement was 
bourgeois was to examine its goals to determine whether they aimed to serve the 
interests of the bourgeoisie.
Basing his argument on the ‘Paradox of Emancipation’,84 Cheng argued that the 
Taiwan independence movement could only be said to be bourgeois if it aimed 
primarily to further the interests of the bourgeoisie. He felt it could be accurately 
categorised as a populist or nationalist movement, leaving to one side the right-left 
divide. Cheng then went on to argue that the Taiwan independence movement was not 
a bourgeois movement, but rather, inspired by the European model of social 
democracy, aimed to advance the wellbeing of everyone in Taiwan.85
Same Materialist Perspective, Different Historical Narratives
Ethnic Imagination in Contemporary Taiwan, pp. 101-119.
84 He pointed out: ‘As the Marxist theories have argued, if the masses and the labourers are always 
unable to know what their interests really are, then political activists are left with two options: one is to 
humour the wishes of the masses, the other is to impose the leaders* ideology on the masses. However, if 
we choose to humour the wishes of the masses in a situation in which mass consciousness is dominated 
by the ruling class because the people have lived within die existing political order, then can we expect 
any emancipation at all? To humour their wishes is therefore no different from accepting the existing 
politico-economic orders. If we choose to impose the leaders’ ideology upon the masses, then we would 
run the risk of tyranny. This paradox can only be resolved through interaction between the movements 
and the masses. Before this process of interaction is complete, it is too early to define the class 
characteristic of the movement’. Cheng Ming-cheh, 1984, ‘Is die Taiwan independence movement really 
a bourgeois movement?’, Shih Min-hui (ed.), A Selection o f Articles on the Taiwanese Consciousness 
Debate, 1984, p. 130.
85 His argument was based on a comparison between the conditions on the island and mainland at the 
time. He claimed that unification with the mainland could not be expected to improve the living 
standards of the working people in Taiwan or benefit the development of the labour movement. 
Moreover, only if all classes except the bourgeoisie preferred equality or socialism to other values and 
ideals and would pursue them at any cost, such as greater poverty, political corruption, cultural ruin and 
thought control, could the Taiwan independence movement be labelled a bourgeois movement, (ibid., pp. 
124-7)
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Towards the end of the ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate 
in the late 1980s, a public debate emerged featuring different historical narratives of 
the development of national consciousness in Taiwan rooted in the same philosophy 
of history. This was a historical-materialist approach to explaining the development 
of national consciousness in Taiwan. At the heart of the debate were different 
narratives of Taiwan’s contemporary history and related analyses of social formation 
at different historical stages. The debate was further developed in the late 1990s with 
contributions from poststructuralist and neo-Confucian discourses.
Shih Ming, the ‘father of Taiwanese independence’, adopted a clearly materialistic 
approach in his famous book ‘The Four-hundred Year History of the Taiwanese’, 
presenting the formation of Taiwanese consciousness and nationalism as the 
historical product of Taiwan’s distinctive developmental experience. Shih stated: 
‘Taiwan society and the Taiwanese people, that is, the Taiwanese nation, and 
Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwanese nationalism are the products of a 
developmental history featuring harsh struggles and endeavours in the processes of 
migration and reclamation, social modernisation, capitalist industrialisation and 
struggles against Japanese colonialism in which generations of our ancestors were 
engaged’. Shih argued that the common experience of anti-colonialist struggle in the 
prewar era was particularly important.86
After the end of the Second World War, Shih continued, in the aftermath of the ‘great
86 They include: the ‘anti-Dutch rule’ revolt initiated by the farmers with Kuo Huei-yi as its leader, the 
‘anti-Qing regime’ movements led again by farmers Kuo Yi-kuei and Lin Shuang-wen during the period 
when the Koxinga occupied Taiwan and used it as a base in their fight against the Qing court, the 
guerrilla wars led by farmers against the impending Japanese takeover during the period of the 
short-lived Democratic Taiwan Nation, the contemporary national liberation movements led by reformist 
intellectuals, and the socialist revolutionary struggles by the Taiwanese workers and farmers.
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February 28th revolution against the mainlanders’, the idea that the Taiwanese belong 
to the Chinese nation disappeared together with the ‘imaginary Great Han 
nationalism’ originally a component of Taiwanese consciousness. In other words, the 
‘entanglement’ of (Taiwanese) consciousness with the notion, based on lineage 
theory, that Taiwanese were Han Chinese, was entirely disentangled. Taiwanese 
nationalism, understood as ‘the aspiration for independence and liberation of the 
Taiwanese nation, the argument for its national interests, and concern about the fate 
and future of the nation’, eventually became the sole and ultimate principle 
underlying the foundation of the Taiwanese nation.87
On ‘Chinese consciousness’, Ying-chen Chen employed the same 
historical-materialistic approach88 to explaining the development of consciousness in 
Taiwan and, like Shih, emphasised the common experience of resistance against 
Taiwan’s colonisers, yet reached a conclusion diametrically opposed to Shih’s in 
terms of their evaluation of Taiwanese nationalism. This was mainly because Chen 
was so keen to establish historical connections between the two sides of the Strait that 
he tended to ignore the widely recognised differences in the historical experiences of 
the two societies. Most notable was the debate between Chen Ying-chen (hereafter 
Chen Y.) and Chen Fang-ming (hereafter Chen F.), a pro-independence leftwing 
historian, on the ‘social formations’ of Taiwan at different historical stages. Central to 
the dispute were different views of the ‘nature’ of the KMT regime and different 
understandings of what constituted ‘colonialism’.
87 Shih, 1980, pp. 1095-6.
88 Historical materialism was understood by Chen Ying-chen as involving the view that ‘the 
socio-economic structure of every historical epoch forms the foundation of reality and that the entire 
superstructure, which is composed of the legal system, political institutions, religious and philosophical
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Whilst Chen Y. maintained that Taiwan was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society 
under Japanese rule and remained a (new) colonial society in the 1960s and 1970s as 
the result of American economic and military aid, Chen F. argued that Taiwan was 
fully colonised by the Japanese, re-colonised by the KMT after 1945 and entered the 
postcolonial stage after 1987.89 Chen Y. rejected Chen F.’s characterisation of 
Taiwan as a full colony under Japanese rule.90 Obviously, their main differences 
stemmed from the fact that Chen F. emphasised political domination or coercion 
when discussing colonialisation, while Chen Y.’s attention was centred on Japanese 
and American imperialism in Taiwan. This also explains why Chen F. saw the KMT’s 
rule until the lifting of martial law in 1987 as the ‘re-colonialisation’ of Taiwan while 
Chen Y. considered only Japan and America to be colonisers.91
views, should be explained through this foundation of reality’. Chen Ying-chen, 1997, p. 70.
89 Chen Ying-chen divided Taiwan’s social formation into five historical stages: a semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal society during the period of Japanese colonial rule; a semi-colonial society during the early 
days of the retrocession in 1945; a new colonial and semi-capitalist society under KMT rule as a result of 
capitalist transformation (1950s); and the formation of another new colonial society at die stage of 
capitalist-dependent development in the 1960s and 1970s. See Chen Ying-chen, 2000. Chen Y.’s 
periodisation of Taiwan’s history was actually a critical response to Chen F.’s article, which put forward 
different historical periodisations: the period of Japanese colonisation (1895-1945); re-colonisation 
(1945-1987); and the post-colonial period (1987 to the present). See Chen Fang-ming, 2000, pp. 163-5.
90 Chen Y. rejected Chen F.’s account because ‘colonial society’ was not considered a distinctive 
historical stage in Marx’s stage theory, which posited primitive communism; slavery (or the Asiatic 
mode of production); feudalism; capitalism; and socialism/communism. He elaborated on this point: ‘On 
the one hand, imperialism establishes capitalist relations in colonies which results in the collapse of local 
traditional-feudal economies to a certain degree; on the other hand, imperialist powers, by consolidating 
and taking advantage of the existing traditional-feudal forces such as bourgeois landlords, compradors, 
and bureaucrats and their material bases, achieve their imperialist goals of monopolising accumulation 
and reproduction of capital. As a result... colonies become malformed semi-feudal societies, trapped 
somewhere in the process stretching from feudalism to modem capitalism’. Chen Ying-chen, 2000a, p. 
140.
91 Chen Y. argued that under the dual structure of the Cold War and the Chinese civil war, Taiwan and 
mainland China developed separate national economies. It was therefore incorrect to view the KMT’s 
rule in Taiwan as ‘re-colonisation’. (Chen Ying-chen, 2000a, pp. 148-51). In response, Chen F. said that 
he had never used the term ‘alien regime’ to describe the KMT in his works but merely defined its rule as 
‘re-colonisation’ because of the continuity of many colonial policies implemented by the KMT 
government in Taiwan after Japan left, including the national language policy, the monopoly of financial 
capital, a vigilant household registration system, and a compulsory national education programme. All 
this, according to Chen F., recapitulated Japanese colonial rule. See Chen Fang-ming, 2000, p. 161.
179
The exchange between the two Chens continued, each eventually trying to expose the 
other’s position on the unification-independence issue. Chen F. argued that Chen Y. 
insisted on claiming that Taiwan was semi-colonial under Japanese occupation 
mainly because this was the only way to establish a historical link between social 
formation in Taiwan and mainland China. For the mainland was a semi-colony during 
the same period. Chen Y. responded by implying that Chen F.’s project of writing a 
new literary history of Taiwan, featuring the aforementioned periodisation, would fail 
if its analytical framework ignored the Marxist theory of social formation. Without 
discussing his own pro-unification position, Chen Y. also attributed Chen F.’s 
inability to understand his points to the latter’s pro-independence ideology.93
The ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate in a broader sense 
came to an end in the late 1980s. Rather than heralding a ‘cease-fire’ between the 
Chinese and Taiwanese nationalists, the end of the ‘consciousness debate’ 
precipitated the identity politics of ‘Chinese nationalism vs. Taiwanese nationalism’. 
The distinctive feature of Taiwanese public culture since the mid-1980s has been the 
dominance of the identity issue in public debate.
The ‘Taiwanese Nationalism vs. Chinese Nationalism’ Debate and Identity 
Politics, 1991 to the present
Post-1987 Taiwan witnessed the flourishing of social movements primarily as the 
result of political liberalisation. Between 1987 and 1992, however, liberalisation was 
a process controlled by the ruling party. The KMT opened as it saw fit, albeit under
92 Chen Fang-ming, 2000, p. 158.
93 Chen Ying-chen, 2000b, pp. 139-40.
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some public pressure, and granted liberties it deemed acceptable. For the first few 
years of liberalisation, reforms were enacted from above. In the early 1990s, the KMT 
seemed far less capable of controlling political outcomes than it had been a few years 
before. Faced with the political challenge from the newly founded opposition party 
(the DPP) with its political discourse fusing democratisation and Taiwanese 
nationalism, Lee Teng-hui launched another wave of localisation or Taiwanisation of 
the KMT.94
Lee’s ‘politics of delegitimisation’ was considered to be driven by both the urgent 
need to consolidate power95 and his belief in liberal democracy if not Taiwan 
independence, which motivated him to form the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity 
Union in 2004, after coming under pressure to resign as party chairman in the wake of 
the party’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election. As one brilliant analysis pointed 
out, when Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, most political analysts predicted a 
collective leadership in the post-Chiang era because no single ‘strongman’ could be 
found in the party. Few observers anticipated that Lee Teng-hui would have the 
Machiavellian prudence and will to oust the KMT old guard. Even fewer foresaw that 
he would be able to tackle the formidable task of restructuring an imagined
94 The previous wave of Taiwanisation by the KMT party-state was carried out under Chiang Ching-kuo 
in the early 1970s, when Taiwan suffered a series of diplomatic setbacks, in an attempt to reduce the 
sense of alienation from the state generated by his father Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.
93 Lee’s position as the successor to Chiang Ching-kuo was precarious in the beginning. He encountered 
a series of challenges between 1988 and 1990. He had to maintain his position as the interim KMT party 
leader against the intervention of Madame Chiang, the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, and challenges from his
rivals within the party, primarily the veteran Chinese representatives in the central legislative bodies,
who were later known as the non-mainstream faction. By contentiously appointing as premier Hau 
Pei-tsun, the Minister of Defence and one of the leaders of the non-mainstream faction, Lee completed 
the consolidation of his power by creating divisions in this faction. This appointment also sparked 
protests among the KMT’s mainstream faction and the DDP against ‘the intervention of a military man’, 
or the ‘anti-Hau campaign’. See Kuo Cheng-liang, 1998, ‘The phenomenon of the “Lee Teng-hui 
complex’” ; Shaw Carl K. Y., 2002, ‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’.
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community beyond the dichotomy of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism.96 This he 
did by inventing the concepts ‘new Taiwanese’ and ‘community of lives’ or 
Gemeinschaft, allegedly due to the influence of Peng Ming-min’s argument in his
07early A Taste o f Freedom.
In addition to growing domestic demand to move beyond liberalisation towards 
democratisation, the changing political situation on the mainland in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen massacre (June 1989), specifically the challenge to the CCP’s 
legitimacy, was an external factor equally important to understanding the emergence 
of identity politics in Taiwan. After Deng’s tour of the south in 1992, all-out 
marketisation was unleashed, with rampant capitalist development, astonishingly fast 
rates of economic growth and rising inequality. The new, uneven prosperity 
considerably eased the serious crisis of legitimacy that overtook the regime after the 
Tiananmen tragedy. The contradiction between fading invocations of socialism and 
the realities of a runaway capitalism, however, still left an acute moral and ideological 
vacuum. To fill it, the CCP turned increasingly to nationalist appeals. Its fears were 
intensified by the spectacle of the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, which 
some of its think-tanks as well as observers abroad warned might have a bearing on its
96 See Shaw, 2002, pp. 129-30.
97 Lee Teng-hui’s formative experiences in many ways paralleled those of the secessionist Peng. Both 
were among the few Taiwanese who attended university in Japan. Both returned to Taiwan at the end of 
the Second World War, experienced the trauma of the first years of the KMT administration, attended 
National Taiwan University, from which they graduated in 1948 with degrees in agrieconomics and 
politics respectively, and joined the faculty. Both spent periods studying overseas: Lee in America and 
Peng in Canada. Despite these similar backgrounds, Peng and Lee reacted very differently to co-option 
into government service, joining different sides of the political divide. Whilst Peng was forced into 
eventual exile in the United States because of his Declaration o f Taiwanese Self-Salvation, Lee 
developed his career in the government, from research fellow at the Taiwan Provincial Co-operative 
Bank, a post at the US-ROC Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), senior specialist in 
charge of the Rural Economy Division, Mayor of Taipei City, Governor of Taiwan Province, 
Vice-President under Chiang Ching-kuo and then President of Taiwan until 2000.
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own future. The 1990s saw the steady rise of an official nationalism, based on 
territorial claims derived from old dynastic imperial conquests, and expansion of the 
wealth and power of the central state.98
Unsurprisingly, the CCP’s turn to nationalist politics had a considerable impact on 
Taiwan’s political situation. For Beijing regards Taiwan as an inseparable part of 
China which was cut off from its motherland as a result of imperialism, first that of 
Japan, then America. Hence Taiwan, together with Tibet and Xinjiang, has become a 
central feature of the ‘national question’ as reflected in Chinese policies. For Beijing, 
‘Taiwan’ is a ‘life and death’ struggle, primarily against America, which involves not 
only national pride and security but also its project of creating a multi-polar world 
order in which China will punch its weight with other mega-states like the US and EU. 
Beijing’s policies towards Taiwan have changed accordingly. 1995 was the watershed 
in the development of cross-Strait relations. Following the breakthrough in the early 
1990s," which was seen as a contribution to ‘peaceful unification’ and encouraged 
unionists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Beijing carried out a missile test in the 
South China Sea on the occasion of Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater Cornell, 
intended to deter Taiwanese voters from casting their ballots in the island’s first
98 Wang Chaohua saw the development of China after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre as the gradual 
materialisation of an ‘empire-building’ project while Chalmers Johnson, commenting on the recent 
‘remilitarization of the Taiwan problem’ in a political atmosphere in which ‘China as threat’ discourses 
are again gaining ground, acknowledged the emergence of China as a rich and successful countiy with 
understanding and sympathy, saying that ‘China has just had a couple of bad centuries and now it’s back’. 
See Wang, 2005, ‘The Island of Contention’, New Left Review, No. 32, Mar/Apr 2005, pp. 93-5. C. 
Johnson, 2005, ‘No Longer the “Lone” Superpower: Coming to Terms with China’, Japan Policy 
Research Institute (JPRI) Working Paper No. 105.
99 Cross-Strait relations took a positive turn shortly after the Tiananmen incident, when Beijing was hit 
by international sanctions, with increasing economic exchanges between the two sides. As a result, 
Taipei took the initiative in setting up the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to manage practical matters 
of trade and travel and Beijing responded by creating a counterpart Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The contacts between the SEF and ARATS resulted in a meeting between their 
respective chairmen, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, in Singapore from 27-29 April 1993.
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popular presidential election, to be held in 1996. In March 2005, a new law-- ‘Anti 
Separation Law’-- was passed by the Chinese authorities to delegitimise Taiwan 
independence legally, claiming its legal right to use force should Taiwan declares 
independence.
One important factor in Beijing’s changing policies on the ‘Taiwan question’ was 
lingering suspicion over Lee Teng-hui’s true intentions concerning unification, a 
suspicion reinforced by the general trend of Taipei’s mainland and foreign policies. 
This was evident in the progression from Chiang Ching-kuo’s commitment to ‘one 
China’, through the Lee administration’s idea of ‘one country, two governments’ and 
‘one country, two areas’, to the idea of ‘two political entities’,100 which virtually 
claimed that Taiwan was a ‘state’ on an equal footing with the PRC.101 After the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, exchanges between Taiwan and China came to 
halt. It was also against this background that Taiwan implemented the policy of 
‘patience over haste’ in 1996 after the opening of China had attracted vast amounts of 
capital from the island, followed by reverse migration.
The ‘Chinese Nationalism vs. Taiwanese Nationalism ’ Debate
The publication of Ethnic Relations and National Identity in 1993 marked the
100 In Hughes’ analysis, ‘behind all this lay Taipei’s attempts to obfuscate the meaning of “one China” by 
redefining it in terms of a vague entity not necessarily related to concepts of sovereignty. This had been 
made clear in statements by the National Unification Council and by Lee himself in an interview with the 
Japanese journalist Ryotaro Shiba on 31 March 1994, in which he said that the implications of “China” 
are not clear, that “sovereignty” is a dangerous concept, and that the notion that Taiwan is part of the PRC 
is a “strange dream’” . Hughes, 1997, p. 89. See also Wang, 2005, p. 95.
101 This policy change was interpreted by many Chinese nationalists as a gesture encouraging 
pro-independence voices. Lee Teng-hui’s position was therefore considered to be ‘pro-independent 
sovereign Taiwan’ (du tai), which is different from ltai du ’ (Taiwan independence) in that it still upholds 
the ‘One China’ principle without relinquishing the goal of eventual reunification, but on the basis of 
equality between Taipei and Beijing.
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beginning of the Chinese nationalism vs. Taiwanese nationalism debate. It was a 
collection of essays and perhaps the first book devoted to discussions and analyses of 
the relationship between ethnic politics and Taiwan’s democratisation as well as the 
sensitive issues of ‘provincial origins’ and nationalism. The contributions most cited 
in the nationalist debate are Chang Mau-kuei’s ‘The pursuit of a “community” and the 
ethnic question’ and ‘The question of “provincial origins” and nationalism’, Wu 
Nai-teh’s ‘Provincial consciousness, political support and national identity’ and 
Wang Fu-chang’s ‘The nature of provincial integration’.
The book originated in the proceedings of the ‘Provincial Origins, Ethnic Groups and 
National Identity’ conference, which aimed to provide a public forum for open 
discussion of the worrying ‘ethnicisation of politics’, which exacerbated ‘ethnic 
tensions’, primarily during election campaigns.102 The conference was regarded as a 
chance to pursue a kind of ‘collective healing’ and to search anew for a foundation for 
social solidarity. The ultimate goal was to construct a ‘community of common destiny 
in Taiwan’, a concept distinct from the long-existing concept of ‘nation’ that
102 ‘Ethnic relations’ here primarily refers to those between mainlanders and islanders. The mayoral 
elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung and the Taiwan Province gubernatorial election in 1994 are good 
examples of the ‘ethnicisation of politics’ during election campaigns. Nationalist discourses couched in 
the language of unification and independence mushroomed throughout the year. This occurred after the 
non-mainstream faction of the KMT had broken away in 1993 to form a new pro-unification party named 
the China New Party, after Lee was felt to have adopted an ‘independent Taiwan’ (du tai) position. The 
New Party was founded by six ex-KMT legislators and one veteran, formerly a legislator. In the Taipei 
City mayoral election the following year, the New Party nominated a former cabinet member and shining 
political star, Chao Shao-kang, as its candidate to run against the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian. National 
identity became the key theme of the campaigns, generating heated debates over the 
unification-independence issue. Given the different historical memories of different ethnic groups, 
primarily the mainlanders and islanders, the ethnicisation of the entire campaign seems unsurprising if 
unfortunate. In short, rather than more constructive discussions of policies of public interest, the debate 
degenerated into mutual accusations, summed up in the slogans ‘preserve the ROC’ and ‘independent 
sovereign Taiwan’. Worst of all was the claim made by Chen Ding-nan, the DPP’s candidate for 
Governor of Taiwan Province, that the campaign was ‘the first battle for the Taiwanese in four hundred 
years’, implying that the choice between him and his KMT rival, James Soong, was one of ‘ethnic 
identity’.
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overemphasised ‘social integration’ at the price of pluralism, failing to respect the 
distinctive consciousness of individual ethnic groups.103
This supposed effort to generate public debate on the sensitive issue of ethnic 
relations and national identity by publishing the aforementioned book was however 
blamed for ‘creating the new nationalist phenomenon’. Chao Kang and Marshall 
Johnson produced a post-colonialist critique in an essay, accusing the contributors to 
the collection of taking an active part in the project of ‘nationalist social sciences and 
the fabrication of subimperial subjects in Taiwan’. 104 Central to their critical 
argument was the idea of ‘subimperial subjects’, those people who support Taiwanese 
nationalism. For they considered Taiwanese nationalism a kind of ‘subimperialism’, 
involving Taiwan’s ‘Southward Advancing’ policy, which meant establishing 
‘colonies’ in Southeast Asian developing countries for Taiwanese capitalists.105 In the 
Taiwanese context, the imperialist was clearly America, whose imperial project, 
according to Chao and Johnson, ‘can only be accomplished with the participation of 
subjects themselves colonized by a national structure of feeling’.106 Essays written by 
Chang Mau-kuei, Lin Chung-cheng and Lin He-ling, Wu Nai-teh, and Wang 
Fu-chang were singled out as particularly striking examples of this.
103 Chang Mau-kuei et al, 1993, Ethnic Relations and National Identity, p. 2-3.
104 Apart from their critique of Taiwan’s subimperialism from a post-colonialist perspective, their 
argument centred on two points: ‘firstly, there is a genre in contemporary Taiwanese social science 
circles ideologically antidemocratic and nationalist in content and positivist in form; secondarily, this 
genre is deployed not only with the public in mind but also as a model for work in the highly stratified 
field of Taiwanese academia, a field permeated by authoritarian practices and personnel moulded by the 
former Chinese nationalism of the KMT’. Chao Kang and Marshall Johnson, 2000, ‘Nationalist Social 
Sciences and the Fabrication of Subimperial Subjects in Taiwan’, positions, 2000, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 154.
105 The notion of ‘subimperialism’ however was first used by Chen Kuan-hsing in his article ‘The 
Imperialist Eye’ to signify the cultural imaginary of Taiwanese nationalists. The article is discussed in 
detail below.
106 Chao & Johnson, 2000, p. 151.
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Chao and Johnson’s article must be seen as a critical intervention in the heated 
nationalist debate, rather than speaking for or defending either side. In fact, the 
distinctive feature of 1990s nationalist debate among intellectuals in Taiwan, and 
indeed to this day, is that rather than Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists 
engaging in a dialogue in public fora, the discourse of Taiwan-centred liberal 
nationalism has come under attack from various perspectives, primarily liberalism 
and radical discourses inspired by postmodernism and poststructuralism. 
Multiculturalism and civic republicanism, though less prevalent, have also been 
drawn on, respectively, to suggest ways of dealing with the ethnic question and to 
construct a more democratic discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. This is mainly 
because ‘liberalism’ has been a dominant ideology in Taiwan, although liberal 
intellectuals see the emergence of nationalist politics as disproving this claim.
Prior to Lee’s ‘Taiwanisation’ of the KMT in the 1990s, there existed a debate 
between the KMT’s official Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism of 
different kinds, albeit the terms used at the time were ‘consciousness’ or ‘complex’ 
rather than ‘nationalism’ due to the political sensitivity of the term, especially 
Taiwanese nationalism.107 Thus, apart from election campaigns, in which the two 
nationalist sentiments were expressed in the language of unification and 
independence, public debate between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalists was rare. 
Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism have also been debated beyond the island, 
between Taipei and Beijing. As noted above, although China’s Chinese nationalism
107 For a comprehensive study of the movement aiming to construct a Taiwanese cultural nationalism, 
see Hsiau, 2000, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism. It is fair to say that whilst some 
pro-independence Taiwanese writers have devoted themselves to constructing a Taiwanese cultural 
nationalism, social scientists have chosen to formulate and promote a Taiwanese liberal/civic
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appeals to anti-colonialism and national unity, it is commonly perceived in Taiwan as 
a discourse of cultural nationalism. It is discussed further below.
The Discourses of Chinese Nationalism
There are roughly three types of Chinese nationalist discourse in Taiwan. The first is 
represented by the leftwing discourse of Chen Ying-chen, the second is the 
rightwing/conservative discourse of Hu Fo, professor of political science, and Wang 
Tseng-tsai, a historian,108and the third is the discourse of neo-Confucianism as put 
forward by Chen Chao-ying, a professor of Chinese literature.109 Whilst the elements 
of ethnonationalism can be discerned in Chen Ying-chen’s as well as Hu Fo’s and 
Wang Tseng-tsai’s discourses, Chen Chao-ying’s argument for Chinese nationalism 
can be seen as an example of Taiwanese cultural nationalism.
Chen Ying-chen’s discourse of Chinese nationalism, as noted above, was constructed 
against the background of 1970s Taiwan society. Anti-neocolonialism, specifically 
that of the United States and Japan, in the context of Taiwan’s rapid capitalist 
industrialisation and the Diaoyutai Incident, was its main focus. Nevertheless, 
elements of cultural nationalism or ethno-symbolism are also apparent in Chen 
Ying-chen’s nationalist discourse, such as his comments on pop-star Hou Teh-chien’s 
migration to the mainland. Central elements of his notion o f‘natural nationalism’ are
nationalism.
108 See Hu, 1983, ‘Political culture and young people’s national identity’, an interview article, China 
Tribune, 1983, Vol. 15, No. 12; Wang, 1994, ‘China’s national identity and modernisation’, in Identity 
and State: Comparison o f Chinese and Western Contemporary Histories.
109 She has been regarded as a ‘new star’ in the study of neo-Confucianism in Taiwan and has replaced 
the leftwing ‘old generation’ represented by Chen Ying-chen and Tai Kuo-hui as the main creator of 
Chinese nationalist discourse, albeit a cultural nationalist discourse. Indeed, she was dubbed by a 
commentator, Lu Chien-rong ‘the guardian of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s’. See Lu, 1999, p. 248.
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symbols of China as a nation, such as ‘dragon’, ‘ Yangtzu River’, ‘Yellow River’, and 
the physical features of Chinese people, such as ‘black eyes’, ‘black hair’ and ‘yellow 
skin’, all of which appeared in the lyrics of Ho’s well-known folksong The Dragon’s 
Descendants.
Compared to Chen Ying-chen’s discourse, Hu and Wang seemed to base their 
arguments for Chinese national identity solely on ethnicity and common ancestry 
respectively. In an interview, Hu identified six levels of identity: internationalism 
(identifying with all human beings), racism or ethnonationalism (identifying with the 
Chinese nation), political nationalism (identifying with Greater China, which includes 
the mainland and Taiwan), separatist identity (identifying with ROC on Taiwan, 
excluding the mainland), provincial identity (identifying with one’s province of origin 
in China) and local identity (identifying with local communities). Hu put national 
identity or political nationalism first, believing that it was most capable of ensuring 
the ‘stability of the political system’. As noted above, Hu emphasised common 
ancestry or ‘blood origin’ as the basis of national identity. Hu thus rejected the theory 
of Taiwan independence as ‘an attempt to sever the lineage encompassing the 
Taiwanese and Chinese nation’, which was in any event doomed to fail.
Hu’s and Wang’s nationalist arguments were therefore no different from the KMT’s
official nationalism, characterised by its anti-communism and anti-independence.
They were rightwing and conservative in this sense. Their images of a united China of
the future were thus very different: a democratic socialist China in Chen Ying-chen’s
case and a liberal-democratic capitalist China in the case of Hu and Wang. As many
critics have pointed out, Chen Ying-chen’s Chinese nationalism, which justified the
unification of Taiwan and the mainland on the basis of the existence of a socialist
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China, must answer a crucial question: how many socialist elements remain in 
China’s political, economic, social and cultural institutions?
In a 1995 essay entitled ‘On Taiwan’s nativisation movement’ in the journal Chinese 
and Foreign Literatures, Chen Chao-ying periodised the movement, defined 
primarily by its resistance against the ‘Other’, into three waves. The first wave 
(1895-1949) was characterised by its opposition to Japanese imperialism. The second 
(1949-1983) was opposed to Westernisation. The third wave, beginning with the 
Taiwan independence movement in 1983, pursued Taiwan’s subjectivity. She argued 
that in the first two waves, Taiwanese consciousness was part of Chinese 
consciousness or that the two at least overlapped. In the third wave, however, ‘China’ 
became the ‘Other’ to Taiwan (independence) consciousness.
The notion of ‘metamorphosis of Taiwanese consciousness’ and Hegel’s concept of 
‘alienation’ were employed by Chen Chao-ying as the theoretical framework for her 
analysis and criticism of the formation of the ‘independent Taiwanese consciousness’ 
out of Chinese consciousness. She argued:
‘[B]ecause Taiwanese people view China as their motherland, naturally, the origin o f 
Taiwanese consciousness is Chinese consciousness. The Chinese culture and particular 
lifestyle o f Han people represented in Taiwan form the cultural base o f “Taiwanese 
consciousness o f the Chinese-style”. Now, Taiwanese consciousness, following the path 
along which its self-consciousness evolves, is developing into a new Taiwanese 
consciousness against itself. As far as the resistance o f  the new Taiwanese consciousness 
against Chinese consciousness, which previously embraced Taiwanese consciousness, is 
concerned, Taiwan-independence consciousness means alienation from Chinese 
consciousness; insofar as the resistance against the kind o f Taiwanese consciousness
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characterised by its love for the motherland is concerned, Taiwan-independence 
consciousness is self-alienation*.110
Chen Chao-ying’s use of Hegel’s notion of ‘alienation’ to explain the evolution of 
Taiwanese consciousness from a component of Chinese consciousness to 
Taiwan-independence consciousness is certainly intriguing, yet for some 
commentators her account was problematic, implying a kind of ‘cultural essentialism’ 
and teleological view of historical development. Liberal intellectual Chiang Yi-hua 
questioned this teleological view of the prospects for cross-Strait relations, which in 
fact took eventual unification with the mainland to be the island’s prospect. The 
formidable question for Chen Chao-ying, therefore, was whether other nations or 
countries deeply influenced by Confucian norms or Chinese culture in general, such 
as Korea and Vietnam, should eventually unite with China in order to avoid or 
overcome any (self)-alienation.1H
Commenting on the debate between Chen Chao-ying and Chen Fang-ming on 
so-called ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and ‘Chinese-ness’, the historian Lu Chien-rong 
wondered whether Chen Chao-ying’s neo-Confucian view of China, centred almost 
solely on an idealised notion of China’s institutional legacy, might run the risk of 
drawing an uncritical if not unrealistic ‘rosy picture’ of the nation. Chen Chao-ying 
claimed that the ‘subjectivity of Chinese culture’ was based on these ideal institutions. 
What worried Lu was that Chen Chao-ying seemed to ignore the dark side of Chinese 
culture and tradition, such as the tendency towards despotism and the conservatism
110 Chen Chao-ying, 1995a, ‘On Taiwan’s nativisation movement’, p.25.
1,1 Chiang, 1998, pp. 146-7.
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119deeply anchored in Confucian teachings.
Lu’s comment on Chen Chao-ying’s view of traditional China was based on his
interpretation of her criticism of Chen Fang-ming’s ‘definition of China on the basis
of the negative side of Chinese-ness’. Rather defensively, she stated that, ‘from the
cognitive point of view, just as “subjectisation” or “Japanisation” should not be seen
as representative of the whole content of “Taiwanese-ness”, “despotic and
conservative China”, emphasised by the advocates of westernisation and Taiwan
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independence, should not be seen as representative of “Chinese-ness”’.
The biggest flaw in Chen Chao-ying’s account, according to Lu, was that discussion 
of the period between 1945 and 1949 was missing. For this was the formative period 
of a Taiwanese consciousness in opposition to Chinese consciousness, represented by 
the rule of the KMT, an emigre regime, and thus a period essential to analysis of the 
formation of Taiwan-centred consciousness or identity. Lu used the example of the 
Taiwanese consciousness of native Taiwanese writers such as Yeh Shih-tao.114 The 
February 28th Incident in 1947 and the subsequent highly repressive policies of the 
KMT government are important historical events that had a far-reaching impact on 
the transformation of Taiwanese consciousness, and indeed on the evolution of a 
Taiwanese nationalism that initially saw China as the nation in question but later 
privileged Taiwanese nationhood.
112 Lu Chien-rong, 1999, Fragmenting National Identity in Taiwan 1975-1997, p. 250. For a 
comprehensive critical discussion of Chen Chao-ying’s argument see pp. 249-55.
113 Chen Chao-ying, 1995b, ‘Discovering the genuine colonial history of Taiwan -  a response to Mr. 
Chen Fang-ming’, Chinese and Foreign Literature, Vol. 24, No. 4, p.86.
114 Lu pointed out Chen Chao-ying’s selective reading of the works of Wu Tzuo-liu and Yang Kuei 
which focused on their affection for motherland China without taking into account how their views of 
China changed. See Lu, 1999, p.253.
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The Modulations of Taiwanese Nationalism
In comparison to Chinese nationalist discourses, more theoretical efforts have been 
made to construct Taiwanese nationalism, specifically liberal nationalism. Recently, 
an attempt has been made to build a more radical discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, 
which can be described as a ‘leftwing Taiwanese nationalist discourse’. A Taiwanese 
cultural nationalist movement has also developed.
As noted above, this movement was promoted by Taiwanese humanist intellectuals 
revolving around two literary journals, Li Poetry Magazine and Taiwan Literature in 
the first half of the 1980s and New Culture and New Taiwanese Culture in the second 
half. They also rallied around two organisations: Taiwan Pen Association and Taiwan 
Association of Professors. Essential to contemporary Taiwanese cultural nationalism 
is the claim that Taiwanese culture is distinct from both Japanese culture and Han 
Chinese culture. Crafting a national language, national literature and national history 
was central to this cultural nationalist movement.115 Hsu Hsin-liang’s Taiwanese 
nationalist discourse of ‘the rising people’ (hsing-hsin min-tsu) is distinct from all 
others in that it praised Taiwanese entrepreneurship and capitalist interests and the 
policy of ‘advancing westwards’, that is, investing on the mainland.116
115 Among others, novelists Chung Chao-cheng, Lee Chiao, Sung Tse-lai, Yang Ching-chu and Yeh 
Shih-tao, and poet and literary critic cum history professor Lee Min-yung are the leading figures in this 
cultural movement. The term ‘Taiwanese literature’ assumed increasing political significance in the first 
half of the 1980s. For these Taiwanese humanist intellectuals, Taiwanese literature was based on a 
wholesome ‘Taiwan consciousness’ whilst Chinese nationalist writers such as Chen Ying-chen saw it as 
‘Chinese literature in Taiwan’. The second half of the 1980s witnessed another wave of cultural 
nationalist discourse, which was characterised by an intention to ‘de-Sinicise’ and ‘nationalise’ 
Taiwanese literature. ‘Cultural subjectivity’ has been the catchword of Taiwanese cultural nationalists 
since the late 1980s and formed an important element of cultural nationalist discourse. For them, the 
subjectivity of Taiwanese culture implied autonomy from Chinese culture and underscored the boundary 
between the two ‘nations’. See Hsiau, 2000, pp. 96-109.
116 Hsu is a former leader of the DPP. He dubbed Taiwanese ‘the rising people’, characterised by their 
determination and courage to overcome the challenges they face, originating in both the natural and
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Among liberal Taiwanese nationalists, Wu Nai-teh is perhaps one of the few notable 
figures. In his research on various but related issues of ethnic identity, political 
support, democracy and democratisation, and national identity, Wu first drew on 
theories of liberal nationalism, primarily the writings of J. S. Mill and Yael Tamir, to 
make a normative argument for nationalism compatible with liberal ideals. He then 
used the data collected by means of opinion polls on identity-related questions in 
Taiwan not only to seek empirical evidence for the theoretical arguments of liberal 
nationalism but also to demonstrate a positive correlation between secessionism or
1 1 npro-independence identity and democratic consciousness.
Liberal critics however claimed that Wu had misinterpreted the core argument of 
liberal nationalism, such as that of Tamir. For liberal nationalism generally suggests 
dealing with identity politics in the multicultural context not by ‘secessionism’ or 
‘political independence’ but ‘cultural autonomy’. While ‘secessionism* can be 
justified by extension of the liberal principle of autonomy, liberal nationalism could 
support secession solely on the basis of protection of human rights, rather than racial 
differences.118 This critical point was made from a theoretical point of view. 
Anderson’s remark that China was unlikely ever to accept a breakaway Taiwan even 
in the long-term proved it from a historical perspective. Anderson explained: ‘From 
the standpoint of the nation-state, for a former province without ethnic difference
man-made environments, and by their ability to compete with their rivals economically in the 
international arena. See Hsu, 1995, The Rising People, p. 18. It is however unclear whether ‘die rising 
people’ here represents all people in Taiwan. Hsu’s discussions focused almost exclusively on the role 
and economic interests of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. His is clearly a ‘class-biased’ account.
117 See Wu Nai-teh, 1993,1996a, 1996b, 1997.
118 Chiang Yi-hua further argued that ‘what should be taken into consideration when Wu attempted to 
establish a link between liberalism and nationalism is the opposition of liberal nationalism to any 
arbitrary nationalist appeal to independence or secession’. See Chiang, 1998, ‘The theoretical types of 
national identity discourse in contemporary Taiwan’, in Chiang, Liberalism, Nationalism and National
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from the majority population to attempt independence is secession. So far, no 
nation-state has ever permitted this’.119
Wu Rwei-ren’s argument represents another strand of Taiwanese liberal nationalism. 
In contrast to Wu Nai-teh, who drew on theories of liberal nationalism and used 
empirical survey data to test theoretical arguments, with a view to demonstrating that 
liberalism and nationalism were compatible theoretically and empirically, the focus of 
Wu Rwei-ren’s discussion of ‘pragmatic Taiwanese nationalism’ was the 
‘democratically formed’ discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. This notion is related 
to what Lin Chia-lung referred to as ‘the political formation of Taiwanese 
nationalism’.121
In an essay discussing Taiwan’s democratic consolidation, Wu Rwei-ren reminded 
his readers of Phillipe C. Schmitter’s argument that the fundamental precondition for 
democracy is a pre-existing and legitimate political unit. He applied this to the 
Taiwanese case. ‘The paradox of Taiwan’s democratisation’, according to Wu 
Rwei-ren, ‘was that the democratisation ensuing the division of national identity, 
which in turn destroyed the preconditions for democratic consolidation -  a commonly 
recognised political boundary’.122 Wu’s justification for Taiwanese nationalism was 
thus that national unity is a necessary precondition for democracy, in line with the
Identity, pp. 173-4.
119 Perry Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’, London Review o f Books, p. 23.
120 By ‘pragmatic nationalism’, Wu Rwei-ren meant the ‘democratically formed discourse of 
Taiwan-ROC’s sovereignty’. Moreover, Wu argued that ‘the democratically formed discourse of 
Taiwan-ROC sovereignty has already gained a status of what Gramsci calls “moral and intellectual 
leadership” in Taiwanese society from which almost no serious political contender can afford to deviate’. 
See Wu Rwei-ren, 2002, ‘Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism’, especially p. 213.
121 Lin, 2002, ‘The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism*.
122 Wu Rwei-ren, 1997, ‘The paradox and dilemma of democratisation?’, in You Ying-lung (ed.), 
Democratic Consolidation or Collapse, p. 33.
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views of political scientists Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan123 and philosopher Ghia 
Nodia.124 Wu Nai-teh’s and Wu Rwei-ren’s liberal nationalist discourses thus differ 
in terms of the normative foundation of Taiwanese nationalism: whilst Wu Nai-the 
focused on the compatibility of liberalism and nationalism, Wu Rwei-ren emphasised 
the democratic process of constructing Taiwanese national identity through popular 
elections.
Wu Jieh-min’s recently-published critical discussion of Perry Anderson’s ‘The 
Stand-Off in Taiwan’ and Wang Chaohua’s ‘What is Taiwan?’125 has contributed 
considerably to the construction of a more progressive discourse of Taiwanese 
nationalism.126 Wu Jieh-min’s article scrutinised the role of America in the 
emergence and development of Taiwanese nationalism. The critical exploration of 
this question was a response to Anderson’s claim that ‘the peculiarity of the 
Taiwanese case lies in the fact that the nation claiming independence is itself 
completely dependent on a foreign power’. Taiwanese nationalism is thus a 
‘soft-shell’ or ‘protected’ nationalism.127 ‘The separation from the mainland that has 
formed its distinctive experience for the past century’, Anderson continued, ‘has
123 They pointed out that ‘nationalism provides one possible definition of the demos, which may or may 
not coincide with the demos of the state’. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, 1996, Problems o f 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe, p. 16.
124 Nodia argued that rational deliberation in democratic polities rested ‘unavoidably on a nonrational 
foundation’ because ‘a nonrational act of political definition (determining who belongs to “We the 
People”) is a necessary precondition of rational political behavior’. Ghia Nodia, 1996, ‘Nationalism and 
Democracy’, in Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy,
p. 8.
25 Wang Chaohua, 2004, ‘What is Taiwan?’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, No. 56, 
December 2004. The English version, titled ‘The Island of Contention’, was published later in New Left 
Review in March 2005.
126 Wu Jieh-min, 2005, ‘Pink Specter over the Taiwan Strait’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social 
Studies, No. 57, March 2005.
127 The term ‘soft-shell’ or ‘protected’ nationalism does not appear in Anderson’s article but was used in 
personal communication with the present writer.
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always been a function of empire, not a revolt against it. First Japanese, then 
American suzerainty has been the condition of all else.... But the underlying reality is 
that the island remains a protectorate of US imperial power.’128
Wang’s response to Anderson’s comment that Taiwanese nationalism was a soft-shell 
or protected nationalism suggested that to grasp Taiwan’s development into a 
‘protectorate of the US’ one has to take into account the Cold War context and the 
nature of its ‘de-colonialisation’ following Japanese rule. Besides, Wang argued, if 
increasingly aggressive Chinese nationalism is taken into consideration, the fact that 
any claim to independence by Taiwan would depend on American support is entirely 
understandable.129
Wu Jieh-min, probing America’s role in the simultaneous political democratisation 
and nation-building in Taiwan, agreed that the dominant discourses of Taiwan’s 
political democratisation and Taiwanese nationalism fail to critically examine the 
impact of American intervention on Taiwan’s political development. This echoes 
Anderson’s critical analysis of the characteristic of Taiwan nationalism and the 
post-colonialist critique claiming that the process of de-colonialisation in Taiwan is 
still incomplete. Wu argued that this was mainly due to the lack of thoroughgoing 
critical reflections on the nature of the KMT party-state, a ‘quasi-colony’ of American 
imperialism. This regime had far-reaching historical consequences. Most important, 
as far as Taiwanese public culture is concerned, is its sociocultural effect: a collective 
mindset imbued with anti-communist and conservative ideologies. Rooted in this
128 Anderson, 2004, ‘Stand-Off in Taiwan’, p. 8.
129 A point made by Wang in personal communication with the present writer.
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mindset were downright hostility to and fear of leftwing ideas, on the basis of 
collective ignorance.130
Addressing the question of national identity, Wu Jieh-min emphasised the importance 
of the distinction between and deliberation over the principles of ‘political legitimacy’ 
and ‘political expediency’ in the construction of nationalist discourses.131 Criticising 
China’s Chinese nationalism, whose ‘anti-secession’ ideology rejected Taiwan’s 
claim to autonomy and equality, Wu argued that since Taiwan had been ‘separated’ 
from China rather than ‘seceding’ from it, any attempt by Beijing to force Taiwan to 
accept unification on its terms, either by threatening the use of military force or luring 
the island with economic or other incentives, was ethically unsustainable.
Equally unsustainable in terms of the principle of political legitimacy, Wu continued, 
was Chinese nationalist discourse that appealed to ‘common ancestry and culture’ and 
‘sacred territory’. Given the reality of the separation between Taiwan and China, the 
de facto sovereignty of Taiwan and its liberal democracy, Wu argued that Beijing has
130 Wu Jieh-min pointed out four noteworthy structural features of the KMT ‘quasi-colonial regime’ and 
their consequences. Firstly, the KMT’s capacity to rule can be seen as an extension of American imperial 
domination in Taiwan. Thus, on the one hand, as the dominator in Taiwan, the KMT demonstrated a 
mentality of cultural superiority embodied in its systemic discrimination against local Taiwanese culture 
and dialect. On the other hand, few people in Taiwan are aware of the American hegemony in the 
political, economic and cultural fields. Second, the nature of the KMT as an 'im igri regime’ dominated 
by mainlanders explains the opposition focus on the unfair distribution of power between different ethnic 
groups. As a consequence, notions of ‘de-colonial justice’, anti-colonialism, anti-authoritarianism and 
anti-exploitation, have been missing from opposition discourses; politics in Taiwan have been 
‘ethnicised’. Third, the Cold War has had an ambivalent impact on Taiwan’s politico-economic 
development: Taiwan enjoyed a ‘long peace’ as a result of the stand-off between the US and USSR and 
received American economic aid, which created initial conditions conducive to it’s economic prosperity. 
American aid was not without its costs, as the controversy over American arms sales to Taiwan 
demonstrated. Last but not least, the most negative legacy of the Cold War was anti-communist ideology. 
This has underpinned a downright hostility to and fear of all radical/leftwing ideas of social equality and 
emancipation. See Wu, 2005, pp. 221-6.
131 The discourse of political legitimacy emphasises ideals and values while the discourse of political 
expediency is a ‘realist’ discourse: choices should be made in line with the need for practical survival. 
Wu, 2005, p. 230.
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to shoulder the burden of justification for Taiwan’s eventual unification with China. 
He thus produced an indirect form of Taiwanese nationalist discourse. Wu’s implicit 
Taiwanese nationalist discourse calls for critical reflection on the dependence of 
Taiwanese nationalism on American hegemony and emphasises social emancipation, 
making it distinct from the discourses of Taiwanese liberal and cultural nationalism.
Alternative Discourses -  Multiculturalism and Civic Republicanism
Tsai Ying-wen’s multicultural discourse and Shaw Carl K. Y.’s civic republican
discourse can be seen as alternatives to mainstream nationalist discourse in that they
did not appeal directly to nationalist ideals. Chiang Yi-hua’s discussion of the
theoretical types of national identity in contemporary Taiwan for example placed
Tsai’s multiculturalism and Shaw’s civic republicanism in the liberal category, which
1favours ‘constitutional identity’, a concept similar to Habermas’ ‘constitutional 
patriotism’.133 Yet, unlike liberal or radical critics, they did not express downright 
hostility to nationalism. The republican concept of liberty, for example, which links 
individual liberty to collective liberty or the ‘liberty of the republic’ may lead some to 
consider civic republicanism a form of nationalist discourse.
Having established why effective communication between nationalists and liberals 
taking part in the public debate on national identity in Taiwan was difficult if not 
impossible,134 Tsai attempted to construct a synthesis argument on the formation of
132 Chiang, 1998, pp. 165-70.
133 Habermas, 1996.
134 Because: ‘From the nationalist perspective, the institutions of liberal constitutionalism and its 
principles cannot generate citizens’ “sense of belonging” or loyalty to the political community where 
they live and this is because the concept of citizenship is an individualist one.... From the liberal point of 
view, the construction of a subjectivity of the Taiwanese nation may easily create a situation in which the 
majority ethnic group dominates culturally and politically. The consequence is the emergence of
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self-identity that could accommodate both the merits of liberal universalism and the
particularism of nationalism, but which was free of their defects. Tsai argued that a
synthesis of the two was inevitable. He summed up the principle underlying this
fusion in the following way: ‘On the one hand, certain universal normative principles,
such as equality and justice, should be taken to be the “metaphysical condition or
language” of public deliberation in which individuals and communities are engaged;
on the other, the realisation of these universal principles and their meaning should be 
1context-dependent’. Tsai suggested that democratic constitutionalism remained the 
political order best able to deal with the issue of national identity.136
Shaw’s discourse of civic republicanism, which referred to the national identity 
debate in Taiwan, was articulated primarily in three essays: ‘National Identity, 
Nationalism, and Constitutional Democracy: Reflections on Political Philosophy’, 
‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’ and ‘Democratisation and 
National Identity in Taiwan: Reflections on Political Theory’.137 Before writing these 
essays however, Shaw had studied the intellectual history of ‘community’, which laid 
the theoretical ground for the civic republican discourse he later applied to the 
Taiwanese case.138 Drawing on this theoretical foundation, Shaw claimed that
“populism”, “aggressive nationalism” orthe “collective ethnic cult”’. Tsai Ying-wen, 1997, ‘Identity and 
Politics’, Political Studies Review, p. 78.
135 ibid., pp. 72-6.
136 According to Tsai, the principle of democratic constitutionalism provides a vantage point for critical 
reflection upon the value of national culture (or what he called ‘locally formed ethnic-cultural identity’) 
whilst national culture constitutes the space or context of public discourse and provides materials for 
deliberation. Although national culture generates identity, this identity is not fixed, but changes as new 
situations arise, (ibid., p. 79)
137 Shaw Carl K. Y., 1997, ‘National Identity, Nationalism, and Constitutional Democracy: Reflections 
on Political Philosophy’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, No. 26; 2002, ‘Modulations of 
Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’, Issues & Studies, June 2002, Vol. 38, No. 2; 2003, 
‘Democratisation and National Identity in Taiwan: Reflections on Political Theory’, in Chiang Yi-hua 
and Li Qiang (eds.), Modem State Structures in the Chinese World.
138 Shaw, 1996, ‘The Concept of Community: A Historical Review’, Taiwan Political Science Review,
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constructing a theory of political community should not mean ‘simply and 
conveniently mixing those incompatible elements (e.g. rationality and traditionalism) 
and the various forms of community (e.g. classic political community reminiscent of 
the ancient Greek polis), modem state, and civil society) without a 
thoughtfully-selected method.... A better choice of theory is the one that is based on a 
community theory which regards the liberal public sphere as the core institution and 
incorporates the civic republican idea of participation, and the romanticist analysis of 
culture’.139
Shaw defined the concept of national identity as citizens’ willing identification with 
the political community to which they belong. The three main characteristics of this 
identity are outlined as follows: firstly, it represents the choices and common goals of 
the members of the community within a constitutional regime, i.e. it is an expression 
of political will; secondly, such identity must be presented in the form of political 
discourse, which involves rationality and speech action; finally, national identity is 
indispensable for political legitimacy: the regime must generate political support from 
its people or citizens in order to achieve solidarity within the community and such 
support was largely based on the affection of the general public.140
1996, Initial Issue. His main point is that although most liberal scholars view the discourses of 
community as opposed to liberalism, the liberal view of ‘society’ is still a theory of community, 
consisting of two main elements: public opinion and the market. Shaw pointed out that the ideal type of 
liberal community is one that embodies Hegel’s concept of civil society. The reason liberals are reluctant 
to use the term ‘community’ to describe their view of society, he argued, is because it seems to them that 
the teleology of common good in the concept of community is incompatible with individual freedom of 
choice. Shaw then identified three types of community in modem political theory: the state, civil society, 
and the nation, (ibid., p. 258).
139 ibid. p, 287.
140 Shaw, 1997, p. 4. Nonetheless, Shaw admitted that more often than not, these three elements have 
been in tension with each other, opening up some difficult questions for the construction of national 
identity.
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Shaw, nevertheless, seemed rather pessimistic about Taiwan’s prospects of putting 
into practice those desirable theoretical arguments of national identity which he 
proposed. This emphasises the importance of democratic constitutionalism due to the 
so-called ‘Lee Teng-hui phenomenon’. In a sense, according to Shaw, whether 
Taiwan could establish a civic republic with democratic constitutionalism as its 
political order depended very much on how respectful Lee was of the constitution 
after the ‘Machiavellian moment’, the moment in which the new republic was 
created.141
In light of the heated nationalist debate in Taiwan, in which Chinese nationalism on 
the mainland has always been an influential factor, Shaw suggested that Taiwan, and 
China too, should move beyond the idea of ‘autocentric nationalism’, not least to 
prevent the ‘Taiwan problem’ from becoming a life-and-death issue for both sides. 
Having addressed the contribution of civic nationalism to ‘paving the ground for the 
establishment of a self-sufficient subjectivity through democratic participation in 
Taiwan’,142 Shaw argued that ‘[A] further task remains, namely to direct Taiwan’s 
national identity toward the civic dimension in order to avoid the mischief of cultural 
nationalism’. Based on the civic republican view of corruption, which emphasises that 
it originates more often from within the community than from the external enemy,
141 Shaw creatively, and appropriately, borrowed J. G. A. Pocock’s notion of ‘the Machiavellian 
moment’ to describe the context of post-1987 Taiwan in which martial law was lifted and Lee Teng-hui, 
the first Taiwanese president, took over from the last strong-man in Taiwan politics, Chiang Ching-kuo. 
During this period, Lee strove to complete his project o f‘political innovation’, a term from Machiavelli’s 
The Prince. At this ‘Machiavellian moment’, Taiwan was a political world whose construction and 
change revolved around one person, Lee, the ‘new Prince’. This was Lee’s ‘virtue’. Central to his 
political innovation project was the ‘politics of delegitimisation’, characterised by implementation of 
democratisation (institution building) and concurrent ‘state building’. See Shaw, 1997, p. 22; 2002, pp. 
129-37.
142 This has partially eased Taiwan’s identity crisis rooted in the dilemma of recognition. Shaw, 2002, p. 
143.
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Shaw drew attention to the most urgent issues facing Taiwan: ‘empowering citizen 
participation, reducing inequality, checking ambitious politicians and power factions, 
and preventing political struggles from degenerating into private duels’.143
Concluding his essay on the modulations of nationalism on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait, Shaw claimed: ‘[E]liciting the moral resources from the paradigm of civic 
republicanism, therefore, is not a naive, self-congratulatory euphoria of Taiwan’s 
political democracy. Rather the movement calls for continual reform of the political 
order to overcome corruption. A civitas is bound to be in perpetual flux, the very 
reverse of the stable hierarchy of ecumenical empire’.144 A practical and no less 
important issue raised by Shaw’s argument, as one commentator has pointed out, is 
the institutional design of civic republicanism in modem societies, in which, in 
contrast to ancient city-states, political participation in the form of face-to-face public 
deliberation among all citizens becomes virtually impossible.145
Critiques o f National Identity Politics
Lee Teng-hui decided to put ‘state-building’ at the heart of his administration’s 
policies at a time when various discourses critical of Taiwan’s nationalist politics 
started to emerge in public debate. These critiques were made, broadly, from the 
perspectives of liberalism and radical democracy. Proponents of the latter, often 
involved in the journal Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, can be further
143 Inspired by civic republicanism, Shaw argued that ‘this task is to establish a historical 
self-understanding of an autonomous people, rather than a uniquely autonomous people’. Shaw, 2002, p. 
143-4.
144 ibid., 144.
145 This question was raised by Lin Chun at a conference held at the London School of Economics (May 
2002) where the early version of Shaw’s article was presented.
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divided into three groupings on the basis of the distinct yet closely related intellectual 
influences of postmodern, postcolonial and poststructural theories.
The Liberal Critique of Populist Authoritarianism
Chien Sechin Y. S. and Wang Jenn-hwan’s ‘March Towards a New Nation State?’ is 
representative of the liberal critiques. Indeed, it has in a way set the tone for liberal 
critique of Taiwanese nationalism.146 In contrast to Shaw’s conditionally positive 
comment on Lee’s state-building movement, which saw it as the ‘new prince’s’ 
project of political innovation to create a new republic, Chien and Wang criticised Lee 
for exploiting the public yearning for democracy in Taiwan and abusing his power 
and authority as a democratically elected president to further the ideology of 
Taiwanese nationalism.
To put it differently, liberals like Chien and Wang suspected that Lee’s project was an 
attempt to construct a new nation-state rather than to consolidate liberal democracy. 
The result, they contended, was a ‘populist authoritarianism’ as understood in 
Wolfgang Mommsen’s criticisms of Weberian ‘plebiscitary leadership 
democracy’,147 which invents a homogenised ‘people’ to mobilise public support. As 
a result, the diversity of civil society was subordinate to the interests of the ruler. Lee 
was compared with Adolf Hitler, and Taiwan’s politics with the Weimar Republic on 
the brink of collapse.
146 Chien Sechin Y. S. & Wang Jenn-hwan, 1995, ‘March Toward a New Nation State? The Rise of 
Populist Authoritarianism in Taiwan and Its Implications for Democracy’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly 
in Social Studies, August 1995, No. 20.
147 Part of the theoretical background of Chien and Wang’s critique was the breakdown of the Weimar 
Republic in the fanfare of acclamation for the Fiihrer. Their criticisms thus centred not on democratic 
electoral politics per se, but Lee’s charismatic approach to constructing political identity.
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Shaw has commented on Chien and Wang’s characterisation of Taiwan politics since 
1988 as ‘populist authoritarianism’. He stated that the concerns underlying Chien and 
Wang’s critique were, first, whether popular democracy would lead to the abolition of 
liberal constitutionalism and second, whether the presidential elections would be 
turned into a secessionist referendum, to the very great peril of the country. For Shaw, 
there were no a priori answers as these were empirical questions. Whilst claiming that 
the first direction seemed unlikely, Shaw expressed concern about the fast-developing 
populist politics as democratisation proceeds in Taiwan.148
Deconstructing Taiwan’s Cultural Imaginary of a Subempire and a Nation-State
Radical intellectuals influenced, as noted above, by various ‘post-isms’ and the 
intellectual legacy of 1968 have expressed downright hostility to the nation-state in 
general, and Lee Teng-hui’s state-building movement and nationalist discourses of all 
kinds in Taiwan in particular. Whilst their discourses differ in their theoretical 
positions and presuppositions, most notably, postcolonialism, postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, they form a united front against nationalist politics in Taiwan and 
promote the idea of radical democracy. Among these radical discourses, Chao Kang’s 
approach can be differentiated from others in his deployment of (radical) political 
economy and pragmatism, inspired by Dewey.
Chen Kuan-hsing, a professor of foreign literature, has been commonly regarded as 
the leading figure in the postcolonialist critique of Taiwanese nationalism, especially 
after the publication of his article ‘The Subimperialist Eye’ mentioned in passing
148 Shaw, 2002, p. 145. Shaw argued that the first scenario, the radical abolition of liberal 
constitutionalism, was unlikely given the vitality of civil society in Taiwan and the importance of liberal
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above.149 The English version of the article started by citing a poem, Burning (1989), 
written by Taiwanese aboriginal poet Monanen Malialiaves (Ah Neng) while the 
Chinese version included three other brief quotes by a Taiwanese lesbian feminist, 
intemationalist-feminist and postcolonialist, 150 intended to indicate an 
anti-essentialist account of identity and imply his own stance of ‘new international 
localism’, a multi-levelled construction in terms of epistemology, methodology, 
politics, ethics and desire.151 The poem reads:
I look hard for 
The origin o f blood.
Some say I ’m from the Malaysian archipelago,
On the southwest border o f China...
But my parents told me:
We are all children o f the sun,
The eggs o f the rattler,
legitimacy in sustaining support from major liberal-constitutional states. See also Shaw, 2003, pp. 162-4. 
14 Chen’s article ‘The Imperialist Eye: The Cultural Imaginary of a Subempire and a Nation State’ was 
first published in Chinese in July 1994 in Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies. The English 
version was published in 2000, positions. He acknowledged the existence of an English-language work 
with a similar title, Mary Pratt’s Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (N.Y.: Routledge, 
1992).
1S0 These short quotes included: ‘We live on different native earth' -  a Taiwanese lesbian feminist; ‘I am 
an internationalist, because I am a feminist’ -  Meaghan Morris; ‘“African” nation-state building is 
anti-people’ -  Manthia Diawara. Chen, 1994, p. 152.
131 Chen’s ‘new internationalist localism’ was an attempt to formulate a synthesis that could 
accommodate universal and particularist claims, similar to Tsai Ying-wen’s multicultural discourse, with 
a view to preventing nationalism from becoming a conservative and self-centred discourse and losing its 
liberating potential in the postcolonial context. Chen argued: ‘There is no necessary connection between 
racism and nationalism, or between nationalism and imperialism. Nevertheless, the trajectory of desire -  
from individualism, racism, nationalism, and colonialism to imperialism -  constitutes history per se 
unless political ethics intervene to destroy and transform the narcissistic mechanism or alternatively, a 
denationalising, new internationalism is developed to internalise the other, forging a hybrid 
intersubjectivity, and thus effects a process of becoming instead of accumulative being. In this context, 
new international localism based on a dialogical alliance of popular democracy can resolve the dilemma, 
loosening the imposed nation-state category on the epistemological level; emphasising the dialectic of 
local and international on the methodological level; resisting all hegemonic operations on the political 
level; internalising the other on the ethical level; deconstructing the myth of primordial sentiment on the
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The race bred in the earth...
No accurate answer after all.
But retracing assures me,
Making me understand the real master o f  the beautiful island, 
And page after page o f broken history.152
The implementation of Taiwan’s ‘Southward Advancing’ economic policy in 1994
under Lee Teng-hui, ‘endorsed by the opposition party, and applauded and
propagated by scholars, politicians and capitalists’, was seen by Chen as the
1formation of Taiwan’s ‘subempire’ in Southeast Asia. ‘The Taiwan empire was 
being formed’ through capital investment in the developing countries in the region. 
Chen argued, ‘[A]s a matter of fact, advancing toward the South, West, and East 
projects exactly the same desire as that of imperialist expansionism in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries’.154 Chen proposed to critically intervene in the discourses 
and projects of Taiwan’s ‘imperialist expansionism’ intellectually by means of ‘the 
postnationalist cultural imaginary’ and ‘the new international localism’, central to 
which was the deconstruction and reconstruction of nationalism and dialogue 
between the local and international.
level of desire’.
152 Translation by Wang Yiman. Chen, 2000, p. 9.
153 By subempire, Chen meant ‘a lower-level empire that depends on the larger structure of imperialism’. 
Chen argued: 'Within the neocolonial structure, Taiwan’s own economic, political, and cultural structure 
is subordinated to the United States and Japan. Therefore, its targets of expansion are the 
politico-economically weaker countries, rather than more robust capitalist areas’. Chen, 2000, p. IS.
4 ‘South’ referred to Southeast Asian countries where Taiwanese investments have been made, such as 
‘Taiwan’s sixth export processing area’ in the Philippines, ‘Taiwan industrial area’ in Vietnam, ‘Taiwan 
development project’ in Indonesia, and capital investments in Malaysia and Thailand. ‘West’ referred to 
China, primarily the southeast coastal provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong. For a detailed discussion 
of this point, see the paragraph ‘What are the concrete manifestations of Taiwan’s subempire?’, Chen,
2000, p. 16.
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For many critics, political economists in particular, Chen’s critique of Taiwan’s 
‘southward advancing’ policy failed to address an important question: for a heavily 
trade-dependent small economy with a limited domestic market like Taiwan, what 
would be the alternative to encouraging and assisting Taiwanese industrialists to 
search for locations offering more favourable production factors and potential 
markets? In the article, Chen seemed to spare himself this question by stating: ‘Where 
should the structural flow of capital be directed? Is it always necessary for capital to 
expand externally? These are not the questions I am considering here. Suffice it to say 
that imperialist expansion not only leads to exploitation of foreign labourers but is 
harmful to local workers as well; investment abroad will reduce the employment of 
local labourers’.155
Five comments on Chen’s essay were published in Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in 
Social Studies in February 1995, the following year. Relatively critical comments 
were made primarily from the perspective of political economy whilst others were 
largely in agreement with Chen’s argument.156 Wang Jenn-hwan’s critical comment 
addressed the aforementioned question of Taiwan’s industrial policy making. It 
focused on the political economic implications of the ‘southward advancing’ or ‘south 
bound’ policy as he called it, arguing that the out-flow of Taiwanese capital was 
basically related to global capitalist trends. The policy accordingly had two 
implications. Firstly, it was merely the political result of ‘following the logic of
155 Chen, 2000, p. 17.
156 They are Yu Chi-chung’s ‘The Construction of Subjectivity and the Cultural Imaginary of the 
Nation-State’, Wang Jenn-hwan’s ‘What does the South Bound Policy Tell Us?’, Chiu Fred Y. L’s 
‘Extemalization of Industrial Disasters, the One- “Nation” Left and Democratic Unthinking- An 
Internationalist-Historical Discourse on “Taiwan Sub-imperialism’” , Wen-liang Cheng’s ‘Imagined 
Post-State’, and Chu Wan-wen’s ‘The Myth of Economic Imperialism’. Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in 
Social Studies, No. 18, February 1995.
208
capital’ and thus a mercantilist approach totally devoid of imperialist intentions. 
Secondly, this policy-making was still closely bound up with politics in the sense that 
it was an attempt to alleviate the pressure of demand of ‘westward advancing’, 
meaning further deregulation on business investment in China; ideologically, 
Taiwanese national identity could be strengthened. This was however detrimental to 
labourers both in Taiwan and the target countries of Taiwanese investment.157
Chu Wan-wen made a similar comment to Wang’s. Unlike Wang, who 
straightforwardly rejected the policy as an imperialist project, however, Chu ridiculed 
the Taiwan state’s intention of becoming an empire, given its limited economic power 
and lack of other powers normally possessed by imperialists. Not only that, but the 
decision of Taiwanese industrialists to move their factories abroad demonstrated their 
reluctance or inability to upscale their businesses. This relocation in fact laid bare the 
weakness of Taiwan’s economy rather than its capacity for economic expansion.158
Representing ‘The Phony Taiwanese’ -  The Anti-Essentialist Critiques
The anti-essentialist critiques of national identity politics in Taiwan have come from 
postmodernists and poststructuralists. Given their common anti-essentialist position, 
poststructuralist discourse is perhaps distinct from its postmodernist counterpart 
primarily in its emphatic use of the notions of ‘subject position’ and ‘empty space’.159 
Liao Chao-yang, for example, commenting on Chen Chao-ying’s claim that 
‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ and ‘Taiwanese-ness’ must overlap with ‘Chinese
157 Wang, 1995, pp. 226-30.
158 Chu, 1995, pp. 257-63.
159 See Liao Chao-yang, 1995a, ‘The sadness of the Chinese’ and 1995b, ‘On empty subject’. Lin 
Shu-fen, 2001, Democratization in Taiwan Revisited.
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subjectivity’ and ‘Chinese-ness’, argued that ‘identity’ was an ‘empty space’ and 
therefore we cannot and should not attribute any ‘essence’ to Taiwanese identity.160
Articles collected in a special issue of Off the Island, a radical/non-mainstream 
magazine claiming to speak for all those excluded and neglected by mainstream 
society, is representative of the anti-essentialist critique of the nationalist public 
culture in Taiwan. The issue’s title ‘The Phony Taiwanese -  the fifth ethnic group in 
Taiwan’ was clearly a response to the discourse of ‘four major ethnic groups’ 
prevailing in the early 1990s, used interchangeably with the term ‘new Taiwanese’ 
invented by Lee Teng-hui. For anti-essentialist postmodernist critics, even worse than 
the discourse of ‘new Taiwanese’ was the essentialist discourse of ‘genuine 
Taiwanese’.
The term ‘fifth “ethnic group’” was a postmodern parody intended to contrast the 
‘essentialist’ categorisation of the four major ethnic groups: the mainlanders, the 
Taiwanese/islanders, the Hakka and the aborigines. All those who do not identify with 
the ‘Taiwanese nation’ or are uncomfortable with the aforementioned categorisation 
thus belong to this ‘fifth ethnic group’. The intention here was to subvert such serious 
notions as ‘four major ethnic groups’ and ‘brave Taiwanese’. In an article entitled 
‘The phony Taiwanese’, the author, ‘Taiwanese’, asserted:
‘The phony Taiwanese people possess no subjectivity or essence. They can form no centre 
and cannot be represented or represented. This is an ethnic group without ethnic history or
160 Liao argued, ‘[I]n the process of cultural identity formation, the truly transcendental subject might be 
an empty space without any substantial content.... Such emptiness cannot prescribe any rational thinking. 
It can, however, move beyond rationality and promote thinking based on rationality. Accordingly, any 
substantial content of identity is implanted from outside of the subject. Its function is to fill this empty 
space. Therefore it should not be categorised as irrational emptiness’. Liao, 1995a, p.l 18.
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tradition; instead, it is a (post) modem ethnic group constituted by fragmented, discontinuous 
and chaotic signs and experiences. Who are you? Taiwanese mainlander? Taiwanese Hakka? 
Taiwanese aborigine? Taiwanese Hoklo? Why lousy? Why not join us to be spurious 
Taiwanese? We are having anal sex, dancing, pissing and shitting wherever we like, farting; 
we are causing trouble.... we are enjoying ourselves. (And you?) We are (all) phony 
Taiwanese’.161
Chao Kang’s discourse of radical or popular democracy, inspired by Dewey and Mills, 
was also developed against the backdrop of Taiwan’s nationalist politics. In fact, he 
has devoted much of his time to attacking national identity in general and Taiwanese 
nationalism and its intellectual advocates in particular, as demonstrated in his articles 
‘The scapegoat of identity politics: patriarchy and women in the military dependants’ 
villages’ (1995), ‘Another “transvestite politics”: national identity, or capital 
interests?’ (1995) ‘New Nationalism or Old?’ (1996), ‘Money, “lies”, statistics charts: 
the interest politics of ethnonationalism’ (1998), ‘Power, resentment, the vanguards: 
the identity politics of ethnonationalism’.162
His most notable and indeed widely cited article is ‘New Nationalism or Old?’. Chao 
argued for a ‘democratic nation’ after producing a thoughtful critical analysis of 
Chang Mau-kuei’s article ‘The provincial-origin question and nationalism’ (1993). 
Drawing on the theories of nationalism espoused by Clifford Geertz, Eric Hobsbawn 
and Benedict Anderson,163 he criticised the ‘theological turn’ marking Chang’s
161 ‘A Taiwanese’, 1993, ‘The phony Taiwanese’, Off the Island, 1993, p. 45.
162 These articles were written between 1994 and 1998. Most of them were originally published in 
Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies. They are collected in his book titled Farewell To 
Resentment (1998).
163 Chao, 1996, pp. 21-30. His discussion focused on pointing out Chang's misreading and 
misinterpretation of these nationalist theorists in order to justify Taiwanese nationalism.
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explanation of Taiwan’s ethnic relations. He argued that the quest for Taiwanese 
identity was similar to the quest for a ‘tribal name’. Chao dubbed Chang’s nationalism 
‘hyper-ethnonationalism’ or ‘voodoo nationalism’.164
Chao’s critique of Taiwanese nationalism and identity politics made three main points: 
firstly, it was constructed and promoted to serve the interests of Taiwanese capitalists; 
secondly, identity politics in Taiwan was motivated by the ‘resentments’ of the 
Taiwanese/islanders, and was thus a ‘resentment politics’; finally, Taiwanese 
nationalism was an ethnic nationalism characterised by its ‘male-Hoklo chauvinism’. 
Taiwanese nationalist/identity politics suppressed other identities. The foundations of 
Chao’s critiques were broadly similar to those of the radical discourses discussed 
above, particularly the postmodernist critiques articulated in the special issue ‘The 
phony Taiwanese’ of Off the Island. His argument, however, differed from other 
radical critiques in his emphasis on the significance of a political economic approach 
and the role of the state in creating the pre-conditions for a well-functioning 
participatory or popular democracy, whose essence was ‘empowering politics’.
Chao’s vision of a ‘democratic nation’, constituted by the democratic public and 
characterised by ‘empowering politics’, certainly appears more desirable and 
progressive than the existing liberal democracy in Taiwan. Yet as Chang Mau-kuei 
has pointed out, Chao’s analysis and interpretation of Taiwanese nationalist 
discourses of all kinds, such as Chang’s own, was biased if not distorted. Chao has 
shown a downright hostility to the concept of ‘ethnie’, preferring ‘class’. He thus
164 Chao, 1996, p. 44. By ‘voodoo nationalism’, Chao meant a ‘totemised, tribalised and mysticised 
nationalism’.
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rejected and assailed research intended to examine ethnic relations and nationalism, 
though they are commonly thought to be closely related within Taiwan’s political 
development.165 Whether Chang’s nationalist discourse is ethnonationalist is 
debatable, depending on how ‘Taiwanese’ is conceived: it could refer to ‘citizen’ or 
‘national’. From a civic republican point of view, nationalist discourses as Chang’s 
are not necessarily anti-democratic. Moreover, the invention of the concept of ‘new 
Taiwanese’ was in fact an attempt to alleviate the ethnic tensions which occurred 
primarily during election campaigns. It also refers to all Taiwanese citizens and in this 
sense features no reference to racial differences.
Radical critics have contributed stimulating critical interventions in the nationalist 
debate in Taiwan. Nevertheless, important questions remain for these anti-nationalist 
radicals: Have national identities lost all importance, specifically for national 
solidarity? Is the realisation of social justice and cultural recognition, the core 
concerns of these radical/progressive intellectuals, feasible without a secure and 
capable nation-state?
Smith, responding to the typical postcolonialist critiques of nationalism which 
highlight its pursuit of ‘the cultural unity of the nation’, the work of Homi Bhabha 
being a prime example, argued that: ‘There were always counter-myths of origin and 
alternative memories of national culture, even if some of them might become 
temporarily predominant -  and official. This meant that “national identity” was
165 See Chang Mau-kuei, 1996, ‘Ideological Critique or Witch Hunting? -  A Response to Chao Kang’s 
“New Nationalism or Old?”’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, 1996, No. 23. Chang 
Mau-kuei and Wu Hsin-yi, 2001, ‘Identity and Sentiment in the Nationalist Discourse -  the question of 
respect and recognition', in Lin Chia-lung Lin and Zheng Yongnina (eds.), Nationalism and Cross-Strait 
Relations.
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always being reinterpreted and refashioned by each generation.... After all, most 
modem states have been ethnically plural and heterogeneous, and most nationalists 
have sought national unity, and only rarely national homogeneity’. 166 ‘What all 
nationalists demand’, he stated, ‘is a single public culture’.167
Nancy Fraser, a new-left feminist, expressed concern about the ‘project of 
emancipation’ proposed and promoted in the post-1968 era. She noted that ‘[I]n the 
seventies and eighties, struggles for the “recognition of difference” seemed charged 
with emancipatory promise. Many rallied to the banners of sexuality, gender, 
ethnicity and “race”.’ Fraser continued, ‘[Cjlaims for the recognition of difference 
now drive many of the world’s social conflicts.... Why do so many movements couch 
their claims in the idiom of recognition? To pose this question is also to note the 
relative decline in claims for egalitarian redistribution’. Fraser concludes that the 
upsurge in the ‘politics of difference/recognition’ has worrying implications: ‘insofar 
as the politics of recognition displaces politics, it may actually promote economic 
inequality; insofar as it reifies group identities, it risks sanctioning violations of 
human rights and freezing the very antagonism it purports to mediate’.168
The same concern has been expressed in a special issue of Thesis Eleven that critically 
examined the impacts of 1968 on the development of the Left ‘in the wake of 
capitalist triumphs over internal and external adversaries’.169 In light of these critical
166 Anthony Smith, 1998, pp. 127-8.
167 ibid., p. 151.
168 Nancy Fraser, 2000, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, pp. 107-8.
169 The special issue collected articles by Johann P. Amason and Peter Murphy, ‘Introduction’; Luc 
Boltanski, ‘The Left After May 1968 and the Longing For Total Revolution’; Peter Wagner, ‘The Project 
of Emancipation and the Possibility of Politics, or, What’s Wrong with Post-1968 Individualism?’ and 
others.
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reflections on the 1968 legacy and its implications for the sociopolitical emancipation 
movement, the critical question for anyone claiming to be progressive is: will the 
downright hostility to the nation-state apparent in most radical discourses in Taiwan 
help or hinder the movement? What is needed, perhaps, is a more subtle analysis of 
the state and its role in the politics of ‘socioeconomic and cultural recognition’, as 
Fraser put it.
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Chapter Five 
Welfarism and Social Justice
The Historical Background of the Welfare Development in Taiwan
As we have seen, the discourses of liberalism and nationalism have dominated 
Taiwanese public culture since the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, 
welfare has also been a consistent concern, although public debate over social welfare 
and welfare movements in Taiwan emerged only in the late 1980s. The welfare 
movement got off the ground as part of the broader political opposition movement. The 
concept of ‘welfare state’, referring primarily to the Nordic social democratic model, 
began to emerge as the major welfare discourse within society, as opposed to Sun 
Yat-sen’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood, which, along with the Principles of 
Nationalism and Democracy, informed the official ideology following the foundation 
of Republican China and thereafter. This was gradually disregarded as the KMT, under 
the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, pursued ‘Taiwanisation’, at a time when many 
intellectuals on the mainland were keen on Sunist doctrines.
The implementation of the KMT’s welfare policies in postwar Taiwan has to be 
understood in the broader historical contexts of the Chinese Civil War, the Cold War, 
and the ongoing political stand-off between Taiwan and China in the post-Cold War era. 
Whilst the first two predicaments are intimately related to the ideology of 
anti-communism, due to the incorporation of Taiwan into the US-led ‘Free World’, the 
latter, though undoubtedly a historical legacy of the Cold War, has more to do with the 
development of nationalist politics in Taiwan. This in turn is tied up with the 
emergence and growth of Chinese nationalism, and the relations between Taiwan,
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China and the United States. In addition, the right-wing, pro-capitalist KMT’s social 
policies have been commonly viewed as a conservative ‘pre-emptive strike’ against 
labour movements. Along with all other forms of mass movement, these were seen as 
the major threat both to the consolidation of KMT power and stable capitalist 
industrialisation on the island. Making Taiwan a stable, strong and wealthy ‘combat 
base’ or ‘outpost’ was in turn vital to achieving the KMT’s ultimate goal of destroying 
communism and retaking the mainland.
In recent years, the politics of welfare reform in Taiwan, in comparison to the South 
Korean case, has attracted academic interests. Studies on the subject probe the impact 
of democratic transformation on welfare reform, arguing that with democratic change, 
institutions are reformed, policy networks reworked, and incentives restructured, and 
thus policy priorities are changed, favourable to the development and deepening of 
social welfare. In short, democracy has matter very much in shaping social policy 
reform. The phenomenon of ‘race to the top’ in social policy in Taiwan and South 
Korea, against the general trend of ‘race to the bottom’ in most advanced industrial 
countries, was even dubbed ‘another East Asian miracle’ by some welfare scholars.1 
The welfare deepening in South Korea and the politics of resisting retrenchment of 
welfare state in Taiwan were, in the view of Wong, the products of substantively 
democratic policymaking.2
1 Wong referred this ‘East Asian miracle’ to the phenomenon that at a time when governments around the 
world are facing fiscal constraints and are thus clawing back public expenditures, governments in 
Taiwan and South Korea have increased their spending. Moreover, he pointed out that in an ideological 
climate in which economic crisis invites neoliberal economic restructuring, Taiwan and South Korea 
expanded their social safety nets after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. See Joseph Wong, 2004, Healthy 
Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea.
2 Ibid., p. 16.
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Social Investment in Postwar Taiwan, 1945-1970
The emergence of social policy in Taiwan can be traced back to 1945 when the 
Ministry of Social Affairs launched the Four Postwar Social Policy Outlines: Outline 
o f National Nursery Policy (on children, families, and population), Outline o f National 
Labour Policy (on trade unions and working conditions), Outline o f National Farming 
Policy (on land reform and rural recovery) and the Postwar Outline o f a Primary Social 
Security System (on social insurance, social relief and employment services).3 These 
social policies differed from those pursued in colonial Taiwan, which mainly focused 
on public health and primary education:4 the state committed itself to setting up a social 
security system, particularly social insurance. These social policies, together with 
national education policy, were later incorporated into the ROC Constitution in 1947.5 
The KMT regime was unable to make a reality of the welfare ideals in the Constitution 
amid the chaos of civil war on the mainland. When it fled to Taiwan, however, it
3 Ku Yeun-wen, 1997, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, p. 32; Chan Gordon Huo-sheng, 2001, ‘The 
political, economic, social and environmental analysis of Taiwan’s welfare development’, in Chan and 
Ku (eds.), New Thinking in Social Welfare Policy, p. 22.
4 Ku pointed out that Japanese colonial welfare development in Taiwan focused mainly on health and 
education. He further argued that ‘because of improvements in public health, a declining mortality rate 
and increased life expectancy were two distinguishable trends’. After 1905, annual mortality rates in 
Taiwan, Ku continued, ‘appeared not only to fall but to do so rapidly’. Deaths per thousand declined 
from an average of 33.4 during 1906-10 to 18.5 during 1941-3. The mean life expectancy of males aged 
0 rose from 27.7 in 1906 to 41.1 by 1940, and for females from 29.0 to 45.7. Similarly, education was 
well developed in colonial Taiwan, as illustrated by the radical increase in school and student numbers. 
Between 1918 and 1944, the number of children attending primary schools, vocational schools and high 
schools increased significantly. In 1943, when compulsory education was enforced, the enrolment rate of 
pupils reached 99.62 per cent in some primary schools. Ku, 1997, pp. 29-30. Ranis also pointed out that 
Taiwan ‘benefited from rather unusual colonial policies favoring primary education, for example, by the 
early 1950s, 60 per cent of the population was already literate’ (Ranis, 2002, ‘Lessons from Taiwan’s 
Performance: Neither Miracle nor Crisis’, pp. 4-5). Ranis also stressed that Japan implemented these 
colonial policies ‘for its own selfish reasons’, that is, to support the Japanese war effort.
5 The articles relating to social welfare clearly prescribed an active role for the state in welfare policies, 
stating that it should maintain full employment, implement policies to improve the working conditions of 
workers, farmers, women and children, bring in rules to arbitrate conflicts between employers and 
employees, establish social insurance and social relief for the old, weak, disabled, or victims of disasters, 
protect maternity rights and implement welfare policies for women and children, establish a public health 
and national health system. See Ku’s summary, 1997, p. 33.
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implemented its social insurance policy, adding to the welfare mix left over from the 
Japanese occupation.
Political and intellectual debates over social welfare, nevertheless, were absent in 
Taiwan during the first postwar years. The closest thing to a ‘welfare debate’ was that 
between economic liberalism and democratic socialism within the Free China group in 
the 1950s. The focus, however, was on civil liberties rather than social welfare. 
Economic liberals focussed on the need to limit the government’s role in regulating 
economic affairs and emphasised ‘spontaneous order’ as opposed to ‘invented order’. 
The former was exemplified in the free play of market forces, the latter by centralised 
planning and investment. Economic liberalism and socialism differ most fundamentally 
in that the former values economic freedom above all, while the latter places 
socioeconomic equality or social justice centre stage.
Several hundreds of communists were arrested in the 1930s when Japan militarised 
Taiwan’s political and social spheres to prepare for war.6 This severely damaged the 
socialist movement, which grew out of the resistance against Japanese imperialism. 
The KMT regime’s ‘White Terror’ policy in the early 1950s played havoc with it once 
again. In the Cold War context, Taiwan became difficult if not impossible terrain for 
socialist activism: the KMT regime made ‘anti-communism’ national policy after its 
defeat by the Chinese communists and retreat to the island in 1949. There was therefore 
no real debate between liberalism and socialism until the 1977-78 ‘Nativist literary
6 By the end of 1931, the Japanese police had arrested several hundred communists and 
communist sympathisers. In one instance that happened in September 1931, ninety-one people were 
arrested in a preparation for a peasants' uprising, with thirty-seven of them sentenced from two to eight 
years in prison. And on 2 December 1931, three hundred and ten people with connections to the 
communist party and its movement were arrested. See Chien Chiung-ren, 1997, p. 148.
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debate’, in which the left-wing magazine China Tide posed a strong challenge to the 
dominant modernism and modernisation theory espoused by liberal intellectuals.
The \Economic Liberalism vs. Democratic Socialism ’ Debate in the 1950s
Prior to the ‘Nativist literary debate’ in the late 1970s, the only public debate involving 
a clash between liberalism and socialism pitted the advocates of a ‘free economy’ or 
‘economic freedom’ against the proponents of ‘economic equality’ in the 1950s. This 
debate took place mainly in the influential bimonthly liberal magazine Free China. At 
issue was the core aim of social policy: political and economic freedom, or economic 
equality and social justice? Leaving aside the issue of national liberation, based on 
which different socioeconomic and political discourses were constructed and 
articulated at the same time, this debate resembles that between ‘(economic) 
libertarians’ or the ‘liberal right’ and ‘egalitarians’ or ‘liberal left* as we understand 
these terms today. The prevailing anti-communist ideology ensured that no radical 
‘Marxist’ ideas, such as ‘abolishing private property’ or ‘proletarian revolution’ were 
evoked.
The debate about socioeconomic equality has to be understood against the backdrop of 
the KMT’s defeat by the CCP on the mainland. This defeat was construed as anchored 
in the KMT’s failure to deal with the social stress arising from its mishandling of 
economic problems. The debate grew out of critical reflection upon the reasons for the 
KMT’s loss of popular support in its struggle against the Chinese communists on the 
mainland. The anti-communist ‘war’ was regarded by Free China liberals as a ‘social 
war’, intended to bring about a more equitable and fair society, more likely to withstand
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the attraction of the CCP’s socialism.7 Rather than viewing either the CCP or a 
particular social class as the enemy in this social war, for Free China liberals the 
‘enemy’ primarily referred to socioeconomic inequalities, which, they argued, would 
impede the development of liberal democracy.
Whilst much less concerned about the establishment of liberal democracy than the 
consolidation of its power in Taiwan, the KMT government shared the Free China 
intellectuals’ concern about socioeconomic equality. The destruction caused by the 
anti-Japanese war on the mainland and the siphoning off of resources from Taiwan after 
1945 for the Civil War had a disastrous effect on China’s economy as a whole. Inflation 
soared. The KMT regime responded by issuing more currency to make up its budget 
shortfall, aggravating inflation. The prices of goods increased exponentially within a 
day. Taiwan was affected by these events, but was in a stronger position following fifty 
years of stable economic and social development under the Japanese, who had 
developed the island for reasons of their own,8 than the mainland, which had lurched 
from crisis to crisis.
Chen Yi, administrator and commander of the Taiwan Garrison and head of the Taiwan 
Provincial Administrative Executive Office, plundered the Bank of Taiwan, issuing 
currency to cover deficit financing of the government and its enterprises. This created
7 While the question as to whether the anti-communist war was a ‘national’ or ‘social’ war was hotly 
debated, one of the leading figures in the Free China group, Yin Hai-kuang, defined it as a political 
struggle intended to achieve both national liberation and social transformation, underlining its social 
nature above all (Yin, 1950, Free China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 11). In the 1950s, the intellectuals 
concerned all interpreted the success of the Chinese communists on the mainland as a result of support 
from the Soviet Union and internal economic breakdown and social chaos. The former factor reinforced 
these intellectuals’ notion that the struggle against the Chinese communists was a nationalist war. In their 
view, the immense socioeconomic problems invited Soviet intervention. To put it another way, it was a 
social war utilised by the national aggressor.
8 As noted above, social policies in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule focused mainly on public health
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an environment conducive to inflation. The reforms of August 1948, compounded by a 
sudden rush of capital from the mainland, increased prices on the island by 1,145 
percent in 1948.9 In addition to the horrendous inflation, production stagnated and 
supplies were short.
It is no accident, given the similar economic situation facing Taiwan at the time of the 
KMT’s retreat, that while Free China liberal intellectuals advocated freedom, 
democracy, rule of law and human rights, economic equality was thought to be equally 
important in the early stages of the debate. A number of articles in Free China argued 
that freedom and equality were equally important and ‘compatible’, and could be 
attained through Fabian ‘democratic socialism’. 10 These articles argued for the 
‘socialisation’ of industries, rather than the ‘nationalisation’ advocated by the doctrine 
of ‘dtatisme statism’ and promoted by the Chinese communists.
Whilst ‘nationalisation’ assumed a state-centred economic policy revolving around a 
large public sector or state-owned enterprises, ‘socialisation’ emphasised popular 
participation in economic policy-making, as exemplified by ‘industrial democracy’, 
which promotes self-government for industrial workers.11 In short, according to the
and primary education.
9 See Thomas B. Gold, 1986, State and society in the Taiwan miracle, pp. 52-3.
10 In an article entitled ‘There is only one level road of history: on the mutually entwined relationship 
between freedom and equality’, Huang Chung distinguished socialism from communism, repudiating the 
idea that the latter is the orthodox version of the former (Huang, 1949, Free China, No. 2, Vol. 1, p. 19). 
He also renounced the argument that freedom and equality are mutually exclusive. De-coupling the 
historical relationship between democracy and capitalism, he argued that ‘die achievement of democratic 
politics is the realisation of freedom, and the advocacy of socialism is the pursuit of equality’. Huang’s 
ideal appears to be ‘democratic socialism’. For him, only democracy can guarantee economic equality. 
Tseng Hsu-bai made a similar argument for democratic socialism (Tseng, 1950, Free China, Vol. 2, No. 
6, p. 14), emphasising that economic equality is the indispensable precondition for the realisation of true 
freedom and democracy.
11 Tai Du-heng produced a brilliant critical article discussing the concept of ‘Itatisme statism’. In the 
article he clarified the common, misleading perception of socialism as a kind of ‘statism’. According to 
this misconception, Tai pointed out, the distinctive feature of socialism was its policy of nationalisation,
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former idea, the state participates in economic activities, while it regulates or 
co-ordinates them in the latter. Apart from the value of social equality, the central, 
unifying feature of these arguments is the reformist approach of democratic 
socialism.12
Faced with the KMT, an authoritarian regime organised along quasi-Leninist lines, and 
the communist regime on the mainland, the liberal intellectuals of Free China were so 
terrified of ‘dictatorship* that after much heated debate they compromised on the idea 
of economic equality. On behalf of Free China, Lei Chen, an active member of the 
group, concluded a symposium discussion by stating that:
‘Recently, our colleagues have reached a common view about the role of the state in 
economic affairs. That is, if there is too much state intervention, it seems inevitable that 
political freedom and democracy will be affected negatively. Moreover, if the degree of 
state intervention is so great that the system becomes state capitalism, then political 
dictatorship will follow’.13
Yin Hai-kuang, a leading figure in the Free China group, translated Hayek’s The Road 
to Serfdom and introduced it to Taiwan. The book’s popularity around 1951 and 1952 
reflected not only the consensus among Free China liberals that a ‘free economy’ was
in which the state was a direct participant in economic activities rather than a regulator or co-ordinator. 
For Tai, socialism was wrongly distinguished from liberalism and repudiated for this reason. After all, 
Tai stressed, socialism aimed to achieve human emancipation and in this sense was no different from 
liberalism, whose core value was freedom. The main purpose of Tai’s critical discussion of ‘6tatisme 
statism’ was to clarify the concept of socialism and defend it as a political ideology that could achieve 
freedom and democracy. See Tai, 1950, Free China, Vol. 2, No. 6. On his distinction between 
‘nationalisation’ and ‘socialisation’ of industries, see p. 10.
12 For a detailed discussion of democratic socialism, especially its intellectual development in Britain, 
see Welfare and Ideology by George and Wilding (George and Wilding, 1994, pp. 74-101).
13 Lei Chen made this statement at the end of a symposium organised to discuss the question ‘What 
economic measures should be adopted to realise “economic socialisation” or “economic equality” 
according to the principle of “people’s freedom” and “political democracy”?’ (Hsiao and Yang, Free 
China, 1950, Vol. 2, No. 7).
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essential, but also the dominance of the idea of economic freedom in public debate. 
This ‘negative’ understanding of freedom, in Berlin’s terms, based on liberal distrust of 
state, has influenced Taiwan’s political culture ever since.
Nevertheless, however influential the Hayekian notion of liberalism has been, 
Taiwan’s economic success, relatively equitable society and peaceful political 
transformation to democracy show the common neo-classical economic interpretation 
of the ‘Taiwan miracle’ to be misleading.14 As Ranis has pointed out, Taiwan’s 
performance over the past four decades, its spectacular growth in per capita income and 
income distribution, which improved during the most rapid period of growth in the 
1960s, has provided ‘the world’s most persuasive counterexample to what was once 
viewed as Kuznet’s inverse-U-shaped iron law’. Whilst average real per capita GDP 
growth rates (percent per year) in the postwar period were 5.9 (1960-69), 8.1 (1970-79), 
5.6 (1980-89) and 7.3 (1990-93), income distribution (Gini coefficients) was 0.56 in 
1950,0.44 in 1959,0.29 in 1970,0.29 in 1978 and 0.38 in 1990.15
Taiwan’s history is characterised by a developmentalist ideology, ‘state-led 
development’ and the strong foundations for political democratisation provided by 
human capital. Many ardent free market economists in Taiwan, moreover, such as 
Chiang Shuo-j ieh (fcW ^g^STlsing Mu-huang,16 suggest that the ideal of economic 
liberalism inspired by Hayek has never been taken seriously or ‘sincerely’ put into
14 Alice Amsden and Robert Wade are probably the two most prominent political economists who 
question the literature on the ‘Taiwan miracle’ portraying it as a result of nearly free markets. They 
emphasise the active role of the state in regulating economic activities, or ‘governing the market’, in 
order to build the international competitiveness of domestic industries and thereby, eventually, to raise 
living standards (see for example, Amsden, 1984 and Wade, 1990).
15 Gustav Ranis, 1999, ‘Reflections on the Economics and Political Economy of Development at the 
Turn of the Century’, pp. 5-6.
16 See Hsing, 1992, On Taiwan’s Economy. Taipei: San Min.
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practice within the context of actually existing ‘party-state capitalism’.17 Acceptance 
that the state has played a key role in Taiwan’s remarkable ‘growth with equality’ has 
sociopolitical implications. Rather than using Taiwan’s success story to endorse 
authoritarian capitalist developmentalism or misleadingly advocate neo-classical 
economics, which insists that capitalism requires the free play of untrammelled market 
forces,18 the focus shifts to the vital importance of the state in regulating or 
co-ordinating economic activities to attain desirable social outcomes.
State Corporatism, the Social Insurance Programme and Political Silence * in the 
1960s
The consensus among Free China figures that economic freedom must take priority 
over economic equality reflected the magazine’s primary concern with the civil 
liberties granted in the constitution but later suspended to bolster the struggle against 
communism and enhance national security. Taiwan had been both ‘over-politicised’ 
and ‘under-politicised’ under KMT authoritarianism long before the lifting of martial 
law in the late 1980s.19 In the aftermath of the 1947 ‘February 28 Incident’, watching 
Taiwan’s elite and its successors being systematically hunted down and murdered by
17 Party-state capitalism, in contrast to the positive notion o f ‘East Asian model/governed market theory’, 
has been put forward by many prominent Taiwanese economists to characterise Taiwan’s development. 
The term manifests a strong political tendency against the KMT’s party-state regime. They have 
advocated economic liberalisation, particularly the privatisation of public enterprises. For a critical 
discussion of this desire to ‘destroy party-state capitalism’ in Taiwan, see Wan-wen Chu’s article ‘The 
Role of the State in the Development of Capitalism in Taiwan: A Review of Party-State Capitalism’, 
(Chu, 1995).
18 Christopher Pierson, 1991, Beyond The Welfare State?, p. 26. Pierson’s book comprehensively 
discusses capitalism, social democracy and the welfare state, defending welfare state regime(s) in the 
face of challenges from new social movements and neo-conservatives.
19 It was ‘over-politicised’ in the sense that the party-state’s control over society made people and social 
groups mere tools of the KMT’s political mobilisation and policy propaganda. The ‘under-politicisation’ 
of society refers to social ‘atomisation’ in Taiwan and political apathy, deeply influenced by the common 
belief that ‘politics is dangerous’. See Gold (1986) for this view of state-society relations in Taiwan.
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the KMT regime, the Taiwanese people were so traumatised that the phrase ‘politics is 
dangerous’ became etched into their collective unconscious. In the public mind, 
political activities became associated with violence. The re-conquered Taiwanese again 
became quiescent and apolitical, just as they had been after the brutal Japanese military 
take-over fifty years before. Although the ‘February 28th Incident’ had a significant 
impact on the emergence of ethnic politics in Taiwan, the KMT repressed both ordinary 
mainlanders and native Taiwanese.
The emergence of state corporatism in Taiwan after 1950, commonly thought to be a 
result of the KMT’s deep fear of class conflict and group politics, moulded the social 
dimension of Taiwan’s public culture, influencing the incorporation of civil society, the 
development of social movements and the public debate on social issues.20 Much 
research has been carried out on the related issues of the impact of state corporatism on 
the development of civil society and social movements and the progress of political 
democratisation in Taiwan. The labour movement stands out as the subject that has 
attracted most academic interest and public attention. Scholars commonly argue that by 
conventional standards, the Taiwanese labour movement has been weak 
organisationally and in its capacity to mobilise as a result of the KMT’s comprehensive
20 Philippe Schmitter has defined ‘state’ or ‘authoritarian’ corporatism as follows: ‘[a] system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports’ (Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93-4). State corporatism in Taiwan is 
characterised by the creation of such corporatist structures and arrangements by the KMT party-state, in 
which the democratic dimension of social corporatism as practised in countries such as Sweden and 
Norway is absent. While the ‘governed market theorists' see corporatist political arrangements as having 
contributed to Taiwan’s fast economic growth by limiting conflict between major interest groups, 
promoting continuity of industrial form, and protecting the central bureaucracy from all but the most 
powerful interest groups (e.g. Wade, 1990), for many liberal critics, state corporatism in Taiwan is a 
major means of social control and political mobilisation (e.g. Wu Nai-teh, 1987).
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control,21 though they disagree about whether this is due entirely to state corporatism 22 
While repressing the labour movement and trade unions, the KMT government 
initiated social insurance as early as 1950 as part of a public welfare scheme 23 Two 
accounts have been offered to explain this initiative. The first is developmentalist, 
emphasising the pragmatic need to ensure a healthy and educated labour force for 
economic development. The second is political, underlining the KMT’s desire to 
maintain stability and consolidate its rule on the island. The proponents of such 
accounts point to the specific social groups covered by this social insurance scheme: 
labourers, military servicemen and government employees.
The first reason recalls Lloyd George’s statement within the ‘national efficiency’ 
debate in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century: you ‘cannot maintain an A-l
21See for example, Huang Chang-Ling, ‘The Politics of Regulation: Globalization, Democratization, and 
the Taiwanese Labor Movement’ (Huang, 2002); Chiu Yu-bin, ‘The Taiwanese Labour Movement 
within the Legacy of Authoritarian Rule: from 1988 to 2004’ (Chiu, 2004). Whilst both articles recognise 
the negative impact of the KMT’s authoritarianism on the development of the labour movement, they 
disagree on whether political democratisation in Taiwan, demonstrated by alternation of power between 
the KMT and DPP, has significantly empowered the Taiwanese labour movement. The former argues 
that Taiwanese workers have used their newly acquired political power to manoeuvre between different 
political forces, paving the way for the development of die labour movement. The latter underlines that 
more often than not political parties supportive of the labour movement become conservative after 
gaining power, and emphasises the importance of unions and labour movements autonomous from the 
state.
22 For example, Huang Chang-Ling has disputed the common view that control of labour in Taiwan is 
based on state corporatism. Her central point is that although labour representation is monopolised and 
the union is organised with a corporatist structure, state-sponsored union federations in Taiwan have no 
control over their member unions. Nor do they have the ability to articulate working class interests or the 
means to discipline their supposed member unions (Huang, 1997).
23 Very simply put, social welfare involves the idea of social rights, as defined by T. H. Marshall. As a 
constituent part of human rights or citizenship rights, social rights entail the citizen’s entitlement to state 
provision, just like civil and political rights. The state has increasingly established a set of social services 
to provide a safety net for all of its citizens in order to enforce this right (Marshall, 1964). In the system of 
social insurance, social services are not defined as a human right and are not delivered in the form of state 
provision; they are a kind of commodity. In the case of Taiwan, the social insurance systems have been 
financed from three sources: contributions from both employers and employees and government 
subsidies.
24 See Ku, 1997, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, pp. 149-61; Lin, 2000, ‘Social struggle, political power 
resources, and the development of social welfare policy’, p. 72, Chan, 2001, ‘A political, economic, 
social and environmental analysis of Taiwan’s social welfare development’, p. 22.
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empire with a C-3 population’.25 In the case of Taiwan, the goal was not to build an 
empire, but to make Taiwan into a strong base from which the mainland might be 
retaken in future. Economic development was considered crucial to achieving this 
national goal. In 1950, The Governor of Taiwan Province, Wu Kuo-chen, the architect 
of labour insurance, indicated that it could on the one hand protect the livelihood of the 
labourers, and on the other increase economic production. The same view was 
expressed later by another Governor of Taiwan Province, Chiu Chuang-huan 26
The second account, which focuses on the KMT regime’s need for political stability 
and social control, highlights the timing of the introduction of insurance policies and 
the main social groups they aimed to serve. Lin, among others, dismissed the notion 
that the KMT government cared about labourers’ welfare and was pursuing the ideal of 
the Three Principles of the People. It was, he thought, no coincidence that these 
schemes were implemented shortly after the KMT retreated to Taiwan, or that in 
addition to labourers, the major beneficiaries were military servicemen and civil 
servants/government employees, most of whom came to the island with the regime. 
Social insurance was thus deployed to recompense state personnel for their 
contributions to the country.28
The pressure of competition from the mainland and the lessons of the KMT’s defeat in 
the civil war also underlay the implementation of social insurance. This resembles the
25 Gilbert, 1970, p. 15, quoted in George and Wilding, 1994. p. 80.
26 Chiu, quoted in Ku’s book, stated that ‘the purpose of labour insurance is to protect the livelihood of 
labourers... in order to increase production and help the economy prosper’ (Ku Yeun-wen, 1997, Welfare 
Capitalism in Taiwan, p. 155).
27 Lin Wan-yi, 1995, ‘State and Social Policy’, in Hsiao and Hsu (eds.), State and Society in Taiwan, pp. 
281-2; Ku, 1997, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, pp. 49.
28 Fu Li-yeh, 1993, ‘The Social Insurance System in Taiwan: A Social Control Explanation’, Taiwan: A 
Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, No. 15.
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background to the land reforms. As suggested by the idea of ‘pre-emptive action’ 
against the labour movement, the regime thought that consolidating the support of civil 
servants, military servicemen and labourers would bolster the anti-communist forces.
Until the 1980s, the concepts of ‘social welfare’ and ‘social insurance’, which have 
dominated welfare discourse and which have been the most significant welfare 
achievements in Taiwan, were primarily ‘defined’ by the KMT according to the Three 
Principles of the People rather than ‘debated’ in public fora. It is thus vital to grapple 
with the role and impact of the Three Principles, the core of Sunist Doctrine. The 
Principles have long been the core ideology of the KMT government, which ruled the 
island for over a half century until it was defeated by the major opposition party, the 
DPP, in the presidential election in March 2000. Although the Three Principles has 
become the national ideology, the Constitution clearly stating that ‘the Republic of 
China, based on the Three Principles of the People, is a democratic republic of the 
people, by the people and for the people’, its contribution to the establishment of the 
social welfare system in postwar Taiwan remains a matter of dispute.
While some scholars have emphasised the profound ideological influence of the 
Principle of the People’s Livelihood, others, particularly those critical of the KMT’s 
authoritarianism, have argued that reference to them was mere political rhetoric. Had 
the KMT leadership taken the Three Principles to heart and practised them seriously, 
the KMT’s critics argued, Taiwan should have had a far more robust and 
well-developed social welfare system.30 Other scholars, though, underlined the benefits
29 Lin Wan-yi, 1994, Welfare S ta te-A  Historical Comparison and Analysis.
30 See for example, Lin, 1995 and Ku, 1997.
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of the public provision of such social services as public education and public health
  «
under the KMT government without referring to the influence of the Three Principles.
Probably because of the KMT’s notorious record of authoritarian rule in Taiwan, the 
general public has tended to view the Three Principles negatively, although state 
provision of public education and public healthcare, obviously inspired by the Principle 
of the People’s Livelihood, has been proved to have been crucial to Taiwan’s 
successful development. In the early debate among the liberal intellectuals of the Free 
China group in 1950, Chiang Yun-tien questioned whether it was helpful to adopt the 
Three Principles as the primary guide to both intellectual and national development. He 
argued that:
‘It is stated in the Three Principles of the People that the Principle of the People’s Livelihood is 
socialism, also known as communism. Today we take the Three Principles as the common 
standard whilst the Communists take communism as their standard. Which of them should the 
people follow?’32
According to Berg&re, Sun’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood does seem to feature 
‘utopian communism’. For it states that ‘[T]he principle of the livelihood of the 
people., .is that the people of the whole nation., .have a share in the profits of capital’.
31 This is the opinion of the editorial board of the journal Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies. 
An article titled ‘Publics and the Overcoming of Post-authoritarianism: A Tentative Outline for a 
Democratic Left’ was published in 2004 to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the journal. Its English 
version, ‘Manifesto: An argument for democracy in Taiwan’ was later published in Boston Review, 
October/November 2004.
32 See Hsiao and Yang, 1950, Free China, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 124. This was stated in Sun’s first of four 
lectures on the Principle of the People’s Livelihood. He then repeated in the second lecture that ‘the 
livelihood of the people is communism, it is socialism’. See Bergdre, 1994, Sun Yat-sen, p. 383.
33 Berg&re’s discussion also mentions the claim that this utopian communism would realise the dream of 
making ‘everybody contented and happy, free from the suffering caused by the unequal distribution of 
wealth and property’ (ibid. pp. 386).
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Nonetheless, as Bergere has implied, it is unclear whether the Principle of the People’s 
Livelihood is communism given how many and varied are the ideas covered by the 
term. She draws our attention to Sun’s systematic refutation of Marxism, specifically 
the philosophy of historical materialism, in his first lecture on the Principle of the 
People’s Livelihood.34 The intellectual confusion was compounded by contradictions 
bom of political necessity, which made Sun’s four lectures on the Principle of the 
People’s Livelihood crucially important political statements. They served ‘to convey 
opinions now critical of Marxism, now favorable to communism’. The left and right 
of the KMT thus produced opposing commentaries on, and even divergent versions of, 
Sun’s text. Chiang’s acknowledgement of the intellectual confusion surrounding the 
Principle of the People’s Livelihood should be seen in this perspective.
That said, the KMT retained the Principle of the People’s Livelihood as a guide to 
social policy and as the foundation of its political legitimacy. In 1965, for example, the 
Current Social Policies of the Principle of the People’s Livelihood were announced by 
the KMT government. The state would improve seven social services: social insurance,
34 For Sun Yat-sen, Bergfcre pointed out, the motivating force of history lay in man’s ever renewed efforts 
to ensure his subsistence. ‘The problem of livelihood is the problem of subsistence.... Livelihood is the 
central force in social progress... and social progress is the central force in history.’ Whilst recognising 
the importance of the industrial revolution and the introduction of machines, he rejected historical 
materialism, arguing that ‘the materialistic conception of history is wrong... the struggle for a living and 
not material forces determines history’. Contrary to Marx, ‘the class struggle is not the reason for social 
evolution’ (ibid., p. 384).
33 Bergdre states that Sun’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood is hard to grasp and suggests that the
very absence of a satisfactory translation can be explained by the multiplicity and complexity of the ideas 
covered by the term minshengzhuyi. She continues: ‘Sun Yat-sen used this term to designate at once his 
philosophy of history, the ideal goal that he assigned to social evolution, and the strategy that he
recommended for achieving this objective. Minshengzhuyi thus has a triple meaning -  philosophical, 
normative and programmatic -  and Sun Yat-sen played upon all these levels of meaning without 
explicitly warning his public when he was shifting from one to another’. The crisis provoked by the KMT 
faction hostile to collaboration with the Soviets and the communists at the time when Sun delivered his 
four lectures on the Principle of the People’s Livelihood made his lectures crucially important political 
statements. ‘In the course of crisis’, Berg&re argues, ‘they served to convey opinions now critical of 
Marxism, now favorable to communism’. See Bergfcre, 1994, Sun Yat-sen, pp. 381-2.
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employment services, social assistance, public housing, welfare services for 
disadvantaged groups, social education, and community development. These 
constituted the main content of postwar Taiwan’s social welfare policy.36 Welfare 
scholars have criticised the KMT’s social policies because of their ‘selectivity’ and the 
party’s political motivation, as evident in the timing of the social insurance scheme in 
the 1950s and the social groups covered by the scheme. The government, nonetheless, 
exhibited a consistent concern for welfare, exemplified in its investment in public 
education and public health.
While these social policies, focusing on social insurance, were being carried out in the 
1960s, Taiwan was experiencing a period of ‘political silence’. This was anchored in 
the political events revolving around the arrest of the leading figures of the Free China 
group for attempting to organise a new political party and the subsequent suspension of 
the magazine. Rather than straightforward political criticism of the government’s 
policies or a focus on sociopolitical issues, the public debate in the 1960s was mainly 
about ‘cultural modernisation’. This debate unfolded between cultural conservatives 
defending traditional Chinese culture, specifically Confucianism, and liberals arguing 
for Western values and culture, particularly individualism. The former camp was 
represented by the magazine Democratic Review, led primarily by the 
neo-Confucianists, the latter by the magazine Literature Star, led by the eminent critic, 
historian and writer Li Ao. It had implications for Taiwan’s political development. Lee, 
for example, saw the KMT’s political authoritarianism as rooted in traditional Chinese 
culture and in the norms characteristic of patriarchy and paternalism.
36 Ku, 1997, p. 39; Shih Chiao-yu, 2001, ‘The present organisational system of Taiwan’s social welfare 
and its prospects’, p. 87.
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Political Crisis, the Nativist Debate and Social Policy in Transition, 1971-1980
In addition to the diplomatic setbacks resulting from the normalisation of Sino-US 
relations, which shook the base of the KMT’s domestic political legitimacy, by the 
early 1970s, Taiwan had been integrated into the world capitalist system. An 
export-oriented economy based on labour-intensive industries and private capital had 
come into being. In the cities, the middle classes, made up of the owners of small or 
medium-sized enterprises and white-collar professionals, benefited from the rapid 
economic growth. The rural areas, meanwhile, witnessed the proletarianisation of the 
massive peasant population. Social disparities emerged between the cities and rural 
areas. Taiwan’s international political crises in the early 1970s, resulting from 
America’s new ‘China policy’, as well as rapid capitalist development, formed the 
background to the launch of the Nativist literary debate. This was an attempt to raise 
public awareness of the new social problems and criticise the prevailing capitalist 
ideology and immense western political, economic and cultural influence.
The Nativist literary debate thus emerged in a context in which Taiwan’s 
industrialisation and the accompanying social changes were intensifying and external 
economic threats were hitting not only Taiwan’s economy but also people’s daily lives. 
The external economic shock was initiated by the jump in oil prices in the early 1970s, 
known as the first oil crisis and caused primarily by the Arab oil embargo. The 
attendant hike in the prices of other commodities, from food to capital equipment, 
necessary to Taiwan’s survival, plus the subsequent global recession in all of its 
increasingly protectionist markets, hit the island hard. The nadir came in 1974 when the
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government had to struggle with imported inflation and sudden inflationary 
expectations after many years of hard-won price stability. While the Taiwan 
government was still trying to dampen inflation through stabilisation measures such as 
increasing deposit interest rates and taxes, inflation again caused oil prices to surge in 
1979-80, following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The island’s economy took 
another battering.38
Competition from the mainland in the international market, in addition to the two oil 
crises, explain the decision to upscale Taiwan’s industrial structure from 
labour-intensive to heavy and capital-intensive industries. After 1979, under the 
reformist Deng Xiaoping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) opened economically 
to the outside world. China targeted Taiwan’s markets in an export drive, selling similar 
goods, solicited DFI (direct foreign capital, especially from Overseas Chinese), 
established Special Economic Zones similar to Taiwan’s EPZs (Economic Processing 
Zones), joined multilateral lending agencies, and floated bonds abroad. All of this 
posed a threat, of a previously unanticipated genre, to Taiwan’s economy.39
As noted in Chapter Three, the Nativist literary debate had significant implications for 
nationalist debates in Taiwan.40 Here, I probe the ‘social consciousness’ expressed in 
the debate, rather than its nationalistic dimension, and investigate its questioning of
38 See Gold, 1986, pp. 98-106 and Clark, 1989, pp. 186-96 for detailed discussions.
39 Gold, 1989, p. 99.
40 Their anti-imperialist sentiments generally, and anti-Western/American sentiment specifically 
propelled the Nativists to accuse modernist writers of being ‘cultural compradores’ as well as to promote 
Taiwanese literature. It was not until the early 1980s, when the nationalist public debate got off the 
ground, that Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists debated whether Taiwan was part of China 
and, accordingly, Taiwanese literature was a ‘local literature’ rather than ‘national literature’. Initially 
the participants in the Nativist literary debate were united by their left-leaning position and shared 
concern for the least privileged, who lost out in the capitalist industrialisation process.
234
capitalist modernisation in Taiwan under the KMT’s right-wing authoritarianism. The 
most striking feature of the Nativist writers and intellectuals was their engagement with 
current sociopolitical issues, in contrast to their modernist counterparts’ attitude of 
disengagement. This attitude is anchored in a realist view of literature, which holds that 
‘literature comes from social self-reflection’ and which emphasises its historical and 
social roles.
Nativist writers wrote about contemporary Taiwanese people and concrete social 
problems, which many felt had been ignored by Modern Literature writers. Their 
depictions of the plight of those exploited and marginalised in capitalist 
industrialisation, which entailed criticism of the KMT’s development strategy, were 
discussed in great detail by Kuo and Yip.41 Yang Ching-chu’s fiction The Factory 
Workers, Wang To’s Auntie Chin-shui and Bombingy Wang Chen-ho’s Rose, Rose, I  
Love You and Oxcart for a Dowry, Huang Chun-ming’s The Taste o f Apples, The 
Sandwich Man/Son’s Big Dole, Sayonara Good-bye and Days o f Gazing at the Sea all 
examined the traumatic changes brought by modernisation and urbanisation to 
traditional Taiwan villages, depicting the poverty-stricken lives of Taiwan’s lower 
classes, the ‘little people’, such as peasants, street peddlers and prostitutes. Some were 
intended to critically expose the negative impacts of American and Japanese 
cultural-economic imperialism or neo-colonialism on Taiwan’s development, such as 
Wang’s Rose, Rose, I  Love You and Huang’s Sayonara Good-bye.
The 1977-78 Nativist Literary debate, clearly, did not revolve around conceptions of
41 See Kuo, 1999; Yip, 2004. Whilst Kuo analysed the Nativist literary debate from the perspective of the 
short-lived re-emergence of the leftwing/socialist movement (dubbed ‘the third wave’ of Taiwan’s 
leftwing movement since Japanese rule), Yip centred her discussion on the cultural imaginary of ‘the
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social welfare. It featured no concrete policy suggestions. There was, however, a brief 
debate on how to balance ‘economic development and economic equality’ and 
‘dependent economic development [a concept in radical theories of development 
referring to development that occurs within a dependent structure] and the goal of 
anti-imperialism’.42 All in all, the Nativist literary debate undoubtedly raised public 
awareness of the suffering of the ‘little people’, the weakest members of society. This it 
did by writing about their lives and advocating literary realism. Fearful of the 
government’s repression and harassment, indirect criticisms of the KMT’s right-wing 
economic policy were made through public critiques of American and Japanese 
neo-colonialism.
Radical ideas such as neo-colonialism, imperialism and the Third World were 
introduced to public debate, also enriching the discourse of the anti-KMT Dangwai 
movement. The China Tide, around which the Nativists rallied, was part of the 
Dangwai movement, which began around the end of the Nativist literary debate in 1978.
(Taiwanese) nation’ projected by the Nativist writers.
42 See Guo, 1999, p. 202. This was a debate between Wang To, a Nativist writer, and Sun Chen, a 
economic technocrat. ‘Dependent economic development’ meant primarily Taiwan’s heavy dependence 
on foreign investment, including foreign direct investment and capital investment. Taiwan’s economic 
dependency can also be seen in its trade-dependent policies. The Chinese market must now be added to 
the list. Dependent development was the conceptual invention of Peter Evans, initially applied to Brazil. 
Understanding ‘dependency’ is essential to understanding ‘dependent development’. In radical economic 
theories of development, dependency denotes a structural relationship wherein foreign actors, in 
particular multinational corporations (MNCs), are allied with conservative local elements who facilitate 
external (MNC) control over economic activity as well as social and political life. Dependency 
economists argue that economic links with the developed countries, based on supposed comparative 
advantage in certain primary goods exports, were based on unequal terms of trade that, far from 
stimulating modernisation, added structural barriers to it. The notion of dependent development refers to 
cases in which the result of dependency is not underdevelopment or non-development as in most Latin 
American developing countries. Gold, drawing on Evan’s analytic framework of a ‘triple alliance* 
comprising local capital, MNCs and the state, explained Taiwan’s development. He concluded that 
‘dependent development on Taiwan resulted from the dynamic interaction of state, multinational, and 
local capital pursuing their own interests’ with emphasis on the role of the strong KMT state within the 
‘triple alliance’, which prevented the adverse effects of MNC penetration. See Gold, 1988, 
‘Entrepreneurs, Multinationals, and the State’, pp. 175-9; pp. 202-4.
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Its social concerns were shared by some of the founding members of the major 
opposition party, the DPP.43 Magazines emerging around the same time as a result of 
internal divisions within University Magazine, such as Taiwan Political Review and 
China Tribune, also drew public attention to social problems and welfare issues, though 
they focused more on liberal democratic political reforms.
While Taiwan was facing a severe international political crisis and rapid sociopolitical 
change, the development of its social welfare also entered a new stage. Whilst the idea 
of social insurance still dominated social policy thinking, a ‘welfare turn’ was in sight. 
The passage of the Child Welfare Law in 1973 is often considered a milestone in the 
development of Taiwan’s social policy. The law has often been seen as the KMT 
government’s response to pressure from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
as well as a move to shore up its political legitimacy after the ROC withdrew from the 
UN and UNICEF’s support for child welfare in Taiwan was suspended.44 At the same 
time, a number of social assistance and relief policies were implemented against the 
background of Taiwan’s economic slowdown due to the two oil crises. The idea of 
social assistance was influenced by America’s social programme to tackle poverty in 
the 1960s. Two important projects -  Shao-Kang (fairly prosperous or ‘well-to-do’) and
43 Leading figures involved in China Tide, such as Wang Hsiao-po, Chen Ying-chen and Su Ching-li, 
have mentioned its link with the Formosa faction within the DPP. Some China Tide intellectuals, such as 
Wang To and Chen Chung-hsin, participated (strategically) in the faction (Guo, 1999, pp. 439-40; p. 462; 
pp. 503-8). Another faction of the DPP, the Movement, was also thought to be influenced by China Tide 
because some of its young members were ‘groomed’ by the group (ibid., p. 438). Wang Hsiao-po argued 
that ‘Taiwan Legal Aid for Labour’ and ‘Rights for Indigenous People Committee’, for example, were 
originally organised by the China Tide, but later ‘taken over’ by the pro-Taiwan independence DPP. 
Moreover, Huang Hsin-chieh, the late leader of the Formosa faction and chairman of the DPP, had 
invited the China Tide to take charge of the Department of Labour Affairs which was to be established. 
The China Tide group rejected this because of their own pro-unification position (ibid., p. 439).
44 Ku, 1997; Lin, 2000. For example, Lin argued, ‘in the face of international political isolation and 
domestic pressure for political reform, social welfare legislation thus became the best means of easing 
the social unrest’. Lin, 2000, p. 72.
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An-Kang (healthy and wealthy) -  were launched by local governments. Various relief 
measures already existed to provide financial aid to families living below the declared 
subsistence level, though these were on a piecemeal basis.45
It is illuminating here to briefly discuss the distinction between social welfare and 
social insurance and the latter’s relationship to the idea of public welfare. Social 
insurance is one of many welfare measures which emphasise the contribution of the 
insured and does not involve what welfare scholars call ‘direct income transfer’, as 
exemplified in the practice of progressive income tax. The state is thus not assigned an 
active role in the redistribution of social wealth or at least its role in this process is not 
stressed.
As implied in Bryson’s discussion of vertical and horizontal equity with special 
reference to the well-being of the working class, ‘where needs are covered through 
social insurance, the state merely supervises thrift and saving among workers, rather 
than promoting equality through collective measures’.46 While social insurance is 
clearly a welfare measure, whether it can be said to be based on the principle of public 
welfare is questionable. Labour insurance, for example, depends on contributions by 
labourers, corporations and the state.
45 Ku, 1997, p. 38; Chan, 2001, p. 22.
46 The concepts of horizontal and vertical equity are most often discussed in relation to income, taxation 
and social security. Horizontal equity implies attempts to spread the burden of social support over a 
broader range of social groups. Central to this idea is ‘cost sharing’ by all members of society or general 
‘social responsibility’. The most common form of compensation is for the costs of raising children, 
which, on this view, should be spread horizontally to other citizens not raising (a nation’s) children in the 
form of an allowance. Vertical equity is about making the society-wide distribution of resources more 
equal by reducing the spread of the income-and-wealth ladder. One of the commonest mechanisms used 
specifically to promote this is progressive income taxation; another is tax on capital gains. Achieving 
greater vertical equality is, according to Bryson, ostensibly at least, a principle which also underpins the 
concept of the social wage. See Lois Bryson, 1992, Welfare and the State -  Who Benefits?, pp. 63-5.
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The Economic Growth vs. Social Welfare’ Debate, 1980-1987
The welfare turn of the 1970s culminated in 1980 in a package of legislation commonly 
known as the ‘three welfare laws’ -  the Aged Welfare Law, Social Assistance Law and 
the Handicapped Welfare Law. These laws were however widely criticised, primarily 
by welfare scholars and social workers, for being largely ‘formal’ and failing to 
perform a ‘substantial’ social function, and for being overly constrained by the 
government’s determination to avoid financial burdens.47 As this social legislation was 
being passed, the public debate on ‘economic growth vs. social welfare’ or ‘economy 
comes first vs. welfare comes first’ emerged. What was at issue was whether increasing 
public expenditure on social welfare would be to the detriment of Taiwan’s economic 
development.
This anxiety over the impact of increased public financing on the economy was inspired 
by the passage of the three welfare laws, which were seen as ushering in an era of 
consumption-oriented social policy.48 This concern was understandable, given that the 
welfare turn in social policy occurred at a time when Taiwan’s trade-dependent 
economy was facing difficulties due to the labour shortage and the doubling of wages, 
which increased the price of Taiwan’s exports. This was compounded by the developed 
countries’ adoption of neo-protectionist non-tariff measures to restrict imports, 
especially such Taiwan staples as textiles, footwear, mushrooms and television sets 49
47 Lin, 2000, p. 73; Chan, 2001, p. 23.
48 Chan, 2001, p. 23. The notion o f ‘social consumption’ contrasts with that o f ‘social investment’. When 
a social welfare policy is said to be ‘investment-oriented’, this mean the welfare expenditure is seen as 
investment in the production and reproduction of a healthy and educated labour force capable of meeting 
the needs of economic development. A welfare policy is ‘consumption-oriented’ in the sense that no 
economic return is assumed or anticipated as it does not and is not expected to contribute to economic 
production.
In 1974, Taiwan experienced its first trade deficit since 1970 with only 1.1 percent GNP growth. The
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The ‘economic growth vs. social welfare* debate in 1980s Taiwan must therefore be 
grasped in the above socioeconomic context. At the heart of the debate was whether the 
government should establish institutional and comprehensive welfare systems 
modelled on the Nordic welfare states. Liberal economists and government technocrats, 
who emphasised the priority of economic growth, argued that the state should not 
provide and could not afford welfare provision unless the country’s economic growth 
was sufficient to support it. This echoes Olsson’s notion that the state is the ‘lender of 
last resort’.50 Welfare scholars, meanwhile, most of them heavily influenced by 
theories of the welfare state, along with opposition politicians, argued for greater state 
provision of welfare. They tended to compare public expenditure on social welfare in 
Taiwan and other capitalist countries, primarily the Scandinavian welfare states and 
Britain.51
Underlying the ‘economy comes first’ discourse is concern about the contradictory 
relationship between the scale of state welfare provision and capital profitability as 
suggested in O’Connor’s two premises. The first is that ‘the capitalist state must try to 
fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory functions -  accumulation and 
legitimation*.52 The second is the fiscal crisis of the state, that is, ‘the tendency for
extended global recession that followed the second oil crisis mired Taiwan in a seemingly endless period 
of stagflation. It did not recover until 1983. See Gold, 1988, p. 98.
50 S. Olsson, 1989, ‘Social Welfare in Developed Market Countries: Sweden’, in J. Dixon and R. P. 
Scheurell (eds.), Social Welfare in Developed Market Countries, p. 265.
51 In fact, a fair number of influential social welfare scholars were trained in Britain and have played an 
important role in initiating public debate on social welfare, especially promoting the idea of the welfare 
state, and actively involved in policy-making as advisors to government. Chan Gordon Hou-sheng and 
Ku Yeun-wen are examples. The former was a cabinet minister in charge of labour affairs and a professor 
in the Department of Sociology (Social Work Programme) at National Taiwan University; the latter is a 
professor in the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at National Chinan University.
See O’Connor, 1973, pp. 6-7 (emphases original). In other words, the state must provide services and 
benefits which improve private capital profitability and which also strengthen the social acceptability of 
the capitalist system. In O’Connor’s view, ‘no state outlays can be classified unambiguously’ with the 
result that the same service may well perform both functions even though it emphasises one of them; no
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government expenditure to outrace revenues.’53
Neo-classical economics has had a major intellectual impact on Taiwan’s public culture. 
Heavily influenced by liberal economists such as Hayek, Friedman and Stigler, Kao, a 
prominent liberal economist in Taiwan, insisted that the provision of state welfare is the 
major reason for fiscal crisis.54 Chun-sheng Huang attributed the OECD countries’ 
fiscal crises to expanded state expenditure on social welfare. He went as far as to claim 
that scarce resources should be utilised for defence and economic growth rather than 
education and social welfare. In his view, social welfare should be provided by the 
private sector.55
In contrast with liberal economists, welfare scholars such as Chan, Kuo, Lu and Tsai 
have attempted to de-couple welfare expenditure and fiscal crisis or economic 
recession. Based on the rationale of welfare capitalism, they emphasised how social 
welfare can stabilise production relations as well as supply and demand, facilitating 
smoother capital accumulation and continuous economic growth.56 In the debate, 
liberal economists often used Britain as an example in support of their assertion that 
social welfare damages economic growth. For instance, they argued that the 
comprehensive welfare system in Britain deterred people from saving money, which 
undermined capital accumulation for economic growth. In order to rebut such claims, 
the article by George and Wilding, ‘Social Policy and Encouragement of Economic 
Growth’, was translated into Chinese and published by welfare scholars. Arguing
state can afford to neglect either of these functions.
53 ibid., p. 2.
34 See Kuo, 1987, p. 208-9.
55 Huang, 1983, pp. 52-3.
36 Chan, 1983; Kuo, 1985; Lu and Tsai,1986.
37 George and Wilding, 1984.
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from the perspective of human capital theory, George and Wilding claimed that ‘there’s 
no doubt that both education and health services improve the quality of labour and in
f  0
doing so they assist economic growth’.
While concern for welfare has been constant in Taiwan, its welfare remained rooted in 
the traditional ‘patronage model’ until at least the late 1980s, when social welfare 
became the centre of political contestation in election campaigns.59 In addition, 
compared to the voice of liberal economists, that of welfare scholars has been relatively 
weak. Some commentators attributed this to the indoctrination carried out by the 
powerful KMT state apparatus, through which the opinions of economic technocrats 
and the ideology of capitalist developmentalism were widely publicised. Related to this, 
the anti-leftist ethos and the KMT’s political authoritarianism have caused the public to 
value ‘equality’ far less than ‘freedom’. In a sense, people often associate the concept 
of ‘equality’ with the concentration of politico-economic power and resources in the 
state, rather than with concerns about social justice and the role the state should play in 
realising it.
An equally plausible yet commonly neglected reason, however, is that Taiwan’s 
development, at least into the 1980s, was characterised by ‘growth with equality’. 
Living in a relatively equitable society often makes people unaware of the value of 
equality. This also explains why civil liberties and political rights were and to a certain
58 Whilst insisting that social policy is a positive force for economic growth, George and Wilding also 
admitted that it is not as powerful as some of its protagonists have claimed over the years.
59 The patronage model can be seen as the opposite of the ‘citizenship model’, which sees the public 
provision of welfare as a right of citizenship or public/social entitlement. For a discussion of welfare 
from the perspective of citizenship, see T. H. Marshall, 1981, ‘The right to welfare’, in Marshall (ed.) 
The Right to Welfare and Other Essays; Gail Lewis, 1998, ‘Citizenship’, in Gordon Hughes (ed.), 
Imagining welfare futures.
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extent remain the primary concerns of most people in Taiwan, though the growing 
income gap between rich and poor from the 1990s on has caused increasing public 
concern and discontent. Popular support for the ‘Pan Purple (Fairness and Justice) 
Alliance’, founded by major social welfare groups in Taiwan in 2000 to fight for the 
welfare of the disadvantaged, demonstrates the public awareness of the issue.60
One component of the debate revolved around whether the Principle of the People’s 
Livelihood means democratic socialism or social democracy. Some intellectuals in the 
early ‘economic freedom vs. economic equality’ debate in the 1950s tended to interpret 
it as democratic socialism, while economic technocrats in the 1980s defined the 
economic system suggested by the Principle of Livelihood as social democracy.61 The 
essential difference between democratic socialism and social democracy lies in their 
different views of capitalism and the welfare state. Simply put, the former holds that 
socialism is the most desirable form of social system and the welfare state is a 
significant staging post in the transition from laissez-faire capitalism to socialism 62 
The latter, meanwhile, sees the growth of the welfare state as the capitalist countries’ 
response to lower class protests.63 For social democrats, welfare services are an integral
60 The Pan Purple Alliance was clearly focused on achieving fairer social redistribution by means of 
progressive income taxation and tax on capital gains. Also included in its manifesto were a universal 
national pensions scheme, increasing the number of people covered by the social assistance scheme from 
the present 0.75 percent to 3 percent of the population, and the integration of social welfare resources. 
The Alliance was in favour of the notion of the welfare state and ‘vertical equity’, though these terms 
were not mentioned in its discourse.
61 For example, Wang Tso-jung, an important economic technocrat in the KMT government, argued that: 
‘In short, the economic system according to the Principle of the People’s Livelihood is a system of 
maintaining private property and the market mechanism, insisting on private enterprise as the major 
economic activity, but accompanying this with public enterprise, state-controlled policy, heavy taxes and 
institutional measures of social welfare’. Quoted in Ku, 1997, p. 184.
62 See George and Wilding, 1994, p. 74.
63 Hirst pointed out the major justification for social democracy among established elites in major 
industrial states: it could prevent the worse evil of communism and harness organised labour to the 
national war effort (Hirst, 1997, p. 1). The study by Hicks and Swank on welfare expansion in 18 
advanced capitalist countries concluded that: ‘authoritative policy makers responded to lower-class
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part of the capitalist system: they grow out of it and are essential to its economic and 
political survival.
Political liberalisation certainly created an opportunity structure favourable to the 
development of the social welfare movement in Taiwan. After the ending of martial law 
in 1987, the welfare movement was one of many social movements that collaborated 
with the opposition party to press the KMT government to implement various 
sociopolitical reforms, its particular concern being the establishment of an institutional 
welfare system as opposed to the existing residual model.64
One faction within the opposition party, the ‘Welfare State Caucus’, put the 
establishment of a welfare state in Taiwan at the heart of its policy platform and has 
influenced thinking on welfare in the party. Indeed, in post-martial law Taiwan, the 
ruling KMT and the opposition DPP have exhibited different positions on social policy, 
in addition to their contrasting views of national identity. The DPP’s appeal to social 
welfare proved an effective strategy in election campaigns. It remained an effective 
means of attracting votes until the ruling KMT responded by absorbing the DPP’s 
welfarist stance. For welfare scholars and social workers, this was a pleasing yet at the 
same time worrying development in social policy. Instead of initiating public debates
protests with welfare concessions because such concessions were enacted to placate protestor grievances, 
accommodate public preferences for social order, and/or obviate growth of militant and electoral 
opposition to governments’ (Hicks and Swank, 1984, p. 106).
As Bryson put it: ‘In the fifties and sixties, as many of the world’s welfare states took their mature form, 
there was an extensive debate about the desirability of an “institutional” rather than a “residual” model of 
social welfare. As a normative position, a residual or marginal view of the role of welfare holds that state 
provisions should come into play only when there is a breakdown in the “natural” mechanisms for the 
support of individuals -  the family, the market and voluntary charities. Minford’s safety-net, based on the 
proposition that people should be prevented from falling “below a certain minimum living standard due 
to personal misfortune”, represented residualism.... An institutional view, on the other hand sees welfare 
provisions as “normal”, “first line” functions of modem industrial society’ and ‘implies no stigma, no 
emergency, no “abnormalcy”....The institutional welfare state... guarantees “full citizenship 
rights...unconditionally.’” Bryson, 1992, pp. 55-6.
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over welfare issues and which welfare system should be established, the two parties 
tried to outdo one another in issuing ‘(blank) welfare cheques’ in an irresponsible
65manner.
Welfare State or Welfare Society? 1990 to the present
Party Politics and the Welfare Movement in the Early 1990s
In the early 1990s, while Taiwanese public culture was still dominated by nationalist 
discourses, social welfare was also a key issue. It was particularly hotly debated during 
election campaigns. From the perspective of resource mobilisation theory, a popular 
theoretical approach to explaining Taiwan’s welfare development, it was thanks to the 
‘driving force’ of electoral competition between the ruling KMT and the opposition 
DPP that social welfare and social policy, originally dominated by the DPP’s welfare 
state discourse, suddenly became the focus of election campaigns and appeared in the 
manifestos of both parties. The DPP’s victories in elections in 1992 and 1993, in which 
pensions were the main campaign topic, persuaded the KMT that welfare pledges 
attracted votes.
In response to the publication of the DPP’s Policy White Paper and its calls for public
65 Ku expressed the same concern in his discussion of the competition between the KMT and the DPP on 
pension policies in 1993. In order to win the local election that year, the DPP announced a universal 
pension system in October, in which citizens 65 years old and above would receive NT$5000 every 
month. The KMT savaged this policy as a bribe to elderly voters, while itself targeting aged voters and 
launching new initiatives for them. The Ministry of Interior Affairs announced that a draft policy on 
pensions would be published in November. Plans were then made public for an increase in the allowance 
for low-income elderly people from NT$3000 to NT$5000 per month. In response, the DPP announced a 
pension system targeting the traditional supporters of the KMT, the farmers. The KMT reacted with an 
emergency cabinet meeting and announced a further increase in the allowance for the low-income elderly 
up to NT$6000 monthly and NT$3000 for the middle to low-income elderly. Very quickly, in less than 
one month, pensions became a political football. The size of the allowance grew exponentially. The 
whole process looked and felt rather like auctioneering rather than rational policy debate. See Ku, 1997, 
pp. 247-8.
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policy debate in 1993, the KMT published The Guiding Principles o f Social Welfare 
Policy in 1994. Based on the idea of welfare state capitalism, explicitly mentioned in 
the Policy White Paper, the DPP emphasised the state’s responsibility to protect 
people’s right to work, guarantee fair income distribution, protect the unemployed, sick, 
disabled and elderly citizens, provide public services such as education, housing and 
child care, and establish a social assistance system.66 The KMT’s welfare policy was 
obviously less progressive than the DPP’s, emphasising the central role of family in the 
provision of social welfare and the desirability of a social insurance system. State 
welfare and its relation to women’s needs, and welfare as a ‘caring policy’ were hardly 
mentioned.67 These differing stances are bound up with the contrast between welfare 
state and welfare society, discussed in detail below.
Most important of all, however, was the socioeconomic context in which welfare issues 
became so appealing to the public. The Taiwanese currency was rapidly revalued in 
1987 at a time when the direction of capitalist globalisation was becoming increasingly 
clear. Taiwan witnessed a growing concentration of production resources around this 
time. As a result, social mobility, which had been high mainly as a result of the system 
of public education, slowed and income inequalities increased. Another reason why 
welfare increasingly captured the public imagination was the emergent ‘money-power 
politics’ in Taiwan, referring to the KMT’s close relationship with capitalists and the 
increasing political influence of capital on public policy, especially social and 
economic policies.68 Nevertheless, it would be misleading to think of the DPP as a
66 See the chapter ‘Guidelines on social welfare policy’ in the DPP’s Policy White Paper, 1993, pp. 
161-81.
67 On the KMT’s Guiding Principles of Social Welfare Policy, published in 1994, see Ku, 1997, p. 249.
68 Fu Li-yeh, 2000, ‘Old-age pensions, party competition and elections’, in Michael Hsiao and Lin
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leftist party of any kind.69 To the disappointment and surprise of those social activists 
who had worked with the DPP in the opposition movement against the KMT, its 
right-wing hue and conservative orientation became clear after it was elected to power 
in 2000, though it is still relatively progressive compared to the KMT.
From the mid-1990s onwards, however, the focus of election campaigns shifted back to 
national identity. The 1995-96 ‘Taiwan Strait Crisis’, sparked by the approach of 
Taiwan’s first popular presidential election in March 1996, was a decisive component 
of this shift. In addition to party competition, the rising economic and political power of 
China on the international stage is also important to understanding the emergence of 
nationalist debates and the new nation-state movement in Taiwan, characterised by the 
indigenisation of politics and culture.
The Chinese government’s claim that it would use force if necessary to deter any 
attempts towards Taiwan independence proved rather counterproductive as far as the 
advancement of reunification is concerned, given the growing consciousness of 
‘subjectivity’ among the Taiwanese public. Yet at the same time, China’s huge market 
and cheap labour were irresistibly attractive to the Taiwanese owners of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and the island’s traditional labour-intensive industries. With 
the rise of China in the international political arena, Taiwan has perhaps suffered more 
than before in its ‘spatial politics’, seeking de jure international recognition of its 
sovereign status.
Kuo-ming (eds.), The Social Welfare Movement in Taiwan, pp. 240-1.
69 As Lin Wan-yi pointed out, the DPP is not a left-wing party. It is neither a social democratic party nor 
a labour party although it has discussed social democracy as one potentially desirable system for the 
future. At most, it can be said to be a centre-left party. See Lin, 2000, pp. 120-1.
247
In this domestic and international politico-economic context, public attention was 
understandably drawn to national security or ‘external threats’. The Chinese military 
manoeuvres launched shortly before the 1996 presidential election with a view to 
deterring votes for Lee Teng-hui are a good example. Those concerned about welfare 
development in Taiwan expected the presidential election to further advance the 
welfare debate. China’s actions turned the public attention away from domestic issues
7 /V
to national security. As a result, the public debate over social welfare became 
marginalised, though the island’s welfare development was advanced further, primarily 
due to party competition. The National Health Insurance Scheme, pensions system and 
the amendment of the Basic Labour Law were perhaps the most important social 
policies during this period.
The East Asian Welfare Model and The Welfare State vs. Welfare Society' Debate
After the 1996 presidential election, liberal democrats declared that Taiwan had finally 
completed its democratic transition. Yet they were deeply worried about the impact of 
divided national identities on the island’s democratic consolidation. Radical 
democrats/democratic leftists claimed that Taiwan had merely transited from Lee 
Teng-hui’s ‘populist authoritarianism’ to ‘post-authoritarianism’ with the election of 
Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, as Taiwan’s president in 2000. Rather than hailing 
Taiwan’s maturation into a democracy, they called for critical reflection on Taiwan’s 
democratisation, which they dubbed the ‘provincial-identity path’. One of the primary 
concerns of the democratic leftists was the retreat of the state from welfare provision
70 See Ku, 1997, p. 249.
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and the tendency towards privatisation of social welfare.
It is fair to say that from the late 1980s onwards the idea of the welfare state has been 
influential in the welfare discourse produced by scholars and opposition politicians. 
Although concern for welfare has been constant in Taiwan, public and academic 
debates over different welfare systems emerged rather late, around the late 1990s and 
early 21st century. For some western welfare scholars, this can be explained by the fact 
that ‘systematized social welfare itself has been a relatively new development amongst 
the industrialised East Asian countries’. In the terms of Goodman and Peng, these 
countries are ‘welfare laggards’. As Goodman and Peng have pointed out, with some 
justification, ‘given the relative youth of the subject, East Asian scholars of social 
welfare have, until very recently, tended to reply on and accept Western analyses of 
their own social welfare regimes rather than generate indigenous analyses’.73 This 
claim is true insofar as even today, the analyses and evaluations of Taiwan’s welfare 
system produced by local scholars and researchers remain heavily reliant on existing 
western theories and concepts.
The attempt, primarily by welfare scholars in the West, to investigate whether or not 
there is something which can be termed an ‘East Asian welfare model’ is evident in the 
publication of a collection of essays based on comparative studies of Singapore, South
71 See The Editors of Taiwan, 2005, ‘Manifesto -  An argument for democracy in Taiwan’, Boston 
Review. An extended version of the article was originally published in Chinese in Taiwan: A Radical 
Quarterly in Social Studies (March 2004), with the title ‘Publics and the Overcoming of 
Post-authoritarianism: A Tentative Outline for a Democratic Left*.
72 On the reasons for the lack of literature on welfare systems in East Asian countries, see Roger 
Goodman and Ito Peng, 1996, ‘The East Asian Welfare States: Peripatetic Learning, Adaptive Change, 
and Nation Building’, in Gosta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare States in Transition: National 
Adaptations in Global Economies, p. 192.
73 Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 192.
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Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong and China, The East Asian Welfare Model -  Welfare 
Orientalism and the state, in 1998.74 Interest in the developmentally dynamic societies 
of East Asia and the lessons which might be learned from them started with attempts to 
explain the extraordinary success of the postwar Japanese economy. It then spread to 
other settings, notably the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. This investigation later went on to include 
Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand and Malaysia and mainland China.
The notions of an ‘East Asian welfare model* and ‘Welfare Orientalism’ 75 as 
articulated in the aforementioned book were largely inspired by the discourse of the 
‘East Asian model of economic development*. Rather than producing an 
unconditionally positive evaluation of the East Asian welfare model, characterised by 
‘small government, company/corporate welfare systems, and strong “familial” 
traditions’, 76 or in short, ‘security without entitlement’, 77 the authors questioned 
whether there is such a thing as an East Asian welfare model and whether the East 
Asian experience can be emulated. As far as welfare reforms in Western countries are 
concerned, the East Asian experience is considered ‘of limited substantive relevance to
74 The East Asian Welfare Model -  Welfare Orientalism and the State, edited by Roger Goodman, 
Gordon White and Kuck-ju Kwon. See the ‘Editors’ Preface* on the book’s intentions.
75 The term was borrowed from Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’. White and Goodman argued that to make 
sense of the East Asian welfare experience it was essential to place it in the context of the images which 
have come to structure Western perceptions of East Asia more generally and which have become a 
component of the rhetoric of Western politicians and business leaders. These function in effect as a new, 
positive form of what Said called ‘Orientalism’. A ‘positive Orientalism’ was thus set against a ‘negative 
Occidentalism’ in their discussion. White and Goodman, 1998, pp. 5-10.
76 Goodman and Peng, 1996, p. 192.
77 The phrase was used by Vogel to describe the Japanese model of welfare. Its success, Vogel argued, 
could be measured in the longevity, good health and educational attainment of the general population; 
low government welfare spending through heavy reliance on the family, the firm and a large voluntary 
sector; little inner-city degradation and violence; an active and energetic older generation; high rates of 
employment and little or virtually no welfare dependency. See Ezra F. Vogel’s Japan as Number One: 
Lessons for America (1980), quoted in White and Goodman, 1998, p. 10.
78 Gordon White and Roger Goodman, 1998, ‘Welfare Orientalism and the search for an East Asian
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the West and cannot be regarded as a model for emulation, despite its superficial 
attractiveness’, given that it evolved in the specific politico-economic context of the 
‘developmental state’.79
Scholars of social welfare in Taiwan tend to agree with this critical view of the East 
Asian welfare model. This can be seen in their discussions of the roles of family and 
community in welfare provision. Rather than imagining community as the site of social 
policy intervention and future welfare, as articulated in the ‘communitarian discourses’ 
of social welfare constructed by ‘conservative moral communitarians’ and ‘radical left
A A
pluralists’, they continue to pursue the ideal of the welfare state and related concepts 
of social/welfare rights. While there exists a grouping of radical pluralists in Taiwan, 
such as those deeply engaged in the lesbian feminist movement, their discourse has 
focused on ‘sex politics’. Taiwanese radical left pluralists have made few if any 
attempts to construct a welfare discourse despite their critique of the welfare state 
discourse produced by liberal feminists.
The Discourse o f Welfare Society -  Community and Family as Welfare Providers
welfare model’, Roger Goodman et al (eds.), The East Asian Welfare Model, pp. 13-9.
79 ibid., pp. 19-20.
80 The terms ‘moral communitarianism’ and ‘radical left pluralism’ were used by Hughes and Mooney to 
discuss the idea of community in social policy debates in the contemporary UK, primarily those on 
‘problem communities’ in the 1960s through to the community care legislation of the late 1980s and 
1990s. Moral communitarianism finds its philosophical roots in communitarianism, which became a 
popular and influential way of describing political and ideological appeals to community values and 
common moral virtues in the UK and USA, in reaction to the apparent decline in civic morality and 
growth in individualism and welfare dependency. Moral communitarian thought, more specifically, 
claims to reject the market-led ideology of the New Right, the liberal/libertarian emphasis on individual 
rights, and the state-led, top-down approach to welfare. Radical left pluralism attempts to move beyond 
the idea of community in die singular and exclusive sense to focus on the struggle for communities in 
radically plural and inclusive senses. Radical left pluralism is critical of discourses of conservative 
authoritarianism such as moral communitarianism, arguing instead for a political and welfare strategy of 
social inclusion based on the struggles of diverse communities and the democratic, self-governing 
associations of civil society. See Gordon Hughes and Gerry Mooney, 1998, ‘Community’, in Gordon 
Hughes (ed.), Imaging welfare futures, pp. 73-97.
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‘Welfare communitisation’ is a new perspective on the provision of welfare services in 
Taiwan. Its emergence is influenced by the discourses of ‘welfare pluralism’81 and the 
‘mixed economy of welfare’ against the background of ‘rolling back the state’ and 
‘dismantling the welfare state’ in Western welfare states, commonly known as ‘the 
crisis of the welfare state’. Central to the notion of ‘communitisation of welfare’ is 
‘community care’ or ‘community-based’ welfare services.82 Related to the new idea of 
‘community provision of welfare’ is the programme of community development, which 
can be traced back to the 1960s.
Although it did not become government policy, this national movement aimed to 
improve the lives of the poor. It relied on funding from the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) until Taiwan withdrew from the UN. As a result, the 
community development programme has operated on a reduced scale since then.83 
Without having played a significant part in the provision of welfare since its 
implementation in the 1960s,84 the community development programme was gradually 
replaced by the projects of ‘Welfare Communitisation’ and ‘Establishing Community 
Infrastructure’ in the 1990s.85 Central to the ‘Welfare Communitisation’ project are the
81 Welfare pluralists argue that current over-reliance on state provision of welfare can be relieved through 
a reallocation of responsibilities to the informal, commercial and voluntary sectors. Of these, the 
voluntary sector is seen as particularly attractive as the repository of social and altruistic impulses, 
without many of the vices such as compulsion, centralisation and inflexibility which undermine the state 
as a vehicle for society’s well-being. See Pierson, 1991, pp. 200-1.
82 The project of ‘communitisation of welfare’ was defined in the 1995 National Conference on 
Community Development as a ‘substantive measure and method to integrate the social welfare system 
and community development’. In addition to cost savings, according to Huang, community care was 
advocated in part as a means of creating a pleasant environment for those cared for, primarily the elderly. 
The ‘deinstitutionalisation of care’ was die key idea here. See Huang Yuan-hsieh, 2000, Community 
Care, pp. 3-5; 2001, ‘The practice of and reflections on the communitisation of welfare’, in Chan Gordon 
Hou-sheng and Ku Yeun-wen (eds.), New Deliberation on Social Welfare Policy, pp. 129-30.
83 Ku, 1997, p. 39.
84 Huang, 2000, pp. 277-8; 2001, p. 140.
85 Around the time when the project of ‘Welfare Communitisation’ was launched by the social affairs
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community care programmes, which some cities and counties have experimented with 
and which focus on the establishment of community-based nursing homes and ‘care at 
home’.86
Family is another important concept in the discourse of welfare society which, like 
community, emphasises the values of altruism and mutual aid. As noted above, 
family and community have been placed at the centre of the KMT’s social policy, 
influenced, at least ostensibly, by Sun’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood. In 1994, 
the KMT published The Guiding Principles o f Social Welfare Policy, which clearly 
emphasised the central role of the family.88 In the 1996 National Conference on Social
O Q
Welfare, the Premier’s speech stressed family-centred welfare. The argument here 
echoes Bayley’s characterisation of family relationships as providing ‘for both the 
functional and the expressive needs of their members’.90
authorities, another community-related movement, named ‘Establishing Community Infrastructure’, was 
being pursued by the Council for Cultural Affairs. Whilst the integration of community resources 
(welfare and medical) and the establishment of self-governing communities based on mutual-aid groups 
featured in both projects, the latter aimed to cultivate ‘civic consciousness and culture’ by engaging 
people in community activities. Huang, 2001, pp. 130-6.
Huang, 2000, pp. 286-90.
87 See Pinker, 1979, The Idea o f Welfare, p. 16.
88 The Guiding Principles consisted of nine principles for Taiwan’s welfare development: 1. a balance 
must be maintained between economic and social development; 2. a proper social administration system 
must be put in place; 3. family must be the centre of social welfare policy; 4. government departments 
must work as a team; professional social workers are crucial; 5. harmony and co-operation between 
employers and employees is of vital importance; 6. a financially independent social insurance system 
must be established; 7. needs satisfaction must be pursued and the mixed economy of welfare maintained; 
8. public housing must be provided for lower-income families; 9. equal access to medical care must be 
provided. See Ku, 1997, pp. 248-9.
It was stated in the speech that: ‘Family is still the centre of our society. No matter how comprehensive 
our social welfare system might be, it cannot replace the special role of family.... The social welfare 
authorities should forge a family-centred model of the provision of welfare services which integrates 
social assistance, social welfare, communal mutual-aid, in support of the family as the basic unit of social 
welfare....’ Quoted in Huang, 2000, p. 292.
90 While Bayley’s characterisation of family relationships was based on his study of families caring for 
mentally handicapped relatives, the Taiwanese Premier’s talk about the family’s ‘special role’ also 
focused on Bayley’s notions of ‘functional and expressive needs', albeit in different languages of 
familial ‘affections and concerns’. See Pinker, 1979, p. 17.
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Although the role of community in supporting family ha been emphasised in the 
argument in favour of welfare society, it remains unclear how this can work in practice, 
especially in a ‘gender-blind’ socioeconomic system such as Taiwan. Moreover, when 
the economic function of the family, primarily based on male wage-earning, is affected 
by massive unemployment, as in the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis, state provision of 
social protection proved critical.91
The Feminist Critiques o f the Welfare Society Model
The welfare debate on community included the controversy over the consequences of 
community care strategies, with feminist thinkers in particular criticising the gendered 
assumptions which underpin many uses of ‘community’. Most notable here is the 
common view of the ‘domestic division of labour’, in which the man is the breadwinner 
and the woman the caregiver. Indeed, as Bryson has pointed out, ‘women’s social 
position remains constrained by its historical association with the role of wife and 
unpaid domestic labourer, dependent on a male breadwinner and subject to the 
authority of the husband as head of the family’. ‘The effects of patriarchy are still 
strong’, she continued, ‘despite the reality that rates of employment among married 
women are high’.92
Given that women were historically denied property rights and systematically excluded 
from the better jobs, it is only to be expected that women are poorer than men. This fact 
has been publicly ‘discovered’ and called ‘the feminisation of poverty’. Yet some
91 Eddy Lee, 1998, The Asian Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Social Policy.
92 Bryson, 1992, p. 190. For her feminist analysis of the relations between women and the welfare state, 
see chapter 6 ‘Women’s Welfare State’, pp. 190-225.
93 D. Pearce, 1979, ‘Women, Work and Welfare: The Feminisation of Poverty’, in K. W. Feinstein (ed.),
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have disputed the notion that the feminisation of poverty is a new phenomenon: ‘it 
seems clear that women have, throughout history, borne the major “burden of 
poverty”’.94 Women’s relative economic position is masked in two-parent households 
by the tendency of statistics to ignore access to family income and assume equality of 
access. It is only when women cease to be part of a couple and head their own family 
that their poverty gains recognition.95 The female-headed single parent family appears 
in the national statistics of most countries as the most disadvantaged household type.96
Given the ‘feminisation of poverty’, social policies based on providing welfare by 
protecting male wage-eamers and their families, and which view family care and 
domestic labour as a ‘labour of love’, are thought to exacerbate women’s 
socioeconomic problems. The situation is particularly acute in a society like Taiwan, in 
which the system of social relations is still dominated by the traditional perception of a 
division of labour between man and woman -  the man as breadwinner/wage-eamer and 
woman as unpaid domestic labourer. In the process of social policy-making, the state 
has rarely attempted to change this system of social relations. On the contrary, without 
dealing with the existing ‘sexual division of labour’, social policy has become one of 
the mechanisms reinforcing gender inequality. Community care and child care services 
were singled out by feminist welfare scholars as non-woman-centred family care 
policies.97
Working Women and Families.
94 Bryson, 1992, p. 192.
95 ibid.
96 S. Kamerman, 1984, ‘Women, Children, and Poverty: Public Policies and Female-headed Families in 
Industrialised Countries’, Signs.
97 Wang Li-jung, 2001, ‘The feminist logic and construction of women policy’, in Chan Gordon 
Hou-sheng and Ku Yeun-wen (eds.), New Delibertaion on Social Policy, pp. 266-7.
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Over the past ten years, there has be no substantial change in child care policy in 
Taiwan in the sense that women have had no relief from the pressure of caring for their 
families. Up to the mid-1990s, 25 per cent of children below six years and 75 per cent 
of children below three years were cared for by their mothers. As a result, the rate of 
female labour market participation has remained below 50 percent, at around 45 per 
cent. Many put this down to the state’s inactive child care policy.98
Taiwanese women’s social position is worsened by an ageing society that lacks proper 
social policies capable of responding to these demographic changes. Echoing the 
thinking underlying policies on child care, care of the elderly has remained almost 
entirely a family matter in Taiwan; women’s role as caregiver is taken for granted. 
According to the national statistics, only 23 per cent of elderly sick people have gained 
access to care at home or community care (nursing homes) whilst 70 per cent of the 
population rely on family care. 80 per cent of family carers are women. Another study 
on family care for elderly people pointed out that about 50 per cent of elderly females 
are taken care of by their daughters-in-law whilst half of elderly males are looked after 
by their wives.99
From the perspective of welfare society, social policies that emphasise the role of 
family and the development of community in welfare provision are not necessarily 
conservative. Yet they can only be progressive if the ‘communitisation’ and 
‘familialisation’ of welfare does not mean the ‘feminisation’ of the consequences of 
welfare policy. To put it another way, the discourse of welfare society should not be ‘a
98 Wang Li-jung 1995, Women and Social Policy.
"W ang, 2001, p. 369.
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code flagging that government spending for social security was unlikely to reach the 
level implied by the term welfare state’.100 Therefore, even if the welfare state appears 
less desirable and feasible, theoretically and practically, the state is still expected to 
play an important role in preventing the reproduction of gender inequality within social 
relations and the ‘double burden’ of housework and paid employment.101 In other 
words, although the state cannot and should not be the sole welfare provider, its role as 
regulator and co-ordinator of welfare resources should be emphasised.
The concept of socialisation has been proposed to help construct a better system of care 
work. Welfare scholars have suggested practical welfare measures such as family 
allowance, family tax credits, flexible working hours, workplace nurseries and 
paternity/maternity leave. Fraser proposed the idea of ‘universal caregiver’ to advance 
gender equality in the post-industrial welfare state. The key, she argued, is to ‘make 
women’s current life-pattems the norm for everyone’. The vision of the universal 
caregiver requires the state to ensure that men do the same as women, who today often 
combine breadwinning and caregiving with great difficulty.102
Feminist interventions in the welfare debate in Taiwan also include critiques by radical 
left pluralists, represented by lesbian feminists. As noted above, far from intervening in 
the debate by constructing a welfare discourse, radical pluralists have demonstrated 
outright hostility to the state and focused on criticising feminists who demand that the
100 This is Bryson’s comment on the Japanese model of welfare, according to which family and 
community support are evoked as cheap options for the provision of care without acknowledging the role 
women play in caring. Bryson cited Watanuki’s study, which points to high suicide rates among carers 
and exhausted daughters, both natural and in-law, suggesting that reliance on British-style community 
care is the only feasible alternative way of providing relief for family members. Bryson, 1992, pp. 108-9.
101 White and Goodman, 1998, pp. 17-8.
102 Nancy Fraser, 1997, ‘After the family wage: a post-industrial thought experiment’, in Nancy Fraser 
(ed.), Justice Interruptus, pp. 61-2.
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state play a more active role in welfare provision, either as provider or 
regulator/co-ordinator. While scholars concerned with social welfare seem to 
presuppose a positive concept of liberty, the radical pluralism articulated by Taiwanese 
lesbian feminists entails the libertarian idea of negative freedom.103 While radical left 
pluralism is important in ‘problematising and deconstructing’ the given or latent 
identity associated with welfare discourses, it provides no concrete arguments about or 
sophisticated analyses of social welfare as such. In Taiwan, the ‘right to (sex) work’ is 
perhaps the main notion expressing a concern for welfare close to the common 
perception of social welfare.104
The Discourse o f the Democratic Left -  Beyond Social Democracy/Welfare 
Capitalism?
In comparison to other welfare discourses in the public debate, the discourse of the 
democratic left in Taiwan is perhaps the most radical in terms of its opposition to social 
democracy. This is anchored in the claim that the main objective of social democracy is 
to ‘humanise, not to abolish, capitalism in terms of private ownership’, to borrow the 
phrase used by George and Wilding.105 In the view of democratic leftists, social 
democratic welfare capitalism has undermined the conditions for further class-based 
political mobilisation as a result of the emergence of consumer society, the influence of 
Fordism over labour organisations and their organisational culture, and the 
disintegration of traditional working-class communities.106
103 See Plant on the relationship between welfare and freedom. Plant, 1991, ‘Welfare and the Enterprise 
Society’, in Thomas and Dorothy Wilson (eds.), The State and Social Welfare.
104 The demonstrations against the decision by the municipal government of Taipei to abolish legal 
prostitution in 1997 provide a good example.
George and Wilding, 1994, p. 92.
106 The Editorial Board, 2004, ‘Publics and the Overcoming of Post-authoritarianism’, p. 25.
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In contrast with social democracy, the democratic left emphasises the ‘politics of 
empowering the public’,107 central to which is the idea of ‘active citizenship’ or ‘deep 
citizenship’.108 What should be noted however is that, whilst rejecting the capitalist 
system of a social democratic hue, democratic leftism shares with social democracy the 
notion of social redistribution and does not deny the value of representative democracy, 
though it treats it with caution. Elections as a channel of political articulation and 
representation are accepted by democratic leftists on condition that this representative 
regime entails individual subjects capable of rational communication and action.109
Given its opposition to capitalism and acceptance of representative politics, the 
position of the democratic left seems little different from democratic socialism. 
Whether a scholar opts to support the democratic left rather than democratic socialism 
is likely to be anchored in a compromise between the different intellectual and 
ideological positions held by the members of the democratic left grouping. These 
include postmodemism/post-colonialism/poststructuralism (all of which can be placed 
in the category of ‘radical pluralism’), egalitarian liberalism (heavily influenced by 
John Rawls’ theories of justice and political liberalism), and radical liberalism 
(drawing on Dewey’s pragmatism). Despite the divergent intellectual positions implied 
in the discourse of the democratic left, it nonetheless advocates a key role for the state 
in provision of welfare.110
107 ‘Empowering the public’ means turning ordinary people into active subjects rather than the passive 
objects of public policy, and hence the generators of cultural identity.
108 Both notions are central to democratic theories which emphasise the ‘active’ political participation of 
citizens in contrast with liberal democracy. ‘Deep citizenship*, as used by Barry Clarke, is specifically 
associated with radical democratic theory and new social movements. Clarke, 1996, Deep Citizenship.
109 The Editorial Board, 2004, ‘Publics and the Overcoming of Post-authoritarianism’, p. 25.
110 This can be seen in democratic leftists’ criticisms of the government’s discourse of ‘education as a 
realm of private investment’ and plan to privatise/commercialise the national health insurance scheme.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion: The Future of Taiwan
Drawing on the historical experience of Taiwan, this thesis has deployed a novel 
perspective, that of public culture, to study comparative political development. In light 
of a critical examination of the existing literature, primarily modernisation theory and 
transitology with their assumptions, public culture is defined as a process of public 
deliberation in which the public intellectual as well as the general public are engaged, 
public awareness is stimulated and democratic consensus is arrived at. This perspective 
presupposes an open and pluralist rather than teleological theory of human 
development. Central to the concept of public culture is the role of political ideology 
and public intellectual in shaping the direction and content of political development 
through public deliberation. This is a process of public education in which the 
arguments of participants are refined and revised as a result of reflection on the various 
perspectives expressed in public debate.
Mainstream approaches to political development are anchored in conceptions such as
the convergence theory of modernisation, which describes social changes as a
transformation in which any culture could in principle serve as ‘input’. The concept of
public culture, in contrast, suggests that social changes are and ought to be defined by
the society under investigation through public deliberation. Public culture also differs
from popular materialist theories of political development, such as simplistic
modernisation theories and traditional Marxist accounts centred on the material base,
whose explanations of human development assume a strict causal relationship between
material forces/economic development and social changes, seeing the latter as the
result of the former. While recognising the significance of material conditions in
260
explaining political development, public culture draws attention to political ideology, a 
crucial factor long neglected in comparative studies of political development.
The existing literature on Taiwan’s postwar political development is dominated by 
modernisation theory and transition theory or transitology. The former emphasises the 
structural factors shaping political development, the latter the role of political agents in 
the process of political transition. To remedy the demerits of both approaches, scholars 
of comparative politics have attempted to develop a synthetic framework intended to 
combine the analysis of structure and agency.
Modernisation theory attributes Taiwan’s democratisation, which occurred relatively 
fast and without bloodshed, to its stable and rapid capitalist growth and concomitant 
sociocultural changes. Emphasis is placed on the liberal democratic movement led by 
the middle classes. Transition theory highlights the power struggles between the ruling 
elites and the opposition in the process of political transition, and stresses the role of 
Chiang Ching-kuo in initiating Taiwan’s political liberalisation in the late 1970s and of 
Lee Teng-hui, who led Taiwan towards liberal democracy and the status of independent 
sovereign state in the 1990s.
Research anchored in these perspectives has undoubtedly contributed to our 
understanding of Taiwan’s post-war political development. Nevertheless, most existing 
accounts have failed to probe sufficiently other crucial factors, above all the active role 
of the state, a divided national identity and a consistent concern for welfare. Whilst 
some political economists have stressed the role of the state in guiding Taiwan’s
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industrialisation, characterised, at least until the 1980s, by ‘growth with equity’, most 
literature on Taiwan’s democratisation neglects it.
Drawing attention to the deficiencies of society-centred explanations of Taiwan’s 
political development is by no means to argue that they should instead be replaced by 
state-centred accounts. It is not intended to argue that public culture developed in this 
research is a state culture either. On the contrary, it is a society culture, so to speak. The 
point is that we must take into account the guiding role of the state in explaining 
Taiwan’s rapid and at the same time equitable economic growth and peaceful 
democratic transformation. The concept of public culture thus imagines a ‘strong 
society and strong state’. The state’s role as regulator or coordinator of material 
production and social redistribution has been crucial to Taiwan’s democratisation, 
which got off the ground in the late 1970s.
Indeed, alongside nationalist politics, which frequently renders rational deliberation in 
public fora difficult if not impossible, the increasing social inequality in the late 1990s, 
resulting mainly from the government’s conservative, pro-capitalist tax and economic 
policies, was also detrimental to Taiwan’s democratic advancement. Cynicism and 
political apathy, rather than active public participation, have come to characterise 
Taiwan’s liberal parliamentary democracy, despite claims that the island had achieved 
‘democratic consolidation’ in the late 1990s.
The concept of public culture in this research also emphasises the open-ended and 
ongoing interaction between evidence and concept pertaining to a particular history, 
that is, between history and theory. Here, ‘history’ is related to but not the same as
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‘culture’. ‘History’ includes both political-sociological macroanalyses and 
theoretically informed case studies.2 Drawing on the idea of deliberative democracy, 
which not only emphasises the importance of public deliberation and ideological debate 
in democratic politics but also the socioeconomic conditions indispensable to 
democratic deliberation, this research develops the concept of public culture to 
question the economic determinism of modernisation theory and elitism of the 
transition approach, while drawing attention to the role of state actors, political 
ideology and public deliberation. The sensitivity to particular histories inherent in the 
concept of public culture ensures an open-ended and ongoing interaction between the 
empirical and the conceptual. The concept of public culture can contribute to 
comparative politics in general because of its pluralist view of human development and 
attention to the role of political ideology.
The Taiwan Imaginary: Freedom, The Nation, and Welfare as Social Justice
Liberalism, nationalism and welfarism have been influential discourses in Taiwan’s 
public culture since the end of the Second World War. Most existing studies tend to 
ignore the consistent concern for welfare and its impact on Taiwan’s political 
development. Extensive studies on nationalism and Taiwan’s democratisation only 
emerged in the mid-1990s, yet it was already a factor in Taiwan’s political development 
under Japanese colonial rule.4 Crucially, nationalist discourse has shifted away from
2 See Charles Tilly, 1984; I. Katznelson, 1997.
3 Lin Chun, 2000, ‘Introduction: The Chinese Path and the Limits of Globalism’, China Vol. Ill, p. xvii.
4 The emergence of academic interest in the subject around the mid-1990s has to be understood in the 
context of the state-building movement led by the Lee Teng-hui administration in Taiwan and the ethnic 
conflicts in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. For most political scientists and 
commentators, resolving the issue of Taiwan’s divided national identity is crucial to its prospects of 
democracy or ‘democratic consolidation’, a term widely used by scholars of democracy.
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viewing China as the nation in question to promoting Taiwanese nationhood.
Compared to nationalism and welfarism, liberalism’s role in Taiwan’s postwar political 
development has been studied extensively. During the Japanese occupation, Taiwanese 
liberal intellectuals and the local gentry launched the liberal movement, which fought 
for civil liberties and democratic rights for the local Taiwanese. While left-wingers 
called for popular uprisings and Taiwan independence, liberal campaigns demanded 
equal status before the law for Taiwanese and the establishment of a colonial assembly. 
This political movement was accompanied by a cultural movement focused on 
introducing modem western culture to Taiwan, raising public awareness of Taiwan’s 
status as a colony and preserving its native culture.
This liberal tradition was first interrupted by the increasingly repressive Japanese 
militarism of the late 1930s, then by the oppressive sociocultural policies pursued by 
the KMT regime after it gained possession of Taiwan, specifically after the February 
28th Incident in 1947 and the subsequent ‘Sweeping the Red’ campaign during the 
‘White Terror’ of the 1950s. Not until after the defeat of the KMT by the CCP on the 
mainland and its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 did liberalism again emerge in public debate.
The ‘re-emergence’ of liberalism in Taiwan in the 1950s has to be understood in the
context of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War. Liberalism, led mainly by
intellectuals rallying around the Free China bimonthly, was largely an ideological
weapon in the KMT’s propaganda war against Chinese communism. For most liberal
intellectuals of the Free China group, such as Yin Hai-kuang and Lei Chen, liberalism
was surely a genuine political and moral belief. In addition to anti-communism,
moreover, they expected and advocated liberal democratic reforms within the KMT
and on the island. Their increasingly critical comments on KMT policies and the
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abortive ‘new party movement’, both of which helped get the magazine banned in the 
early 1960s, demonstrate their commitment.
Intellectually, liberalism in Taiwan was heavily influenced by the tradition of the 1919 
May Fourth Movement, also known as ‘the Chinese Enlightenment movement’, in the 
context of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty. Hu Shih, one of the prominent May 
Fourth liberal figures, was the spiritual leader of the Free China movement in Taiwan. 
‘Democracy’, its meaning contested by radical leftists and liberals, and ‘science’, were 
thought crucial to building a strong and wealthy China in the face of foreign aggression.
Yet Yin Hai-kuang’s interpretation of Hayek’s liberal theory, specifically his notion of 
‘spontaneous order’ and theory of the free economy, had an even greater influence on 
the construction of liberal discourse in Taiwan. Free China's liberal discourse is rooted 
in the negative sense of liberty, as Berlin defines it. Inherent in this conception of 
freedom is a deep-seated distrust of the state and an antagonistic view of the 
state-society relationship. This understanding of freedom has had a far-reaching impact 
on public thinking about Taiwan’s political development. Indeed, it continues to 
dominate, though more and more radical liberal discourses addressing social justice 
and equality and eschewing the negative sense of freedom have been presented within 
public debate.
By linking the concept of freedom to human rights and constitutional democracy, 
Chang Fo-chuan’s notion of ‘freedom as human rights’ has inspired Taiwanese 
liberals’ thinking about practical political strategies to fight for individual freedom.5
5 In other words, the notion of human rights was used by opposition movements in Taiwan to justify 
demands for constitutional democracy.
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Human rights were understood as the ‘essence of individual liberties’. Democratic 
politics, institutionalised through the establishment of liberal constitutionalism, was 
regarded as indispensable to the protection of human rights, and hence individual 
liberties. Human rights, though less popular than freedom in the public debate of the 
1950s and 1960s, later became the key component of opposition political discourse 
from the late 1970s onwards. In 2000, when the DPP won the presidential election, 
human rights were placed at the heart of the government’s policies, partly to distinguish 
it from the old KMT regime. Moreover, nationalist politics has deployed human rights 
to argue for Taiwan independence since the 1990s, when the island faced increasingly 
fierce economic competition from the mainland.
After the Free China group’s failed attempt to found a new party in collaboration with 
local Taiwanese politicians in 1961, culminating in the banning of the magazine and the 
arrest of Lei Chen, Taiwan exhibited a highly oppressive political atmosphere and 
public silence in the 1960s. Literature Star, a liberal literary magazine, became the 
major channel for liberal voices during this period. Political criticisms were made in the 
form of cultural critique, attributing the KMT’s authoritarianism to traditional Chinese 
culture and norms. The Intellectual, founded primarily by young liberal intellectuals 
educated in the United States and young entrepreneurs, was the main setting for 
presentation of liberal ideas in the 1970s. This grouping was mainly concerned with 
liberal democratic reform, though it also paid attention to the social conditions and 
welfare of those, such as farmers and workers, disadvantaged by Taiwan’s rapid 
capitalist development.
Taiwan, while performing its economic miracle, suffered a series of diplomatic 
setbacks in the 1970s, beginning with the Diaoyutai Incident and rapprochement
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between the United States and China. The Intellectual was founded against this 
historical background. The bedrock of the KMT’s political legitimacy on the island, its 
status as sole lawful representative of all China, was shaken by US diplomatic 
recognition of the PRC and the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations. Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s initially positive response to The Intellectual group’s demand for 
democratic reform was an attempt to ground the regime’s legitimacy anew.
The changing international situation was unfavourable to the continuation of the 
KMT’s authoritarian rule. The violent Formosa Incident in Kaohsiung in 1979 also 
created conditions conducive to political democratisation. A mass rally, organised to 
mark International Human Rights Day, turned into a riot. The government responded 
with brute force. From the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s, political magazines 
critical of the KMT government flourished. They appear to have functioned as a key 
propaganda weapon in the campaigns of the Dangwai opposition movement. At the 
heart of Dangwai discourse lay human rights and liberal democracy, though the 
movement itself was a loosely organised ‘umbrella grouping’ appealing to all who 
opposed the KMT’s authoritarianism but might not believe in liberal democracy. Some 
of its participants were left-wingers active in the Nativist Literary movement of the 
early 1970s.
The legacy of the Free China group is evident. As an influential intellectual movement 
and political ideology in Taiwan, liberalism was first seriously challenged only in the 
early 1990s. The Nativist Literary movement of the early 1970s, imbued with the 
radical intellectual and political atmosphere of the 1968 student movement, while 
significant in the history of the left and to nationalist debate in Taiwan, posed only a 
limited challenge to liberal ideology, mainly because of the prevailing anti-communist
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ethos. Only when Taiwan had achieved liberal democracy -  the institutionalisation of 
the procedures of parliamentary democracy in the mid-1990s, including the right of 
Taiwanese citizens to elect their president -  did left-wing discourses of various hues, 
including the old left, the new/cultural left, the liberal left and the democratic left, 
together with nationalism and neo-Confucianism, begin to compete with liberalism.
For many liberals, nationalism and nationalist politics represent a real threat to the 
development of liberalism in Taiwan. As mentioned previously, Taiwan’s political 
development and public culture is marked by the twin development of liberalism and 
nationalism. Nationalism played an important part in Taiwan’s politics after the KMT 
retreated to the island. Whilst Free China intellectuals in the 1950s were critical of the 
KMT’s authoritarianism, implemented in the name of national security, liberals in 
1990s Taiwan savaged Lee Teng-hui’s ‘new (Taiwanese) state movement’ as 
‘authoritarian populism’. Between them, the discourse of Chinese nationalism was 
produced by the Nativist Literary movement which, unlike the anti-communist Chinese 
nationalism of the KMT regime, was rooted in a critique of American neocolonialism.
Taiwan’s nationalist debate features two main discourses: Chinese nationalism and 
Taiwanese nationalism. Although Taiwanese nationalism as a radical discourse and 
movement emerged as early as the Japanese colonial period, it appeared in public 
debate in postwar Taiwan only in the early 1990s, when it was no longer a criminal 
offence to call for Taiwan independence. Chinese nationalism, in contrast, was the 
official nationalism from the KMT’s flight to Taiwan at the end of the Second World 
War until the regime change in 2000, when the pro-independence DPP gained power. 
The KMT’s official nationalism was political and cultural, establishing the regime as 
the representative of dao tong, cultural orthodoxy, and fa  tong, legitimate succession:
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the KMT was claimed to be the sole lawful representative government of the whole of 
China. In order to implement its official nationalism in Taiwan after a half-century of 
Japanese colonisation, the regime put in place cultural policies of ‘de-Japanisation’, 
reminiscent of the ‘de-Sinicisation’ pursued by the Japanese colonial government.
Taiwanese nationalism developed on the basis that the KMT’s official nationalism was 
merely an attempt to obscure the regime’s status as a foreign political force with no 
jurisdiction over the island until 1945. KMT authoritarianism -  despite its claim to be 
part of the free world -  and the perception of the party as a ‘foreign regime’, explain the 
convergence o f national and democratic discourses.6 This in turn accounts for the 
emotive power and momentum of Taiwanese nationalism under the KMT. This subtle 
discursive convergence also explains why Lee Teng-hui’s state-building movement 
was criticised by liberals as ‘authoritarian populism’ and why Taiwanese nationalism 
emerged in the form of civic nationalism, in contrast to the KMT’s official nationalism.
Contemporary Taiwanese cultural nationalism emerged only in the late 1980s, like the 
flourishing social movements, as a result of political liberalisation. The cultural 
nationalist movement revolved mainly around a group of local Taiwanese writers and 
humanist intellectuals and strove to craft a national language, national literature and 
national history of Taiwan in which Taiwanese national identity could be anchored.7 
Yet civic or liberal nationalism remains the dominant discourse of Taiwanese 
nationalism.
6 See Shaw Carl K. Y., 2002, ‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’, p. 127. Emphasis 
original.
7 Hsiau A-chin’s book Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (2000) is perhaps the first of the 
very few that investigate the subject.
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Central to the discourse of Taiwanese civic nationalism is Renan’s idea that periodic 
presidential elections are the institutional realisation of a nation’s existence, which 
consists of the ‘daily plebiscite’. In other words, unlike Taiwanese cultural nationalism, 
which holds that national identity is a matter of consciousness based on internalising a 
particular way of life, the result of a unique national history and geography,8 civic or 
liberal nationalism emphasises that the nation (state) and national identity are formed 
through civic participation in public life; in the Taiwanese case, this refers to popular, 
periodic presidential elections.
While Taiwanese nationalism in the postwar era has clearly aimed to create an 
independent, sovereign Taiwanese state, the evolution of Taiwanese consciousness 
entails a more complicated history. Under Japanese colonialism, Taiwanese 
consciousness was rooted in resistance to Japanese imperialism; it involved no 
anti-Chinese sentiment. Taiwanese consciousness signifying a (sub)ethnic distinction 
between mainlanders and islanders and expressing an anti-KMT, hence anti-Chinese 
nationalism, emerged in the aftermath of the February 28th Incident in 1947. In the view 
of the participants in the leftwing Nativist Literary movement in the early 1970s, 
Taiwanese consciousness was a local consciousness opposed to and embraced by a 
broader Chinese consciousness. For them, Taiwanese consciousness, reminiscent of 
Taiwan’s situation under Japanese colonialism, arose to resist American 
neocolonialism in the form of global capitalist development.
In the ‘Chinese consciousness vs. Taiwanese consciousness’ debate in the early 1980s, 
Taiwanese consciousness was bound up with the struggle against the KMT’s
8 ibid., p. 15.
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authoritarianism. Chinese consciousness, based on which the KMT deployed the 
notions of dao tong, fa  tong and cheng tong to back up its claims to legitimacy, was 
regarded as the major obstacle to Taiwan’s political democratisation. By contrasting 
the authoritarian Chinese consciousness and the democratic Taiwanese consciousness 
in the context of the KMT’s authoritarian rule, anti-Chinese nationalism became 
essential to this Taiwanese consciousness, which later evolved into the discourse of 
Taiwanese nationalism.
From the 1990s onwards, following the ‘Taiwanisation’ of the KMT under the 
leadership of Lee Teng-hui, ‘anti-Chinese consciousness’ ceased to mean opposition to 
the KMT’s official nationalism. Its new target was the PRC’s Chinese nationalism. 
Lee’s political vocabulary became even more remote from the KMT’s official 
nationalism, at the heart of which was eventual unification, after he consolidated power 
as the leader of the KMT party-state. Although he provided no systematic agenda for 
national reconstruction, he advocated four interrelated ideas, intended to stress 
Taiwan’s subjectivity if not to imply Taiwan independence -  ‘community of lives’ or 
Gemeinschaft (1991), ‘sovereignty in the people’ or popular sovereignty (1994), the 
novel slogan ‘Manage the great Taiwan, establish the new Central Plains’ (1995), and 
most importantly his redefinition of the relationship between Taiwan and China as a 
‘special state-to-state relationship’ (1999).9
The unexpected victory of the DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian in 2000 was 
interpreted by advocates of Taiwan independence as the climax of Taiwanese
9 See Christopher Hughes, 1997, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism and Shaw Carl K. Y., 2002, 
‘Modulations of Nationalism Across the Taiwan Strait’.
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nationalism. Some political commentators, meanwhile, saw it merely as the public 
yearning for regime change, reflecting general disgust with the KMT’s ‘money-power 
politics’. What seems clear is that Taiwanese national identity is in the process of 
crystallisation. It remains to be seen whether the rise of China as a strong regional and 
global economic power and the increasing economic integration of the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait will disturb this process. For many critics, deeply concerned about the 
democratic prospects for Taiwan, however, the central issue is how to consolidate 
political institutions to ensure a free and open space for democratic public deliberation 
on all issues of public concern, including the ‘unification-independence’ issue.
Also crucial to postwar Taiwan’s political development is the consistent concern for 
welfare, although it is conspicuous by its absence from most studies of the subject. The 
KMT’s concern about welfare issues and implementation of welfare measures shortly 
after it retreated to Taiwan in 1949 must be understood in the context of its defeat by the 
CCP on the mainland. The labour insurance scheme, to take one example, was 
implemented as early as the 1950s as a ‘pre-emptive’ strike to prevent the labour 
movement from getting off the ground. Its failure to win popular support on the 
mainland was after all due to its political corruption and mismanagement of economic 
problems as well as public attraction to the social programmes proposed by the CCP. 
The KMT’s implementation of public welfare measures, primarily education, basic 
health care and social insurance, was also intended to produce the healthy, skilled 
labour force vital to Taiwan’s capitalist industrialisation.
The KMT has always claimed that its welfare discourse and social policy are in 
accordance with Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood. Critics of the 
KMT, however, argued that had the party sincerely carried out social policies anchored
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in the Principle, Taiwan would have been a well-developed welfare state already. They 
viewed the KMT’s promise to provide social welfare, like its promise to establish 
political democracy, as an attempt to legitimate its authoritarian rule rather than a 
serious commitment to the people. However, many of the KMT’s socioeconomic 
policies, most notably land reform, public education and basic health care, did 
contribute to Taiwan’s ‘growth with equality’. The existence of a relatively equitable 
society with decent levels of human development laid a strong foundation for social 
capital, and hence for Taiwan’s democratisation.
The discourse of the welfare state emerged in public debate in Taiwan only in the 1980s, 
when the opposition DPP identified the establishment of the welfare state as one of its 
main policy goals. The DPP’s discourse is greatly influenced by the western theory of 
the welfare state that requires the state to provide education, health services, and care 
for children and the elderly. The family- and community-centred welfare provision that 
characterised the KMT’s social policy, heavily influence by economic technocrats and 
the ideology of the developmental state, thus became the prime target of welfare 
scholars’ criticisms. Once the DPP’s calls for social welfare proved attractive enough to 
defeat the KMT’s candidates in elections, the KMT jumped on the welfare bandwagon.
The party competition between the KMT and the DPP placed social welfare at the 
centre of public debate, yet not without negative consequences. For both parties ‘sold’ 
their welfare policy ideas in a rather irresponsible manner, failing to consider fiscal 
discipline or, relatedly, whether the state can afford to be the sole provider of public 
welfare. In short, both parties cared much less about having serious, thorough public 
policy debates than ‘buying’ votes by promising to provide social welfare, as the 
development of the pensions system in Taiwan demonstrated.
273
Whether the East Asian welfare model, which stresses the role of the family in welfare 
provision, is more appropriate to Taiwan, depends very much on whether the 
‘familialisation of welfare’ might mean the ‘feminisation of welfare’, which has 
contributed to the burden of women in Taiwan as their labour market participation has 
increased. The problem for advocates of state welfare, meanwhile, is whether the state 
can afford to be the sole provider of public welfare. The idea of welfare pluralism is 
proving helpful in a context in which Taiwan is facing ‘the crisis of the welfare state’, 
its economy having slowed down while public demand for state welfare has increased. 
At the same time, welfare state scholars’ concern that welfare pluralism may become 
nothing more than a theoretical argument for ‘privatisation of welfare’ should be taken 
seriously.
Afterword—The Future of Taiwan
As a small island country in ‘the web of empires’, as Michael Mann put it,10 with the 
status of ‘intermediate state’ within the international community, as defined by 
Christopher Hughes, nationalism is bound to be an important element of Taiwanese 
public culture and hence an influential factor in its political development -  in fact, it 
always has been.
For Taiwanese nationalists, it is important to grasp the power relations between China, 
Japan and the United States that have imbued nationalist politics on both sides of the
10 Michael Mann explained the current situation of Taiwan in ‘the web of empires’ (China, Japan and 
America) from the perspective of the relation between wars, capitalism and empires, concluding that ‘If 
no resolution is in sight, the best hope is simply that the stand-off, and its ambiguities and insecurities, 
simply remain’. See Mann, 2004, ‘Taiwan in the Web of Empires: Wars, Capitalism and Empires’, paper 
presented to the Conference ‘Taiwan at the Edge ofEmpires’, in Taiwan, December 18-19,2004. For his 
discussion of the case of Taiwan, see especially pp. 14-21.
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Taiwan Strait. It is equally important to bear in mind Perry Anderson’s remark that 
Taiwanese nationalism is a ‘soft-shelP or protected nationalism, dependent on foreign 
powers, primarily America. Claims that Taiwan has attained ‘subjectivity’ are dubious 
if its nationalism is overwhelmingly reliant on the protection of the United States, or 
can be materialised only on condition of Taiwan being a ‘quasi-colony’ serving 
America’s interests in East Asia.
Among those pro-independence discourses, what is perhaps the most radical yet not 
influential and ironically detrimental to the claim of Taiwan independence or 
subjectivity is the one promoted by the so-called ‘The Club 51’, a group founded on 
July 4,1994 by 51 intellectuals and businessmen with American experience. The main 
appeal of the Club, as indicated in the first page of its ‘Open Letter to the Social Elite of 
Taiwan’ distributed to the public in the event of the 1996 Taiwan Strait-crisis, called for 
Taiwan to join the United States of America as its 51st State, so as to ‘guarantee 
Taiwan’s security, stability, prosperity, liberty and democracy.’11
It is equally important for Chinese nationalists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to 
understand the twin development of liberalism and nationalism that has marked 
Taiwan’s political development since the end of the Second World War. It is true that 
Taiwan has been compelled to play an important part in the expansion of the American
11 The first few paragraphs of the Open Letter makes clear the Club’s central arguments: ‘If Club 51 
cannot awaken the Taiwanese elite in time to give up such selfish and short-sighted practices as 
individual immigration, and to support instead the proposal of “Taiwan’s State-Building Movement” for 
collective identification and naturalization into the US, within a few years Taiwan will not be able to 
escape the appalling fate of “Hong Kongization”. Even if it could avoid this, it will be permanently beset 
by Beijing’s psychological warfare, plunging it into economic recession, falling confidence, and social 
unrest.’ In 1998, the spokesman of the Club 51 who signed the Open Letter in 1996, Chou Wei-lin 
published a highly imaginative work to substantiate his arguments and lay out his moment of utopia, 
entitled A Date with the US—the Ultimate Resolution o f Taiwan’s Future: Taiwan becomes a State ofthe 
US in 2013; Say Yes to America. See Chen Kuan-hsing, 2001, ‘Club Fifty-One’, New Left Review,
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empire in East Asia. Yet it would be wrong to perceive the development of Taiwanese 
nationalism merely as the result of manipulative local politicians in pursuit of personal 
political gain and the passive performance of the political will of the United States. The 
Taiwanese public has developed a common consciousness as a result of shared 
historical experiences after 1949. Despite differing positions on 
unification-independence, which cannot and should not be resolved by unilateral 
decisions by Taiwan or China at the cost of peace or human life, democracy, 
understood as self-government and self-determination, has been the key belief common 
to people in Taiwan.
The people of Taiwan have good reasons to be proud of their democratic achievements, 
that is, the institutionalisation of liberal democracy. Yet when the practice of liberal 
democracy in Taiwan, primarily electoral politics, begins to lose its moral character and 
becomes a game of power and money, a politicoeconomic structure that serves the 
interests of capital rather than the general public, it becomes essential to think critically 
and debate publicly the important question of how to reform the existing sociopolitical 
institutions. Indeed, public deliberation is vital to Taiwan’s future development. As this 
research has demonstrated, important journals and debates, in short, public culture, did 
help collectively transform state culture in Taiwan from political authoritarianism to 
liberal democracy, from Chinese nationalism to Taiwanese nationalism, and from 
capitalist developmentalism to welfare capitalism.
The political apathy and cynicism among the general public in Taiwan reflect a feeling 
that politics is not working. The worsening socioeconomic inequality in recent years
Nov/Dec, 2001; especially pp. 73-8.
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only makes equal democratic participation an even more remote ideal. It is vital to the 
future of Taiwan’s public culture and democracy that the people are empowered by 
engaging them in public deliberation. The public intellectual assumes an important role 
here, engaging in public life, generating new ideas within public debate and raising 
public awareness. It is easy to make cynical remarks on the situation found wanting. 
However, it is hard to explain what led to the situation, and even harder to change it.
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